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AMICUS AI
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citation codes
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Acts
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code)
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, Act 2
  • section 2(1) of Act2 of 1965.6.
  • Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965
  • section 20 of Act 2 of 1965,
  • provisions of Act 2 of 1965.
  • section 115 of the Code
  • Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • section 2(1) of Act 2
  • Rent Control Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code)
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, Act 2
  • section 2(1) of Act2 of 1965.6.
  • Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965
  • section 20 of Act 2 of 1965,
  • provisions of Act 2 of 1965.
  • section 115 of the Code
  • Rent Control) Act, 1960
  • section 2(1) of Act 2
  • Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The core dispute concerns whether a composite lease of a small office building (10×8 ft = 80 sq. ft.) together with a larger area of vacant land (35×75 ft = 2,625 sq. ft.) falls within the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (“Act 2 of 1965”). The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants let the described premises to the respondent by Ext. A1 (Kaichit dated 04-02-1971) initially for three months at Rs. 500 per month for running a petrol pump; the tenancy continued thereafter on the same terms.

Procedural history (as recorded in the opinion): - Respondent filed RCP No. 97 of 1972 in the Rent Control Court for fixation of fair rent. - Appellants filed O.S. No. 38 of 1975 in the civil court for realization of rent arrears; that suit was decreed. - RCP No. 97 of 1972 was dismissed by the Rent Control Court on the ground that the lease was of land and not a building and therefore the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction; appeals/revisions arising from that dismissal were also dismissed. - The respondent filed further proceedings in this court (including CRP/CRR numbers appearing in the record), and both sides ultimately entered into a settlement recorded by this court in Ext. A17 (order dated 17-01-1980), whereby the parties agreed to withdraw their respective lis and the respondent undertook to pay rent at contract rate. - In 1985 appellants terminated the tenancy and filed O.S. No. 213 of 1985 seeking recovery of possession and rent arrears. Appellants pleaded res judicata based on RCP No. 97 of 1972; respondent claimed protection under Act 2 of 1965 and that eviction must follow the procedure in that Act and that the earlier proceedings had been settled (and therefore did not operate as res judicata). - The trial court held for the respondent that Act 2 of 1965 applied (entitling the respondent to protection under that Act) while allowing a decree for rent arrears; the first appellate court affirmed. The appellants filed this second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a composite lease of a building and land (as per Ext. A1) falls within the purview of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (i.e., whether the lease is a lease of “building” under Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965).
  2. Whether the finding of the courts below regarding the application of res judicata was contrary to law.
  3. Whether Ext. A17 (order of this Court dated 17-01-1980 recording settlement) impairs, in law, the finality of Ext. A13 (order of the District Judge in revision) accrued by reason of section 18(5) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as advanced by Sri M.C. Sen, Senior Advocate)

  • Ext. A1 is not a lease of a “building” together with appurtenant land within Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965; it is, in substance, a lease of land on which a small structure merely existed, and the structure is negligible compared to the area of land demised.
  • Even if Ext. A1 were treated as a composite lease, the dominant intention was to lease land (not a building) and therefore the lease would not fall within Act 2 of 1965.
  • Reliance was placed on Nanu Nair v. Krishnan Nair (1957 KLT 256), Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (1960 KLJ 258) and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew (1985 KLT 116) to support the contention that the lease is one of land.
  • The Supreme Court decision in Suryakumar Govindjee v. Krishnammmal ((1990) 4 SCC 343), relied upon by courts below, has no application to the facts of this case.
  • The plea that the civil court lacked jurisdiction under Act 2 of 1965 is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in RCP No. 97 of 1972 (appellants say that decision determined that the lease was of land and hence civil court jurisdiction was preserved).
  • This Court had no jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC to entertain a second revision against the District Judge's order under Section 20 of Act 2 of 1965; consequently, Ext. A17 (this Court’s order recording settlement) in respect of CRP/CRR proceedings had no legal effect and could not affect the finality of Ext. A13 (District Judge’s order). Reliance was placed on Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987 (1) KLT 53) and Jetha Bai & Sons v. Sunderdas Rathenai (1988 (1) KLT 386) in support of this jurisdictional argument.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Sri. Rajendran)

