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Opinion Summary: Writ Appeal arising from W.P. No. 21512 of 2003 (P. Sathasivam, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The husband of the petitioner, Annamalai, who worked as a Line Inspector with the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board (TNEB) at Thandarampet, died on 15.07.1996. He left behind his wife (the petitioner), four daughters and a son (then about 11 years old). The petitioner, as the widow and dependent, sought employment on compassionate grounds for her son.

On 10.07.1999 the petitioner submitted a representation requesting compassionate employment for her son. By letter dated 14.07.1999 the second respondent (Superintending Engineer) replied that appointment on compassionate grounds could be provided only after the son attained 18 years, and that the petitioner should make an application then. The son attained majority on 11.01.2003 and the petitioner applied again on 13.01.2003.

By order dated 24.04.2003 the second respondent rejected the 13.01.2003 application on the ground it was beyond the three-year limit from the date of death, as prescribed in Board Proceedings B.P. No.46 dated 13.10.1995. The petitioner challenged that rejection by filing W.P. No. 21512 of 2003, which the learned single Judge dismissed on grounds of laches. The petitioner appealed against that dismissal; this opinion disposes of the writ appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner/appellant has made out a case for appointment to her son on compassionate grounds.
  2. Whether the learned single Judge was correct in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches and in sustaining the rejection based on the three‑year time limit in Board Proceedings (B.P. No.46 dated 13.10.1995).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The petitioner initially submitted an application on 10.07.1999, which fell within three years of the date of death of her husband (15.07.1996).
  • The second respondent's letter dated 14.07.1999 explicitly informed the petitioner to apply again after her son attained 18 years; the petitioner complied by applying two days after her son attained majority (application dated 13.01.2003 for son born 12.01.1985; majority on 11.01.2003).
  • The petitioner asserted indigence and loss of the family breadwinner, seeking relief consistent with the compassionate appointment policy; there was no laches or inordinate delay on her part in following the Board officer's directive.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents relied on Board Proceedings B.P. No.46 dated 13.10.1995, which contains a condition that applications for compassionate appointment must be made within three years of the death of the employee; the 13.01.2003 application was beyond that three-year limit.
  • Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on multiple reported decisions (several Supreme Court decisions and other authorities) to support the proposition that courts and tribunals cannot award compassionate appointments by sympathetic consideration, that compassionate appointments are to be administered according to rules and cannot be compelled by courts, and that vacancies cannot be held vacant until an applicant attains majority unless specifically provided.
  • The respondents also pointed to a Board proceeding dated 06.04.2002 that deleted certain clauses (including those requiring a minor to reapply on attaining majority and that fresh applications will be considered based on rules applicable on that later date), contending that the later deletion meant the petitioner’s second application could not be treated under the earlier B.P.46 regime.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
1994 (2) S.C.C. 718 One of several Supreme Court authorities collectively cited for propositions including: courts cannot grant relief based on sympathy; compassionate appointments must follow rules; vacancies cannot be reserved until a minor attains majority unless provided; compassionate appointment is not a right; schemes must be followed. The court grouped this decision with others to extract the general principles but observed that, while those principles would point to rejection if strictly applied, they were not directly determinative in the present case because of the Board proceedings and the second respondent's prior communication to the petitioner.
2000 (7) Supreme 83 As above: cited among authorities establishing limits on court-ordered compassionate appointments and the need to follow rules and administrative instructions. Considered by the court as part of the body of authorities stating limiting principles; the court held those principles did not directly decide the present dispute given the factual matrix involving the Board's procedure and the respondent's letter.
2000 (7) S.C.C. 192 As above: part of a group of decisions articulating that compassionate appointments must adhere to rules and cannot be conferred as a matter of sympathy or by judicial fiat. Noted as part of the general principles; the court found those principles not directly applicable on the facts before it because the department itself had invited a further application upon majority.
2004 (7) Supreme 691 As above: cited for the same set of limiting principles regarding compassionate appointments. Treated as part of the body of precedent summarised by the court; the court held these precedents would normally counsel against the grant, but distinguished them in the present fact situation.
2004 (7) S.C.C. 265 As above: contributed to the set of principles restricting judicial interference in compassionate appointments and emphasizing adherence to rules. Summarised with the other decisions; the court concluded these decisions did not override the Board proceeding and the second respondent's prior direction to reapply after majority.
Union of India v. Bhagwan Singh, 1995 (6) S.C.C. 476 Authority relied upon by the learned single Judge (reason not detailed in the opinion excerpt) in support of rejecting the petitioner’s claim. The Division Bench noted that the learned single Judge had relied on this decision, but observed that it was not directly applicable to the facts of the present case.
State of U.P. v. Barasnath, 1998 (2) S.C.C. 412 Authority relied upon by the learned single Judge (reason not detailed in the opinion excerpt) concerning limits on compassionate appointments. The court observed that this decision, as relied on by the single Judge, was not directly applicable to the present facts and thus did not control the outcome here.
G. Vijayaraghavan v. General Manager (P) Indian Bank, 2000 (3) L.L.N. 625 High Court decision holding that an applicant who applied upon attaining majority in circumstances similar to the present case should have his claim considered; eligibility for compassionate appointment can be independent of settlement of gratuity/other benefits. The court treated this decision as analogous and supportive: in similar circumstances the court had directed consideration of the claim upon attainment of majority.
D. Ramadoss v. The Chief Engineer, T.N.E.B., 2001 W.L.R. 601 Single Judge decision relying on the same Board Proceedings No.46 (13.10.1995) and directing the Electricity Board to consider a request where the petitioner had applied within the period contemplated by the Circular. The court cited this decision as a precedent where, despite delay, the Board was directed to consider the compassionate appointment when the first application was within the three-year period.
W.P. No. 24225 of 2001 (order dated 01.02.2002) High Court decision where, on similar facts (mother instructed to reapply after son's majority and compliance immediately after), the Court rejected reliance on the three‑year clause and directed consideration on merits. The court relied on this decision as closely analogous: the department had itself asked for a renewed application after majority, and the court directed the application to be considered on merit.
T. Meer Ismail Ali v. T.N.E.B., 2004 (3) C.T.C. 120 Single Judge decision directing TNEB to consider a claim in circumstances similar to the present matter. Noted by the court as another instance where the Board was directed to consider the claim after majority where the department had earlier asked the dependent to reapply.
Balbir Kaur v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., 2000 (6) S.C.C. 493 Supreme Court authority holding that authorities should adopt a humane outlook in considering compassionate appointments; in appropriate cases denial of deserving cases is liable to be set aside to further social and economic justice. The court relied on this decision to emphasize that compassionate appointments should be considered with a humane outlook and that deserving cases must not be denied; it buttressed the court's conclusion to require reconsideration of the petitioner's application.
W.P. No.14134 of 1991 (order dated 25.01.1999) Judgment of one of the Bench (P. Sathasivam, J.) relied upon by the single Judge (specific rule not recited in the opinion excerpt). The Division Bench observed that although the single Judge relied on this judgment, it was not directly applicable to the facts of the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the decisive issue as whether the petitioner had made out a case for compassionate appointment for her son and whether the single Judge was correct in dismissing her petition for laches. The court's analysis proceeded as follows:

  1. The court acknowledged the Board Proceedings B.P. No.46 dated 13.10.1995, which prescribes that an application for compassionate appointment should be made within three years from the date of death of the employee. If applied mechanically, that provision would bar the second application dated 13.01.2003 (since the death was on 15.07.1996).
  2. The court observed, however, that the petitioner had in fact made an application on 10.07.1999 — within three years of the date of death — and that the second respondent's letter dated 14.07.1999 had explicitly advised that the son, being a minor, should be the subject of a fresh application on attaining 18 years and that the Board would intimate when to apply. This was a material factual concession by the competent officer.
  3. The petitioner complied with that direction by filing the second application on 13.01.2003, two days after her son attained majority on 11.01.2003. The proximity of that reapplication to the date of majority was treated as significant by the court.
  4. Although the respondents pointed to a subsequent Board proceeding (06.04.2002) which deleted some clauses of an earlier circular (including the provisions about minors reapplying on majority), the court found that objection unsustainable in the facts of this case, given the respondent's prior letter promising consideration upon majority and the petitioner's timely compliance with that instruction.
  5. The court considered the body of Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the respondents which articulate limiting principles (courts cannot confer appointments by sympathy; appointments must follow rules; compassionate appointment is not a right; vacancies cannot be reserved for minors, etc.). The court accepted those principles in the abstract but concluded they did not govern this case directly because the department itself had earlier invited a fresh application upon majority and the petitioner had acted promptly.
  6. The court referred to several High Court and single judge decisions (including G. Vijayaraghavan, D. Ramadoss, the order in W.P. No.24225/2001 and T. Meer Ismail Ali) in which courts directed consideration of similar applications when the department had indicated that a fresh application should be filed after majority and the applicant complied promptly. Those decisions were treated as analogous and supportive.
  7. The court also referenced Balbir Kaur v. SAIL for the proposition that authorities must adopt a humane outlook in considering compassionate appointments and that deserving cases should not be denied — a principle the court used to reinforce the direction to consider the petitioner's claim on merits.
  8. On the question of laches, the court found no culpable delay by the petitioner. Because she had an application within the three-year window and because she followed the specific direction of the departmental officer by reapplying immediately after her son attained majority, the court concluded the single Judge's finding of laches was not sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal. The court set aside the order of the learned single Judge and the impugned rejection dated 24.04.2003. It directed the respondents to consider the petitioner’s application dated 13.01.2003 on merits and provide necessary relief. The writ appeal was allowed and the court ordered no costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the respondent authorities must reconsider the petitioner's 13.01.2003 application on its merits in light of the findings set out in this opinion (including the fact that an initial application was made within three years and that the department had invited a fresh application upon majority).
  • The court distinguished various Supreme Court authorities and observed that the general limiting principles in those decisions did not automatically bar relief in the present factual matrix; accordingly, the decision requires application of the Board's scheme together with the respondent's prior communication rather than an absolute application of the three‑year bar in the face of departmental directions to reapply.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new universal legal principle; it resolves the dispute on the specific facts and documents before the court (Board Proceedings and the departmental letter dated 14.07.1999). The court relied on established authorities (including Balbir Kaur) to stress a humane outlook in deserving cases, but did not state a broader novel precedent beyond ordering reconsideration on the facts.

