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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Messrs. T. V. Ramanatha Aiyyar and A. S. Srinivasa Ayyar for the Appellants.
  • Messrs. A. Venkatarayaliah and L. Venkatanarasiah for the Respondents.
Judges
  • Venkatasubba Rao, J.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Messrs. T. V. Ramanatha Aiyyar and A. S. Srinivasa Ayyar for the Appellants.
  • Messrs. A. Venkatarayaliah and L. Venkatanarasiah for the Respondents.
Judges
  • Venkatasubba Rao, J.
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The core dispute concerns whether the subject-matter of the present action has become res judicata. The plaintiffs claim title deriving from Muthu Goundan; the defendants derive from Palani Ammal (the widow of the last male holder). Earlier, Muthu (as presumptive reversioner) brought O.S. No. 83 of 1908 seeking a declaration that a mortgage executed by Palani in favour of the 2nd defendant in that suit was not binding on reversionary heirs.

In O.S. No. 83 of 1908 the first issue was whether Muthu was related as alleged and thus the reversioner. After a witness was examined, Muthu discovered flaws in the pedigree he relied upon and applied for permission to withdraw the suit with leave to file a fresh suit. The District Munsif refused permission; Muthu declined to withdraw without permission; the Court proceeded to decide on the merits and found the issue of reversionary heir against Muthu, dismissing the suit. An appeal by Muthu was also dismissed by the Subordinate Judge.

In the present suit (the proceedings giving rise to this opinion) Muthu alleges he has since become the actual reversioner and claims possession on that footing. The question presented is whether the reversionary-right issue decided against Muthu in O.S. No. 83 of 1908 operates as res judicata in the present suit. The lower courts had decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff in the current proceedings and the third defendant appealed to the court giving this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subject-matter of the present action (the question of Muthu's reversionary right) has become res judicata by reason of the earlier judgment in O. S. No. 83 of 1908.
  2. Whether the death of the widow (after the earlier proceedings) alters the operation of res judicata in respect of a prior decision obtained or given during the widow's lifetime.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (third defendant's) position as reflected in the opinion

  • The opinion records that the third defendant appeals on the ground that the issue of the reversionary right has already been decided in the earlier suit (i.e., that the subject-matter is res judicata).
  • The court records that the appellant's vakil intimated readiness to show that the Lower Appellate Court's judgment could not be sustained on the merits, but those arguments were not heard because the court resolved the case on the ground of res judicata.

