AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • RaoLimitation Act, 1963 (4th 1963 EditionVol. II)
  • Ss. 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Protection Act (Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1955).
  • S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act,
  • S. 14(1) of Central Act 30 of 1956,
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • S. 14(1) of Act XXX of 1956,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • RaoLimitation Act, 1963 (4th 1963 EditionVol. II)
  • Ss. 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Protection Act (Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1955).
  • S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act,
  • S. 14(1) of Central Act 30 of 1956,
  • HINDU SUCCESSION ACT 1956
  • S. 14(1) of Act XXX of 1956,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (unsuccessful in two lower Courts) preferred this Second Appeal arising from O.S. No. 61 of 1966 filed before the Subordinate Judge, Chidambaram, for possession of suit properties. The suit properties originally involved a will dated 10 February 1921 executed by Sarangapani Pillai, giving a life estate to his widow Arumbu Ammal and, after her lifetime, vesting the properties in equal moieties in his minor daughter Valliammai and his brother Balakrishna, with a proviso as to descendants of Valliammai.

Separate litigation occurred: O.S. No. 750 of 1922 (promissory note suit) in which Balakrishna for the first time proclaimed the will and asserted he was not liable. A subsequent suit O.S. No. 255 of 1923 challenged the will as a forgery, and that suit resulted in a compromise on 27 July 1924 (Ex. A-4). Under the compromise Balakrishna relinquished his half share; Arumbu was to enjoy the property for life as a "widow's estate" without powers of alienation, thereafter her daughter as a "daughter's estate" without powers of alienation, with male heirs of the daughter to take absolutely, and in default Balakrishna's heirs to take.

Valliammai died in 1940 childless. Arumbu adopted Venugopal (first defendant) on 3 November 1947 (registered Ex. B-1). Balakrishna died 8 January 1963. On 7 May 1966 Arumbu executed a settlement in favour of her adopted son (Ex. B-2) and on 9 May 1966 she executed a will (Ex. B-3) bequeathing movables, outstandings and properties not covered by Ex. B-2 to the adopted son. Arumbu died on 16 May 1966, and Venugopal (first defendant) entered into possession through tenants (defendants 2–6).

Plaintiffs (daughters of Balakrishna and widow of Balakrishna) contended that under the compromise (Ex. A-4) Arumbu had only a limited estate and on her death they were entitled to the suit properties; they challenged validity of Exs. B-2 and B-3. The first defendant contended inter alia that the 1921 will was a forgery, the compromise was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, and, if the compromise were binding, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (Central Act 30 of 1956) made Arumbu a full owner enabling her to validly convey. Tenants claimed protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1955).

The Subordinate Judge held the 1921 will to be genuine, treated Ex. A-4 as binding and as conferring a widow's estate which became absolute by virtue of S.14(1) of Act XXX of 1956, upheld the settlement and will (Exs. B-2 and B-3) and dismissed the suit. The District Judge confirmed those findings on appeal (A.S. No. 50 of 1968). This Second Appeal challenges those conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What construction should be placed on the compromise deed (Ex. A-4): did it confer a restricted life estate without powers of alienation or a widow's estate that permitted enlargement to absolute ownership?
  2. Which sub-section of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act applies: S.14(1) (enlargement to full owner) or S.14(2) (exception where instrument prescribes restricted estate)?
  3. What is the effect of the 1921 will being upheld in proceedings on the widow's possession — does possession relate back to the will and thereby prevent a claim of adverse possession or alternative title?
  4. Are Sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act applicable to the compromise (Ex. A-4) or to the will (Ex. A-1) such that the restrictions can be tested under those provisions?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments (as summarized for Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer)

  • The construction placed by both Courts below on Ex. A-4 is incorrect.
  • Reading the compromise together with the will (Ex. A-1) shows Arumbu had only a restricted estate, so S.14(2) (not S.14(1)) applies.
  • Since the will has been upheld, Arumbu's possession must be referable to the will dating from the testator's death.
  • Because Arumbu's rights are founded on the compromise, S.14(1) cannot be invoked to enlarge her estate.
  • As the arrangement is a compromise, the restraints in Ss.10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot apply.

