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  • S. 302 of the Succession Act
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  • S. 302 of the Succession Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Katherine Mary Jones, a resident of Bangalore, held a sole current account at the Imperial Bank of India (Bangalore branch). On 13 May 1951 she asked the Bank to convert her sole current account (with a credit of Rs. 17,683-15-7) into a joint account with Mrs. Esme Folkes. Both women completed an “Either or Survivorship” letter stating that the joint account was to be operated by either of them and by the survivor until notice to the contrary. The joint account was opened on 14 May 1951.

Mrs. Jones died on 20 October 1951; the balance in the joint account on that date was Rs. 21,199-1-1. Mrs. Jones left a will dated 25 May 1951 (Imperial Bank appointed sole executor). The will made specific bequests (including Rs. 3,000 to Mrs. Folkes) and devised the residue to Mrs. A. F. Cowdrey (residing in Southern Rhodesia). The Bank obtained probate.

Mrs. Folkes claimed the joint-account balance on the basis of the either-or-survivorship arrangement. Mrs. Cowdrey (residuary legatee) opposed the claim, asserting that the conversion was only for convenience during Mrs. Jones' lifetime and that the balance formed part of the residue. Mrs. Cowdrey also specially claimed two sums included in the account as having been provided for specific purposes. Because of conflicting claims the Imperial Bank of India applied to the Court under S. 302 of the Succession Act for directions as to disposal of the balance. The trial judge (Chandra Reddi, J.) held for Mrs. Folkes and directed payment to her. Mrs. Cowdrey appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conversion of Mrs. Jones's sole current account into a joint "Either or Survivorship" account with Mrs. Folkes operated as a gift (or disposition) such that the survivor (Mrs. Folkes) became absolutely entitled to the balance on Mrs. Jones's death, or whether the conversion was merely an arrangement for convenient operation during the deceased's lifetime so that the balance formed part of the deceased's estate (residue) and vested in the residuary legatee, Mrs. Cowdrey.
  2. Whether the surrounding facts and evidence adduced were sufficient to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust (i.e., to prove that an actual gift was intended).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Mrs. A. F. Cowdrey) — main contentions

  • The conversion of the sole current account into a joint either-or-survivorship account was only for convenient operation during Mrs. Jones's lifetime due to her ill-health and defective eyesight.
  • Mrs. Folkes did not acquire any right to the account balance, and there was in fact no gift by the deceased to Mrs. Folkes.
  • There was no valid gift or legal disposition of the amount — consequently the amount should fall into the residue and pass to the residuary legatee (Mrs. Cowdrey).
  • Reliance on the deceased's physical condition, the omission of any mention of the account balance in the will, and the fact that Mrs. Jones made a specific bequest of only Rs. 3,000 to Mrs. Folkes (argued as evidence against an intention to gift the whole account balance).
  • Special claims were made in respect of specified sums alleged to have been sent by Mrs. Cowdrey for medical expenses and redemption proceeds of certain bonds included in the account.

Respondent (Mrs. Esme Folkes) — main contentions

  • At the material time Mrs. Jones was elderly and unable adequately to look after herself; Mrs. Folkes assisted her, attended morning and evening, and had no other relations to help her.
  • In consideration of these services, Mrs. Jones desired that Mrs. Folkes be provided a reasonable portion of her estate; with that intention the sole account was converted into a joint either-or-survivorship account so that the survivor would take the balance on the deceased's death.
  • Positive evidence (affidavits) was adduced to show Mrs. Jones clearly manifested the intention that the balance be for Mrs. Folkes: testimony from Dr. Ross (medical consultant), Rev. Mathew Hickey (Catholic priest), and Mr. Harden (Bank agent) supported Mrs. Folkes' account of Mrs. Jones' intention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta Stated the general equity principle that a voluntary conveyance without declaration of trust gives rise to a resulting trust in favour of the grantor unless it can be proved that an actual gift was intended; noted English exception (presumption of advancement from husband to wife) does not apply in India. The Court applied the principle to explain that a resulting trust would arise absent proof of gift; but on the facts the Court found an actual gift was proved, so the resulting trust principle did not defeat Mrs. Folkes' claim. The Court also noted the English presumption of advancement was inapplicable because Mrs. Folkes was not related to Mrs. Jones.
Williams v. Ball Held that an indorsement on a life policy in favour of a house-keeper (authorising her to draw if the owner predeceased her) was an incomplete gift and did not transfer title where no properly executed testamentary document supported a gift by way of legacy. The Court distinguished Williams v. Ball: it held that the present conversion into a joint either-or-survivorship account operated to vest title in both account-holders subject to the survivorship condition, unlike the incomplete assignment in Williams v. Ball.
Marshal v. Crutwell (discussion by Sir George Jessel M.R.) Explained the rule for accounts or purchases in joint names: surrounding circumstances must be considered; a purchase in the name of a wife or child may be deemed a gift if unexplained but surrounding circumstances can show a trust; similarly, for a stranger surrounding circumstances may show a gift. The Court relied on this exposition to hold that, on the surrounding circumstances in this case, Mrs. Jones intended to make a provision for Mrs. Folkes rather than merely arrange for convenience. Thus the Court inferred a gift rather than a resulting trust.
In re Harrison On its facts, held that opening a joint account was intended as a provision for the wife rather than merely an arrangement for convenience. The Court cited this case as an authority where surrounding facts supported a provision for the survivor; it found the present case analogous and agreed that Mrs. Folkes became entitled to the balance on Mrs. Jones' death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked stages: factual determination followed by legal application.

