This was an appeal from the decision of Mr. Justice Pontifex.
It appears that on the 26th of April 1877, the plaintiff obtained a decree from the Second Judge of the Small Cause Court, against the defendant, for a sum of Rs. 205-5, and for the non-payment of this sum the defendant was arrested, and committed to the Presidency Jail for six weeks. The plaintiff incurred a liability for a further sum of Rs. 9-4 for costs of execution. This amount, added to the abovementioned Rs. 205-5, made a total of Rs. 214-9, for which sum the plaintiff sued the defendant in the High Court. In his plaint, he stated that the defendant had no moveable property whatever, within the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, upon which he could execute the decree of that Court, but that he was possessed of a dwelling house at No. 28, Moonsheetollah.
Mr. Justice Pontifex, before whom the case was tried, dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the defendant had already been imprisoned under the Small Cause Court judgment, and that such imprisonment operated as a satisfaction of the debt.
The plaintiff appealed from this decision.
Trevelyan and Andrews, for the Appellant.
No one appeared for the Respondent.
The following judgments were delivered by the Court (1):—
Garth, C.J:— This suit was brought to recover Rs. 214-9 upon a judgment of the Calcutta Court of Small Causes.
The learned Judge in the Court below has dismissed the suit, upon the ground that the defendant had already been imprisoned under the Small Cause Court judgment, and that it would be contrary to the spirit and the intention of the Small Cause Court Act, to allow this suit to proceed, and so to subject the defendant to be taken in execution again for the same debt under process of this Court.
It seems that since the year 1850, when the Small Cause Court Act, IX of 1850, was passed, a number of suits of this nature have been brought from time to time in the High Court, and judgments have been obtained in them without objection. None of them were defended; and the question seems never to have been seriously raised, until about a year ago, whether such suits would lie, so that we have now to decide that question in an Appellate Bench of this Court for the first time.
The particular point upon which Mr. Justice Pontifex dismissed the suit, appears to us to be only one of several considerations which ought to be enquired into for the purpose of ascertaining, whether it was the intention of the Legislature that judgments in the Small Cause Courts should be enforced suits in this Court. We must see how far such suits are consistent with the provisions of Act IX of 1850, and, on the other hand, how far such suits are calculated to defeat the intentions of that Act.
The same question arose in England, after the passing of the first County Court Act there.
That Act was the 9 and 10 Vic., Cap. 95, and its provisions were in many respects very similar to those of the Indian Act of 1850, which was passed a few years later.
The case in which the subject was first discussed was Berkeley v. Elderkin (1 Ellis and Blackburn, 805). The point was there raised for the first time in the Court of Queen's Bench, whether an action would lie in a superior Court upon a judgment of the County Court; and Lord Campbell, in his judgment, says: “Prima facie an action lies on the judgment of every Court of competent jurisdiction; but I think it quite clear, when we look at the provisions of the 9 and 10 Vic., Cap. 95, that the intention of the Legislature was to confine the remedy on the judgments of Courts constituted under that Act to the remedies specially provided by the Act.
“The policy of the Act was to give a cheap and easy remedy for the recovery of small debts. The intention of the Legislature will be entirely defeated if the creditor is at liberty to adopt this course.
“The Act provides special remedies for enforcing the judgment.”
His Lordship then goes on to point out particular provisions in the County Court Act, which were inconsistent with suits being brought upon County Court judgments, and which would tend to defeat the objects of the Act itself.
Thus, by section 96, the wearing apparel and bedding of the execution-debtor and the tools and implements of his trade, to the value of £5, were to be protected from execution.
“That protection,” says his Lordship, “would be entirely lost, if this action were maintainable; for on a judgment of the superior Court a fi-fa might issue, under which the debtor's tools in trade might be taken and sold by the Sheriff.”
So again, as to the debtor's person. He could be imprisoned under the Act for only 40 days; and then not by way of execution, but as a punishment for contempt of Court. But if an action in the superior Court lay upon the judgment, the debtor would be subject to the ordinary process of execution in the latter Court, over and above what he might have undergone in the County Court.
Then, again, by section 100 of the County Court Act, the Judge of the County Court had a right to rescind, or alter any order that he may have made against any defendant, for the payment, by instalments or otherwise, of any debt or damages recovered, and to make any other order, either for the payment of the whole of such debt or damages, or by instalments, or otherwise, as to the Judge might seem just. “This shews” says Lord Campbell,” that there is nothing in the nature of a final judgment in the County Court. The Judge has still jurisdiction over this very judgment on which this action is brought. He might now rescind or alter it, and make a new order to pay by instalments, or at some other time. That power given to the Judge would be defeated, if this action lay.”
This last point was also especially relied upon by Mr. Justice Wightman, and the Court unanimously decided that the action would not lie.
