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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion (Norris, J., concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns whether execution of a decree dated 29 April 1862 is barred by the law of limitation. The present application for execution was made on 25 September 1882. When the decree was obtained the decree-holder was a minor and his estate was under the Court of Wards. Some proceedings relating to execution occurred between 1862 and 1866; the execution case was struck off on 5 September 1866. Between that date and the present application no proceeding was taken either by the Court of Wards or by the decree-holder after he attained majority. The lower Courts found that the decree-holder attained majority on 25 September 1879 and decided the limitation question in his favour, applying Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 to allow an application within three years of attaining majority.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 applies to an application for execution of a decree dated 29 April 1862 (a decree obtained when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force).
  2. Whether, applying the Limitation Act of 1859 (Act XIV of 1859), the decree was barred by limitation at the moment immediately before the Limitation Act of 1877 (Act XV of 1877) came into force.
  3. Whether an application for execution of a decree is to be treated as part of the original suit for the purposes of determining whether proceedings were "pending" when the later Limitation Act came into force.
  4. Whether the provisions dealing with disability (Section 11 of the Limitation Act of 1859) extend to execution proceedings so as to preserve the decree-holder's right when he was a minor and under guardianship.
  5. If the decree had already been barred before the 1877 Act came into force, whether the 1877 Act could revive the right to take out execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The decree being dated 1862 (when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force), Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 does not apply to this application.
  • Reliance on the Privy Council decision in Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri and on the decision in Behary Lall v. Goberdhun Lall to support the proposition that the earlier Act (1859) governs execution applications for decrees dated when that Act was in force.
  • Under the Limitation Act of 1859 the decree-holder was not entitled to any indulgence on the ground of minority; reliance was placed on Muthoora Dass v. Shumbhoo Dutt.
  • At the time the Act of 1877 came into force the decree was already barred under the Act of 1859, and nothing in the Act of 1877 revives a right to take out execution; reliance was placed on Shumbhu Nath Saha Chowdhry v. Guru Churn Lahiry and Nursingh Doyal v. Hurryhur Saha.

