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  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India.11.
  • Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as well as Article 227 of the Constitution.
  • Article 227 corresponds to Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915.
  • Section 115, C.P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution of India
  • provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of sub-section (2) of the Section 115, C.P.C
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT
  • Section 115, C.P.C to the Defendant. Sub-section (2)
  • Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Code. Similar expression in Section 115, C.P.C
  • Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act (70 of 1962).40.
  • Article 227 of the Constitution Section 115
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 115(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • SECTION 105 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 114 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT
  • SECTION 99 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • sub-section (1), and added sub-section (2)
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • sub-section (2) of Section 115, C.P.C
  • sub-section (2) to Section 115, C.P.C,
  • clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section 1
  • Amendment Act of 1976.23.
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Section 115, & Section 116
  • Section 115, C.P.C22.
  • Section 115, C.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India.11.
  • Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as well as Article 227 of the Constitution.
  • Article 227 corresponds to Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915.
  • Section 115, C.P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution of India
  • provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of sub-section (2) of the Section 115, C.P.C
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT
  • Section 115, C.P.C to the Defendant. Sub-section (2)
  • Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Code. Similar expression in Section 115, C.P.C
  • Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act (70 of 1962).40.
  • Article 227 of the Constitution Section 115
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 115(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • SECTION 105 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 114 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 115 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT
  • SECTION 99 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • sub-section (1), and added sub-section (2)
  • HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
  • sub-section (2) of Section 115, C.P.C
  • sub-section (2) to Section 115, C.P.C,
  • clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section 1
  • Amendment Act of 1976.23.
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Section 115, & Section 116
  • Section 115, C.P.C22.
  • Section 115, C.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This case arises from Suit O.S No. 170 of 1984 filed by the Plaintiff, wife of the deceased Velu, against the Defendant, the deceased's mother, seeking declaration of title and delivery of possession of a property allegedly purchased by the deceased with his self-acquired funds held by the Defendant. The Plaintiff married Velu in 1982, and after his death in 1983, the Defendant retained possession of the property, denying the Plaintiff's claim. The Trial Court initially decreed the suit ex parte, but upon the Defendant's successful application to set aside the ex parte decree, the suit was retried and again decreed ex parte in favor of the Plaintiff, declaring her owner of the entire property and directing possession delivery.

Subsequently, a third party filed Suit O.S 102 of 1986 claiming title to the same property, which was dismissed with observations favoring the Defendant as heir of Velu. The Plaintiff filed Execution Petition No. 71 of 1990 to enforce the decree, which the Defendant contested, claiming the property belonged to her and that the decree was ineffective due to the third party suit. The Executing Court dismissed the Defendant's application, and the Defendant challenged this dismissal in Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P) 509 of 1991.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Trial Court erred in declaring the Plaintiff as the exclusive owner of the entire property, ignoring the fact that the Defendant is also a Class I heir under the Hindu Succession Act entitled to a share.
  2. Whether the High Court can exercise suo motu powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the decree passed by the subordinate court for grave injustice caused by non-application of law.
  3. The scope and limitations of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, especially in cases where an appeal lies.
  4. The applicability of the principle of res judicata in execution and revision proceedings challenging the validity of the decree itself.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant's Arguments