1) Factual findings: The Court accepted positive evidence presented on behalf of Mrs. Folkes. Affidavits established that:

  • Dr. Ross (medical consultant) deposed to Mrs. Jones's attachment to and dependence on Mrs. Folkes and stated that Mrs. Jones informed him the proceeds of the joint either-or-survivorship account were intended for Mrs. Folkes; the deponent was confident Mrs. Jones intended the survivor to be absolutely entitled to the proceeds.
  • Rev. Mathew Hickey deposed that Mrs. Jones explicitly told him she intended the proceeds to go to Mrs. Folkes.
  • Mr. Harden (the Bank's agent in 1951) stated he remembered Mrs. Folkes telling him that Mrs. Jones wanted the account converted so that Mrs. Folkes could operate the account and that on Mrs. Jones' death the balance would automatically go to Mrs. Folkes.

The learned trial judge accepted this evidence and found that Mrs. Jones intended that whatever balance remained should go to Mrs. Folkes.

2) Legal analysis: The Court identified the governing legal principle from Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta: ordinarily a voluntary conveyance without declaration of trust results in a resulting trust for the grantor unless an actual gift is proved. The Court acknowledged English authorities that sometimes presume advancement (husband to wife) but noted that such presumption does not apply in India and in any event did not apply here because the parties were not related.

Applying the principle, the Court held that the accepted factual finding — that Mrs. Jones intended to give the balance to Mrs. Folkes — satisfied the requirement to rebut a resulting trust. The Court distinguished Williams v. Ball (where the gift/assignment was incomplete and unsupported by testamentary form) by holding that conversion of a sole current account into an either-or-survivorship joint account operates to vest title in both account holders subject to the survivorship condition, and so is an effective disposition to vest survivorship rights.

The Court further relied on the approach in Marshal v. Crutwell and In re Harrison: surrounding circumstances are relevant to infer whether a joint account is a provision for the survivor or merely a convenience. On the facts (the surrounding circumstances and the direct testimony), the Court concluded the account was intended as a provision for Mrs. Folkes and not merely for convenient operation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The Court held that on the death of Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Esme Folkes became entitled to the balance standing to the credit of the joint either-or-survivorship account in their names.

Direct consequences for the parties: The Imperial Bank of India was directed (by the trial judge, and the order affirmed on appeal) to pay the balance to Mrs. Folkes. Costs of all parties were ordered to be paid out of the estate.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles (resulting trust rules and inference from surrounding circumstances) to the particular facts; it does not purport to set a new general precedent beyond applying those principles to find that a joint either-or-survivorship account may effect an immediate vesting of survivorship rights where the depositor's intention to gift is proved by surrounding circumstances and direct evidence.

    Mrs. Avis Fitzalan Cowdray v. The Imperial Bank Of India And Another.

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by the Chief Justice.)

    This appeal against the judgment of Chandra Reddi, J. arises in the following circumstances: One Katherine Mary Jones, a resident of Bangalore was a constituent of the Bangalore branch of the Imperial Bank of India and had a current account with it in her sole name. On 13th May, 1951, she addressed a letter to the Manager of the Bank asking him to arrange to have her current account, in which an amount of Rs. 17,683-15-7 stood to her credit, changed to a joint account with Mrs. Esme Folkes of No. 7 Viviani Road, Richards Town, Bangalore. Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Folkes filled up the necessary form for opening a current, account in their joint names and both of them also filled up what is called an “Either or Survivorship” form which is in the form of a letter addressed by them to the Manager in the following terms:

    “With reference to the current account to be opened in your books in our joint names, please note that such account is to be operated on by either of us and by the survivor of us, until you receive notice from either of us to the contrary.”

    Accordingly, a joint account was opened in their names on 14th May, 1951. Mrs. Jones died on 20th October, 1951 and on that date, the balance at credit in the joint account was Rs. 21,199-1-1. The appeal relates to this sum.