Respondent's (plaintiff's) position as reflected in the opinion

  • The respondent (plaintiff, Muthu) contends in the present suit that he has become the actual reversioner and claims possession on that basis.
  • The respondent relied upon a passage in the District Munsif's order in the previous suit, which stated that plaintiffs could, after the widow's death, bring a suit for possession contesting the alienations — arguing that that passage prevents application of res judicata.
  • The respondent also relied upon Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi to support the contention that a second suit for possession is not necessarily barred where an earlier suit for declaration was withdrawn without liberty. The court however found that Singa Reddi was not an authority in the respondent's favour on these facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal Authority for the rule that a suit by reversioners during the lifetime of the widow is representative and enures for the benefit or detriment of all reversioners. Used to support the proposition that judgment by a presumptive reversioner binds the whole body of reversioners during the widow's lifetime.
Varamma v. Gopaladasayya Illustrates and gives full effect to the representative rule applicable to reversionary suits during the widow's lifetime. Cited alongside Venkatanarayana Pillai to establish settled law that actions by presumptive reversioners bind all reversioners.
Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pargash Ojha Held that where a presumptive reversioner obtained a declaration (during the widow's life) that an alienation was not binding, after the widow's death the actual reversioner could rely on that decision as res judicata. Used to examine whether a decision given during the widow's life can be relied upon after her death by an actual reversioner; the court treats this as authority that prior favourable decisions bind subsequently.
Husain Reddy v. Venkata Reddy Converse of Kesho Prasad: a prior suit by presumptive reversioner dismissed on a ground favourable to the alienee operated to bar a later suit by actual reversioner after the widow's death. Applied to show that prior adverse findings in the earlier proceedings can operate as res judicata against subsequent reversioners.
S. A. No. 923 of 1921 (C. K.'s own earlier judgment) Used as an instance where a judgment in a suit against the widow, finding for the widow on the ground of a will, was held to operate as res judicata against the actual reversioner later. Personal precedent relied on by the court to illustrate that an adverse finding in earlier proceedings precludes re-agitation by an actual reversioner after the widow's death.
Raja Rau Lakshmi Kantaiyammi v. Raja Inuganti Rajagopal Rau Privy Council authority holding that a question distinctly raised and decided in an earlier suit is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent suit even after the death of the widow. The court cited this as a direct authority that a prior decision on reversionary right is conclusive between the same parties in a later suit; discussed mutuality and reciprocity of res judicata.
Surender Nath Pal Chowdhry v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhry Referenced for Petheram, C.J.'s observations on mutuality (estoppel as mutual). Invoked in the discussion of mutuality of estoppel and res judicata — that a judgment binding one party must bind the opposite party reciprocally.
Gnanambal v. Parvathi Referenced for Muthuswamy Aiyar, J.'s observations on mutuality and estoppel. Used to support the principle that a particular judgment, if obligatory upon either party, is binding upon both (mutuality of estoppel).
Jamaitutunissa v. Lutfunissa Authority for the proposition that a finding which conclusively binds one party must bind the opposite party for res judicata to serve its object. Quoted to support the reciprocity principle underlying res judicata and to buttress the court's conclusion that prior findings bind both sides.
Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey Also cited in support of the reciprocity principle in res judicata (cited alongside Jamaitutunissa). Used to reinforce the mutuality argument that prior conclusive findings bind both parties.
Nawab v. Punjaba Held that in similar circumstances a second suit by a reversioner after the death of the widow was barred as res judicata. Relied upon to show consistent precedent that subsequent suits by reversioners after the widow's death can be barred by earlier findings.
Fateh Singh v. Jaganatha Bakhsh Singh (Judicial Committee) Judicial Committee decision holding that plaintiffs who were remoter than a nearer reversioner and whose claim was dismissed in an earlier suit could not re-open the question in a later suit; the decision applied explanation IV of Sect. II, Civil Procedure Code. Treated as almost conclusive against the respondent: the court relied on its reasoning (including application of explanation IV) to hold that a decision negating reversionary rights precludes relitigation in a later suit for possession.
Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi Held that a second suit for possession was not barred under Order 23, Rule 1, where the first suit for declaration was withdrawn without liberty. The court considered this authority and found it inapplicable to the present facts because, in the present case, the earlier suit was not withdrawn without permission but was decided on the merits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the pivotal question: whether the question of Muthu's reversionary right has become res judicata by reason of the earlier proceedings in O. S. No. 83 of 1908. The analysis proceeded in a sequence of legal propositions and applications of precedents quoted in the opinion.

First, the court accepted as settled law that a suit by reversioners during the lifetime of the widow is representative and binds or prejudices the whole body of reversioners — authorities such as Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal and Varamma v. Gopaladasayya were cited for this principle. From this premise the court drew two corollaries:

  • A judgment obtained by a presumptive reversioner in favour of the alienee is binding on all reversioners during the widow's lifetime.
  • Conversely, a decision obtained by the presumptive reversioner against the widow that an alienation is not binding is res judicata and cannot be questioned by the widow during her lifetime or in subsequent suits by other reversioners.

Second, the court addressed whether the widow's death alters the operation of res judicata. It surveyed authority (Kesho Prasad Singh; Husain Reddy; the author's own prior decision) to show that prior findings in litigation during the widow's lifetime are treated as conclusive even after her death — both where the prior decision was favourable to the reversioner and where it was adverse.

Third, the court examined the Privy Council decision in Raja Rau Lakshmi Kantaiyammi v. Raja Inuganti Rajagopal Rau and the Judicial Committee decision in Fateh Singh v. Jaganatha Bakhsh Singh. These authorities were applied to the present facts to reinforce that a question distinctly raised and decided in an earlier suit is conclusive between the parties in a later suit, and that matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in the former suit is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue under explanation IV of Section II (Civil Procedure Code).

The court also engaged the doctrine of mutuality: citing authorities and commentary to the effect that estoppel and res judicata operate reciprocally (a party would be bound by a former judgment unless he could have used it as protection if the result had been otherwise). On that basis the court held that an adverse finding against the presumptive reversioner in the earlier proceedings is equally binding against subsequent reversioners.

The respondent relied on a remark in the District Munsif's order suggesting plaintiffs could bring a fresh possession suit after the widow's death. The court rejected this as preventing application of res judicata, noting that a similar contention was overruled in Fateh Singh by the Judicial Committee. The respondent's reliance on Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi was also rejected because, in contrast to Singa Reddi, in the present case the earlier suit was not withdrawn without permission but proceeded to final judgment on the merits.