Respondent's / Lower Courts' Arguments

  • The decree-holder is entitled under Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 to make his application within three years from the date he attained majority; if the 1877 Act applies, the present application is within time.
  • Reliance upon the Bombay High Court decision in Gurupadapa Basapa v. Virbhadrapa Irsangapa, which dissented from the earlier Behary Lall decision; the lower Courts and respondent treated the execution application as governed by the 1877 Act.
  • Reliance upon Full Bench authority in Huro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia for the proposition that the words "suit" (and analogous provisions) should be construed broadly so as to include execution proceedings, supporting application of protective provisions for disability to execution proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri, L.R. 8 I.A. 123 : I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51 That if a decree is dated at a time when Act XIV of 1859 was in force, that Act governs the application for execution; identification of "proceedings" with "suit" (as held by the Privy Council). The Court regarded this decision as binding on the point that an application for execution is an application in the suit which resulted in the decree and accepted that proposition as authoritative.
Behary Lall v. Goberdhun Lall, I.L.R. 9 Cal. 446 : 12 C.L.R. 431 The Bench had held, following Mungul Pershad Dichit, that an application for execution made after the Limitation Act of 1877 came into force in a suit pending when Act XIV of 1859 was in operation must be governed by the earlier Act. The present opinion states that Behary Lall wrongly assumed that proceedings were pending without record and departs from the correctness of Behary Lall on that specific point (i.e., whether the suit remained "pending" after decree without further proceedings).
Gurupadapa Basapa v. Virbhadrapa Irsangapa, I.L.R. 7 Bom. 459 Dissent from the view in Behary Lall; suggests distinction that an application for execution initiates new proceedings and that "proceedings" need not be equated strictly with "suit". The respondent and lower Courts relied on this Bombay High Court decision; the present Court noted the decision and contrasted it with the earlier Bench decision, but ultimately adhered to Privy Council authority on the point that execution applications are applications in the suit.
Huro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia, 9 W.R. 402 (Full Bench) Construction of Section 14 of the Limitation Act of 1859: the word "suit" must be construed broadly to mean any proceeding instituted in a Court of Justice (and therefore to cover execution proceedings). The Court accepted the Full Bench reasoning and applied the same mode of construction analogically to Section 11 of the 1859 Act, concluding that Section 11 also applies to execution proceedings.
Muthoora Dass v. Shumbhoo Dutt, 20 W.R. 53 Cited for the proposition that under the Limitation Act of 1859 the decree-holder was not entitled to indulgence on the ground of minority. The Court noted this authority but observed that its view (that Section 11 applies to execution proceedings) is opposed to Muthoora Dass, and because of the Full Bench decision in Huro Chunder Roy the Court did not consider itself bound by Muthoora Dass on that point.
Shumbhu Nath Saha Chowdhry v. Guru Churn Lahiry, 6 C.L.R. 437 Relied upon to support the contention that if a decree was already barred when the 1877 Act came into force nothing in the 1877 Act revives the right to take out execution (i.e., decisions on revival and application of the 1877 Act). The Court agreed with the reasoning of this decision to the extent that the 1877 Act's provisions (like Section 2) indicate an intention to revive rights and extend to execution proceedings; the Court thus applied that reasoning in the statutory interpretation of the 1877 Act.
Nursingh Doyal v. Hurryhur Saha, 6 C.L.R. 489 Similar to the above, concerning the effect of the Limitation Act of 1877 on rights that had been barred under the earlier law. The Court concurred with the view expressed in this decision regarding the legislative intent of the 1877 Act to extend revived rights to execution proceedings.
Phoolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahoy, I.L.R. 1 Cal. 226 (Privy Council) That being under the guardianship of the Court of Wards does not prejudice the rights of the ward in the context of limitation and enforcement. The Court relied on this Privy Council authority to conclude that the decree-holder's guardianship under the Court of Wards when the 1877 Act came into force would not prejudice his rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the question as whether the execution of the 1862 decree was barred by limitation when the present application was made in 1882. It accepted the uncontested point that either the day of attaining majority or the day of application must be excluded in computing the period of limitation.

Two principal lines of inquiry were pursued:

  1. Which statute governs — the Limitation Act of 1859 (Act XIV of 1859) or the Limitation Act of 1877 (Act XV of 1877)? The Court noted the binding Privy Council authority in Mungul Pershad Dichit's case that if a decree is dated when Act XIV of 1859 was in force, that Act governs the application for execution. Thus the Court examined whether, under the 1859 Act, the decree would have been barred immediately before the 1877 Act came into force; if it was barred at that point, Section 7 of the 1877 Act would not assist the decree-holder.
  2. Whether proceedings were "pending" under Section 6 of Act I of 1868 at the time the 1877 Act came into force. The Court adhered to the Privy Council's statement that an application for execution is an application in the suit which resulted in the decree (i.e., the execution application is part of the suit). However, the Court reasoned that although execution applications are within the suit, after a decree is made the suit cannot be said to remain "pending" unless execution proceedings have been initiated; a decree that has had no further steps taken cannot be regarded as pending merely because a decree exists. On that basis the Court criticized the Behary Lall decision for assuming proceedings were pending without record showing any such ongoing proceedings.

Turning to the substantive construction of the Limitation Act of 1859, the Court examined Sections 11 and 20. Section 20 provides that no process of execution shall issue to enforce any judgment, decree or order unless some proceeding shall have been taken to enforce or keep it in force within three years next preceding the application. Applying Section 20 literally to the facts (decree dated 29 April 1862; last proceeding struck off 25 September 1866; nothing thereafter until 1877) would render the decree barred by limitation by 1877.

