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  • provisions of section 3 (1) read with section 2 (f) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973 (for short COFEPOSA Act).
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  • provisions of section 3 (1) read with section 2 (f) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973 (for short COFEPOSA Act).

    Hem Raj Sapra v. Administrator Of Delhi

    Charanjit Talwar, J.

    1. Hem Raj Sapra was directed to be detained under the provisions of section 3 (1) read with section 2 (f) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973 (for short COFEPOSA Act). The order was passed on 20th June 1986 by the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi with It view to preventing the petitioner, namely, Hemraj Sapra, from smuggling foreign currency out of India and preventing him from engaging in transporting, concealing and keeping foreign currency and also with a view to preventing him from abetting the smuggling of foreign currency. A similar order was also passed by the Administrator against one Vidyanath K. C. on the same day in respect of the same incident. The petitioner so far has not been detained. His so-called accomplice Vidyanath K. C. was, however, detained on 28th August 1987. He filed a petition of habeas corpus which was allowed on 16th October, 1987 by one of us (Malik Sharief-Ud-Din, J.).

    2. The petitioner is seeking quashing of the order dated 20th June, 1986 on a number of grounds. Mr. Bagai learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has confined himself only to two grounds. Those are (i) that the impugned order was passed after a long delay of 8 months from the date of the incident and (ii) that there is no justification for delay in the execution of that order till today.

    3. We may note that the incident occurred on 22nd October, 1985. Vidyanath K. C. was apprehended at the Airport on that day on the allegation that he was carrying lot of foreign exchange unauthorisedly. The petitioner herein is alleged to be a business partner of Vidyanath K. C. The two grounds which have been urged before us were also taken in Vidyanaths writ petition Criminal Writ. No. 408 of 1987. The detention order in that case was held to be vitiated on both these grounds.

    4. As noticed above, the impugned detention order was passed on 20th Jane, 1986. It is submitted that the criminal case under the Customs it had been filed earlier against the petitioner and Vidyanath on 23rd of October 1985. The petitioner has placed on record photo stat of certified copies of the orders passed by the learned Magistrate before whom the proceedings were pending. Some of the orders relate to the dates of hearing prior to the passing of the impugned order and a number of them relate to the dates of hearing thereafter. The orders passed on 20th August, 1986, 18th December, 1986, 28th April, 1987, 4th July, 1987, and 10th Nov. , 1987 show that the petitioner was present on all these hearings. These orders further show that Shri Satish Aggarwal, advocate, Special Public Prosecutor for the Customs Department, was also present. The plea of the petitioner urged in paragraph 5 of the petition that the petitioner has all along been available but was not detained seems to be well founded. The respondents case in reply to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, however is that the petitioner had absconded and, therefore, could not be trained by the police. Those paragraphs read as follows:

    145 Contents of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the writ petition are wrong and denied. In fact, immediately after the detention orders were issued, the detenu and his accomplices absconded and could not be located/traced by the police. The reports dated 28/7/1986, 18/11/1986 and 2/12/1986 and 4/3/1987 revealed that the petitioners presence could not be ascertained at the given address and no property exists in his name. His presence in the court is a matter of record. However, the Customs Deptt. is filing their own affidavit with regard to petitioners appearance in the trial court.

    6. The contents of para 6 of the writ petition are wrong and denied. Since the detention order dated 20/6/1986 had already been returned by the police department, vide their letter dated 2. 1286, there is no question of visiting any officials of the police department.

    5. We may note that the customs department bas not filed any affidavit as is averred in reply to paragraph 4 above. The stand of the respondent seems to be that although the petitioner was available in Delhi as he had attended court proceedings but still he was to be considered as an absconder as the police had filed reports to that effect. It is rather surprising that although the police dapartment had returned the detention order on 2nd December, 1986, yet no effort whatsoever was made by the Customs department, that is, the sponsoring authority, or the detaining authority to detain the petitioner for the last more than two years. As we have noticed above, even after 2nd December, 1986 and right upto 10th November, 1987 the petitioner had been appearing in the criminal case filed against him under the Customs Act. We may further note that so far the authorities have initiated no action under section 7 of the cofeposa act thereby clearly showing that the respondents are not at au keen to detain the petitioner by virtue of the impugned order. Thus we have no option but to hold that the live link between the objective which had to be achieved and the order of detention stands snapped.

    6. In this view of the matter, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the other point regarding the delay in passing the detention order.

    7. We may note that Mr. Lao, learned counsel for the respondent, has taken a plea that the present petition ought to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner has not surrendered. In any case, he submits that having come to know of the detention order in June 1986 the present petition filed on 18th July 1988 is belated. We do not agree.

    8. This court has held in a number of decisions that such a petition seeking quashing of the detention order where the detention order was yet to be executed is maintainable. Some of those cases are Ram Kishore Gupta v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, and Lalit Kumar v. Union of India.

    9. The objection regarding the petition being belated has also no merit. As long as the order remains in operation that order is liable to be challenged. The petition cannot be held to be belated. Cause of action in a Case like this survives as long as the order remains in existence.

    10. The result of the above discussion is that the present petition is allowed and the impugned detention order is quashed and the rule is made absolute.

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    Hem Raj Sapra v. Administrator Of Delhi
    (Mar 7, 1989)