  • The Defendant challenged the Plaintiff's status as the wife of the deceased and contested the suit property ownership.
  • Claimed that the property belonged to her and that the decree in O.S 170 of 1984 became ineffective due to the third party suit judgment.
  • Argued that the High Court should not interfere with the decree under Section 115(2) C.P.C since an appeal lay against it.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The Plaintiff claimed exclusive title to the property as the sole heir under the Hindu Succession Act.
  • Relied on the decree of the Trial Court and sought execution of possession.
  • Contended that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court should not be exercised merely on an error of law.
  • Argued that the principle of res judicata applies, preventing re-examination of the decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chowdhury Ram Prasad Rai v. Mahesh Kant Chowdhury, AIR 1922 Pat 525 No limitation period for exercising suo motu powers under Section 115, C.P.C. Supported the Court's suo motu exercise of revisionary powers to prevent miscarriage of justice.
P.C. Muthu Chettiar v. Narayanan Chettiar, AIR 1928 Mad 528 Same as above regarding suo motu powers under Section 115, C.P.C. Reinforced the principle of no limitation for suo motu revision.
Rasu v. Rattara, AIR 1924 Ran 349 Ground for revision when subordinate court disregards a provision of law. Applied to hold that ignoring the Hindu Succession Act provisions warranted revision.
Imam Din v. Shag Singh, AIR 1931 Lah 746 Omission of an obvious principle of law by subordinate court amounts to illegal exercise of jurisdiction. Supported the Court's finding of jurisdictional error in the Trial Court's decree.
R. Krishnamurthy v. G. Parthasarathy, AIR 1949 Mad 780 Distinction between inherent want of jurisdiction (void decree) and error of jurisdiction (correctable by appeal). Clarified limits of revisional jurisdiction, but Court found Trial Court had jurisdictional error.
Shri Kumar Dwivedi v. Thakurji Maharaj Brijman, AIR 1950 All 43 Revision limited to jurisdictional errors or material irregularity causing failure of justice, not every error of law. Used to distinguish errors justifying revision from mere legal errors.
Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 Section 115, C.P.C powers limited to jurisdictional issues, not mere errors of law. Supported the Court’s view that ignoring a substantive legal provision is a jurisdictional error.
Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, AIR 1964 SC 1341 Section 115, C.P.C powers severely restricted, cannot correct errors where jurisdiction was rightly exercised. Reinforced that only jurisdictional errors justify revision.
The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 SC 76 High Court should not interfere unless there is illegal or materially irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Applied to emphasize limits on revisional interference.
Arvind Berry v. Admiral A.P.S Bindra, AIR 1985 Del 248 Order wrong in law but within jurisdiction is not a nullity. Distinguished jurisdictional error from mere legal error.
Balambika v. Elizabeth, 1990 (1) MLJ 369 Section 47, C.P.C refusal to interfere if justice rendered. Referenced regarding execution proceedings but distinguished on facts.
Vidyavati v. Shri Devi Das, AIR 1977 SC 397 Revision maintainable if no appeal lies to High Court from order sought to be revised. Discussed in relation to Section 115(2) and appeal availability.
P. Ramaswamy v. Sri Dhandayuthapani Finance, Sankari, AIR 1986 Mad 360 Appeal to subordinate court does not oust High Court's revisional jurisdiction. Considered in construing Section 115, C.P.C post-amendment.
Surendra Nath Dibra v. Stephen Court Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1361 Article 227 powers should be used sparingly but can be exercised to correct errors apparent on record. Justified suo motu interference by High Court under Article 227.
State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji, AIR 1964 SC 1481 Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction cannot be limited by State Legislature Act. Supported High Court’s power to ensure subordinate courts obey law.
Josephy Santa Vincent v. Ambico Industries, AIR 1969 Bom 49 Article 227 jurisdiction complementary to Section 115, C.P.C; can correct errors not amounting to jurisdictional errors. Supported exercise of Article 227 jurisdiction for errors apparent on record.
Rathinam v. Pavathal, 1991 (2) MLJ 323 Article 227 can be invoked even where alternative remedies exist if justice demands. Used to reject contention that alternative remedy bars Article 227 invocation.
Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjuna Bhavanappa Tinmuite, AIR 1960 SC 137 Mere error of law does not warrant exercise of Article 227 jurisdiction unless error is apparent on face of record. Distinguished error of law from jurisdictional error justifying interference.
Meneck Castodiji Surjarji v. Sarafazali Miran, AIR 1976 SC 2446 Article 227 should not be invoked if alternative remedy exists. Distinguished for suo motu exercise where alternative remedy is not invoked by parties.
Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustuquim, AIR 1984 SC 38 Article 227 should not interfere with Civil Court decisions merely due to error of law or fact. Distinguished from present case where error was jurisdictional and apparent.
Poosariar Ekambaram Pillai v. Visalakshi, 1990 (2) MLJ 90 Same principle as above regarding Article 227 interference. Applied similarly to distinguish error of law from jurisdictional error.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court found that the Trial Court's decree in O.S 170 of 1984 was fundamentally flawed due to a failure to apply the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, which designates multiple Class I heirs equally entitled to the deceased's property. The Plaintiff and Defendant, both Class I heirs, were entitled to equal shares, yet the Trial Court erroneously declared the Plaintiff as sole owner and ordered possession delivery. The Court emphasized that the Trial Court did not apply its mind to this legal principle, constituting a jurisdictional error and miscarriage of justice.

The Court distinguished between mere errors of law and jurisdictional errors, holding that the latter justify intervention under Section 115, C.P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution. It rejected the Plaintiff's argument that revisional jurisdiction should not be exercised because an appeal lay, reasoning that the suo motu exercise of revision by the High Court is not fettered by procedural bars applicable to party-filed petitions. The Court also held that the principle of res judicata does not apply when the validity of the decree itself is challenged.

Relying on numerous precedents, the Court confirmed that where a subordinate court disregards a substantive provision of law, the High Court must intervene to prevent grave injustice. The Court found that the evidence supported the Plaintiff's title only to one half share and that the Plaintiff should have been directed to file a suit for partition. However, to avoid injustice and unnecessary litigation, the Court directed the Trial Court to pass a preliminary decree declaring the Plaintiff's right to one half share and allowing further proceedings for final partition.

Consequently, the original decree was set aside, the execution proceedings became infructuous, and the Civil Revision Petition was dismissed on that ground. The Court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that the decree in O.S No. 170 of 1984 declaring the Plaintiff as sole owner and directing delivery of possession was unsustainable and set it aside.

The Court declared that both Plaintiff and Defendant, as Class I heirs under the Hindu Succession Act, are entitled to equal shares in the property. It directed the Trial Court to pass a preliminary decree recognizing the Plaintiff's right to one half share and permitted further proceedings for partition and final decree. The execution proceedings based on the original decree were dismissed as infructuous. The Court exercised suo motu powers under Section 115, C.P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution to rectify a grave miscarriage of justice due to non-application of law by the Trial Court.

No new precedent was set beyond reaffirming the scope of revisional and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in cases of jurisdictional error and miscarriage of justice.

    Annapoorni v. Janaki .

    JUDGMENT

    1. This is an extraordinary case demanding this Court's invoking its suo motu powers under Section 115, C.P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in order to prevent the perpetuation of grave and gross injustice caused by the Trial Court's overlooking an express provision of law. Facts are as follows: The parties will be referred to according to their array in the Suit. The Plaintiff is the wife of one Velu, who died on 15.7.1983 The Defendant is his mother. The Plaintiff has filed the Suit O.S No. 170 of 1984 for a declaration of her title to the property described in the Plaint and for delivery of possession of the same by the Defendant. In the Plaint, it is stated that the husband of the Plaintiff had saved money from his salary earned by him on employment in a milk depot and kept it in the custody of his mother, with the aid of which, he purchased the suit property on 13.6.1979 The amount had been paid on 9.6.1976 from out of the money kept by the Plaintiffs husband with his mother, the Defendant, to the vendor. The Plaintiff married the deceased Velu on 1.7.1982, and as there was some misunderstanding between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the Plaintiff decided to live separately. She was taken to her father's place in Karumbur village on 13.7.1983 by her husband, who returned to Karaikudi on 14.7.1983 and wrote a Letter to her. The Plaintiff got information that her husband died on 15.7.1983 and rushed to Karaikudi, but even before her arrival, the body was cremated. The property was purchased with the self-acquired funds of the Plaintiff's husband and nobody other than the Plaintiff is his heir. The Plaintiff is a Class I heir under the Hindu Succession Act. The Defendant has taken the Sale Deed into her custody, taking advantage of the death of her son and has been preventing the Plaintiff from enjoying the property from 27.11.1983 The Plaintiff owned several jewels and vessels which were brought as ‘Stridhana’ to her husband's house. The Plaintiff would file a separate Suit with regard to the same. The Defendant has no right whatever in the suit property and she was bound to deliver possession to the Plaintiff. Hence, the Plaintiff has prayed for declaration of title and recovery of possession.