The court therefore concluded that the subject-matter of the present action had become res judicata and that the plaintiff's suit must fail. Because the court resolved the case on this ground, it did not hear the appellant's contentions on other merits.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: Second Appeal allowed; the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout on the ground that the subject-matter is res judicata.

Direct consequence for the parties: The plaintiff's (Muthu's) claim for possession based on his alleged status as the actual reversioner is dismissed because the issue of reversionary right was already conclusively decided against him in the earlier proceedings (O. S. No. 83 of 1908), and that prior decision operates as res judicata in the present suit.

Broader implications: The court's decision applies established principles and prior authorities concerning representative suits by reversioners, mutuality of estoppel, and application of res judicata (including the effect of prior litigation during a widow's lifetime on subsequent suits after her death). The opinion resolves this case on the basis of existing precedent; it does not announce or state a novel rule of law beyond applying those precedents to the facts at hand.

C. K. — Appeal allowed.
Show full summary ...

    Palani Goundan v. Suppia Goundan

    The question to be decided in this appeal is, has the subject-matter of the action become res judicata? The plaintiffs derive their title from one Muthu Goundan and the defendants from Palani Ammal, the widow of the last male holder. Muthu filed, as the presumptive reversioner of the estate of one Raya Goundan, O. S. No. 83 of 1908, for a declaration that a mortgage executed by Palani, in favour of the 2nd defendant in that suit was not binding upon the reversionary heirs. Palani, who was the 1st defendant, as also the mortgagee 2nd defendant, denied the relationship set up, by the plaintiff. The first issue framed in the case, raised the question whether Muthu was related, in the manner alleged in the plaint and was the reversioner, as claimed. After a witness was examined, Muthu discovering that the pedigree, on which he relied, was wrong applied to be allowed to withdraw the suit, with permission to file a fresh suit. The Court refused the permission and the plaintiff having declined to withdraw the suit, without such permission, the Court disposed of the case on the merits. The issue relating to Muthu being the reversionary heir was found against him and the suit was dismissed. Muthu then filed an appeal, which was also dismissed. In the present suit, Muthu alleges that he has become the actual reversioner, in whom the estate has vested and possession is claimed on that footing. The matter really decided becomes apparent from the following passage of the judgment of the District Munsif in O. S. No. 83 of 1908:

    “In the affidavit now filed by the plaintiffs in support of their petition for withdrawal of the suit, with permission to sue again they admit that the pedigree given by them, along with the plaint, is not correct. Ex. 1 the registration copy of the sale-deed, executed by 1st plaintiff's father, shows that the 1st plaintiff's grandfather was not Perumal Goundan, as given in the plaintiff's pedigree, but his name was Chinna Thirumalai Goundan. From Ex. II, the division release deed between plaintiffs 2 to 4, attested by 1st plaintiff, it is also clear that 1st plaintiff is not related to the other plaintiffs, as he claims to be in the pedigree. The burden of proving the relationship to 1st defendant's husband and thus their reversionary right to this estate lies heavily on the plaintiffs and they have failed to discharge it. I find the 1st issue against the plaintiffs and on that finding alone, dismiss the suit.”

    The Subordinate Judge in appeal from the decision of the District Munsif, thus deals with the question:—

    “Upon the evidence on the record, the Lower Court has found that plaintiffs have failed to prove their reversionary light and I concur in its finding. The appeal is dismissed with costs.”

    The point, therefore, to be decided is, whether the question of the reversionary right of Muthu has become res judicata. This issue has been decided, in favour of the plaintiff by the Lower Courts and the third defendant appeals.

    It is now settled law that a suit by a reversions, during the life time of the widow, is a representative one and enures for the benefit of all the reversioners and is equally operative, to the detriment of all: see Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal(1) and Varamma v. Gopaladasayya(2). The last case cited illustrates very forcibly this rule and gives full effect to the principal. The presumptive reversioner, at the date of the alienation, by failing to bring a suit within the 12 years allowed, became barred under Art. 125 and his omission was held to preclude all reversioners including, even subsequently born reversioners, from questioning the alienation, during the widow's lifetime, although, be it noted, that subsequently born reversioners became, on their birth, nearer presumptive reversioners than the person whose omission led to this result.

    There can thus be no doubt that a judgment obtained by the presumptive reversioner that an alienation is good is binding, during the life-time of the widow, on the whole body of reversioners; and conversely a decision obtained by the presumptive reversioner against the widow that an alienation is not binding, is res judicata and cannot be questioned by the widow, during her life-time, in any subsequent suit, brought by any other reversioner.

