LAHIRI, J.

( 1. ) This rule has been obtained by the Union of India representing the Eastern Railway Administration against a decree made by the Small Cause Court Judge of Asansol in Small Cause Court Suit No. 123 of 1953. The following facts are now undisputed.

( 2. ) On the 6th June, 1950, a consignment of silk was sent to the plaintiff at Barakar from Surat but the plaintiff did not receive the consignment and he preferred a claim for compensation and also served a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon the General Manager, Eastern Railway. Thereafter on the 1st August, 1951, the Chief Commercial Manager of Eastern Railway wrote a letter to the plaintiff which runs as follows:

"I beg to advise that Pay Order No. 42187/53 of date for Rs. 413/7/3 issued in your favour in full satisfaction of your claim in this case has been sent to the Station Master, Barakar who has been instructed to pay you on production of this letter and the original railway receipt. Please arrange to receive payment at an early date as the Pay Order if not cashed within three months from date is invalid. Yours faithfully, (Illegible) For Chief Commercial Manager."

( 3. ) Thereafter on the 1st September, 1951, the plaintiff approached the Station Master, Barakar, with that letter for receiving payment but the payment was not made under some pretext. The plaintiff thereafter wrote several letters and served pleader's notices upon the Railway Administration without any response and eventually on the 18th July, 1953, he instituted the present suit, after having served another notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In paragraph 7 of the plaints the plaintiff states that the cause of action of this suit arose on and from the 1st September, 1951, the date on which the payment was refused by the Station Master, Barakar, even after the production of the aforesaid letter of the Chief Commercial Manager along with the railway receipt The defence of the railway administration, inter alia, was that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to institute the suit within the period of limitation prescribed by Articles 30 and 31 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned Small Cause Court Judge has overruled the defence and made a decree in favour of the plaintiff and against that decree the railway administration has obtained the present Rule.

( 4. ) Mr. Bose appearing in support of the Rule has argued that the plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed as being barred by limitation because he did not institute the suit within one year from the date when the loss or injury occurred or from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered within the meaning of Articles 30 and 31 of the Indian Limitation Act. According to Mr. Bose the letter written by the Chief Commercial Manager on the 1st August, 1951 is of no assistance to the plaintiff because this letter was written after the period of limitation had already expired. Now I have already said that according to the allegation made by the plaintiff in his plaint, he had served a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the 1st August, 1951. If that case is accepted there can be no doubt that the plaintiff was entitled to an extension of a period of two months under section 15(2) of the Indian Limitation Act for the purpose of instituting a suit for compensation and if this period is added to the period of one year as provided for by Articles 30 and 31, the letter written by the Chief Commercial Manager falls within that period. The question, therefore, is whether that allegation specifically made by the plaintiff in paragraph 2 of the plaint can be accepted. The learned Small Cause Court Judge has believed his story because there is no specific denial of this allegation in the written statement filed by the defendant. I must say that according to the plaint two notices under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure were served upon the defendant and the service of the first of such notices is alleged in paragraph 2 of the plaint and the service of the second notice is alleged in paragraph 5. With regard to this allegation, all that the defendant states in paragraph 6 of the written statement is that the defendant denies the service as also the legality and validity of alleged notices under sections 77 and 140 of the Indian Railways Act and section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is hardly necessary to say that such an omnibus denial of all notices that are required to be served under the law can never be accepted as sufficient and moreover the statement in paragraph 6 of the written statement is, if I may say so, a conglomeration of several inconsistent cases sought to be made out. If the service of the notice is denied, no question can arise as to its legality or validity. On the other hand, a challenge as to the legality or validity of the notice postulates service of the notice. Speaking for myself, I am entirely unable to understand the meaning of such an omnibus denial as made in paragraph 6 of the written statement and I am of the opinion that the learned Small Cause Court Judge has come to a correct conclusion as to the service of the first notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure as alleged in paragraph 2 of the plaint. In my opinion, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to add a period of two months to the period provided for by Articles 30 and 31 of the Indian Limitation Act for the purpose of instituting the suit for compensation for loss, destructions or deterioration of the goods, and the letter written by the Chief Commercial Manager on the 1st August, 1951 was within that period. Mr. Bose relied upon a decision of this court in the case of Sriram Arjundas v. Governor-General in Council, (1) (A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 443). That was a case where short delivery certificate was issued on the 3rd August, 1943 and the letter of the Chief Commercial Manager was written on the 22nd March, 1945 and that letter was repudiated by him, by another letter written on the 24th April, 1945. There can be no question that in that case the right of the plaintiff to institute a suit for compensation had already been barred on the date on which the Chief Commercial Manager wrote his first letter because that letter was written nearly one year and seven months after the issue of the short delivery certificate. The plaintiff wanted to rely upon that latter as an acknowledgment of liability or as a promise to pay a barred debt under section 25(3) "of the Indian Contract Act and Sinha, J. held that that letter could not amount to a promise to pay a barred debt for the simple reason that within a month of the date of the first latter, the Chief Commercial Manager repudiated it by his second letter. In the case before me however the right of the plaintiff to institute a suit for compensation had not been barred on the date on which the Chief Commercial Manager wrote his letter and moreover there is nothing in the present case to show that the Chief Commercial Manager even repudiated the letter which he had written on the 1st August, 1951. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the decision of Mr. Justice Sinha has any bearing upon the facts of the case before me. In this case the Chief Commercial Manager by his letter dated the 1st August, 1951 lulled the plaintiff into a sense of security by false assurance of payment and induced him to refrain from instituting any suit till the expiry of the period of limitation and after the period of limitation had expired, the railway administration turned round and denied its liability. To say the least, such a defence is not only unmeritorious but is scandalous, coming, as it does, from a public body.