    2. A Written Statement was filed by the Defendant in which several pleas were raised, including a challenge of the status of the Plaintiff as the wife of the deceased Velu. It is not necessary for the purpose of this order to refer to the defence set up by the Defendant in the Suit. The Suit was posted for trial to 19.6.1985 in the list. The Defendant filed an Application for adjournment and it was dismissed. Her Counsel reported no instructions. The Plaintiff gave evidence as PWI and marked two documents as Ex. A1 & A2. The Suit was decreed ex parte on the basis of such evidence.

    3. The Defendant filed I.A 734 of 1985 for setting aside the ex parte decree and it was allowed on 3.4.1987 The Suit was posted for trial once agree to 17.6.1987 On that day too, the Defendant remained ex parte and the Plaintiff examined her father as PW1. Two documents were marked as Ex. A1 & A2. The Suit was decreed ex parte on the basis of the evidence. The Trial Court granted a declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner of the property and directed the Defendant to deliver possession on or before 17.8.1987 to the Plaintiff.

    4. Even before the Suit was disposed of, a third party, by name, Peria Karuppanna Chettiar filed a Suit O.S 102 of 1986, on the file of the District Munsif, Devakottai, against the Plaintiff and the Defendant, for a declaration of his title to the property and for recovery of possession after removal of the superstructure and closing of the well in the suit property. There was also a prayer for mesne profits besides damages for use and occupation. The Plaintiff remained ex parte in that Suit and the Defendant filed a Written Statement, contesting the same. That Suit was dismissed by the District Munsif on 12.4.1989 long after the disposal of O.S 170 of 1984. In the course of the judgment, there was an observation that the Defendants therein were rightly claiming as heirs of the deceased Velu.

    5. The Plaintiff filed an Execution Petition No. 71 of 1990 for delivery of possession pursuant to the decree dated 17.6.1987 in O.S No. 170 of 1984. A Counter Statement was filed by the Defendant contesting the execution proceedings. The Defendant also filed an Application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure in E.A 575 of 1990, praying that the Execution Petition should be dismissed as the suit property belonged to her. The contention raised in that Application is that in O.S 102 of 1986 to which both the Plaintiff and Defendant were parties, a judgment had been given on 12.4.1989 in favour of the Defendant herein and the decree in O.S 170 of 1984 became ineffective as a consequence thereof. The Application was contested and the Executing Court dismissed the same by Order dated 11.1.1991 It is the said order which is challenged by the Defendant in C.R.P 509 of 1991.

    6. When the Civil Revision Petition was being heard, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the Plaintiff was claiming only under the Hindu Succession Act as Class I heir of her deceased husband and the Defendant would naturally be another Class I heir of the Plaintiffs husband, she being his mother. It was, therefore, argued that the decree in the Suit declaring the exclusive title of the Plaintiff and directing the Defendant to deliver possession was unsustainable in law and such a decree could not be executed. At that time, I had occasion to look into the records of the Suit O.S 170 of 1984, and found that the District Munsif had completely ignored the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and failed to note that the Plaintiff would be entitled to only one half share in the property even on the basis of the facts set out in the Plaint. Hence I passed an order on 27.9.1991, expressing my opinion that the decree in O.S 170 of 1984 was really per in curiam, and exercising my powers under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code suo motu, ordered issuance of notice to the Respondent herein, to show cause why the decree should not be set aside.

    7. I had also sent for all the records in O.S No. 170 of 1984 through Court besides the execution records. When the matter was taken up for hearing after the receipt of records, learned Counsel for the Respondent raised several objections to which I will refer in detail later, including an objection that Section 115(2) of the Civil Procedure Code prevents this Court from interfering with the decree in the Suit. At that stage, I thought it better to call upon the Counsel to argue as to why I should not exercise my powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India suo motu and set aside the decree. I gave sufficient time to learned Counsel on both sides to prepare their arguments with reference to Article 227 of the Constitution, and the matter was finally heard on 18.11.1991

    8. The facts set out by me earlier would clearly show that the decree in C.S 170 of 1984 is unsustainable in law. I have referred to the contents of the Plaint. There is no averment in the Plaint that the Plaintiff husband bequeathed the property to the Plaintiff by testament or conveyed the property to the Plaintiff by any other instrument. The only basis of the claim of the Plaintiff is that she is a Class I heir under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. By the same token, the mother of the husband of the Plaintiff would equally be a Class I heir. There being no other heir of the deceased, the Plaintiff and the Defendant would equally be entitled to the property. Strangely, the prayer in the Plaint is to the effect that the Plaintiff is to be declared entitled to the entire property. Counsel for the Plaintiff should have advised the Plaintiff to claim only such relief to which she would be entitled, to law. He did not do so. The Defendant did not point out in the Written Statement that the Plaintiff would be entitled to only one half share even on the basis of the averments in the Plaint, probably, because, the Defendant wanted to defeat the claim of the Plaintiff in entirety. One plea taken by her is that the Plaintiff had lost her status as the wife of the deceased by a divorce according to caste custom. Another plea is that the property was purchased by her with her own funds in the name of her son when he was a minor, and he was not entitled to any interest in the property.