    Mrs. Jones left behind her a will dated 25th May, 1951 in and by which she appointed the Imperial Bank of India as sole executor. She bequeathed all her clothing and wearing apparel to Mrs. Folkes and two pecuniary legacies of Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 3,000 to Miss Brito and to Mrs. Folkes respectively. She devised and bequeathed all the residue of her property, real and personal, immoveable and moveable, subject to the payment of just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses to her cousin Mrs. A.F Cowdrey, residing in Southern Rhodesia. The Imperial Bank of India duly obtained probate of the will. On 1st November, 1951 Mrs. Folkes wrote to the Manager of the Bank that the current account of the deceased Mrs. Jones had been converted into a joint either or survivor account at the express wish of the deceased, so that she, Mrs. Folkes, could help the deceased in her last days and the balance would go to herself on the death of Mrs. Jones, and claimed the said amount. Mrs. Cowdrey, the residuary legatee, opposed this claim and herself made a claim to this amount as residuary legatee. She made a special claim in respect of two amounts which were included in the joint current account, namely, a sum of Rs. 5006-7-6 being the total of the amounts alleged to have been sent to the deceased by her (Mrs. Cowdrey) for the express purpose of paying the doctor's bills, nursing fees, medicines etc., of the deceased, and to a sum of Rs. 7281-12-0, being the redemption proceeds of 3% Government of India loan, 1951-54 bonds of the face value of Rs. 7300 belonging to the deceased. In view of the conflicting claims, the Imperial Bank of India filed an application to this Court under S. 302 of the Succession Act for directions as to the disposal of the balance at credit of the joint either or survivor account with the Bank standing in the names of the deceased Mrs. Jones and Mrs Folkes. Mrs. Cowdrey and Mrs. Folkes set out their respective claims to the amount in question. The learned Judge held that Mrs. Folkes' title to the balance of the said joint account as on the date of the death of Mrs. Jones had been established and directed the Bank to pay Mrs. Folkes the said balance. Mrs. Cowdrey appeals against this order of Chandra Reddi, J.

    The main contentions, on behalf of the appellant were that the conversion of her sole current account by the late Mrs. Jones into a joint either or survivor account in the names of herself and Mrs. Folkes was only for the purpose of convenient operation of the account during her lifetime owing to her ill-health and defective eye-sight, that Mrs. Folkes did not obtain any right to the said amount or any balance that may be left out of such amount that there was in fact no gift by the deceased to Mrs. Folkes and that there was in any event no valid gift or disposition in law of the said amount and that therefore the amount fell into the residue to which she, Mrs. Cowdrey became entitled as residuary legatee. It was contended on behalf of Mrs. Folkes that at or about the material time Mrs. Jones was in advanced age and incapable of adequately looking after herself and that she was assisting her in looking after her affairs, that she was attending on her both morning and evening, and that she had no other relations or friends to render her any help, that she (Mrs. Jones) in consideration of Mrs. Folkes' services, desired that she should be provided with a reasonable portion of her estate and with that intention, the sole current account was converted into a joint either or survivor account, so that whatever amount remained to the credit of that account at the time of the death of Mrs. Jones may be taken by her (Mrs. Folkes).

    In support of her case, the appellant, Mrs. Cowdrey, relied upon that fact that Mrs. Jones was at the time physically feeble and practically blind, that there was no mention of any gift of the amount in question to Mrs. Folkes in the will and that there was a specific bequest of Rs. 3,000 only to Mrs. Folkes. We agree with the learned Judge, Chandra Reddi, J., that none of these facts is conclusive. The fact that Mrs. Jones was weak and of failing eyesight might well support the case of Mrs. Foikes that on that account Mrs. Jones had to rely entirely on Mrs. Folkes and would naturally have intended to reward her (Mrs. Folkes) for her services. The omission in the will of any mention of the amount in the joint account may well be explained by a consciousness on the part of Mrs. Jones that she had already made an arrangement for the disposal of the balance that may remain in that account, by opening an either or survivor account.