  • Ext. A1 grants a lease of the office building and the vacant land which together were absolutely necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the demised property for running a petrol pump; therefore the lease falls within Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965 and the civil court lacks jurisdiction to order eviction.
  • Various clauses of Ext. A1 indicate that the parties gave prominence to the building (describing it as “office building”, specifying obligations about vacating, repairs and liability for damage), showing the building formed an integral part of the lease.
  • At the time this Court entertained and disposed of CRP/CRR proceedings, the law (as per the Full Bench decision in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT 583)) permitted a second revision to this Court under Section 115 CPC from an order of the District Judge in revision under Section 20 of Act 2 of 1965; therefore there was no jurisdictional error in accepting the settlement recorded in Ext. A17 and withdrawing the lis. Later contrary decisions (Aundal Ammal and Jetha Bai) do not nullify orders already rendered and final; those earlier final orders remain valid (reliance cited to Kuriakose v. Varkey (1987 (1) KLT 345) and Sigma Agencies (P) Ltd. v. P.V. Thomas (1990 (2) KLT 454)).
  • Because the parties settled and this Court recorded the settlement in Ext. A17, the issues in the earlier proceedings were not heard and finally decided by this Court and therefore the bar of res judicata does not apply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (how the precedent was used)
Nanu Nair v. Krishnan Nair (1957 KLT 256) Authority cited for the proposition that a lease may be of land notwithstanding structures on it (supporting the appellants' position). Referenced by appellants to argue that Ext. A1 was a lease of land and not of a building; the Court noted the reliance but examined the specific facts of Ext. A1 instead.
Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (1960 KLJ 258) Holds that to fall within rent control legislation it must essentially be a lease of a building; example of lease of land with a building on it. Relied upon by appellants and discussed by the Court as part of earlier jurisprudence holding some composite arrangements to be leases of land; the Court considered the principle but applied the Suryakumar guidance to the facts here.
Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew (1985 KLT 116) Example where a large area of land demised for a purpose (drying copra) with a building on it was held to be a lease of land (not a building) and thus outside the Rent Control Act. Cited by appellants; the Court recited the case facts as a precedent of a lease held to be of land, but distinguished the present transaction where the building and land were demised as an integral unit for running a petrol pump.
Suryakumar Govindjee v. Krishnammmal ((1990) 4 SCC 343) Guideline from the Supreme Court: where a composite lease of land and building is for a composite purpose and it is difficult to break the integrity of the lease, the Rent Control legislation applies; "appurtenant" must be given a broad, secondary meaning. Key authority for the Court’s analysis. The Court followed Suryakumar to hold that composite leases for a composite purpose (as here, running a petrol pump) fall within the scope of the Rent Control Act.
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai (1987 (1) KLT 53) Held that a second revision under Section 115 CPC would not lie to the High Court from an order of the District Judge in revision under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act (i.e., limited the availability of second revision). Cited by appellants to challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the second revision; the Court noted the authority but held that the High Court’s power under Article 227 to supervise subordinate courts remained available and that earlier final orders rendered under prior law could not be upset by later decisions.
Jetha Bai & Sons v. Sunderdas Rathenai (1988 (1) KLT 386) Followed Aundal Ammal in holding that a second revision would not lie under Section 115 CPC from certain orders of the District Judge. Relied upon by appellants for the jurisdictional point; the Court considered this line but emphasized Article 227 powers and the effect of settlements/orders already made final.
Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT 583) Full Bench decision indicating that a second revision under Section 115 CPC from an order of the District Judge in revision under Section 20 was maintainable (authorised second revision at that time). Relied on by respondent to justify that when this Court entertained and disposed of the CRP/CRR proceedings Ext. A17 was legally acceptable; the Court noted this historical position in its jurisdictional analysis.
Kuriakose v. Varkey (1987 (1) KLT 345) Principle that decisions already rendered and which became final would stand notwithstanding later decisions to the contrary. Cited by respondent and considered by the Court when addressing the effect of subsequent contrary precedent on earlier final orders.
Sigma Agencies (P) Ltd. v. P.V. Thomas (1990 (2) KLT 454) Supports the proposition that the High Court may exercise power over subject matter and parties under Article 227 even if Section 115 CPC is not available; an order made by the High Court, even if without jurisdiction unless set aside, cannot be considered void. Relied on by respondent and referenced by the Court to explain the High Court’s competence to act under Article 227 and the legal effect of its orders.
Moir v. Williams (1892 (1) QB 264) Explanation of what constitutes a "building" and that whether a lease is of land or building is a question of fact depending on circumstances. Used by the Court to frame the general principle that classification (lease of land vs. building) depends on facts and circumstances.
J.H. Irani v. T.S. Pl.P Chidambaran Chettiar (AIR 1953 Madras 650) Held that “appurtenant” may have a broad, secondary meaning equivalent to “usually enjoyed with” and that grounds let with a building in that sense fall within the statute’s operation. Quoted by the Court for the broader construction of “appurtenant” as supporting inclusion of land necessary or usually enjoyed with a building within the meaning of "building" for rent legislation.
Bayley v. Great Western Railway (1885 (26) Ch.D 434) & Thomas v. Owen (1888 (20) QBD 225) English authorities referred to in J.H. Irani on the meaning of “appurtenance” and its secondary sense. Referred to by the Court in recounting the reasoning in J.H. Irani about the secondary meaning of “appurtenant.”
Saraswathi Bai v. The State of Madras (AIR 1958 Madras 74) Held that ‘appurtenant to a holding’ implied being part of the holding or forming part and parcel of it. Referred to by the Court to show existing judicial interpretations of 'appurtenant' and its relation to the holding.
Sakeena and Ors. Kusumb't (AIR 1983 Bombay 384) Held that ‘land appurtenant’ means land necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the building and which forms part of such building. Referred to by the Court in the discussion of the meaning of “appurtenant” and beneficial enjoyment.
T.K. Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon (1953 KLT 110) Stated that in deciding rent-control jurisdiction the main and sole object of the transaction and whether the lease relates to a building should be considered. Referred to by the Court as part of the jurisprudential background on how to determine whether the Rent Control Act applies.
Trim v. Sturminster, Rural Council (1938 (2) KB 508) & Methuen Campbell v. Walters (1979 (1) ALL.ER 606) Authorities discussing limits of the term “appurtenance” and its primary/secondary meanings. Referred to in the Court’s exposition of the meaning of "appurtenant" and the possibility of a secondary, broader meaning encompassing land usually occupied with a building.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court divided its reasoning into two related strands: (A) the jurisdictional/res judicata question arising from earlier orders and the settlement recorded in Ext. A17; and (B) whether the particular lease (Ext. A1) is a lease of “building” within section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965.