    9. In any event, the Court ought to have borne in mind the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and passed a decree in accordance with law. The Court has completely failed to apply its mind to the relevant provisions of law. It should also be noted that the evidence adduced before the Court does not also warrant the grant of a declaration as prayed for. The Plaintiffs father who has given evidence as PW1, has merely stated that his daughter is the wife of deceased Velu, and that the property was purchased under Ex1. Ex. A2 is a Letter written by the deceased Velu to the Plaintiff on 14.7.1983 Thus, on the totality of the evidence and the averments in the Plaint, the only decree which could have been legally passed by the Court is to declare the right of the Plaintiff to one half share and reject the prayer for recovery of possession. In the normal course, the Plaintiff should have been directed to file a Suit for partition.

    10. When this Court finds that a decree suffers from an error of law apparent on the fact of the record owing to non-application of mind of the Court, to the relevant Principles of Law, this Court cannot keep silent and allow the decree to be in force, particularly, when it causes grave injustice. There can be no doubt whatever that under the Hindu Succession Act, certain persons are designated as Class I heirs and all of them are entitled to succeed to the estate of a deceased Hindu. There is no earthly reason for depriving the mother of the deceased of her legitimate share in the estate which in this case happens to be a moiety. This is a typical case of miscarriage of justice which should be rectified the moment it comes to the notice of this Court. It is only for that reason, I am exercising my powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India.’

    11. There is no period of limitation for exercising suo motu powers under Section 115, C.P.C - vide Chowdhury Ram Prasad Rai v. Mahesh Kant Chowdhury*, AIR 1922 Pat 525; and P.C. Muthu Chettiar v. Narayanan Chettiar, AIR 1928 Mad 528 : 1915 (28) LW 297. It is also held that if a provision of law is completely disregarded by a subordinate Court, that will be a ground for exercising the powers under Section 115, C.P.C - vide Rasu v. Rattara, AIR 1924 Ran 349. It is held in that case, “When a Court has applied its mind to the law and decides wrongly, then there is ground for revision; but where it disregards some provision of law, and has not applied its mind to that provision, then there is ground for Revision. In lmam Din v. Shag Singh, AIR 1931 Lah 746, Jai Lal, J. held that if an obvious principle of law is omitted to be applied by the subordinate Judge, it would amount to illegally acting in the exercise of jurisdiction.

    12. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff placed reliance on the Judgment of a Division Bench in R. Krishnamurthy v. G. Parthasarathy, AIR 1949 Mad 780, to contend that the Revisional powers of this Court cannot be exercised merely because there is an error in the Order of the Lower Court. The Bench has referred to a distinction between an inherent want of jurisdiction where a decree would be absolutely void and want of jurisdiction on grounds to be determined by the Court in which case the decree cannot be set aside by Collateral proceedings. It is also pointed out that if the question which is alleged to a create the want of jurisdiction is one which the Court is bound to decide, the matter is not one relating to jurisdiction, and if there is any error in the decision, it can be only remedied by an Appeal or other procedures known to law.

    13. Learned Counsel invites my attention to the decision if Shri Kumar Dwivedi v. Thakurji Maharaj Brijman, AIR 1950 All 43, wherein a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was confined to the four corners of the powers given in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and every error of law, or every error of procedure or every error of fact could not be revised by the High Court under that Section. It was observed:

    “It is therefore clear that the powers of the High Court in Revision are not available for correction of errors of law, however gross those errors may be, and whatever may be the result of those errors on the merits of the case. This power of the High Court is only available where the High Court could legitimately hold that the Court below had exceeded its jurisdiction or had refrained from exercising jurisdiction vested in it or it acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of that jurisdiction, namely committed such an error of procedure, a mandatory procedure, and the error had resulted in failure of justice or some such thing.”

    14. Learned Counsel referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497. Reliance is placed on the following passage:

    “The power given by Section 115 of the Code is clearly limited to the keeping of the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. It does not comprehend the power exercisable under the Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus. It is also not a full power of Certiorari inasmuch as it arises only in a case of jurisdiction on and not in a case of error. It has been ruled by the Judicial Committee and also by this Court that the section is concerned with jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone, involving a refusal to exercise jurisdiction where one exists or an assumption of jurisdiction where none exists and lastly acting with illegality or material irregularity. Where there is no question of jurisdiction in this manner the decision cannot be corrected, for, it has also been ruled that a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly. But once a flaw of jurisdiction is found the High Court need not quash and remit as is the practice in English law under the Writ of Certiorari but pass such order as it thinks fit.”

    Learned Counsel referred to a decision in Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai , AIR 1964 SC 1341. It was held in that case that the power of the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C is severely restricted and it cannot be exercised in a case where the Trial Court had jurisdiction to decide a question and did decide it, whether it decided rightly or wrongly.

    15. Learned Counsel cited the judgment in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, AIR 1973 SC 76, wherein it was held that the High Court should not interfere even if the order of the Lower Court is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not, unless the Lower Court had exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

    16. He relied on the observations found in Arvind Berry… v. Admiral A.P.S Bindra…., AIR 1985 Del 248, that an order may be wrong in law, but if a Court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter and parties, it cannot be said to be a nullity.

    17. Learned Counsel drew my attention to the judgment in Balambika v. Elizabeth, 1990 (1) MLJ 369 : 1990 LW 218, in which Abdul Hadi, J. refused to interfere with an order of the Lower Court under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that justice had been rendered.

