Manmohan, J.:— The present writ petition has been filed under articles 226 and, 227 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of writ of certiorari quashing the order dated November 28, 2008, of the Director General of Income-tax (Exemptions) (in short, “the DGIT(E)”) passed under section 10(23C)(via) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for brevity, “the Act”).
2. The facts of the present case are that the petitioner is a registered educational society (hereinafter referred to as “the petitioner-society”) with its registered office at Delhi. The petitioner-society has been running an Ayurvedic Medical College, namely, J.D Ayurvedic Medical College and Hospital situated at Bhankari, G.T Road, Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh. The petitioner-society had made an application before the DGIT(E) seeking exemption under section 10(23C)(iv) and 10(23C)(via) of the Act. Later on at the petitioner-society's request the application was confined to seeking exemption under section 10(23C)(via) of the Act which provides exemption in respect of hospital or other institution for reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness. The DGIT(E,) after examining the relevant documents and other submissions of the petitioner-society, rejected the grant of exemption under section 10(23C)(via) of the Act by his order dated November 28, 2008. Dr. Rakesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner-society, submitted that the DGIT(E) had passed the impugned order without affording an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner-society and thus violated the principles of natural justice. Mr. Gupta further submitted that though there was a delay in filing the application on the part of the petitioner-society and there being no provision for condonation of delay in filing the application, yet the DGIT(E) in exercise of his judicial power of granting approval under section 10(23C) of the Act should have condoned the delay in the interest of justice as sufficient cause was shown by the petitioner-society.
3. Mr. Gupta further submitted that the DGIT(E) had failed to consider the replies of the petitioner-society, vide letters dated October 21, 2008, November 7, 2008, and November 25, 2008, wherein the clarifications sought by the DGIT(E) in regard to discrepancies in the records of petitioner-society were provided.
4. Lastly, Mr. Gupta submitted that the DGIT(E) had failed to appreciate the fact that the activities of the petitioner-society had already been examined by the Income-tax Department thrice, viz., while granting exemption under section 12A of the Act in 2004, granting registration under section 80G of the Act in 2007 and while framing of assessment under section 143(3) of the Act for the assessment year 2005-06 in 2007.
5. Ms. Prem Lata Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner-society was granted sufficient number of opportunities of being heard and it was not a case of violation of the principles of natural justice.
6. Ms. Bansal further submitted that the provisions of section 10(23c) were amended with effect from June 1, 2006, and as per the amended provision, the application under section 10(23C) of the Act for the assessment year 2007-08 could have been filed by the petitioner-society on or before March 31, 2007, and, therefore, the application dated November 5, 2007, was beyond the prescribed time limit.
7. Ms. Bansal further submitted that clauses 4, 8 and 11 describing the aims and objects of the petitioner-society under the memorandum of society were other than for hospital as prescribed under section 10(23C)(via) of the Act. She submitted that according to third proviso to section 10(23C)(via) of the Act, the prescribed authority granting exemption, had to ascertain as to whether the applicant applied its income wholly and exclusively to the objects for which it was constituted or established. She further submitted that in the present case the DGIT(E) examined the books of account including the donation account and salary registers and found them to be manipulated. She submitted that the DGIT(E) had rightly arrived at the finding that the activities of the petitioner-society were not genuine and charitable and the petitioner-society was being run for profitable purposes with huge siphoning off money of the petitioner-society.
8. Lastly, Ms. Bansal relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 9 American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT, [2008] 301 ITR 86 (SC) to submit that even in cases where approval has already been granted, the prescribed authority is empowered not to renew or even withdraw the approval in case there is a violation of the provisions of the Act. She submitted that, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply to the facts of the present case. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, we find that the application was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed date and the sole explanation of delay given by the petitioner-society in the letter dated October 21, 2008, was that the provision was a new one. It is a settled position of law that ignorance of law is not an excuse. The question whether the DGIT(E)'s power of approval under section 10(23C) of the Act is judicial or administrative in nature is immaterial in view of the unconvincing explanation offered by the petitioner-society. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the application filed by the petitioner-society was barred by limitation. But having regard to the fact that we have heard the matter, we are disposing of the case on the merits also.
9. We are of the considered opinion that the petitioner-society's contention that there was violation of principles of natural justice is baseless. We gather from the records that the petitioner-society was in fact granted opportunities of being heard on six different occasions, namely, October 13, 2008, October 21, 2008, October 31, 2008, November 4, 2008, November 7, 2008, and November 25, 2008. Out of these, the petitioner-society itself sought adjournment on three occasions and the submissions of the petitioner-society on the other three hearings are on record, vide letters dated October 21, 2008, November 7, 2008, and November 25, 2008. In fact, the petitioner-society in its letter dated November 25, 2008, submitted as under:
“In view of the above explanation, affidavits submitted by the employees and their personal presence here before your goodself for cross-examination, it is humbly submitted that the society has discharged its onus and have reasonably established that the salary was paid to the employees and the signatures were appended by the employees while accepting the salary from the society. All the employees have owned the signatures appended in front of their name in the salary registers.
It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the no adverse inference may be drawn out of the alleged irregularities in the salary registers as the society has established and substantiated its claim of salary been paid to the employees.”
10. From the aforesaid quotation, it is apparent that the petitioner.-society had placed on record before the DGIT(E) all the evidence it had in its possession.