(A) Jurisdictional / Res judicata analysis

  • The Court held that even if, with hindsight, a second revision under Section 115 CPC would not have been maintainable from an order of the District Judge in revision under Section 20 of the Act (as later held by the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal), this did not render this Court powerless to examine the legality, regularity and propriety of the subordinate court's order. The High Court has judicial superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution to supervise subordinate courts, and that power includes reviewing whether those courts exercised jurisdiction they lacked or failed to exercise jurisdiction they had.
  • The Court observed that the Supreme Court’s decision (Aundal Ammal) did not overrule the High Court’s power under Article 227; the Court relied on prior Kerala decisions (including Sigma Agencies) to support the proposition that the High Court could exercise power over subject matter and parties under Article 227 even if Section 115 was not the correct vehicle.
  • Because this Court lawfully acted in the exercise of its supervisory power and recorded a settlement in Ext. A17 (which the parties accepted and did not challenge), Ext. A17 operated to nullify the earlier effect of Ext. A13 (the District Judge’s order) insofar as Ext. A13 purported to hold the lease outside the Rent Control Act. Consequently, the appellants could not successfully maintain that the respondent’s plea of protection under the Rent Control Act was barred by res judicata.

(B) Whether Ext. A1 is a lease of "building" under Section 2(1)

  • The Court examined the text of Ext. A1, notably the operative clause (“on lease … the building and vacant land … for a rent of Rs. 500/- per month for the purpose of conducting a petrol pump ‘etc’”) and the schedule which described an “office building” with stated measurements, and the fact that rent was fixed jointly for the building and vacant land.
  • Relying on the Supreme Court guidance in Suryakumar, the Court explained the controlling principle for composite leases: where there is a composite lease of land and building for a composite purpose and it is difficult to break the integrity of the lease as one of land alone or building alone, the Rent Control Act applies. The word “appurtenant” must be given a broad, secondary and non-technical meaning (i.e., land “usually enjoyed with” or necessary for beneficial enjoyment of the building and which parties considered appropriate to let along with the building).
  • The Court considered the relative areas (building 80 sq. ft., land 2,625 sq. ft.) and the parties’ stated object (running a petrol pump) and concluded that the building and the vacant land were let for the same composite purpose (conducting the petrol pump). The building was described as the “office building” and several clauses in Ext. A1 showed that the building was integral to the lease (directions as to vacating both building and land on expiry, prohibition on assignment, repair obligations, and liability for damage to the building by the respondent).
  • On these facts the Court held that the integrity of the lease could not be broken up into a lease of land alone or a lease of building alone: the lease was a composite lease of building and land for a composite purpose and therefore constituted a lease of “building” as defined in Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Rent Control Act applied and that the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction insofar as eviction relief was concerned; the courts below were correct in so holding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final decision was to dismiss the second appeal. The core ruling is emphasized as follows:

Second appeal dismissed.

Implications (direct effect): - The Court held that Ext. A1 is a composite lease of an office building and the vacant land appurtenant to it for the composite purpose of running a petrol pump, and therefore the lease falls within the definition of “building” under Section 2(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. - Because Act 2 of 1965 applies, the civil court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction in respect of the lease; the courts below were right in holding that the respondent was entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act. - The second appeal fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs (as recorded in the opinion).

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to set out a new general precedent beyond applying the governing authorities (in particular the Supreme Court guidance in Suryakumar) to the facts of this lease. The Court confined its decision to the legal effect of Ext. A1 and the settled principles on composite leases; no further, broader rule-making beyond this factual application is stated in the opinion.

    Kunhibi P.P & Ors. v. P.V Sherin

    JUDGMENT

    1. Does a composite lease of building and land come within the purview of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, “Act 2 of 1965”)?. That is one of the substantial questions of law I am called upon, to decide in this appeal. Short facts, frills and embroideries excluded and necessary for decision of this appeal are: A small building with measurement of 10×8 ft (80 Sq. ft) described as office building and vacant land measuring 35×75 ft. (2625 Sq. ft.) on which it is situate and belonging to the predecessor-in-interest of appellants was let out to the respondent as per Ext. A1, Kaichit dated 04-02-1971 for three months for a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- for running a petrol pump. The tenancy continued on the same terms and conditions stated in Ext. A1 even after expiry of the said period. Respondent filed RGP. No. 97 of 1972 in the Rent Control Court against appellants for fixation of fair rent. Appellants filed O.S No. 38 of 1975 in the civil court for realisation of rent arrears. Respondent contended that his liability is only to pay the fair rent. O.S No. 38 of 1975 was decreed. RCP. No. 97 of 1972 was dismissed holding that as it is a lease of land and not building and hence the Rent Control Court had no jurisdiction to fix fair rent. The appeal and revision arising therefrom also ended in dismissal. The unrelenting respondent, at a time when a second revision (from the order of District judge in revision under section 20 of Act 2 of 1965) was maintainable in this court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”) filed CRP. No. 2382 of 1979. He also challenged judgment and decree in O.S No. 38 of 1975 in this court in A.S No. 182 of 1978. While so, parties thought it fit to bury their disputes and entered into a settlement. As per that settlement respondent agreed to pay rent at the contract rate and both parties agreed to withdraw their respective lis. Based on that settlement this court by Ext. A17, order dated 17-01-1980 disposed of A.S No. 182 of 1978 and CRP. No. 2362 of 1979. The undertaking of respondent to withdraw RCP. No. 97 of 1972 was recorded. Appellants were permitted to withdraw O.S No. 38 of 1975. Things went well for sometime. Respondent was running the petrol pump in the tenanted premises using the small building as office. In 1985 appellants terminated the tenancy and filed O.S No. 213 of 1985 for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises with rent arrears. Anticipating the possible contention of respondent, appellants pleaded that claim of respondent for protection of Act 2 of 1965 is barred by resjudicata in view of the decision in RCP. No. 97 of 1972. Respondent shot back contending that he is a tenant entitled to the protection of Act 2 of 1965, eviction can be ordered only as per provisions of the said Act and hence the suit for recovery of possession is not maintainable. He claimed that as the previous disputes were resolved by settlement and the respective Us were withdrawn the decision in RCP.No 97 of 1972 cannot operate as resjudicata. Trial court accepted the plea of respondent and held that respondent is entitled to the protection of Act 2 of 1965. Trial court gave the appellants a respite a decree for recovery of rent arrears as they claimed. First appellate court has confirmed decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence this second appeal at the instance of appellants/plaintiffs. Apart from the applicability of Act 2 of 1965 to a composite lease of building and land the following substantial questions also are framed for a decision.