    18. All the rulings referred to by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff do not have a bearing in this case. I have already pointed out that disregarding an obvious provision of law would nullify the decision of the subordinate Court, but if the Court had considered the question and come to a conclusion, that cannot be interfered with in Revision, even if the same is wrong in law. In the present case, the Court never applied its mind to the question whether the Plaintiff was entitled to the entirety of the property, and on her showing she was entitled to only one half thereof. When the Plaintiff has chosen to refer to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act and claimed as a Class I heir, the Court should have immediately realised that the Defendant is also a Class I heir under the same Act. In all the cases referred to by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff, it has Been held that their Revisional jurisdiction of this Court should not be exercised to set right a decision which is erroneous in law. No doubt, mere errors of law cannot be corrected under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless they relate to the jurisdiction of the Court. But when the errors are apparent on record, in utter disregard of a substantive provision of law, and there is flagrant violation of justice, this Court is entitled to interfere and bound to interfere under Section MS, C.P.C

    19. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the judgment in O.S 170 of 1984 would operate as res judicata in these proceedings. There is no merit in the contention. It is the validity of the said judgment that is being questioned here. Hence the Principle of res judicata will have no Application. It is then contended by learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that no plea was raised by the Defendant in the Suit that the Plaintiff is entitled to only one half share. I have already referred to that aspect of the matter. I am of the view that even if there is no plea by the Defendant, the Court is bound to respect the relevant provisions of law and apply the same correctly before passing any decree in the matter.

    20. It is then contended that this Court has no more excessive power than that of the executing Court which is bound to execute the decree, and it cannot go behind the decree. There is no substance in this contention also, I am not merely disposing of C.R.P 509 of 1991 which is arising out of the Execution proceedings. I am exercising suo motu powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as against the decree in O.S 170 of 1984. My powers are governed by Section 115, C.P.C and they are certainly wider than that of the executing Court.

    21. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff referred to the provisions of sub-section (2) of the Section 115, C.P.C and contended that this Court shall not under the subsection, ‘vary or reverse any decree or order against which an Appeal lies either to this Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.’ Learned Counsel rightly pointed out that an Appeal was available to the Defendant as against the decree in the Suit, to the District Court or the Sub-Court. Hence sub-section (2) bars the grant of any relief under Section 115, C.P.C to the Defendant. Sub-section (2) was introduced by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976. The amendment itself was brought about by a recommendation of the Law Commission and on the basis of the Report of the Joint Committee. Before the amendment was introduced, the Supreme Court had construed sub-section (1) in Vidyavati v. Shri Devi Das, AIR 1977 SC 397, and held that a Revision in the High Court was maintainable if no Appeal lay to the High Court from the order sought to be revised. The words “in which no Appeal lies thereto” were interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean that “no Appeal must lie to the High Court from the order in question and where an Appeal against an order lies to the District Court or other subordinate Court and not to the High Court, a Revision is maintainable under Section 115, C.P.C”

    22. Long after the Amendment was introduced, Sathiadev, J., in P. Ramaswamy v. Sri Dhandayuthapani Finance, Sankari, AIR 1986 Mad 360 : 1986 (99) LW 404), held that the fact that an Appeal against the impugned order lies to a Subordinate Court does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a Revision Petition. There is no reference in the judgment to sub-section (2) of Section 115, C.P.C introduced by the Amendment Act of 1976.

    23. There was no difficulty whatever when the Section stood as it was before the Amendment. Complications have arisen only after the amendment. The Law Commission of India, in its 14th Report, on Reform of Judicial Administration Volume I, Chapter 17, made the following suggestions:

    “Though we do not feel justified in recommending any general curtailment in the powers of revision conferred by Section 115, we are of the view that the difficulties created by conflicting judicial views in the interpretation of the section need to be removed. We, therefore, make the following recommendations indicating the lines on which Section 115 should, in our opinion, be amended:

    (1) The expression “case decided’ in the Section should be clarified so as to include within it an interlocutory order including an order deciding an issue from which no Appeal lies.

    (2) Provision should, however, be made in the section, limiting the power of revision to such interlocutory orders which if decided in favour of the Petitioner would be sufficient for the final disposal of the Suit or proceeding; or in which the order is likely to occasion a failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury.”

    (3) The words “in which no Appeal lies thereto” in the first part of the Section should be altered so as to make untenable the view of the Rajasthan High Court that a Revision will lie if the order could be brought before the High Court eventually in Second Appeal or be made the subject matter of a ground of Appeal to the High Court under Section 105 of the Civil Procedure Code. Our intention is that the right of moving the High Court in revision should be denied only in cases where an Appeal lies either to the High Court or to the District Court from the order in question.

    Apart from the provisions of Section 115, it is not unusual to invoke jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in order to induce the High Courts to interfere in Revision. We are of the view, however, that such powers as the High Courts possess under Article 227 need to be preserved, notwithstanding their occasional use for the purpose of reviewing decisions of the Courts below.”

