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citation codes
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Acts
  • s. 622 of Act X of 1877, as amended by s. 92 of Act XII of 1879,
  • Act VIII of 1859, the old Code of Civil Procedure.
  • s. 21 of the Oudh Civil Courts Act
  • s. 18 of the Limitation Act.
  • s. 4 of the Limitation Act.
  • S. 92 of Act XII of 1879
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • s. 622 of Act X of 1877, as amended by s. 92 of Act XII of 1879,
  • Act VIII of 1859, the old Code of Civil Procedure.
  • s. 21 of the Oudh Civil Courts Act
  • s. 18 of the Limitation Act.
  • s. 4 of the Limitation Act.
  • S. 92 of Act XII of 1879
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from an application to set aside an ex parte judgment. Article 164 of the Limitation Act (schedule II) prescribes thirty days as the period of limitation for such an application, running from "the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment." Section 4 of the Limitation Act requires dismissal of suits, appeals or applications instituted after the prescribed period even if limitation has not been set up as a defence.

A subordinate Judge (the Munsif) admitted an application to set aside an ex parte judgment. The High Court was asked to consider whether it had revisional power under section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code to intervene where a subordinate court had admitted such an application in contravention of the Limitation Act, and whether the subordinate Judge had erred in his application of the Limitation Act in the particular facts before the Court. The High Court set aside the subordinate Judge's order and remanded the case to him for determination of the question of fraud (i.e., whether the judgment-debtor had been kept by fraud from knowledge of his right to apply), with costs to follow the result.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court has revisional powers under section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside an order of a subordinate Court that has admitted an application to set aside an ex parte judgment in contravention of the Limitation Act.
  2. How the Limitation Act applies to an application to set aside an ex parte judgment under Article 164 — specifically, from which date the period of limitation runs (the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment, and whether "any" means the first process).
  3. Whether an application made after the true period of limitation may nevertheless be entertained if the judgment-debtor was kept by fraud from the knowledge of his right to make the application (the applicability of section 18 of the Limitation Act).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maulvi Mahammad v. Syed Husain Held that when under s.622 the High Court calls for a record in a case where no appeal lies, it might pass any order it could have passed as a second appeal; view extended by some to permit passing any order as to fact or law. The opinion records this authority as an earlier Full Bench view supporting broad revisional power, but notes that subsequent Privy Council authority (Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh) has superseded these broader aspects. The case is used to describe previous expansive interpretations of s.622.
Subbaji Rau v. Srinivasa Rau Madras High Court held that the High Court could interfere in revision on the ground of fraud vitiating execution-sales. Referred to as an instance of prior authority allowing revision on fraud grounds; placed in context with other rulings that have been affected by the Privy Council decision.
Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath Explained the scope of revisional powers of the High Courts (elaborate judgment by West, J.). Cited as an explanation of revisional scope with which the author generally agreed; like other older rulings it is said to be overtaken in part by the Privy Council decision.
Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh Privy Council decision holding that only questions relating to jurisdiction can be entertained under s.622 (i.e., limits on revisional power). Described as recent and binding authority that limits revisional interference under s.622 to questions of jurisdiction broadly understood, and accordingly supersedes earlier expansive views of revisional power.
Magni Ram v. Jiwa Lal Full Bench ruling of this Court adopting the Privy Council's decision (that only jurisdictional questions are entertainable under s.622). Relied upon by the author as consistent with his view of the proper scope of revisional power; the author states he participated in that Full Bench ruling and that it does not go beyond his expressed views.
Pachu v. Jaikishen Decided that the word "any" process (in the Limitation Act provision) must be taken to mean the "first" process for enforcing the judgment. The Court agrees with this decision and applies it to hold that the period of limitation runs from the date of the first process (in the present case, the date of attachment).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains complementary judgments (Oldfield, J. and Mahmood, J.) that together form the Court's reasoning.

Oldfield, J. — Primary legal points:

  • Article 164 of the Limitation Act prescribes thirty days from "the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment" as the period within which an application to set aside an ex parte judgment must be made.
  • Section 4 of the Limitation Act mandates dismissal of suits, appeals and applications made after the prescribed period even if limitation is not pleaded as a defence.
  • If a subordinate Court admits such an application in contravention of the Limitation Act, it is an illegal exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code; consequently, the High Court has revisional powers under s.622 where no appeal lies.
  • The Judge in the present case erred in treating the period of limitation: the period runs from the date of executing any process (construed as the first process), and in this case from the date of attachment of the judgment-debtor's property in execution.
  • An application filed after that date is barred unless the judgment-debtor was kept by fraud from knowledge of the right to apply; whether fraud exists must be determined by the Judge before entertaining the application.
  • Accordingly Oldfield, J. sets aside the order and remands the case to the Judge to decide the fraud question; costs to follow the result.