    (i) Is not the finding of courts below regarding application of resjudicata contrary to law?

    (ii) Does Ext.A17, order of this court in CRP. No. 2362 of 1979 impair, in law the finality of Ext. A13 order accrued by reason of section 18(5) of the Act?

    2. Sri. M.C Sen, learned Senior Advocate appearing for appellants raised the following arguments:

    Ext. A1, kaichit dated 04-02-1971 is not a lease of “building” together with the land appurtenant to it as described in section 2(1) of Act, 2 of 1965. Instead, it is a lease of land over which a small structure, when compared to the extent of land negligible in extent also stood and hence the lease cannot come within the purview of Act 2 of 1965. Construction given by the courts below to Ext. A1 is erroneous. Even if Ext AI is taken as a composite lease of building and land, it could not come within the purview of Act 2 of 1965 in the facts and circumstances of the case considering the dominant intention of the parties as could be revealed from Ext. A1. Reliance is placed on the decisions in Nanu Nair v. Krishnan Nair (1957 KLT 256), Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (1960 KLJ 258) and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew (1985 KLT 116). According to the learned Senior Advocate decision of the Supreme court in Suryakumar Govindjee v. Krishnammmal ((1990) 4 SCC 343) relied on by the courts below has no application to the facts of the case. At any rate plea of respondent that the lease as per Ext. A1 attracted application of Act 2 of 1965 and hence the civil court has no jurisdiction is barred by resjudicata in view of the decision in RCP. No. 97 of 1972, Learned Senior Advocate would contend that this court had no jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code to entertain a second revision against Ext. A13, order of learned District judge in revision under section 20 of Act 2 of 1965, this court could not have entertained CRRNo. 2362 of 1979 and hence could not also have accepted settlement reached between the parties, Ext.A17 order passed by this court in A.S No. 182 of 1978 and CRR No. 2362 of 1979, hence, to the extent it concerned CRP. No. 2362 of 1979 has no legal effect and cannot affect finality of Ext.A13 order of the learned District judge in revision. Hence Ext. A15, order operated as resjudicata against the respondent. At any rate finding in Ext A13 that the lease as per Ext. A1 is not of a building as defined in section 2(1) of the Act operated as resjudicata. Learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on the decisions in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai. (1987 (1) KLT 53) and Jetha Bai & Sons v. Sunderdas Rathenai (1988 (1) KLT 386).

    3. Sri, Rajendran, learned counsel for respondent would content that Ext. A1, kaichit creates a lease of building and land which is absolutely necessary for beneficial enjoyment of the respondent considering the purpose of lease and hence it attracted application of Act 2 of 1965 as rightly found by the courts below on a correct interpretation of Ext. A1. According to the learned counsel various clauses in Ext. A1 eloquently indicate that parties to it gave prominence to the building while entering into the lease arrangement. Learned counsel argues that in view of the decision in Suryakumar (supra) conclusion inescapable is that civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction of respondent. Learned counsel also argues that at the time this court entertained and disposed of CRP. No. 2362 of 1979 the law as decided by the Full Bench of this court in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT 583) was that a second revision under section 115 of the Code was maintainable from the order of the District judge in revision under section 20 of Act 2 of 1965, Hence there was no jurisdictional error in this court accepting the settlement and disposing of RCP. No. 97 of 1979 as per Ext. A17 order. As such there is no final decision in RCP. No. 97 of 1972 attracting bar of resjudicata. It is not disputed that parties hereto settled their disputes in A.S No. 182 of 1978 and CRP. No. 2362 of 1979 and accepting that settlement this court disposed of those cases vide Ext. A17, order dated 17-01-1980. As per the settlement parties agreed to withdraw their respective lis. Hence if Ext. A17, order of this court is accepted, it could not be said that the contentious issues in A.S No. 182 of 1978 and CRP. No. 2362 of 1979 were heard and finally decided by this court and hence the bar of resjudicata would not apply. As on the date of Ext.A17, position of law was as held in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (supra) that from the order of District Judge in revision under section 20 of Act 2 of 1965, this court could entertain a revision under section 115 of the Code. Conceded, none of the parties challenged Ext. A17, order and that has become final. It is later that the Supreme Court in Aundal Am mat v. Sadaslvan Pillai (supra) held that a second revision would not lie to the High court under section 115 of the Code. That decision was followed in Jetha Bai & Sons v. Sunderdas Rathenai (supra). But the said decisions cannot have the effect of nullifying decisions already rendered basing on the decision in Ouseph Vareed v. Mary (supra) and which became final. The decisions already rendered and which became final would stand notwithstanding the decision in Aundal Ammal's case (supra). This position is made clear in Kuriakose v. Varkey (1987 (1) KLT 345) and Sigma Agencies (P) Ltd. v. P.V Thomas, (1990 (2) KLT 454).