The critical question was whether Section 11 — which protects persons under legal disability (e.g., minors) — applies to execution proceedings. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Huro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia, which construed the word "suit" in Section 14 broadly to include any proceeding instituted in a Court of Justice. Applying the same mode of construction analogically to Section 11 (noting that Section 11 uses "action" but later substitutes "suit"), the Court concluded that Section 11 should be read to apply to execution proceedings as well, thereby preserving rights that accrued to a person under disability until the disability ceased.

The Court acknowledged that this view conflicted with the decision in Muthoora Dass v. Shumbhoo Dutt and similar authorities, but emphasized that the Full Bench reasoning in Huro Chunder Roy justified applying Section 11 to execution proceedings and that the Court was not bound by the contrary single-judge decisions.

Having concluded that Section 11 of the 1859 Act applied to execution proceedings, the Court held that the decree had not been barred by limitation at the moment just before the 1877 Act came into operation. The Court also noted that the decree-holder's being under guardianship of the Court of Wards when the 1877 Act came into force did not prejudice his rights, relying on Phoolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahoy.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that the lower Courts were correct in their decision and therefore the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree-holder's application for execution (filed on 25 September 1882) is not barred by limitation under the legal reasoning adopted; the lower Courts' decisions in his favour are upheld and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
  • Statutory construction implications specifically noted by the Court: the opinion adopts a broad construction of the protective provisions applicable to persons under disability (Section 11 of the Limitation Act of 1859) so as to include execution proceedings, and it rejects the narrower view that would treat execution applications as outside the scope of those protective provisions. The opinion also criticises the earlier Behary Lall decision for assuming proceedings were pending without record support.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided concurring opinion (Norris, J.) and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Jugmohun Mahto v. Luchmeshur Singh

    (Norris, J., concurring)

    1. The question for decision in this case is whether the execution of a decree, dated 29th April 1862, is barred by the law of limitation or not; the present application for its execution being made on the 25th September 1882. When the decree was obtained the decree-holder was a minor and his estate was in the Court of Wards. It appears that certain proceedings relating to the execution of the decree were taken between the years 1862 and 1866, and on the 5th September 1866 the execution case was struck off. Between that date and the present application no proceeding was taken either by the Court of Wards, or by the decree-holder after he attained his majority, which the Courts below have found was on the 25th September 1879. The lower Courts have decided this question of limitation in favour of the decree-holder. It has been held that Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 entitles the decree-holder to make his application within three years from the date on which he attained majority. If the limitation act of 1877 is the Act applicable to this case, it is not disputed that the present application is within time.

