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  • ss. 584 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure final and non-appealable.Section 18 of the Indian Basements Act, 1882 (Act
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  • ss. 584 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure final and non-appealable.Section 18 of the Indian Basements Act, 1882 (Act
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Sir John Edge, C.J. and Banerji, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant under section 10 of the Letters Patent) sued for possession of a piece of land he alleged formed part of the courtyard of his kothi, and for the demolition of a chabutra which the defendants claimed the right to maintain and use. The defendants, in their written statement, denied the plaintiff's title, stated that they always used the chabutra as a sitting place, and alleged that during Moharram tazias and alums were exhibited on the chabutra and a takht was placed upon it. At trial before the Munsif the defendants orally pleaded adverse possession.

The Munsif held that the land was the plaintiff's and part of his courtyard and that the defendants had not acquired title by adverse possession. He found that the only right proved was the laying of tazias on the land during Moharram and that such use did not constitute adverse possession; he granted the plaintiff possession and demolition of the chabutra but reserved to the defendants a limited right to erect a temporary chabutra two days before Moharram and use it from the 1st to the 12th days of Moharram each year.

Both parties appealed to the District Judge of Bareilly. The District Judge found for the plaintiff: the land belonged to the plaintiff; the defendants had not acquired any right by prescription and had not established a custom; he varied the Munsif's decree by directing removal of the chabutra without permitting the defendants to rebuild temporarily.

The defendants appealed to the High Court (before Aikman, J.), who held that the defendants-appellants had asserted a customary right in their written statement and that the evidence (mirasis placing tazias and singing on the plot for about twenty years) was sufficient to establish that custom; Aikman, J. restored the Munsif's decree. From that decision the plaintiff appealed to the present Court (Sir John Edge, C.J. and Banerji, J.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants had acquired title to the land or the chabutra by adverse possession (prescription).
  2. Whether the defendants had established a local customary right to use the plaintiff's land and chabutra for Moharram ceremonies.
  3. Whether the facts found by the District Judge—namely, that various mirasis had, within about twenty years, placed tazias on the land and sung there—necessarily, in law, established the local custom claimed by the defendants.
  4. Whether, if the District Judge's conclusion that no custom was proved is correct, the decree of the District Judge is final and non-appealable by reason of sections 584 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by accepting the District Judge's factual findings but reviewed the legal conclusions. The Court noted that no prescriptive title (casement by prescription) had been proved: there was no dominant tenement, and it was not shown that the defendants had, as of right and without interruption for twenty years, enjoyed a right to use the land or chabutra for any purpose.

The central legal question for the Court was whether the factual finding of the District Judge—that “various mirasis, whose connexion with each other was not proved, had within a period of twenty years or so placed tazias on the land and sung there”—necessarily compelled, as a matter of law, the conclusion that a local custom existed under which the defendants could lawfully use the land against the proprietor.

The Court explained the applicable legal principles:

  • Section 18 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 leaves open the question how a local custom may be established; where a local custom limits a proprietor's rights, those asserting the custom must be put to strict proof.
  • A local custom that excludes or limits the general rule of exclusive proprietorial use must be reasonable and certain in its extent and application.
  • A custom is ordinarily proved by reliable evidence of repeated, open acts which have been assented to and submitted to, so as to show the usage has acquired the force of local law in respect of the persons and things concerned.
  • To establish a customary right to do acts that would otherwise be trespass, the enjoyment must have been “as of right” — not by force, stealth, or by leave from the proprietor asked from time to time.
  • The Court rejected the application of the English common-law requirement of immemoriality in the Indian context; no statutory period of enjoyment is prescribed, and modern local customs of growth should not be destroyed by imposing such a requirement.
  • The Court cautioned that a court should not declare the existence of a local custom unless satisfied (i) of the custom's reasonableness and certainty; (ii) that the enjoyment was not by permission, stealth or force; and (iii) that it had been openly enjoyed for a length of time suggesting that originally, by agreement or otherwise, the usage had become local law.

Applying those principles to the District Judge's factual findings, the Court observed that the sole proved facts were that different mirasis, within about twenty years, had placed tazias and sung on the plot; there was no proof of a continuing organized body of mirasis, of their representativeness in the locality, or that the use had the necessary character (open, as of right, by assent) to establish a binding local custom. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the District Judge was not legally compelled to hold that a local customary right had been established on the evidence before him.