    4. Even if it is assumed that this court could not have as on the relevant day entertained a second revision under section 115 of the Code, i am not persuaded to think that this court was powerless to decide upon the legality, regularity and propriety of the order of the District Judge in revision under section 20 of Act 2 of 1965 or to give accord to the settlement reached between the parties in the second revision. As a court invested with judicial superintendence over the subordinate courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India it was well within the power and competence of this court to see whether the courts below exercised a jurisdiction which it did not have, failed to exercise the jurisdiction it did have or exercised the jurisdiction in a wrong manner. It is relevant to note that in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) while holding that a second revision from the order of District judge in revision is not maintainable under section 115 of the Code, the Supreme Court was not referring to or overruling the power of judicial superintendence of the High Court over judgments/orders of the subordinate courts under Article 227 of the Constitution as is clear from the observations in paragraph 23 of that decision, in Sigma Agencies (P) Ltd. (supra) it was held that this court could exercise power over the subject matter and parties under Article 227 of the Constitution, if not under section 115 of the Code and that an order made by the High Court even without jurisdiction unless set aside cannot be considered void. To say that a party to the proceeding has no right to convert a proceeding under section 115 of the Code into one under Article 227 of the Constitution is different from the power of judicial superintendence of this court under that Article and to interfere in appropriate cases. Hence even if it is assumed that CRP. No. 2362 of 1979 was not maintainable in this court under section 115 of the Code it is not as if this court lacked power to decide whether the subordinate court while dismissing RCP.No 97 of 1972 acted legally and whether the interpretation given to Ext. A1 was in accordance with the principles regarding construction of documents, It cannot therefore be contended that Ext. A. 17, order of this court is without jurisdiction and does not have the effect of nullifying the effect of Ext.A13, order passed by the District Judge in revision that the lease as per Ext. A1 did not attract the provisions of Act 2 of 1965. In the light of Ext.A17, order appellants cannot contend that plea of respondent that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for eviction in the nature of lease created as per Ext. A1 is barred by resjudicata.

    5. The next question is whether the lease as per Ext. A1 attracted application of Act 2 of 1965 and ousted jurisdiction of the civil court.

    (As I have this day taken on lease on behalf of the said company the building and vacant land belonging to you and described in the schedule hereunder for a rent of Rs. 500/- per month for the purpose of conducting a petrol pump “etc”.)

    (emphasis supplied)

    The schedule of Ext. A1 is as under:

    (The middle portion of western part or northern paramba and the office building measuring E.W-8.0, S.N-10.0 ft.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    The extent of land involved is 2625 sq.ft (4.50 cents) while area of the building is 80 sq.ft According to the learned Senior Advocate, dominant intention of the parties was lease out the land on which there happened to be a small structure and considering the area of the structure and extent of land, it is possible to hold that it is a lease of land. Learned Senior Advocate with the aid of authorities (supra) argues that only a lease of building and not land would come under section 2(1) of Act2 of 1965.

    6. The preamble to Act 2 of 1965 states that the enactment is made as “it is expedient to regulate the leasing of buildings and to control the rent of such buildings in the state of Kerala”. Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965 defines ‘building’ as;

    “any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes—

    (a) the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut, and let out or to be let along with such building or hut;

    (b)……………………………………

    (c)……………………………………

    7. The expression ‘building’ in Act 2 of 1965 takes in the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures if any appurtenant to such building, Esher MR, In Moir v. Williams (1892 (1) QB 264) explained what is a “building”. According to the learned Judge what a ‘building’ is, whether a lease is of building with land appurtenant or is a lease of land with a building appertaining thereto is a question of fact depending on various circumstances. That was a case of lease of 1.50 acres of agricultural land with a building attached to it. The lease was held to be not of building but of the land. Thressia v. Saraswathi Amma (supra) also was a case of lease of land with a building on it. This court took the view that to bring within the scope of Rent Control Act it must essentially be a lease of building. In Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) 74V2 cents of land (29450 sq. ft) was leased out for drying copra. There was a building (1920 sq.ft) on it. On the finding that what was demised was only the land (yard) for drying copra on which there was a building it was held to be a lease out of the purview of Act 2 of 1965.