No further factual details, procedural motions, or additional party submissions were contained in the provided opinion excerpt.

    Indiraniammal v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai Another

    P. Sathasivam, J.

    The above writ appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 04/08/2003 made in W.P.No. 21512 of 2003.

    2. For convenience, we shall refer the parties as arrayed before the learned single Judge.

    3. The brief facts which are required for the disposal of the appeal alone are stated hereunder:

    The husband of the petitioner, namely, Annamalai, while he was working as a Line Inspector, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board at Thandarampet, died due to illness on 15.07.1996. At the time of death, he left behind him, besides the petitioner, four daughters and a son as his legal heirs. His son was aged about 11 years. The petitioner s husband was the only breadwinner of the family. To reface the family burden, she made a representation to the second respondent Superintending Engineer on 10.07.1999, requesting him to provide employment to her son A. Palani, on compassionate ground. The second respondent, by his letter dated 14.07.1999, informed her that appointment to her son on compassionate ground will be provided only after he attains the age of 18 years and he will send intimation to make application for the same. On her attaining the age of 18 years, the petitioner again made a representation to the second respondent on 13.01.2003 requesting to provide a suitable job to her son on compassionate ground with necessary particulars. By the impugned order dated 24.04.2003, the second respondent rejected her claim for appointment on compassionate ground on the ground that her claim for appointment to her son is not within three years from the date of death of her husband, as per Board s proceedings dated 13.10.1995. Questioning the said order, the petitioner has filed W.P.No. 21512 of 2003.

    4. The learned single Judge, after considering her claim and the stand taken by the respondents Electricity Board, after holding that the petitioner is to be blamed for laches on her part in seeking the relief, dismissed the said writ petition; hence the present writ appeal.

    5. Heard Mr. V.K. Muthusamy, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Mr. V. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel for the respondents.

    6. The only point for consideration in this writ appeal is, whether the petitioner/appellant has made out a case for appointment to her son on compassionate ground and whether the learned single Judge is right in dismissing her writ petition?