    As against these circumstances relied on by the appellant, the respondent, Mrs. Folkes, relied on the positive evidence adduced by her to the effect that Mrs. Jones clearly manifested an intention that whatever balance was left in the joint account should be taken by Mrs. Folkes. Dr. Ross, who was the medical consultant of Mrs. Jones during her last days, swore to an affidavit in which he deposed that the deceased was considerably attached to Mrs. Folkes who was her constant help and attended to her needs for several years upto the time of her death and that Mrs. Jones informed him that the proceeds of the joint either or survivor account which Mrs. Jones had desired to be opened in their joint names was intended for the benefit of Mrs. Folkes. He had no hesitation in saying that to his personal knowledge Mrs. Jones had opened that account with the object and intention that the survivor should be entitled absolutely to the proceeds of the account. Rev. Mathew Hickey, Catholic Priest and Vice-Provincial of Redemptorist Congregation, deposed in an affidavit that he had visited Mrs. Jones sometimes in his capacity as a Catholic Priest and that Mrs. Jones explicitly mentioned to him that she had intended that the proceeds of the joint either or survivor account in the Imperial Bank of India should go to Mrs. Folkes. Mr. Harden, the agent of the Imperial Bank of India in 1951 swore to an affidavit in which he inter alia stated that he remembered Mrs. Folkes calling on him in May 1951 and informing him that Mrs. Jones wished to have her personal current account converted into a joint either or survivor account with Mrs. Folkes for two reasons, namely, (1) that Mrs. Folkes could operate on the account at her discretion, and (2) that in the event of the death of Mrs. Jones the balance would automatically go to Mrs. Folkes. On this evidence which the learned Judge accepted, it is clear that the intention of Mrs. Jones in converting her sole current account with the Bank into a joint either or survivor account in the names of herself and Mrs. Folkes was to give absolutely such balance as may remain to the credit of that account at her death to Mrs. Folkes.

    On this finding of fact, there is very little scope for legal argument. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta(1), which no doubt dealt with money deposited in the Bank by a Hindu, the Privy Council laid down a general principle, thus:

    “The general principle of equity, applicable both in this country and in India, is that in the case of a voluntary conveyance of property by a grantor, without any declaration of trust, there is a resulting trust in favour of the grantor, unless it can be proved that an actual gift was intend.”

    Their Lordships then referred to an exception made in English law where money belonging to the husband is deposited at a bank in the name of a wife or in the joint names of husband and wife, when a gift is presumed. This is the rule or presumption of an intended advancement in favour of a wife, which rule however does not obtain in India, where there is a wide spread practice among Mohamedans and Hindus to make benami grants and transfers. As Mrs. Folkes is not even related to Mrs. Jones, there is of course no question of any presumption of an intended advancement. Learned Counsel for appellant relied upon certain decisions and contended that there was no declaration of trust in favour of Mrs. Folkes. We agree with him, but that does not carry him all the way, because we have, held that it has been proved that an actual gift was intended. Nor does the decision in Williams v. Ball(2), help the appellant in any way. There the owner of a life policy gave it to his house-keeper with an indorsement authorising her to draw the insurance in the event of his predeceasing her. It was held that this indorsement did not have the effect of transferring any title to the housekeeper, as the assignment was an incomplete gift and there was no testamentary document duly executed to support her claim on the basis of a legacy. In the present case, the conversion of the individual current account into a joint either or survivor account operates to vest the title to the amount in the account in both Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Folkes, subject to the condition that on either of them surviving the other the balance is taken by the survivor absolutely.

    We may now briefly refer to certain decisions of the English Courts cited to us. Sri George Jessel M.R discussed in Marshal v. Crutwell(3) the general rule to be followed in cases where a banking account in joint names is opened. He observed:

    “As I understand it, the law is this: The mere circumstance that the name of a child or a wife is inserted on the occasion of a purchase of stock is not sufficient to rebut a resulting trust in favour of the purchaser if the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that a trust was intended. Although a purchase in the name of a wife or a child, if altogether unexplained, will be deemed a gift, yet you may take surrounding circumstances into consideration, so as to say that it is a trust, not a gift. So in the case of a stranger, you may take surrounding circumstances into consideration so as to say that a purchase in his name is a gift, not a trust.”

    In the particular case before him, the Master of the Rolls came to the conclusion that in opening an account in the joint names of himself and his wife, the husband did not intend to make a provision for the wife, but that it was a mere arrangement for convenience. He said:

    “Having regard to the rule which is now binding on me that I must infer from the surrounding circumstances what the nature of the transaction was, I come to the conclusion that it was not intended to be a provision for the wife, but simply a mode of conveniently managing the testator's affairs, and that it leaves the money therefore still his property.”

    In the present case, we have come to the conclusion from the surrounding circumstances that Mrs. Jones did intend to make a provision for Mrs. Folkes in case she died before Mrs. Folkes. Following the general rule enunciated by the learned Master of the Rolls, Russell J. held in In re Harrison on different facts that in that case it was not a mere arrangement for convenience but that it was intended to be a provision for the wife. We agree with the learned Judge that both in fact and in law, on the death of Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Folkes became entitled to the balance standing to the credit of the joint account in the names of both.

    The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Costs of all parties will come out of the estate.

    V.C.S

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    Mrs. Avis Fitzalan Cowdray v. The Imperial Bank Of India And Another.
    (Apr 21, 1955)