    The question then arises, does the death of the widow make any difference? In Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pargash Ojha(3) the facts are, that the then presumptive reversioner filed a suit, during the widow's lifetime and obtained a declaration that an alienation was not binding on the widow's death, she then died and succession opened to the plaintiff, who was the actual reversionary heir and in his suit, he was held entitled to take advantage of the previous decision and to rely upon it as res judicata.

    Husain Reddy v. Venkata Reddy, decided by Wallace and Jackson, JJ. is the converse of Kesho Prasad Singh v. Sheo Pargash Ojha. The previous suit, in the lifetime of the widow, by the presumptive reversioner was dismissed, on the ground that the alienation was for a justifiable purpose. The second suit, by the actual reversioner, after the widow's death, was held barred, on the ground of res judicata. To the same effect, is my own judgment in S. A. No. 923 of 1921. In the suit against the widow, by the presumptive reversioners, their right was found against, on the ground that the last male-holder had left a will. This judgment, I held, operated as res judicata, precluding the actual reversioner, from re-agitating the question after the death of the widow.

    Sri Raja Rau Lakshmi Kantaiyammi v. Sri Raja Inuganti Rajagopal Rau has also a very direct bearing on the issue to be decided. S. filed a suit, claiming as reversionary heir, entitled to inherit, after the death of the defendant, the mother of the last male-owner. She defended that suit, on the ground that the properties were her stridhanam and that her daughter and daughter's son were entitled to succeed to them after her. S. died during the pendency of the suit and E. who alleged to be his adopted son was substituted for him. The said daughter and the daughter's son were also made parties to the suit. A decree was passed declaiming that certain alienations made by the mother were invalid against the reversionary heir. The mother, having died after decree, R. brought, as the nearest reversioner, a second suit against the daughter and the mother for possession of the property. The point to he decided was, whether the matter of the reversionary right became res judicata. Collins, C. J., and Parker, J. held that the contention of res judicata was well founded. They observed:—

    “As the issue was tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction, between the same parties, litigating under the same title, we can see no reason why the question between them should not be res judicata, under Sect. 13?”. See bottom of page 346.

    The Privy Council, observing at page 350, that the question whether R. was the nearest reversioner was distinctly raised in the earlier suit, confirmed the decree of the High Court and held that the previous decision was conclusive, between the parties in the second suit. This ruling would be a direct authority, but for the fact that in the present case, the reversioner did not succeed in the first suit but lost it. But does this fact make any difference? Hukum Chand points out that the test of res judicata is mutuality. He cites the observations of Petheram, C.J in Surender Nath Pal Chowdhry v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhry and of Muthuswamy Aiyar, J. in Gnanambal v. Parvathi, to the effect that estoppel is mutual and that a particular judgment if obligatory upon either is binding upon both. He says that a party will not be concluded against his contention, by a former judgment; unless he could have used it, as a protection, had the judgment been the other way. The result, therefore, is that the Privy Council, having held in Sri Raja Rau Lakshmi Kantaiyammi v. Sri Raja Inuganti Rajagopal Rau that a decision, favourable to the reversioner, could be used against the widow; and the converse of the proposition is equally true chat the widow who obtained a judgment in her favour could use it as a protection against the reversioner. As Mr. Justice Mahmood in Jamaitutunissa v. Lutfunissa(4) says:

    “A finding, which conclusively binds one party, must necessarily bind the opposite party also, and that but for this reciprocity, the rule of res judicata, far from attaining its object of putting an end to litigation, would only achieve the contrary result of increasing litigation. (See Hukum Chand's Res Judicata, 1894 Ed., p. 2). Bee also Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey(5),

    In Nawab v. Punjaba(6), it was held, that in similar circumstances a second suit by a reversioner, after the death of the widow, was barred as res judicata.