    8. In Abbot's law Dictionary the word “appurtenant” is stated as meaning “belonging to another thing as principal as hamlet to another village; gardens to a home; that which passes as incident to the principal thing, a thing used with, and related to or dependent upon, another thing more worthy, and agreeing in its nature and quality with the thing whereunto it is appendant or appurtenant; that which belongs to something else, an adjunct; an appendage”, In Trim v. Sturminster, Rural Council (1938 (2) KB 508) and Methuen Campbell v. Walters (1979 (1) ALL.ER 606) it is held that the word “appurtenance” had never been extended to include land as meaning corporal hereditament which does not itself fall within the curtilage of the yard of the house itself, ie, not within the parcel of demise of the house. But that is the primary meaning of the word ‘appurtenant’. That word can have a secondary meaning also. In Stroud's judicial Dictionary, Second Edn; at page 109 it is stated,

    “But the word ‘appurtenant’ may be used in a secondary sense as equivalent to such phrase as “usually enjoyed with”.

    9. The Madras High Court in J.H Irani v. T.S Pl.P Chidambaran Chettiar (AIR 1953 Madras 650) after referring to Bayley v. Great Western Railway (1885 (26) Ch.D 434) and Thomas v. Owen (1888 (20) QBD 225) has taken the view that the word ‘appurtenance’ has a secondary meaning as equivalent to ‘usually occupied’. Raghava Rao, J. held

    “In my opinion the word “appurtenant” occurring in the definition of “building” in the Act with which we are concerned is used in the broad, secondary and non technical sense of “relating to”, usually enjoyed or occupied with and “adjoining” just notided by me. The idea of the legislature seems to be that if grounds appurtenant to the building in this sense are let along with the building they should stand attracted to the operation of the Act. That the grounds should also be let along with the building would not be a matter of specific provision in the definition of the statute, if the primary or legal sense of the word “appurtenant” were intended, as in that case anything appurtenant to another in that sense would pass with it under the demise whether specially let or not along with it………”

    10. In Saraswathi Bai v. The State of Madras, represented by the Collector of Tirunelveli and Another (AIR 1958 Madras 74) the same Court held that ‘appurtenant to a holding’ implied ‘a part of the holding’ or ‘part and parcel of the holding’ or ‘forming part of the holding’ According to the Bombay High Court, Sakeena and Ors. Kusumb't(AIR 1983 Bombay 384) ‘land appurtenant’ means land necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the building and which forms part of such building. In Suryakumar's case (supra) the Supreme Court held that the expression, “appurtenant to such building” cannot be restricted to land which in the given circumstances, a court may consider necessary or imperative for its enjoyment. It should be construed as comprehending the land which the parties considered appropriate to let along with the building, Thus, land ‘appurtenant’ when given its broad, secondary and non-technical sense would mean that parcel of land which is necessary for beneficial enjoyment of the building and which parties considered appropriate to it along with the building. Such parcel of land would come within the inclusive definition of ‘building’ in Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965.

    11. In T.K Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon (1953 KLT 110) and Thressia v. Sara swat hi Amma (1960 KLJ 258) this court stated that in deciding whether jurisdiction of the rent control court is involved, consideration should be the main and sole object of the transaction and whether the lease relates to a building.Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew (supra) was a, case where land measuring 29450 square feet was given on lease for drying copra. That land included a structure having dimension of 1920 square feet as well. The finding in that case is that it was a lease of land (and not of building or lease of land and building) though, there happened to be structures on the Sand which was the subject matter of lease. It was in the above circumstance that this court held in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Abraham Mathew that the civil court alone had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On the other hand, heavy reliance is made by learned counsel for respondent on the decision of apex court in Surayakumar; case (supra). The meaning of the expression ‘building’ appearing in section 2(2)(a) Of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was considered. After an exhaustive consideration of all the relevant decisions including T.K Sivarajan v. Official Receiver, Quilon (supra) the Supreme court has laid down the guidelines to decide whether the lease invited jurisdiction of the civil court or rent control court. That was a case where lease was of land together with a ‘Kaichalat’ (a small structure). The supreme court considered the effect of composite lease of land and building.