11. Further, we are in agreement with Ms. Prem Lata Bansal, learned counsel for the respondent, that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the facts of the present case. We believe that not finding any discrepancy or inconsistency in earlier years while granting exemption under section 12A and registration under section 80G of the Act would not automatically entitle the petitioner-society to have approval under section 10(23C) in subsequent years. In income-tax matters, each assessment year is an independent year and the principle of res judicata, in general is not applicable. We may refer with profit the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Thane v. Vidyut Metallics Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 688, 694; [2007] 9 RC 521, 527, wherein it has been held as under:
“18. So far as the proposition of law is concerned, it is well settled and needs no further discussion. In taxation matters, the strict rule of res, judicata as envisaged by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has no application. As a general rule, each year's assessment is final only for that year and does not govern later years, because it (determines the tax for a particular period. It is, therefore, open to the Revenue/taxing authority to consider the position of the assessee every year for the purpose of determining and computing the liability to pay tax or octroi on that basis in subsequent years. A decision taken by the authorities in the previous year would not estop or operate as res judicata for the subsequent year (vide Maharana Mills P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1959] 36 ITR 350 (SC); AIR 1959 SC 881, Raja Bahadur Visheshwara Singh v. CIT, [1961] 41 ITR 685 (SC); AIR 1961 SC 1062, Instalment Supply P. Ltd. v. Union of India, [1961] 12 STC 489 (SC); AIR 1962 SC 53, New Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, [1963] 49 ITR (SC) 137. Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013, Devilal Modi v. STO, [1965] 16 STC 303 (SC); AIR 1965 SC 1150, Joint Family of Udayan Chinubhai v. CIT, [1967] 63 ITR 416 (SC), M.M Ipoh v. CIT, [1968] 67 ITR 106 (SC), Kapurchand Shrimal v. TRO, [1969] 72 ITR 623 (SC), Cit v. Durga Prasad More, [1971] 82 ITR 540 (SC), Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT, [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC), Society of Medical Officers of Health v. Hope (Valuation Officer), [1960] AC 551 (HL), Broken Hill Proprietary Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill, [1926] AC 94 (PC) and Turner on Res Judicata, second edition, para. 219, p. 193).”
(emphasis1 supplied)
12. In addition, we find that the DGIT(E) has acted within the ambit of 14 second proviso to section 10(23C) of the Act. The second proviso reads as under:
“Provided further that the prescribed authority, before approving any fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution, under sub-clause (iv) or sub-clause (v) or sub-clause (vi) or sub-clause (via), may call for such documents (including audited annual accounts) or information from the fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution, as the case may be, as it thinks necessary in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the activities of such fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution, as the case may be, and the prescribed authority may also make such inquiries as it deems necessary in this behalf.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. From a perusal of the papers and in particular the impugned order, it is apparent that the petitioner-society has neither maintained proper books of account nor proper receipts of donations. Also salaries are shown to-have been paid to the employees even though they had resigned. Also the DGIT(E) cross-examined the persons presented as witnesses by the petitioner-society and found their statements contrary to the records of the petitioner-society. Some of the relevant observations in the impugned order are reproduced hereinabove:
“3… Thus, the Mittal family has been shown to give donation to the society on 16 occasions. But, the donation receipt books of the applicant did not show a single receipt issued by the society to anyone in the Mittal family for the donations received…
4. Considering all these facts, it was obvious that the applicant's, books of account were manipulated and its activities were not genuine and charitable…
6. However, the applicant filed the affidavits of the following persons but did not produce them for examination:
(i) Dr. Anurag Dixit
(ii) Sh. Sarvesh Kumar
Further, it did not file any affidavit in the case of Sh. Dinesh Kumar Yadav and also did not produce him for examination. The evidence filed in respect of these three persons and the facts found from the salary registers of the applicant are discussed hereafter.
7… As per his appointment letter (annexure B3 and B4) filed by the applicant, he was appointed to the post on May 17, 2005, and as per his resignation letter filed before me (annexure B5 to the order), he resigned, with effect from July 31, 2005. However, the examination of the salary register reveals that he was shown to have been paid salary as under:
SI. No.
in the salary register
Month/Year
Pay in Rs.
11
April, 2005
8,500
11
May, 2005
8, 500
11
June, 2005
8,500
11
July, 2005
8, 500
SI. No.
in the-salary register
Month/Year
Pay in Rs.
11
August, 2005
8,500
11
September, 2005
8,500
11
October, 2005
8,500
11
November, 2005
8,500
11
December, 2005
8,500
12
January, 2005
8,500
11
February, 2006
8,500
11
March, 2006
8,500
9
April, 2006
8,000
10
May, 2006
8,000
10
June, 2006
8,000
8
July, 2006
8,000
8
August, 2006
8,000
7
September, 2006
8,000
7
October, 2006
8,000
10. Thus, comparison of the affidavits, appointment letters, resignation letters of these persons filed by the applicant on November 25, 2008, with the salary registers of the applicant clearly shows that the society is run for profit and not for charitable purpose as the books of account are heavily doctored to siphon off money of the society. It is apparent that the income of the applicant-society was not applied wholly and exclusively to the objects for which it was established.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Moreover, we are of the opinion that this court in its writ jurisdiction 16 cannot re-evaluate the evidences presented before the DGIT(E). The DGIT(E) has reached the factual finding after appreciation of the evidence and cross-examination of witnesses. The petitioner-society was given opportunity of being heard before passing the impugned order. In the absence of any contravention of fundamental rights or violation of the principles of natural justice or gross unreasonableness or arbitrariness, this court would neither interfere nor substitute its own views in place of the decision taken by the DGIT(E). The writ jurisdiction is not intended to be an appellate jurisdiction.
15. Consequently, the present petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed 17 but with no order as to costs.