The Court also noted that if the District Judge's conclusion that no custom was proved did not legally compel the opposite conclusion, then under sections 584 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure the District Judge's decree would be final and non-appealable; the Court therefore treated the appellate review accordingly.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, set aside the decree of Aikman, J., and restored and affirmed the decree of the District Judge. (The opinion concludes: “Appeal decreed.”)

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree of the District Judge—that the land is the plaintiff's, that the defendants acquired no title by prescription, and that no local custom to use the land or chabutra had been established—was restored and affirmed. The variation ordered by the District Judge (direction that the chabutra be removed without permission to the defendants to re-build temporarily) stands as the operative relief granted to the plaintiff.
  • Legal guidance provided by the Court: The judgment articulates standards to be applied when courts consider whether a local custom has been proved. Those standards emphasize strict proof, the need for reasonableness and certainty, and that the enjoyment relied on must have been as of right (not by leave, force or stealth) and openly enjoyed for such length and in such manner as to suggest it became local law. The Court expressly rejected the need to prove immemoriality in India for modern local customs.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion states legal principles for establishing local custom and clarifies evidentiary standards; however, the immediate holding affects only the parties before the Court by restoring the District Judge's decree. The opinion does not purport to create an expansive new rule beyond the articulated standards for proof of local customs.
Appeal decreed.

    Kuar Sen v. Mamman

    Sir John Edge, C.J and Banerji, J.:— The plaintiff, who is the appellant in this appeal under s. 10 of the Letters Patent, brought his suit for the possession of a piece of land, which, he alleged, formed part of the courtyard of his kothi, and for the demolition of a chabutra thereon, which the defendants claimed the right to maintain and use. The defendants in their written statement denied the plaintiff's title, and alleged that they always used the chabutra as a sitting place, and that during the Moharram the tazias and alums were exhibited upon the chabutra and a takht was placed upon it. At the trial in the Court of the Munsif it; was orally pleaded on behalf of the defendants that they had obtained a title to the land and chabutra by adverse possession.

    The Munsif found that the land in question was the plaintiff's and was part of the court-yard of his kothi and that the defendants had not acquired any title to it by adverse possession. This is what [89] the Munsif said on the question of adverse possesion in his judgment:—

    “I am inclined to think that the defendants and other mirasis of the locality have been laying their tazias on this land during the Moharram. This is the only right which the defendants have acquired by long and uninterrupted usage. I cannot go so far as to hold that such possession amounts to adverse possession.” Further on in the judgment the Munsif, after discussing some decisions, found as follows:—“I therefore hold that the defendants, by virtue of an old custom, have acquired right to lay their tazias on this soot during the Moharram only and perform the ceremonies incidental to it,” and he gave the plaintiff a decree for possession of the land and for demolition of the chabutra, but reserved to the defendants a right to erect, two days prior to each Moharram, a temporary chabutra on the piece of land and to use such chabutra by laying upon it their tazias and performing upon it the incidental ceremonies from the 1st to the 12th days inclusive of the Moharram in each year. From that decree the plaintiff appealed, as did also the defendants, to the Court of the District Judge of Bareilly. The learned District Judge found that the land in question was the plaintiff's and that the defendants had acquired no right by proscription to use the land or the chabutra and that no custom to use the land or chabutra had been established. After stating his reasons, with which we agree, for holding that the defendants had acquired no casement by prescription, he thus discussed the question of a custom:—

    “Have the defendants and other mirasis a customary right to use the land for stationing their tazias and alums at the time of the Moharram? Assuming that such rights might possibly be acquired against proprietors of land by a class only out of the public, I think proof is requisite that the use has been of right and had not a merely permissive origin, and that the right should be distinctly claimed as by custom. Now in the present case, beyond the mere fact that various mirasis, whose connexion with each other is not established, have, within a period of twenty years or so, placed tazias on the land and sung there, I find no evidence of a right. [90] The particular part of Bareilly does not seem to have been long inhabited and the only clue to the origin of the use is a suggestion by Chaudhri Shib Lal, witness for the defendants, that his ancestor may have permitted it when he was zamindar. But besides this, the defendants do not set up a claim to customary user, but pleaded a proprietary right which they have failed to establish.” The District Judge allowed the plaintiff's appeal, and varied the decree of the Munsif by directing that the chabutra be removed without permission to the defendants to re-build temporarily.

    From the decree of the District Judge the defendants appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard by our brother Aikman. He was of opinion that the defendants had in their written statement claimed a customary right to use the land and chabutra for the ceremonies of the Moharram. Our brother Aikman in his judgment said:—“There was evidence in this case that the mirasis, to which caste the defendants-appellants belong, had for a period of twenty years or so placed tazias on the disputed plot and sung there. There was a suggestion that this was by leave of the zamindar, but there was no evidence in support of this. In my opinion the facts found by the District Judge are sufficient to establish the custom set up by the appellants,” and he restored the decree of the Munsif. From that decree of our brother Aikman this appeal has been brought by the plaintiff.