    12. In the case of composite lease of land and building a question may arise whether the lease is one of land though there is a small building or hut on it which does not really figure in the transaction or is it a lease of building in which the lease of land is incidental or, it is a lease of land and building regardless of their respective dimensions, There may be cases where there is a joint lease of land and building without there being any considerations sufficient to justify spelling out an intention to give primacy to the land or building. In such situations it is not the dominant purpose of leas® which should guide the court in deciding whether lease is of land or building but consideration as to whether the parties intended that the building and land should go together or whether the lessor could have intended to let out the land without the building. In the case of such composite lease for composite purpose, it is difficult to break up the integrity of lease as one of land alone or of building alone. Such teases come within the purview of the Rent Control Act, Where, what the parties had in mind was only the lease of land although there were certain small structures on the land which were not demolished or kept out of the lease but were also let out the Rent Control Act would not apply. In the case before the supreme court (Suryakumar's case) it was a lease of vacant land (3600 sq.ft) together with a tiled katchalas (600 sq.ft), it was held, (paragraph 16)

    “Having regard to all these circumstances the correct inference appears to be that what the lessor intended was a lease of both the land and building, The land was to be put to use for a petrol pump, so far as the building was concerned. The lessee was at liberty to use It as he liked but he had to maintain it in good condition and return it at the ends of the lease. This was a composite lease with a composite purpose. It is difficult to break up the integrity of the tease as one of land atone or of building atone, in these circumstances we think this Jetting would come in within the scope of the Rent Control Act, for the reasons already stated.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    13. Hence composite lease ofbuilding and land for a composite purpose where it is difficult to break up integrity of the lease as one of lease of land or of building would come within the scope of Act 2 of 1965. Ext. A1 grants Sease of the “office building and vacant land” for conducting a petrol pump “etc”. The building and vacant site were let out for the same purpose-conducting the petrol pump. As the building is described in the schedule to Ext. A1 as “office building” when Ext. A1 states that lease of building and vacant land is for conducting petrol pump “etc” It is certain that the building was let out for use as office of the company and other purposes which Is essential for conducting the petrol pump. Rent fixed for the building and vacant land jointly is Rs. 500/- per month, ft is not possible to break up integrity of the lease granted under Ext. A31. What is relevant for consideration is what the parties intended by the lease as per Ext. A1. Here, it is a composite lease of office building and vacant land for conducting the petrol pump. Necessarily the building and land were let out for convenient enjoyment of the purpose of lease, i.e to run the petrol pump, There is clear Indication m Ext. A1 that the building formed an important and integral part of the tease as is clear from the j-directions in Ext. A1 that on the expiry of period of liease4 respondent was to vacate the building and the vacant land and that during the period of lease respondent shall not have right to assign the building and the land or, effect repairs on the building. It is also stated in Ext. A1 that If on account of any negligence or other act of respondent any damage is caused to the building respondent will be liable for the resultant loss to the appellants, Having regard to the object of the lease in mind it is possible to hold that the building with the vacant land which formed essential part of the building were let out to the respondent for the purpose stated in Ext. A1, It is a composite lease ofbuilding and land for a composite purpose, it is difficult to break up the integrity of the lease as one of land alone or of building alone and hence is a tease of “building” as defined in Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965. The word “appurtenant” occurring in Section 2(1) of Act 2 of 1965 has to be given its secondary, broad and non-technical meaning as “relating to”, “usually enjoyed or occupied with” and “adjoining and comprehending the land which the parties considered appropriate to let along with the building. Giving that meaning to the word “appurtenant”, there is no difficulty to hold in the light of Ext. A1 that the building and vacant land was intended by the parties to be occupied and enjoyed for the purpose of Setting. Considering that intention of the parties, that along with the building vacant land was also let out in my view made no difference and did not take the lease outside the scope of the Act. Courts below have rightly held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit to the extent it concerned prayer for eviction, The substantial questions of law framed in this regard are answered as above, It followed that appellants cannot succeed in the second appeal,

    14. Resultantly the second appeal fails. It is dismissed without any order as to cost.

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