This case was followed by the Court of Exchequer, in the case of Austin v. Mills (9 Exch., 288), and it has since been the undoubted law of Westminster Hall.
The only reported case in which, so far as we can find, the question has been at all discussed here, is that of Khoblall Baboo v. Ram Chunder Bose (I.L.R, 2 Cal., 434).
Some doubt having been expressed at that time by one of the Judges of this Court, as to whether a suit of this kind was maintainable, Mr. Justice Kennedy proposed to refer the question to a Full Bench; but as his Lordship's own opinion was in favor of the practice, which had prevailed, of allowing such suits, it was considered that the case was not one for a Full Bench, and after hearing an ex-parte argument from Mr. Bonnerjee, Mr. Justice Kennedy decided in accordance with the existing practice.
The ground of the learned Judge's decision appears to have been, that the particular provisions in the County Court Act in England, which influenced the Courts there in deciding that such suits would not lie, were not to be found in Act IX of 1850, but it is much to be regretted that the case was not argued on the part of the defendant, because his Lordship's attention does not appear to have been called to certain provisions of Act IX of 1850, which seems to us to render the arguments and reasons used by the Court in Berkeley v. Elderkin, directly applicable to suits like the present.
Thus by sections 58, 60, 61, and 68 of the Act IX of 1850, a debtor may be taken in execution for non-payment of a sum, which he has been ordered to pay, but his imprisonment is not to operate as a satisfaction of the debt, and is not to continue for more than six calendar months; and when the debtor has once been taken in execution, he cannot be imprisoned again upon the same judgment.
But, if the judgment-creditor can bring a suit upon the judgment in the High Court, he would, of course, have the usual remedies for enforcing the judgment which he obtains there, and one of those remedies would be, that he might imprison the execution-debtor again, notwithstanding the provisions of section 61 of the Act of 1859.
This would obviously be in direct contravention of the intention of the latter Act, and this is the point upon which the judgment of Mr. Pontifex proceeded in the Court below.
Again, by section 69 of the same Act, certain goods of the judgment-debtor are exempted from execution precisely as they are by the County Court Act in England, namely, the wearing apparel and bedding of himself and his family, and the tools and implements of his trade.
But if the judgment-creditor can sue in this Court on the Small Cause Court judgment, he may, under the process of this Court, execute his decree against all the property of the judgment-debtor, including that which is protected by the Act of 1850.
Then, again, under section 71 of the Act of 1850, the Small Cause Court has power, in case of the sickness of the debtor, or his inability to pay, to suspend or stay any judgment or order, which may have been pronounced against him “in any action for such time and on such terms as it shall think fit, and so from time to time to suspend or stay such judgment or order until the defendant's disability shall have ceased.”
This is a very similar provision to that of the English County Court Act, and the effect of it, as pointed out by the Court of Queen's Bench, is to make the judgment of the Small Cause Court not final. The Judge has power to suspend or stay a judgment, or give the defendant further time to pay it.
It is clear that this provision would be entirely defeated if the judgment-creditor could bring a suit upon his judgment and enforce it at once in this Court. It would be absurd to allow a judgment-debtor to be sued upon a judgment in the High Court, while the Small Cause Court Judge might be staying the judgment in the Court below, or giving the debtor further time to pay it.
These provisions, which we have pointed out in the Act of 1850, seem precisely analogous to those of the County Court Act, which induced the Courts in England to decide that a suit does not lie upon a County Court judgment, and we think that the arguments of the Judges in the case of Berkeley v. Elderkin are directly applicable to the present case.
The Act of 1850 provided here rights for creditors with special and appropriate remedies, and if the ordinary remedies in the High Court were superadded to these, not only would the objects of the Act be defeated, but it might become, in the hands of creditors, an instrument of injustice and oppression.
We may observe that this point was decided many years ago in the Supreme Court of Bombay in accordance with the view which we now take of it, and that the decision has since been considered as the law of the Bombay High Court.
White, J.:— I quite concur in the judgment of the Chief Justice. The case referred to by my Lord was determined in the late Supreme Court of Bombay, about 20 years ago. It was determined on the authority of Berkeley v. Elderkin and Austin v. Mills; the learned Judges who decided the case holding that the reasons for the decisions of the Court of the Queen's Bench, and the Court of Exchequer, applied to a judgment of the Small Cause C of the Presidency Towns of India, equally an well as to a judgment of the County Court in England.
The case is not reported, because at that time there were no reports of the Supreme Court at Bombay in existence, but I was Counsel in the case which arose upon a demurrer, filed to an action on a judgment of the Small Cause Court at Bombay; I argued the demurrer, and the demurrer was allowed.
Since that date, as far as my experience goes, it has always been considered to be the law in Bombay that no action will lie on the judgment of a Small Cause Court.
Garth, C.J:— The appeal is dismissed with costs.