    It is obvious from the findings of the District Judge that no casement by prescription had been proved in this case. There was no dominant tenement. It was not proved that the defendants or any of them had as of right and without interruption and for twenty years enjoyed a right to use the land or the chabutra for any purpose whatsoever. All that was proved, according to the findings of the District Judge, was “that various mirasis, whose connexion with each other in not established, have within a period of twenty years or so placed tazias on the land and sung there.” We are bound by the findings of fact of the lower appellate Court, but we are not bound by the conclusions of law of the lower appellate Court. What we have to consider is, does the fact which the District Judge [91] found—that various mirasis whose connexion with each other was not proved, had “within a period of twenty years or so placed tazias on the land and sung there,”—unexplained, necessarily in law lead to the conclusion that there was a local custom by virtue of which the casement now claimed by the defendants was acquired?

    If that fact found by the District Judge and unexplained does not necessarily in law lead to that conclusion, the decree of the District Judge was by reason of ss. 584 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure final and non-appealable.

    Section 18 of the Indian Basements Act, 1882 (Act No. V of 1882) leaves at large the question of law how a local custom may be established. As such a local custom as is now set up on behalf of the defendants excludes or limits the operation of the general rule of law that a proprietor or other person lawfully in the possession of land, and whose rights are not controlled or limited expressly or impliedly by Statute law, by grant, or by contract, has an exclusive right to the use or enjoyment of his land for all purposes not injurious to the rights of his neighbours, it is necessary that those setting up such a custom as that in the present case should be put to strict proof of the custom alleged by them.

    A local custom to have the effect of excluding or limiting the operation of the general rules of law must be reasonable and certain. A local custom as a general rule is proved by good evidence of a usage which has obtained the force of law within the particular district, city, mohalla or village, or at the particular place, in respect of the persons and things which it concerns. Where it is sought to establish a local custom by which the residents or any section of them of a particular district, city, village or place are entitled to commit on land not belonging to or occupied by them, acts which, if there was no such custom, would be acts of trespass, the custom must be proved by reliable evidence of such repeated acts openly done, which have been assented and submitted to, as leads to the conclusion that the usage has by agreement or otherwise become the local law of the place in respect of the person or things which it concerns. In order to establish a customary right to do acts which would otherwise [92] be acts of trespass on the property of another the enjoyment must have been as of right, and neither by violence nor by stealth, nor by leave asked from time to time. We cannot in these Provinces apply the principle of the English Common Law that a custom is not proved if it is shown not to have been immemorial. To apply such a principle as we have been urged by the counsel for the appellant to do would be to destroy many customary rights of modern growth in villages and other places. The Statute law of India does not prescribe any period of enjoyment during which, in order to establish a local custom, it must be proved that a right claimed to have been enjoyed as by local custom was enjoyed. And in our opinion it would be inexpedient and fraught with the risk of disturbing perfectly reasonable and advantageous local usages regarded and observed by all concerned as customs to attempt to prescribe any such period.

    In our opinion a Court should not decide that a local custom, such as that set up in this case, exists, unless the Court is satisfied of its reasonableness and its certainty as to extant and application, and is further satisfied by the evidence that the enjoyment of the right was not by leave granted or by stealth or by force, and that it had been openly enjoyed for such a length of time as suggests that originally, by agreement or otherwise, the usage had become a customary law of the place in respect of the persons and things which it concerned.

    As we understand the judgment of the District Judge, all which he found to have been proved by the evidence was that different mirasis had within a period of about twenty years before suit placed, during the Moharram, tazias upon the land and had sung there, but that it was not proved, at any rate to his satisfaction, that there was any connexion between such different mirasis, or that they represented the body of mirasis of Bareilly, or even of the particular mohalla or part of Bareiliy in which the plaintiff's land is situate. Wo cannot say that in law the District Judge was bound, on the evidence before him in first appeal, to hold that a local custom under which the defendants could lawfully and adversely to the plaintiff [93] go upon his land or maintain or erect a chabutra there was established. Under such circumstances we allow this appeal with costs, and, setting aside the decree of this Court, we restore and affirm the decree of the District Judge.

    Appeal decreed.

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    Kuar Sen v. Mamman
    (Jan 10, 1895)