    Similar observations are found in the 27th Report of the Law Commission also. Based on the Recommendations made by the Law Commission, the Select Committee suggested the amendment as seen at present. As a result of the Amendment, sub-section (1) prescribes the basic condition for entertaining a Revision Petition in this Court, it being that ‘no Appeal lies to this Court’. Under sub-section (1), this Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit if any of the conditions set out in clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section 1 is present. The Proviso introduced by the Amendment refers to interlocutory orders which have no relevance in this case. Sub-section (2) reads that this Court ‘shall not vary or reverse any decree or order against which an Appeal lies to this Court or any Court subordinate.’ If sub-section (2) is read independently, it would mean that no Revision would lie in a case where the decree or order in question is appealable. If that had been the intention of the Legislature, it need not have introduced sub-section (2) to Section 115, C.P.C, but could have achieved the object by deleting the word “thereto” in sub-section (1). If the section enables this Court to exercise its power of Revision in a case in which no Appeal lies, that would certainly be sufficient, and there would have been no doubt whatever that whenever an Appeal lies against a particular order or decree, a Revision cannot be entertained. Reference may be made to Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code in which the Code provides for a review of a decree or order under clause (b) of the said section. The expression used is, “decree or order from which no Appeal is allowed by this Code.” Similar expression in Section 115, C.P.C would have served the purpose. But the Parliament has, in its wisdom, chosen to retain the language of the section as it stood in tact and numbered it as sub-section (1), and added sub-section (2) thereto. Thus, it has become the duty of the Court to give a harmonious construction to sub-section 1 and sub-section (2). If the contention of learned Counsel for the Plaintiff is accepted, sub-section (1) would become meaningless, inasmuch as it restricts the power of Revision to cases in which the Appeal does not lie to this Court. The incongruity in the situation has been pointed out by Sarkar on Civil Procedure, Seventh Edition, Volume 1, at pages 263 & 264 in the following passage:

    “In view of the express provisions made in sub-section (2), the words” in which no Appeal lies thereto” should have thus been appropriately omitted from sub-section (1). It may be pointed out that Law Commission, in 54th Report opined that in view of Article 227 of the Constitution Section 115 was no longer necessary and recommended omission of Section 115, & Section 116 was as such deleted in original Bill. The Joint Committee, however, felt that, in spite of the alternative remedy available under Article 227 of the Constitution, Section 115 serves useful purpose as a cheap and easy remedy and, recommending the retention of Section 115 and following the Recommendations of Law Commission's 14th and 27th Reports, added the Proviso, sub-section (2) and Explanation reproducing verbatim the draft Amendment proposed in the 27th Report but overlooking that in the said draft Amendment in sub-section (1) the words “and in which no Appeal lies thereto” were consequentially omitted (vide P. 40 of the Report). The re Suit has been that while according to the basis condition in sub-section (1) the High Court may entertain an Application for Revision from an order against which an Appeal may lie to the Lower Appellate Court (see Khanna v. Dillon, and Vidyawati v. Devadas, Sup), the High Court according to sub-section.(2) is incompetent to revise that order. The position is quite incongruous.”

    24. In my opinion, the section should be construed in such a manner that sub-section (2) would not apply to cases where this Court chooses to exercise its power suo motu, and not on any application by a party. When this Court decides to exercise its power suo motu, it means that there is a flagrant violation of justice, and this Court wants to prevent the perpetuation thereof by exercising its suo motu powers. In such case, it would be unreasonable to say that if an Appeal lies to any Court against the decree or order, which has caused the miscarriage of justice, this Court is not entitled to vary or reverse the same. Hence sub-section (2) should be limited in its Application to Petitions filed by parties under Section 115, C.P.C invoking the power of Revision of this Court. That sub-section cannot, in the nature of things, apply to the suo motu exercise of power of Revision and restrict the same in any manner. When it is found that the Revisional power of this Court is necessarily to be exercised suo motu, even if any party has not moved this Court, therefor, the procedural fetters cannot stop this Court from exercising the same.

    25. It is also possible to consider the matter from a different angle. The words used in sub-section (2) are “vary or reverse”. In sub-section (1), this Court may make “such order in the case as it thinks fit”. If the two sub-sections are to be construed harmoniously so that both may exist together, sub-section (1) should be interpreted in such a manner as to enable the Court to pass an order, which will not fall within the scope of the expression “vary or reverse”. In other words, a third kind of order other than ‘varying or reversing’ is contemplated. In Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code, while referring to the powers of the Appellate Court in an Appeal against the original decree of a Subordinate Court, the section uses the following expression:

    No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded….,

    That Section contemplates decree being (1) reversed, and (2) substantially varied and (3) the case being remanded. The Appellate Court has got powers under that Section to pass three kinds of Orders. If sub-Section (1) is to be construed as enabling the High Court to make three kinds of Orders, namely, (1) varying the Order of the Trial Court, (2) reversing, the same and (3) remaining the matter for fresh disposal, it could be said to be a harmonious construction. However, I do not want to dispose of this case on the basis of the latter construction of Section 115, C.P.C I prefer the former construction set out supra. I am also entitled to invoke the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which have been recognised by the Supreme Court to be complementary to Section 115 C.P.C Vide Kishori Devi v. Kala Narain Raigal, 1969 (1) SCWR 133).

    26. Turning to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the power of superintendence of this Court is not only administrative but also judicial. It is open to this Court under that Article to interfere with a judicial order made by a Subordinate Court, if and when necessary. Vide In re Gangalakurthi Pattisam, AIR 1954 Mad 573 : 1954 (67) LW 24; Naryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215; and Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233.

    27. In Surendra Nath Dibra v. Stephen Court Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 1361, the Supreme Court cautioned that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should ordinarily be used sparingly by the High Court. But, at the same time, it was pointed out that it would not be a ground to throw out an Application where it was necessary to exercise the power, in the circumstances of the case.

    28. In State of Gujarat v. Vakhatsinghji, AIR 1964 SC 1481, it is held that the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals which the High Court has under Article 227, cannot be limited by any Act of the State Legislature, and that the supervising jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the Law.