Mahmood, J. — Scope and limits of revisional power (historical and analytical treatment):

  • Provides a legislative and judicial history tracing revisional power: Act VIII of 1859 (old Code), Act XXIII of 1861 s.35 (limited High Court revision to cases decided on appeal where subordinate Court exercised jurisdiction not vested in it), Act X of 1877 s.622 (expanded revision to include courts of first instance and failure to exercise jurisdiction), and Act XII of 1879 s.92 (added power to interfere where lower Court acted "illegally or with material irregularity").
  • Notes that s.622 as amended has been reproduced in the present Code, so earlier arguments and decisions apply subject to later authoritative rulings.
  • Considers the Privy Council decision in Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh and explains that their Lordships confined revisional interference under s.622 to questions relating to jurisdiction; he analyzes the meaning of "jurisdiction" in a broad sense (not narrowly).
  • Distinguishes between (a) absence of jurisdiction, (b) failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the court, and (c) exercise of jurisdiction in a manner vitiated by illegality or material irregularity; he explains that s.622 contemplates these three distinct bases for revision.
  • Gives examples where a court may have jurisdiction in the narrow sense but exercise it illegally or with material irregularity (e.g., disregarding procedural bars, altering decree meaning, hearing review incorrectly, dismissing claim without hearing evidence).
  • Applies this framework to the present case: on the Judge's findings, though he professed to apply the Limitation Act he contravened s.4 of that Act by permitting an application after the true period had expired; thus the Judge acted "in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity" (i.e., ultra vires), justifying revision under s.622.
  • On the concrete facts, the Court accepts Pachu v. Jaikishen's construction that "any process" means the "first process"; identifies 19 June 1883 (attachment) as start of limitation and 13 December 1883 as date of application (barred). The Munsif had found fraud in concealment, but because of the mistake as to limitation he did not properly decide the merits of fraud. Mahmood, J. therefore concurs in setting aside the order and remanding to decide fraud.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: THE ORDER OF THE SUBORDINATE JUDGE IS SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE JUDGE FOR FURTHER DISPOSAL (with costs to follow the result).

Implications and direct consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The High Court exercised revisional power under section 622 of the Civil Procedure Code to quash the subordinate Judge's order because the latter had admitted an application contrary to the Limitation Act, constituting an exercise of jurisdiction "illegally or with material irregularity."
  • The Court applied the Limitation Act to hold that the period for an application under Article 164 runs from the date of executing the first process for enforcement (here, the date of attachment: 19 June 1883). The application filed on 13 December 1883 was therefore, on its face, barred by limitation unless the fraud exception (section 18 of the Limitation Act) applies.
  • The case is remanded to the subordinate Judge to determine whether the judgment-debtor was kept by fraud from knowledge of his right to apply (i.e., whether the exception in section 18 applies). The subordinate Judge must decide that factual issue before entertaining the application further.
  • The opinion applies and discusses existing authorities (including the Privy Council's constraining view of s.622) rather than announcing a novel doctrine; it clarifies application of limitation and confirms that revision is available where a subordinate Court acts ultra vires by contravening limitation statutes or otherwise exercising jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

    Har Prasad And Another (Petitioners) v. Jafar Ali (Opposite Party).

    Oldfield, J.:— (After stating the facts, continued):—Art. 164 of the Limitation Act provides thirty days, as the period of limitation for an order to set aside a judgment ex parte, from the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment, and by s. 4 of the Act it is enacted that “subject to the provisions contained in ss. 5 to 25 inclusive, every suit instituted, appeal presented and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the second schedule of the Act, shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”

    When therefore a Court has admitted an application to set aside an ex parte judgment in contravention of the Law of Limitation, it must be held to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally within the meaning of s. 622, and, there being no appeal to this Court in the case, this Court has, in my opinion, powers of revision under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    In the case before us the Judge erred in his application of the Law of Limitation. The period of limitation will run from the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment; and in this case will run from the date of attachment of the property of the judgment-debtor in execution of the decree; and the application will be barred unless the judgment-debtor has been kept by means of fraud from the knowledge of his right to make the application. This is a question which the Judge must determine before he can properly entertain the application.

    The order is set aside, and the case will go back to the Judge for disposal with reference to the above remarks. Costs to follow the result.

    Mahmood, J.:— The question whether the order of the District. Judge can be revised by this Court, under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, opens up a very important question of law, in discussing which it is not necessary to go further back than Act VIII of 1859, the old Code of Civil Procedure. That Act, [348] as it originally stood, does not seem to have contained any provisions enabling the High Courts to interfere in revision, but s. 35 of Act XXIII of 1861 laid down the following rule:— “The Sudder Court may call for the record of any case decided on appeal by any subordinate Court in which no further appeal shall lie to the Sudder Court, if such subordinate Court shall appear in hearing the appeal to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; and the Sudder Court may set aside the decision passed on appeal in such a case by the subordinate Court, or may pass such other order in the case as to such Sudder Court may seem right.”

