1. This is a petition for review of the judgment in W.A 1202 of 19861 delivered by the First Bench of this Court to which I was a party. As the learned Chief Justice retired from service before this petition was taken on file, this petition has come up before me in accordance with the provisions of O. 47, R. 5, C.P.C
2. It is not necessary to set out the facts of the case in this order. All the relevant facts have been fully set out in the judgment under review.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following grounds in support of his contention that the judgment in the appeal suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record, warranted a review of the same:—
(i) The provisions of S. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act have been held to be mandatory by the Supreme Court in The Collector (Dt. -Magistrate), Allahabad v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, and C.K Narayana Chary v. Bothapalli Aghama A.I.R 1986 S.C 317., and when there is a failure on the part of the authorities to comply with the mandatory requirements of the section, this Court is in error in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay. Mere delay, however long it may be, will not validate a void proceeding.
(ii) The Bench has wrongly placed reliance on the ruling in Hari Singh v. State of U.P A.I.R 1984 S.C 1020., overlooking that in the said case urgency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act had been invoked and thus the facts bore no similarity to the facts of this case.
(iii) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay (vide: Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnog v. Mst Kariji 100 L.W 676=A.I.R 1987 S.C 1353.. This Court wrongly preferred technical consideration.
(iv) When the fundamental rights of the petitioner are affected, the court is wrong in invoking the rule of discretion overlooking that there cannot be a waiver of fundamental rights-vide (a) Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State Of Bombay A.I.R 1955 S.C 123. (b) Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajastan A.I.R 1959 S.C 149., (c) R.S Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra A.I.R 1974 S.C 259., and (d) C.P Doval v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U.P A.I.R 1984 S.C 1527.
(v) Factually, there was no delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court. There were negotiations with the Government till 1981 and the writ petition was filed in 1983.
4. In my view, none of the grounds urged by learned counsel affords sufficient reason for reviewing the judgment. By now, the principles on which a review is to be granted are too well-settled. The power to review is a restricted power which authorises the Court to look through the judgment not in order to substitute a fresh or second judgment but in order to correct it or improve it because some material which it ought to have considered had escaped consideration or failed to be placed before it for any other reason or because it suffers from a patent error which cannot be sustained by any process of reasoning. The Court cannot under cover of review arrogate to itself the power to decide the case over again because it feels then that the assessment of evidence etc., done formerly was faulty or even incorrect. An erroneous view of evidence or law is not a ground for review. A wrong exposition of the law, a wrong application of the law and a failure to apply the correct law have been held to be not sufficient for review. If the Court was aware of what it was doing, even if the decision was erroneous, no review lies.
5. In the present case, the Bench was quite conscious of the mandatory nature of the provisions of S. 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, and had expressly referred to the same in more than one place. This Court also referred to Rajaram Jaismal's case, and considered the same in extenso. As regards Hari Singh's case, the distinction sought to be made by learned counsel for the petitioner is one without a difference. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in that case will apply even to cases of acquisition under the normal provisions of the Land Acquisition Act without the invocation of emergency provisions.
6. The third ground urged by learned counsel is of no substance, as the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is discretionary, and it is not a mere technical consideration when the court refused to exercise the discretion on the ground of inordinate delay. Very recently, the Supreme Court observed in State of M.P v. Nandalal Jaiswal A.I.R 1987 S.C 251., as follows: —
“If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may declined to interfere and grant re'ief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices.”
Thus, it is not a rule of technicality as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner. The above proposition is reiterated by the Supreme Court in G.C Gupta v. N.K Pandey. The observations in Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, were made in an appeal against an order of the High Court dismissing an application filed by the State for condonation of a delay of four days in preferring an appeal against the enhancement of compensation in respect of acquisition of lands to the extent of nearly Rs. 14,00,000. They have to be understood in the context of the case.
7. The next argument of learned counsel is based on a misconception. The petitioner's fundamental right to carry on business or trade under Art. 19 (1)(g), is not taken away by the acquisition of lands in question. It is not as if the petitioner cannot purchase some other suitable land for its purposes with the help of the compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act. This is not a case of violation of any fundamental right. Even when there is alleged breach of fundamental rights, the High Court's discretion under Art. 226 is not fettered. This has been clearly laid down in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller I and E, on which reliance is placed by us in the judgment under review. The decisions of the Supreme Court that there cannot be a waiver of a fundamental right have no applicability here.
8. The last of the submissions made by learned counsel is a factual one and no materials were placed before the Bench or before me now to substantiate the same.
9. In the result, there is no merit in this petition and it is dismissed.
VCS/RR.