    29. In Josephy Santa Vincent v. Ambico Industries*, AIR 1969 Bom 49, Tarkunde, J. expressed the law thus:

    “On the preliminary objection Mr. Banaji argued that it was open to the Petitioner to file a Revision Application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code from the decrees passed by the Courts below and that the hearing of this Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution must, therefore, be confined to such contentions as can be entertained by this Court in the exercise of its Revisional jurisdiction. Since no error was committed by the Courts below in the exercise of their jurisdiction, this Petition, according to Mr. Banaji was not tenable. I do not find any merit in this preliminary objection. If a Revision Application were an adequate remedy in the present case, the Petitioner would not have been entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. This Petition has been filed because, according to the Petitioner, the decree passed by the Courts below are vitiated by an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, but which is not an error in the exercise of their jurisdiction. In Sp. Civil Appln. No. 459 of 1965, decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 14th & 15th December, 1965, it was held that a party who is aggrieved by a decree passed against him, and who claims that the decree is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, can approach this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, if the error is not capable of being corrected under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Moreover, the question must now be held to have been concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court, Surendra Nath Skluma Bi-bro v. Stephen Court Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 1361. That was an Appeal form the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in an Application which had been filed in the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code as well as Article 227 of the Constitution. What was challenged before the High Court was a decree of the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta. The Supreme Court held that, since the Application in the High Court had been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution as well as Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was open to the High Court to correct an error of the Court below which was not an error in the exercise of that Court's jurisdiction. In the case before me the alleged error of law of the Courts below is apparent on the face of the record and the Petition is, therefore, tenable under Article 227 of the Constitution.”

    The learned Judge has clearly pointed out that if an error is apparent on the face of the record, this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

    30. In Saral Dev Sharma v. Lila Ram, 1972 All India Rent Control Journal 552, the Delhi High Court held that an incompetent Appeal can be converted by the High Court into an Application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India suo motu in the interest of justice and to prevent miscarriage of justice.

    31. In Ram Bahal Singh v. Chhote Narain Singh, AIR 1975 Pat. 241, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that in the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, if it comes across any order which is contrary to law, the Court has got ample jurisdiction to quash the same suo motu.

    32. In Santosh Kumari v. Surjit Singh, 1990 Cri.L.J 1012, Kasliwal, C.J exercised his power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and set aside the order of the Subordinate Court on the ground that it was against the elementary principles of law and would perpetuate the offence of bigamy. By the order passed by the Subordinate Judge in the case, he granted a declaration that due to ill and weak health of the Plaintiff she was unable to satisfy the sexual desire of the Defendant and the Defendant was permitted to solemnise second marriage while the Plaintiff would be entitled to be called as legally wedded wife and the Defendant (husband) shall provide her (Plaintiff) all amenities till her death, and the marriage of their daughter shall be performed by the Defendant. While holding that the decree was absolutely wrong and illegal and it was against the clear provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, the learned judge pointed out that it would enable the party to commit the offence of bigamy as defined by the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge observed as follows:

    “Parties are admittedly Hindus and they were married on April 14, 1986 according to Hindu rites. There is no allegation that any divorce had taken place between the parties or their marriage had been declared void by any Competent Court of law before filing the present Suit for declaration.”

    “In the face of these circumstances, no order or decree should have been passed permitting the Defendant Sh. Surjit Singh to solemnise second marriage during the subsistence of marriage with his legally wedded wife Smt. Santosh Kumari. The Sub-Judge has clearly ignored the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act as well as the Indian Penal Code in this regard The Sub-Judge is expected to know such elementary principle of law and it is a gross mistake on his part to have ignored such principle of law and to have given a decree contrary to the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act and perpetuate a Criminal offence of bigamy punishable under the Indian Penal Code.”

    33. I am tempted to make some observations as made by the learned Judge in the above passage, with reference to the District Munsif, Devakottai who passed the decree in O.S 170 of 1984.

    34. Very recently, Venkataswami, J. had occasion to consider the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in Rathinam v. Pavathal, 1991 (2) MLJ 323 : 1991 (2) LW 688. An order of interim injunction made by the District Judge was challenged before this Court and it was set aside. While rejecting the contention urged by the Respondent's Counsel that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution should not be invoked where alternative remedy was available under the Civil Procedure Code, the learned Judge observed as follows:

    “…It is true that the Petitioners have remedies available under the Code of Civil Procedure. When they have invoked such alternative remedy and finding that they could not get justice speedily, then only, they have filed this Revision under Article 227 of the Constitution, and this is quite obvious from the tacts narrated above. Under such circumstances, this Court is not helpless to remedy the situation. If Article 227 of the Constitution is not available to remedy situations like this, I fail to understand under what better circumstances. Article 227 of the Constitution can be invoked. It may not be out of place to just point out that Order 39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the circumstances under which temporary injunction can be granted. Rule 3 directs the issue of notice to the opposite party before granting injunction and in the event of grave urgency requiring grant of “Injunction without notice”, the Court shall record the reasons explaining the object of granting the injunction and Rule 3-A further enjoins the Court to dispose of the Application for injunction within 30 days. In spite of all these in-built precautions, the District Judge has thrown overboard all these principles and granted interim injunction, and adding insult to the injury, continued the injunction even though the abuse of process of Court by the Plaintiff/Petitioner before him was clearly brought to his notice and also established before him.”

    35. On the facts of the present case, I am of the view that if Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not enable this Court to remedy the injustice caused by the decree made by the District Munsif, it is as if there is no such provision in the Constitution of India.

    36. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff placed reliance on the Judgment in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjuna Bhavanappa Tinmuite, AIR 1960 SC 137, in support of his contention that a mere error of law does not warrant the exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the following passage in the said Judgment:

    “We have noticed that in the Application to the High Court the Respondent asked that Court to exercise its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution by the method of issuing a Writ of certiorari or any other suitable Writ. Article 227 corresponds to Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. The scope of that section has been discussed in many decisions of Indian High Courts. However wide it may be that the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is well established that the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under that section assume Appellate powers to correct every mistake of law. Here there is no question of assumption of excessive jurisdiction or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or any irregularity or illegality in the procedure, or any breach of any Rule of Natural Justice. If anything, it may merely be an erroneous decision which, the error not being apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by the High Court in Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 227.”