    7. In view of narration of facts of the case in the earlier paragraphs, there is no need to traverse the same once again. It is seen that the claim of the petitioner for employment on compassionate ground was rejected mainly based on Board s proceedings No.45 dated 13.10.1995. As per the said proceedings, the application for appointment on compassionate ground should be made within three years from the date of death of an employee of the Board. In our case, the husband of the petitioner, namely, Annamalai died on 15.07.1996. Since at the time of death of her husband, her son was aged about 11 years and according to her, she did not make any representation for appointment. However, it is not in dispute that she submitted an application on 10.07.1999, seeking employment for her son. The said application was considered by the second respondent, who, by letter dated 14.07.1999, informed the petitioner that since her son has not attained 18 years of age, her claim could not be considered at the relevant time. However, in the same communication the petitioner was informed that on her son attaining 18 Years of age, she would apply again and the same would be considered in accordance with the Rules of the Board. It is Further seen that on her son-attaining majority, i.e., on 11.01.2003 (date of birth of her son is 12.01.1985), she made a second application on 13.01.2003 to the second respondent seeking employment for her son. Her request was turned down by the second respondent by the impugned letter dated 24.04.2003 only on the ground that her application is beyond the period of three years from the date of death of her husband. We have already referred to the Board s proceedings B.P.No.46 dated 13.10.1995. No doubt, as per that proceedings, an application for appointment on compassionate ground should be made within three years from the date of death of an employee. The second application being 13.01.2003 and the date or death of her husband being 15.07.1996, the second respondent by applying the said B.P., rejected her request.

    8. We have already referred to the letter of the second respondent dated 14.07.1999, which finds a place at page 11 of the typed set, wherein the second respondent, who is the competent officer while considering her application dated 10.07.1999 for appointment on after her son attaining majority (18 years). As said earlier, immediately on attaining majority, i.e., on 11.01.2003, the petitioner has made another application on 13.01.2003. In such a circumstance, particularly in the light of the statement made by the second respondent in his letter dated 14.07.1999 and of the fact that the petitioner has made a further representation on 13.01.2003, i.e., within a period of two days on her son attaining majority, as directed by the second respondent, we are of the view that the rejection of her representation based on BP.No.46 dated 13.10.1995 on the ground that her application is beyond the period or three years from the date of death of her husband cannot be sustained.

    9. Mr. V. Radhakrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has very much relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions justifying the rejection of the petitioner s application.

    (i) 1994 (2) S.C.C. 718;

    (ii) 2000 (7) Supreme 83;

    (iii) 2000 (7) S.C.C. 192;

    (iv) 2004 (7) Supreme 691 and

    (v) 2004 (7) S.C.C. 265.

    We find that the following principles emerged from the above decisions.

    (i) The Courts and Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration;

    (ii) The Tribunal or the High court cannot compel the Department concerned to relax the ceiling of compassionate appointment and appoint a person;

    (iii) There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes major after number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief;

    (iv) Appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the Rules, Regulations or administrative instructions, taking into consideration the financial conditions of the family of the deceased; and

    (v) Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Died-in-harness Scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased employee.

    10. If we apply the above principles, no doubt the claim of the petitioner has to be rejected. However, in our case, the Electricity Board has framed a Scheme and formulated certain guidelines, as seen from B.P. 46 dated 13.10.1995. As per the said proceedings, particularly Clause 3 (i), one of the main conditions is that application for appointment on compassionate ground should be made within three years from the date of death of an employee. In our case, we have already observed that the petitioner made an application within three years period and one more factor in favour of the petitioner is that the second respondent himself has informed in his letter dated 14.07.1999 that her son being a minor, after attaining the age of 18 years, she would make another application. Pursuant to the same, she has made an application on 13.01.2003, i.e., within two days on her son-attaining majority.

    11. The learned counsel for the Board has brought to our notice that by proceedings dated 06.04.2002, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board has deleted two conditions imposed in Board s Circular dated 14.06.1997, viz., (a) if the applicant is a minor, he has to make an application after attaining majority; and (b) fresh application after attaining majority will be considered based on the Rules of the Board applicable on the date. It is contended that since the above said Clauses have been deleted by the above referred proceedings dated 06.04.2002, which has come into force from 06.04.2002 itself, the second application of the petitioner dated 13.10.2003 cannot be considered as per BP.46, dated 13.10.1995, as her application is beyond the period of three years from the date of death of her husband. For the reasons stated in para 11 we are unable to sustain the said objection.

    12. Though the learned single Judge while rejecting the request of the petitioner relied on Judgment of one of us (P. Sathasivam, J.) made in W.P.No.14134 of 1991 dated 25.01.1999 and the case of Union of India Vs. Bhagwan Singh reported in 1995 (6) S.C.C. 476 as well as the case of State of U.P. Vs. Barasnath reported in 1998 (2) S.C.C. 412, for the same reasons as stated in para 11 above, those judgments are not directly applicable to the case on hand. In the case of G. Vijayaraghavan Vs. General Manager (P) Indian Bank reported in 2000 (3) L.L.N. 625, learned single Judge of this Court (P. Sathasivam, J.) in similar circumstance directed the Indian Bank to consider the claim of the petitioner therein, who made an application on attaining majority for employment on compassionate ground. In that decision, it is held that, irrespective of settlement of full term service gratuity and other benefits, eligible person can claim appointment on compassionate grounds.