    2. It was not disputed, probably because it has now been conclusively settled, that either the day on which the decree-holder attained his majority or the day on which the application for execution is made, must be excluded from computation. One of these two days being excluded the application is made on the last day allowed by law, if the law is such as has been contended for by the learned vakeel for the respondent. Against the judgment two points have been made before us--First, that the decree being a decree of the year 1862, when the Limitation Act of 1859 was in force, Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877 has no application. In support of this contention the learned vakeel for the appellant has relied upon the well-known decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri L.R. 8 I.A. 123 : I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51; he has further relied upon the decision of this Court in Behary Lall v. Goberdhun Lall I.L.R. 9 Cal. 446 : 12 C.L.R. 431. In this latter case this Bench held, upon the authority of Mungal Pershad Dichit's case, that an application for execution made after the limitation act of 1877 came into force, in a suit which was pending at the time when Act XIV of 1859 was in operation, must be governed by the provisions of the latter Act. It was contended that if the law laid down in this last mentioned case be correct, then the lower Courts are not right in applying the provisions of Section 7 of the Limitation Act of 1877, but that the law applicable was the Limitation Act of 1859. That being so, it was further contended that under the Limitation Act of 1859, the execution was barred by limitation, because under that Act, it was contended, the decree-holder was not entitled to any indulgence on the ground of minority, and in support of that contention the ruling in the case of Muthoora Dass v. Shumbhoo Dutt 20 W.R. 53 was cited. The next point that was made was that the present application is barred by limitation, because at the time when the Act of 1877 came into force, the decree was altogether barred by limitation, and that contention is also based upon the ground that under Act XIV of 1859 the decree-holder is not entitled to any indulgence on the ground of minority. It was contended that if, in the year 1877 when Act XV of that year came into operation, the present decree was not capable of being enforced, nothing in the Act itself would revive the right to take out execution, which right had then been extinguished under the old law. In support of this contention the learned vakeel for the appellant has relied upon two decisions of this Court, Shumbhu Nath Saha Chowdhry v. Guru Churn Lahiry 6 C.L.R. 437 and Nursingh Doyal v. Hurryhur Saha 6 C.L.R. 489. As regards the first contention, the learned vakeel for the respondent, as well as the lower Courts, rely upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Gurupadapa Basapa v. Virbhadrapa Irsangapa I.L.R. 7 Bom. 459. In that case the learned Judges dissented from the view laid down in Behary Lall v. Goberdhm Lall I.L.R. 9 Cal. 446 : 12 C.L.R. 431. This latter decision was a decision of this Bench, and I am free to confess that I overlooked in that case one important point, viz., whether or not, at the time when the limitation act of 1877 came into operation, there was any proceeding pending within the meaning of Section 6 of Act I of 1868. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court say: "In the case quoted Behary Lall v. Goberdhun Lall 'proceedings' are identified with 'suit', but we think that where a decree has been obtained, the application for execution initiates a new set of proceedings." As to "proceedings" being identified with "suit" it seems to me that we held that proposition to be correct on the authority of the Privy Council decision in Mungal Pershad Dichit's case, and after hearing arguments in this case, and after considering the judgment quoted, I still adhere to that opinion, viz., that an application for execution of a decree is an application in the suit which resulted in the decree. That was distinctly held in Mungal Pershad Dichit's case, and we are bound by that decision. But at the same time it seems to me that, although it is an application in that suit, it may not be an application in a pending proceeding. The suit having matured into a decree could not properly be said to be pending thereafter. A proceeding to be a pending proceeding after the decree, must be initiated by an application for execution. But after a suit terminates in a decree, if nothing further is done, it cannot be said to be a pending proceeding. It is on that ground that I think we were not right in the decision in Behary Lall v. Goberdhun Lall I.L.R. 9 Cal 446 : 12 C.L.R. 431. There we assumed as a fact that the proceedings were pending, although there was nothing on the record to show that anything in the shape of proceedings were pending. Then, as regards the next contention, it seems to us that the view taken by this Court, if I am permitted to say so, in the decisions in Shumbhu Lall Saha Chowdhry v. Guru Churn Lahiry 6 C.L.R. 437; Nursingh Doyal v. Hurryhur Saha 6 C.L.R. 489 is quite correct, and I entirely concur in that view, not because the words "right to sue" in Section 2 of Act XV of 1877 necessarily mean "right to sue out execution," but because from the provisions of that section and other sections in that Act it is clear that it was the intention of the Legislature to extend the provisions of that section to proceedings in execution also. Mr. Justice Pontifex, at page 493, referring to Section 2, Act XV of 1877, says: "No doubt there is some foundation for this argument," viz., (the argument which was urged, then, that the words used were ' to revive any right to sue,' and that these words did not include a right to takeout execution), "from the imperfect language used in the Act, but we think that Section 2 at least indicates the policy of the Act." Upon this ground it was held that it was the intention of the Legislature (as far as it could be gathered from that section and other sections of the Act) to extend the provisions of Section 2 of the Act to applications for execution also. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that if it can be shown that this application, if made just the day before Act XV of 1877 came into operation, would have been barred, then Section 7 of the Act of 1877 would have no application. The question therefore is whether the decree was barred on that date. Now, upon this point, it is quite clear that the law to be looked at is Act XIV of 1859, because that has been held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Mungal Pershad Dichit's case. The decree is dated 1862, when Act XIV of 1859 was in force; and, although there had been an intermediate Limitation Act in 1871, it was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that, if the decree is dated at a time when Act XIV was in force, that Act alone would govern the application for execution of decree. We, therefore, come to the consideration of the question whether under Act XIV of 1859 the decree-holder would have been barred if he had made his application in the year 1877. The answer to this question depends upon the construction to be put upon Sections 11 and 20 of the Limitation Act of 1859. Section 20 says: "No process of execution shall issue from any Court not established by Royal Charter to enforce any judgment, decree or order of such Court, unless some proceeding shall have been taken to enforce such judgment, decree or order, or to keep the same in force within three years next preceding the application for such execution." That is the general position, viz., that unless there is some proceeding taken within three years next before the application it would be held to be barred by limitation. It was pointed out in some cases decided under the old Act, that there is a defect in the language of the section, and that it really means that no process of execution shall issue from any Court not established by Royal Charter unless an application for execution shall have been made within three years from the date of the decree, etc. Now, in this case, if Section 20 applies, there is no doubt that the application was barred by limitation, because the date of the decree is 29th April 1862, and the last proceeding taken was struck off on the 25th September 1866, and nothing was done between that date and the date when the Act of 1877 came into operation. Therefore, clearly, under Section 20 the application made on that date should have been held to be barred by limitation. Therefore, unless the decree-holder was entitled to rely upon Section 11 of the Limitation Act of 1859, the present application must be held barred. Upon this point the learned vakeel for the respondent relied upon a Full Bench decision in Huro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia 9 W.R. 402; that was a decision upon the construction of Section 14 of the Limitation Act of 1859. The same difficulty arose in applying Section 14 to execution proceedings as in applying Section 11, and it was held by the majority of the Court in that case that the word "suit" must not be construed in a restricted sense, and that it means any proceeding instituted in a Court of Justice. Having regard to the arguments used in support of this conclusion I do not see any distinction between the construction to be put as regards this point upon s, 14 and Section 11. No doubt in Section 14 the words used are: " The time during which the claimant, or any person under whom he claims, shall have been engaged in prosecuting a suit upon the same cause of action against the same defendant, or some person whom he represents, bond fide and with due diligence, etc.," and in Section 11 the words used are: "If at the time when the right to bring an action first accrues the person to whom the right accrues is under a legal disability, the action may be brought by such person." But it seems to me that the words "to bring an action," may be converted into the words "right to bring a suit," and that is also clear because in the section itself the word "suit" bas been subsequently used as a substitute for the word "action." If we give effect to the argument upon which this broad construction was put on the word "suit," then we are compelled to come to the same conclusion as to the construction to be put upon Section 11 as the learned Judges in the last mentioned case came to as to the construction to be put on Section 14. Therefore it seems to me that Section 11 also applies to execution proceedings. No doubt this view is opposed to that expressed in the decision in Muthoora Dass v. Shumhboo Lall 20 W.R. 53 and the cases there cited, but the decision in Huro Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Shoorodhonee Debia 9 W.R. 402 being a Full Bench decision, and we agreeing with the reasons given in that judgment, are not bound by the decision and the decisions cited therein. For these reasons I am of opinion that under Act XIV of 1859 the decree had not been barred by limitation at the time when Act XV of 1877 came into force. There is only one point which remains to be noticed, viz., that when the Act of 1877 came into operation the decree-holder was not in a position to execute the decree as he was then under the guardianship of the Court of Wards; but this would not prejudice his rights; it has been so held by the Privy Council in the case of Phoolbas Koonwar v. Lalla Jogeshur Sahoy I.L.R. 1 Cal. 226.

    3. On these grounds I am of opinion that the decisions of the lower Courts are correct. The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

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    Jugmohun Mahto v. Luchmeshur Singh
    (May 18, 1884)