( 5. ) The second point, raised by Mr. Bose is based on section 75 of the Indian Railways Act. According to that section, when certain specified articles are delivered to the railway administration for carriage and the value of such articles in the parcel or package exceeds Rs. 300/- the railway administration shall not be responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the parcel or package unless the consignor caused the value and contents to be declared in writing and if so required by the administration paid or engaged to pay a percentage on the value so declared by way of compensation for increased risk. Mr. Bose argues that the articles in the present case were of the type specified in schedule 2 of the Railways Act and the value of those articles was also in excess of Rs. 300/-and therefore, according to him, it was necessary for the plaintiff to make a declaration about the value and contents of the consignment ana as he failed to do that, he is not entitled to recover. With regard to the payment of additional charges it is conceded by Mr. Bose that that depends upon the requisition made by the railway administration and as that was not done by the railway, he does not press that point, but he insists that in the absence of a declaration as to the value and contents of the consignment, the consignor cannot succeed. On an examination of the record I find in the parcel way bill which is Ext. 2 in this case, the nature of the consignment has been described because it is stated to contain "India Silk", but I do not find any declaration about the value. On this question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to succeed if he had merely declared the nature of the contents without disclosing the value, there is a decision of a Division Bench of this Court presided over by Sir Comar Petheram, C.J. and Mr. Justice Hill in the case of the Secretary of State for India in Council v. Budhunath Poddar, (2) (I.L.R 19 Cal. 538). In that case the position was exactly the same as in the case before me. There also the consignor sent a wooden box, containing specie worth Rs. 4,291-14-5 gds addressed to his agent in Calcutta and the consignor informed the railway that the box contained specie of certain value; but there was no declaration of the value of the consignment. The consignment having been mislaid or stolen on the way could not be delivered to the plaintiff who accordingly brought a suit to recover a sum of Rs. 4,291 14-5 gds. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff did not pay the additional fare for insurance. That decision of the trial court was reversed on appeal and the railway administration brought a second appeal in this court against the decree made by the court of appeal below and on behalf of the railway administration it was contended that under section 11 of the Railways Act (Act IV of 1879), the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed without making any declaration as to the nature and value of the property that had been made over by him to the railway administration. But this argument was overruled by the Division Bench and the decree made in favour of the plaintiff was affirmed. It is true that the decision in that case proceeded upon a construction of section 11 of the Railways Act (Act IV of 1879). On going through that section I find that the provisions of that section are substantially the same as those of section 75 of the present Railways Act, with some variations which are not material for my present purpose, and I quote section 11 of the Railways Act as it stood at that time. "When any property mentioned in the second schedule hereto annexed is contained in any parcel or package delivered to a carrier by railway, the carrier shall not he liable for loss, destruction or deterioration of, or damage to, such property, unless at the time of delivery the value and nature thereof have been declared by the person sending or delivering the same, and an increased charge for the safe conveyance of the same, or an engagement to pay such charge, has been accepted by some railway servant specially authorised in this behalf."

( 6. ) So far as the points which require my consideration in this case are concerned, I find no distinction between the provisions of section 75 of the present Act and the provisions of section 11 of the Indian Railways Act of 1879 (Act IV of 1879) and I, accordingly, hold that the decision is a conclusive authority against the contention which has been raised by Mr. Bose. That decision being a decision of the Division Bench is binding on me. Mr. Bose, of course, argues that according to the previsions in the section not only the nature of the consignment should be declared but also its value, but for the purpose of the present case I need not go into this question and having regard to the unmeritorious defence set up by the defendant, I do not think it necessary to send this case to a Division Bench for being referred to a Full Bench for consideration.

( 7. ) With regard to the applicability of section 75 of the Indian Railways Act, he learned Small Cause Court Judge has observed that in order to attract the operation of that section, the railway must prove that the consignment in question was lost or destroyed or deteriorated, but they have failed to prove that. The only witness examined by the railway administration in this case is D.W. 1, J. C. Mitra whose evidence consists of three sentences. The first two sentences are in the examination-in-chief and one sentence in answer to a question put by the court. In the examination-in-chief all that he says is as follows:

"I was Senior Booking Clerk at Barakar at the time. The consignment was not received at our station."

( 8. ) Cross-examination was declined but in answer to a question by the court the witness said: "I cannot say what happened to the consignment." 9.This is the only evidence on the record to prove loss, destruction or deterioration of the consignment in question and I am not surprised that the learned Small Cause Court Judge found it absolutely insufficient for the application of section 75 of the Indian Railways Act. Mr. Maitra appearing for the plaintiff opposite party cited several rulings to show that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed upon the case that the letter of the Chief Commercial Manager constituted a contract to pay a barred debt within the meaning of Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. As the plaintiff has succeeded upon the main case made by him, I do not think it necessary to go into this question or to consider the applicability of the different rulings which have been cited by him. 10. In the result, I hold that the petitioner has entirely failed to make out a case for interference and as such this Rule must be discharged with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at five gold mohurs. Under section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure I give the petitioner time till the end of May, 1958 for paying the decretal dues.