    It is important to notice here that the only cases in which the High Court had power to interfere in revision were those “decided on appeal,” and in which the subordinate appellate Court had ‘exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law.” So the law stood until Act X of 1877 was passed. S. 622 of that Act was as follows:—The High Court may call for the record of any case in which no appeal lies to the High Court, if the Court by which the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; and may pass such orders in the case as the High Court thinks fit.” The change here made are two: first that not only the judgments of the subordinate appellate Courts, but those of Courts of first instance, might be interfered with in revision; and secondly, that the cases in which such interference was justified were not only those in which there was assumption by the lower Court of a jurisdiction it did not possess, but also cases in which there was failure to exercise a jurisdiction which it did possess. There was, therefore, a clear increase of the powers of revision, and it is important to see how legislation on this subject went further. S. 92 of Act XII of 1879 gave the High Court the power to interfere not only in the two kinds of cases mentioned in s. 622 of the Code of 1877, but also in cases where the lower Court appeared “to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity” thus distinctly conferring a third power, distinct from those, which the High Court previously possessed. Now s. 622 of Act X of 1877, as amended by S. 92 of Act XII of 1879, has been reproduced verbatim in the present Code” and therefore all arguments and decisions which apply to [349] the former section apply equally to the present. The question then arises, how the present section is to be interpreted. Does it mean that in cases where” no appeal lies to the High Court,” the revisional powers of the Court are co-extensive with those which it has in second appeal by virtue of s. 584 of the Code? I cannot think that it means this. Here I may refer to the Full Bench case, decided by this Court, of Maulvi Mahammad v. Syed Husain(1), in which the majority of the Judges held that when, under s. 622 of Act X of 1877, the High Court had called for the record of a case in which no appeal lay to it, it might, under that section, pass any order in such case which it might have passed if it had dealt with the case as a second appeal. The late Chief Justice even went further, and held that the High Court might, under that section, pass in such case any such order as it thought proper, whether in regard to fact or law. A similar view of s. 622 was taken by the Madras High Court on Subbaji Rau v. Srinivasa Rau, where it was held that where the lower Court had failed to do so, the High Court was competent to interfere in revision on the ground of fraud vitiating execution-sales.

    Another case to which I wish to refer is Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath in which, West, J., in an elaborate judgment, with which ??? generally, I agree, explained the scope of the revisional powers of the High Courts. All these rulings, however, with the exception of the principles of the last, must now be regarded as superseded by the recent decision of the Privy Council in Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh; but before I deal with the judgment in that case, I wish to ??? to the recent Full Bench ruling of this Court in Magni Ram v. Jiwa Lal, in which the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council was allowed. That ruling was to the effect that the Privy Council had decided that only questions relating to jurisdiction can be entertained under s. 622.

    I was a party to this ruling of the Full Bench, and I am anxious that its precise meaning (or at least my meaning in concurring in ???) and effect should not be misunderstood. The question [350] ??? what was decided by the Privy Council in the case referred to? The substance of the judgment is contained in the concluding words of the penultimate paragraph:— “The question then is, did the Judges of the lower Courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with material irregularity. It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them, and they did decide it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case; and even if they decided wrongly, they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.”

    The view of law here expressed is of course binding upon this Court, and I proceed to consider the exact meaning of the passage. And in doing to it seems to me that the word “jurisdiction,” as used by their Lordships of the Privy Council, is the most important word.

    The words in its ordinary meaning simply means the legal power or authority of hearing and determining disputes for the purposes of administering justice, and in its broad legal sense it may be taken to mean the bower of administering justice according to the means which the law has provided, and subject to the limitations imposed by that law upon the judicial authority. Such limitations may either be territorial or pecuniary with reference to the value of the subject-matter in litigation, or they may elate to the nature of the litigation, or the domicile and nationality of the parties, or the class or rank to which the tribunal belongs.

    I am of opinion that the expression, as used by their Lordships, must be understood in its broad sense and not too narrowly, and this interpretation is supported by the fact that in the last paragraph of their judgment their Lordships say that “the Judicial Commissioner had no jurisdiction in the case” under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. Considering that the Judicial Commissioner exercises in Oudh (to use their Lordships' own words) “the same powers as the High Court,” the dictum cannot be understood to mean that he had no “jurisdiction,” in the narrow sense of the word, to entertain an application for revision under s. 622 in the case. I understand the passage simply to mean that he had exceeded his powers, and that his order was therefore ultra vires.