    Fateh Singh v. Jaganatha Bakhsh Singh(7) a decision of the Judicial Committee, is almost conclusive against the respondent. Certain reversioners instituted a suit for cancellation, as void, of a deed of gift executed by the widow of the last male-holder. Besides the widow and the alienee, there were others who were impleaded as defendants, one of whom was Ganga Baksh. The planitiffs admitted that they were remoter, in relationship to the common ancestor, than Ganga Baksh, who being the nearest reversioner, would ordinarily be the person entitled to question the alienation. The plaintiffs, however, based their right to sue upon Ganga Baksh's indifference to his rights and collusion with the widow and the alienee. During the pendency of the suit, the widow died and the plaintiffs applied for permission to amend the plaint, by adding a prayer for possession and by adding a new ground of claim, namely, that according to a custom alleged, the nearer, as well as the remoter heirs, both inherit the property, according to the shares of their father per stirpes. The application for amendment was disallowed, on the ground that it was material to allege the family custom in the suit, even as originally laid and that the plaintiffs not having then alleged it, ought not to be permitted to introduce this ground, at a later stage. Thereupon, the suit itself was disposed of and the material portion of the judgment is as follows:—

    “I therefore order that the plaintiffs, being one degree remoter to the lost male-holder, than defendant No. 3, they have no cause of action. The suit must be, therefore, dismissed.”

    Some of the reversioners, who instituted this suit, instituted a second suit (the widow having as stated above died), against the alienee and the representatives of Ganga Baksh, for possession of the property. One of the defences raised was that the subject-matter of the action was res judicata. The Courts in India held that the question became res judicata and the Judicial Committee upheld this view.

    As an authority on the question involved in the present case, this decision is extremely valuable for the following reasons:—

    1. The plaintiffs, who brought the second action, were identical with some of the plaintiffs, who instituted the first suit. In this respect, there is substantial agreement, between the facts of this case and the one decided by the Judicial Committee.

    2. The first suit was instituted during the life-time of the widow, the second after her death. In the present case also, these facts exist.

    3. If the plaintiffs, at the time of the fist suit, had been the presumptive reversioners, they would have become, on the facts, upon the death of the widow, actual reversioners. In this respect also, there is no difference between the two cases.

    Let us now see what their Lordships did. They construed the judgment in the earlier suit, as amounting to a negation of the plaintiff's reversionary rights. In the second suit, they held that the question could not be again raised. I may reproduce their own words:—

    “They (the plaintiffs) claimed as next heirs and their claim was dismissed. They cannot fight it over again.”

    Their Lordships felt no difficulty by reason of the fact that the first suit was for declaration and the second suit was for possession. Nor did they refuse to apply the principle of res judicata, on the ground that whereas the earlier suit was directed against the widow, the later one was filed, after her death. What is even more significant is, that notwithstanding these facts, they gave full effect to the doctrine of res judicata, holding, as they did, that the case fell within explanation IV of Sect. II. Civil Procedure Code, which runs thus:—

    “Any matter, which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.”

    The plaintiffs, in the previous suit, ought to have alleged the family custom and not having alleged it, they were precluded from relying on that ground, in the second action.

    The respondent supports his contention that the matter has not become res judicata, by relying upon the following passage in the order of the District Munsif, in the previous suit, the order referred to by me, by which permission to withdraw from the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, was refused.

    “After all, this suit is only for a declaration and there is no hardship for the plaintiffs, if no permission to bring a fresh suit for declaration is granted, for, they could after the widow's death bring a suit for possesion, contesting also the present alienations.”

    I fail to see how these observations of the Munsif can prevent the rules of res judicata from applying. In Feteh Singh v. Jaganatha Bakhsh Singh, already referred to, a similar contention was put forward, by reason of the words “I leave them to the liberty of filing a fresh suit for possession”, occurring in the previous judgment. But that contention was overruled by the Judicial Committee. The respondent also relies upon Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi. The second suit for possession was held not barred under O. 23, R. 1, by reason of the first suit for declaration being withdrawn without liberty. This is clearly not an authority, in favour of the respondent. Order 33, R. 1 Cl. 3 says:—

    “Where the plaintiff withdraws from a suit, without the permission referred to, in sub-rule (ii), he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit, in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim.”

    The case, referred to, decided that the suit for possession cannot be considered, as having been brought, in respect of the same subject matter, as the earlier suit for declaration. In the present case, this section is utterly inapplicable, for the very simple reason that the plaintiff has not withdrawn from the suit without permission. It was open to the plaintiff to have adopted this course. But the case was allowed to be tried and judgment was delivered in due course.

    I am clearly of the opinion that the subject matter of the action has become res judicata and that the plaintiff's suit, therefore, fails. The Second Appeal is accordingly allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs throughout.

    I must add that the appellant's vakil intimated to me that he is in a position to show that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained, even in Second Appeal, on the merits. As I have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff must fail, on the ground of res judicata I have not heard arguments on the other questions.

    C. K.Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Palani Goundan v. Suppia Goundan
    (Feb 2, 1925)