    13. In the case of D. Ramadoss Vs. The Chief Engineer, T.N.E.B., reported in 2001 W.L.R. 601, the learned single Judge (D. Murugesan, J.) in an identical circumstance, relying on a very same Board Proceedings No.46 dated 13.10.1995, after nothing the fact that the petitioner has made a request within the period of three years, as per the Circular, though there was enormous delay, directed the Electricity Board to consider the request or the petitioner therein for appointment on compassionate ground.

    14. In W.P.No.24225 of 2001 dated 01.02.2002, the learned single Judge (K.P. Sivasubramaniam), had an occasion to consider similar claim against Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. Before the learned Judge, the father of the petitioner for seeking appointment on compassionate ground. The said application was also endorsed by the Superintending Engineer by his letter dated 07.01.1998 and the mother of the petitioner was directed to apply for appointment in due course after filing a formal application. Thereafter, the mother of the petitioner complied with the direction. However, the said application was returned by the respondents with an observation that the petitioner s son was minor as on that date and to submit an application after he attains majority. The petitioner, after attainment of majority of his son, by letter dated 08.06.2001, applied for appointment on compassionate grounds. However, by order dated 17.08.2001, the request of the petitioner was rejected on two grounds, namely, that the application has not been submitted within three years after the dears of his father and the petitioner did not complete 18 years within three years. Rejecting both the grounds, the learned Judge has concluded that the limitation of three years from the date of the Board s Proceedings dated 13.10.1995 was contemplated only as a result of the said Circular having been issued afresh in the context of regulating appointments on compassionate ground. It is further held any relevance to the case of the petitioner, who has been specifically directed to apply after completion of 18 years of his son. According to the learned Judge, Clause (3) of B.P.46 dated 13.10.1995 cannot apply to the facts of the present case. The learned Judge has also observed that the Department itself permitted the mother of the petitioner to renew her application after her son attains majority, which has been complied with. In such a circumstance, the learned Judge the application for appointment on compassionate ground and directed the Department to consider the application on merits. It is stated that the Department has accepted the said direction. Inasmuch as in the case before the learned Judge as well as before us, the fact that the son of the deceased was a minor, mother was asked to apply after her son attains majority and in both the cases the application was made immediately after attaining majority, in such a circumstance, as rightly said, the second application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. We are also satisfied that similar scheme in the form of Board Proceedings and conditions are not available in the cases of the Supreme Court relied on by the learned counsel for respondents. It is also brought to our notice that almost in similar circumstance, another learned single Judge of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.) in the case of T. Meer Ismail Ali Vs. T.N.E.B., reported in 2004 (3) C.T.C.120 directed the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to consider the claim of the petitioner therein.

    16. Though we are conscious of the directions of the Supreme Court which we have already referred to in the earlier part of our order, in view of the Boar s Proceedings referred to above and of the fact that the petitioner has made an application within three years from the date of death of her husband i.e., within the prescribed by the second also made subsequent application as directed by the petitioner that after her taking note of the assertion of the petitioner that after her husband s death, in the absence of any income, she is living in poverty, her claim has to be considered. In this regard it is worthwhile to refer the case of the Supreme Court in the case of Balbir Kaur Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., reported in 2000 (6) S.C.C. 493, wherein their Lordships have held that in the case of appointment considering the social and economic justice as enshrined in the Constitution, denial of deserving cases are liable to be set aside. Further, the purpose of providing compassionate ground to a son or daughter or a near relative of the deceased government servant is to render assistance to the family, which is found in indigent circumstances. Hence in considering the case for compassionate appointments, the authorities are supposed to adopt a humane outlook. We do not find any delay or laches on the part of the petitioner, we are unable to accept the conclusion arrived at by the learned singly Judge in our case and we are satisfied that the petitioner has made out a case for consideration of her claim. Accordingly, the order of the learned singly Judge as well as the order impugned in the writ petition, viz., W.P.No.21512 of 2003 are set aside and the respondents are directed to consider the petitioner s application dated 13.01.2003 on merits and provide necessary relief. Consequently, the writ appeal is allowed. No costs.

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    Indiraniammal v. The Chief Engineer (Personnel), The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Chennai Another
    (Mar 8, 2005)