    [331] Understanding in this sense the word “jurisdiction” in the judgment of the Privy Council, I proceed with my views in regard to the revisional powers of this Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. I have already said that the section contemplates three cases in which the revisional powers of the High Court may be exercised. The first is assumption by the lower Court of a jurisdiction which it does not possess. The second is its failure to exercise a jurisdiction which it does possess. The third is where there is neither of these two, but there is exercise of the jurisdiction which the Court possesses, and has exercised in a manner which is vitiated by illegality or material irregularity. The precise question before the Privy Council was, whether or not a particular suit was barred by s. 13 or s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. Now I think it can be shown by considering this question that there may be a decision which is made in the legal exercise of jurisdiction which is erroneous, but not illegal or materially irregular. I gather from the report in Amir Hasan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh that the lower Courts had found that the matter in issue was not res judicata under s. 13, and that it could not have been included in the former litigation so as to be affected by s. 43. In that case no appeal lay from the decision of the lower appellate Court to the Judicial Commissioner, because s. 21 of the Oudh Civil Courts Act allows no second appeal from two concurrent judgments of lower Courts. In such a case I myself should not think it right to interfere in revision. The lower Courts had jurisdiction, and did not exercise it in any illegal or irregular manner. But suppose either of the Judges in that case had said:— “It is true that this same matter, which is now in dispute, was litigated before under the circumstances described in s. 13 of the Code; but although it was then tried and decided, the Judge trying the former suit appears to me to have decided erroneously, and I shall therefore try it myself, and determine it according to my own views.” Or suppose the Court had said:— “This claim could, no doubt, have been made a part of the suit which was formerly tried, but the circumstances are such that I think it would be inequitable to apply the provisions of s. 43, and I therefore allow the plaintiff to sue.” In these cases I think that there would be an exercise of [352] jurisdiction, but “illegally” and “with material irregularity”. Or to take a case which actually came before my brother Oldfield and myself a few days ago. Suppose that a Judge, professing to act under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, which empowers him in certain cases to amend his decree, chooses to say that “dismissed” means “decreed,” and proceeds practically to alter the whole nature of the decree. There again we have jurisdiction, in its narrow sense, existing in the Judge, but exercised by him “illegally” and “with material irregularity.” Or again, take s. 624 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides that (except in certain cases) “no application for a review of judgment, other than that of a High Court, shall be made to any Judge other than the Judge who delivered it.” And suppose that a Judge, disregarding this provision, reviews the judgment of his predecessor. I think that here, too, we have an example of jurisdiction being exercised illegally and with material irregularity. Once more, take the case of the Judge of a Small Cause Court (from whose decision there is no appeal), before whom a claim for Rs. 50 is brought, and witnesses produced, but who dismisses the claim without having heard the witnesses, on the ground that the plaintiff's story is obviously untrue. This is another instance of an illegal or materially irregular exercise of jurisdiction. And so in the present case. Upon the findings recorded by the Judge, it is clear that he, though professing to apply the Law of Limitation, has in fact contravened the provisions of that law as contained in s. 4 of the Limitation Act. To allow an application of the kind referred to in art. 164 of sch. ii to be made after the true period of limitation has expired is to act, not indeed without jurisdiction in its narrow sense, but “in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,” in other words, to act ultra vires. This is all that I desire to say in this case regarding the scope of the revisional powers of the High Court as explained by their Lordships of the Privy Council. The Full Bench ruling of this Court in Magni Ram v. Jiwa Lal does not appear to me to go beyond the views which I have expressed, and if I had thought otherwise I should not have assented to it.

    The reason why I hold the District Judge to have decided wrongly on the question of limitation is this. Art. 164 of sch. ii of [353] the Limitation Act makes the period of limitation for an application by a defendant for an order to Set aside a judgment ex parte to run from “the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment.” In the case of Pachu v. Jaikishen it was held that “any” process must be taken to mean “first” process, and for obvious reasons I agree with that decision. Here the first process for enforcing the judgment of the 15th September 1882 was the attachment of the property on the 19th June 1883. The application to set aside the judgment was not made till the 13th December 1883, and was therefore obviously barred by limitation. The Munsif, however, held on the evidence before him that the decree-holder was guilty of fraud in concealing the proceedings both of the suit and of the execution from the judgment-debtor, Jafar Ali, and that the judgment-debtor is therefore entitled to claim the benefit of s. 18 of the Limitation Act. The Judge, in consequence of his mistake as to the period of limitation, did not go into the merits of the question, namely into the question of fraud, and whether the execution-proceedings were within the knowledge of the defendant. I therefore concur in my brother Oldfield's order allowing the application, setting aside the Judge's order, and remanding the case to him for disposal on the question of fraud.

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    Har Prasad And Another (Petitioners) v. Jafar Ali (Opposite Party).
    (Jan 15, 1885)