    37. The above ruling does not help the Plaintiff. The passage extracted above itself makes it clear that if there is an error apparent on the face of the record, that will enable the Court to correct the record by exercising its jurisdiction.

    38. Learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Meneck Castodiji Surjarji v. Sarafazali Miran, AIR 1976 SC 2446; K.K Shrivastava v. B.K Jain, AIR 1977 SC 1703; and S.T Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, AIR 1988 SC 616, to contend that when there is alternative remedy available in law, Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not be invoked. I have already referred to the rulings which have expressed the view that the existence of an alternative remedy will not prevent this Court from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution whenever necessary. It is only when a party tiles an Application under Article 227, the principle of alternative remedy may come into play. That will not apply to a case where the power is exercised suo motu by this Court.

    39. Learned Counsel placed reliance on certain observation made by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Malam Singh v. The Collector, Se-hare, M.P, AIR 1971 MP 195. A passage at page 198 was read out. In that passage, the High Court had only quoted in extenso from the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.P Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal, AIR 1952 SC 64 : 1952 (65) LW 760 (SC)). In paragraph 12 of its judgment, the Supreme Court stated as follows:

    “(12) It is now well-recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This Rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. In Woolver Hampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford, 1859 SCB (RS) 335, at P. 356 in the following passage:

    “There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon statute. One is, where mere was a liability existing at common law and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the common law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of case law, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy; there, the party can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at in common taw is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it….The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.”

    The Rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Nevite v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant & Co., 1935 AC 532 and Secretary of State v. Mask & C, 44 Cal.WN 709 : 1940 (52) LW 1 (PC); and it has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights (see Hurautrat v. Off. Assignee of Calcutta, 52 Cal WN 343 at P. 349.) That being so, I think it will be a fair inference from the provisions of the Representation of the People Act to state that the Act provides for only one remedy, that remedy being by an Election Petition to be presented after the election is over, and there is no remedy provided at any intermediate stage.”

    The Madhya Pradesh High Court applied the above dictum of the Supreme Court in that case which related to an election under the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act (70 of 1962).

    40. That principle cannot help the Plaintiff in this case. This is not a special right conferred by a statute. Right to the property in question has accrued under the law of Succession, viz., Hindu Succession Act. The said Act does not prescribe any particular procedure. It leaves the parties to approach the Civil Court under the general law of procedure to get the relief they want. Hence, the principle that if a statute confers a particular right and prescribes a procedure to enforce the same, the party should resort only to such procedure, will not apply to the present case.

    41. Learned Counsel also invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustuquim, AIR 1984 SC 38, and a decision of this Court in Poosariar Ekambaram Pillai v. Visalakshi, 1990 (2) MLJ 90, to contend that under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court should not interfere with the decisions of Civil Court or Tribunal even if there is an error of law or fact. It is pointed out in those cases that simply because the High Court can come to a different conclusion, it will nor be a ground for interfering under that Article. On the facts of this case, no Court can come to a different conclusion that the Plaintiff is entitled only to a half share in the property. The District Munsif has taken a view which is patently erroneous in law and it is not a case of coming to a different conclusion on the facts of the case. This is a case where there can be only one conclusion on the facts set out in the Plaint and accepted by the District Munsif as proved. The issues framed in the Suit are, (1) whether the Plaintiff had title to or enjoyment of the suit property at any time, (2) whether the property was purchased benami in the name of the Plaintiff's husband when he was a minor, (3 whether the Plaintiffs husband had the means to purchase the property, and (4) whether the marriage of the Plaintiff and her husband Velu was dissolved according to caste custom. The fifth am sixth issues related to the reliefs to be granted to the Plaintiff.

    42. On the basis of the evidence of PW1 and Exs. A1 & A2, the first four issues have been found in favour of the Plaintiff as there is no evidence whatever to the contra. These finding, cannot be disturbed by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India even if they are erroneous or even if it is possible for this Court to come to a different conclusion. There is no question of setting aside these findings or giving another opportunity to the Defendant to adduce evidence in support of her case in the Written Statement. These findings will remain untouched on such findings, the only conclusions which a Court of law can arrive at is to declare the Plaintiffs title to one half share in the property. No other conclusion is possible. Hence, the conclusion of the District Munsif that the Plaintiff is en-titled to the entire property and recover possession thereof is set aside.

    43. Consequently, the decree passed in O.S No. 178 of 1984 on 17.6.1987 is set aside. As stated earlier, the normal Rule is to pass a decree declaring the Plaintiffs right to a half share and directing her to file a Suit for partition. But in the circumstances of the case, it will be unjust to drive the Plaintiff to another Suit, particularly when the findings on issues 1 to 4 remain unaltered and there is no other sharer to claim any interest in the property. There being no other question to be decided as between the parties, there is no impediment to pass a preliminary decree for partition in this Suit itself so that parties can resort to consequential final decree proceedings for dividing the property. Hence, I direct the District Munsif, Devakottai to pass a preliminary decree in the Suit O.S No. 170 of 1984 declaring that the Plaintiff is entitled to one half share in the property and that she will be entitled to file an Application for passing of final decree for division of the property and separate allotment of the said half share. It will be open to the Trial Court to grant such other appropriate consequential reliefs as the parties may be entitled to. In view of my setting aside the decree in O.S No. 170 of 1984, nothing remains to be executed. Consequently, the execution proceedings and the Execution Petition No. 508 of 1991 have become infructuous. The Civil Revision Petition as well as the Execution proceedings instituted by the Plaintiff are dismissed on that ground. The suo motu Revision under Section 115, C.P.C and Article 227 of the Constitution of India is allowed. The parties will bear their respective costs.

    Hindu Succession Act.

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