Respondent's (First Defendant's) Arguments (as summarized for Mr. K. Gopalachari)

  • The compromise (Ex. A-4) recognises only pre-existing rights of the widow and does not restrict her rights.
  • The parties' intention in 1924 should be ascertained; under the law then prevailing "widow's estate" must be given its proper meaning (which, the respondent contends, would allow some powers of alienation for necessities).
  • Merely because the will has been upheld in these proceedings does not mean the widow's possession is traceable to the will; her rights could remain unaffected.
  • If Arumbu had a widow's estate and was in possession, S.14(1) would enlarge her estate into an absolute estate enabling valid conveyance to the first defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1963 Held that S.14(2) is an exception/proviso to S.14(1); S.14(2) applies only if acquisition is made for the first time by the instrument without any pre-existing right in the female in possession. The court relied on this authority to support that S.14(2) applies where the instrument (compromise) is the source of the widow's title; hence S.14(1) does not enlarge the estate here.
Mulla's Hindu Law (Fourteenth Edition, 1974) (textbook) Explains that to invoke S.14(2) the instrument which limits the estate must be the source or foundation of the female's title; if pre-existing interest existed, S.14(1) continues to operate. Quoted to articulate the test that the instrument must be the foundation of title for S.14(2) to apply; used to conclude the compromise is the source of Arumbu's restricted estate.
Seetharama Pillai v. Sevu Pillai, 83 L.W. 226 Identified as a decision of similar import to the present facts (as stated by the court). The court treated it as a supporting authority for the conclusion that a restricted life estate under a prior instrument will not be enlarged by S.14(1).
Second Appeal Nagarathanammal v. Peria Munuswamy Gounder and 4 others No. 671 of 1972 (earlier decision of the same judge) Used by the court as prior reasoning of the judge relating to Seetharama Pillai and similar principles. The court referenced this earlier decision where Seetharama Pillai was considered in detail and used that earlier consideration to support its conclusion.
B.B. Patil v. Gengabai, A.I.R. 1972 Bom. 16 Relied on by respondent but court observed it was of no assistance to respondent's contention. The court stated the decision relied upon by respondent would not assist and did not adopt it as supporting respondent's position.
Karmi v. Amru, A.I.R. 1571 S.C. 745 Held that where a widow succeeded to properties by a will conferring only a life estate, she could not claim to have become an absolute owner under the Act. The court saw this as analogous and supportive of the appellants' position that a life estate granted under a will/compromise does not become absolute under S.14(1).
Hastan Uduman v. Venkatachala Mudaliar, 1974 II M.L.J. 275; 87 L.W. 583 Provides the test: whether the instrument/decree prescribes a restricted estate or merely acknowledges a pre-existing estate. The court applied this test and answered that the compromise decree prescribes a restricted estate (therefore S.14(2) applies).
Thomas v. Thomas (1855) 110 R.R. 107; 25 L.J. Ch. 139 Principle that possession is not considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title — possession referable to lawful title will not be hostile to another title. Quoted to support the proposition that if the will is upheld and possession is referable to the will, the holder cannot set up adverse possession or a different title inconsistent with the will.
Doe d. Milner v. Brightwen (1809) 10 East 583; 103 E.R. 897 (and Doe v. Brightwen English Reports Vol. CIII K.B.D.) Authority that possession consistent with a lawful title (e.g., customary rights like courtesy) is not adverse to other parties' titles. Cited alongside Thomas v. Thomas to illustrate that possession which can be referable to a lawful title cannot be treated as adverse and so cannot be used to defeat the pre-existing title.
Chitaley & Rao — Limitation Act, 1963 (textbook) States the fundamental principle that where possession can be referred to a lawful title it will not be considered adverse. Quoted in support of the conclusion that when the will is upheld, possession of Arumbu is referable to that will and not adverse to other claimants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Construction of Ex. A-4 (the compromise): The court examined the language of the compromise and the will (Ex. A-1) and concluded that the compromise was "in accordance with the provisions of the will" but, crucially, conferred only a restricted life estate on Arumbu Ammal "without any power of alienation whatsoever" (including for legal necessities). The court emphasized that the compromise also created vested remainders in favour of the daughter and Balakrishna and that construing the compromise to give Arumbu broader powers would render other clauses (remainder provisions) nugatory. Therefore, Ex. A-4 was held to prescribe a restricted estate.
  2. Application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act: The court set out S.14(1) and S.14(2) and explained the settled test: S.14(2) operates as an exception/proviso to S.14(1) and applies only where the instrument (deed, decree, will, compromise) is the source or foundation of the woman's title and prescribes a restricted estate. The court relied on Mulla's text and the Supreme Court's decision in Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi to confirm this proposition.
  3. Factual application: Because the compromise (Ex. A-4) was the source of Arumbu's rights and prescribed a restricted estate, S.14(2) — not S.14(1) — governed. Consequently, Arumbu could not claim to have become an absolute owner by operation of S.14(1).
  4. Effect of the will being upheld: The court addressed the contention that because the 1921 will was upheld, Arumbu's possession must be referable to the will and hence she could not claim other titles. The court agreed that where possession is referable to a lawful title (here the will), it is not adverse and cannot be used to assert a different title. The court quoted Thomas v. Thomas, Doe v. Brightwen and Chitaley & Rao for this principle, but also noted that in the present case the compromise — rather than a mere declaration of a pre-existing title — was the foundation of Arumbu's estate.
  5. On the Transfer of Property Act (Ss.10 &11): The court rejected the applicability of Ss.10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act to the compromise because (a) neither the will nor the compromise conferred an absolute estate and (b) a compromise is not a "transfer" within the meaning of those sections; hence those sections do not apply to a compromise in this context.
  6. Conclusion from the analysis: The court found that the lower courts misdirected themselves in holding that S.14(1) enlarged Arumbu's estate into an absolute estate. The correct legal position, applying the cited principles and precedents, was that Ex. A-4 prescribed a restricted estate and therefore S.14(2) applied; the settlement and will executed by Arumbu could not validly convey an absolute title to the first defendant.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Second Appeal is allowed; the findings of both Courts below are set aside.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The Second Appeal is allowed with costs.
  • There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs as prayed for (i.e., plaintiffs succeed in their suit for possession).
  • The prior conclusions of the trial Court and the District Judge that Arumbu's estate became enlarged into an absolute estate by operation of S.14(1) are overturned.
  • The court explicitly states that the compromise (Ex. A-4) prescribed a restricted life estate without powers of alienation and that S.14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act applies; accordingly, the settlement and will executed by Arumbu could not convey absolute title to the first defendant.

Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to applying established principles (including the Mulla text and cited authorities such as Badri Pershad and Hastan Uduman) to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying existing tests for when S.14(2) (the proviso) displaces S.14(1). The decision's practical effect is limited to the parties: restoration of plaintiffs' claim to the suit properties and reversal of the lower courts' judgments. The judgment ends with the statement "However, I grant leave." (as recorded in the opinion).

    Thayyanayaki Ammal Others v. Venugopala Pillai By Agent And Brother K.V. Ramu Others

    1. The plaintiffs, who were unsuccessful in both the Courts below, have preferred this Second Appeal. They filed O.S. No. 61 of 1966 before the Subordinate Judge, Chidambaram, for possession of the suit properties on the following allegations:

    2. One Sarangapani Pillai, the adopted son of Arunachalam Pillai of Adoor, died in 1921, when be was very young, leaving behind his widow, Arumbu Ammal, and a daughter Valliammai. Prior to his death, he executed an unregistered will on the 10th February 192], whereunder he gave a life estate over the suit properties in favour of Arumbu Ammal, and after her life time, the properties were to be taken in equal moieties by his minor daughter and Balakrishna, the brother of the testator. The will further recited that In the event or Valliammai dying without male issues, the heirs of Balakrishna would take the moiety of Valliammai also.

    3. One, Sornathachi filed O.S. No. 750 of 1922 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Kattumannargudi, against the widow and daughter of Sarangapani on the foot of a promissory note executed by Sarangapani, for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,500/-. In that suit, Balakrishna was also impleaded as a party defendant. The widow and the daughter contested the suit stating that the promissory note was a forgery. While Balakrishna proclaimed the will, for the first time, he set up the defence that as per the terms of the Will, be was not liable. Though that suit was decreed by the trial Court, in appeal, it was dismissed. In the meanwhile, the widow and the daughter, having become aware of the Will of Sarangapani, filed O.S. No. 255 of 1923 before the District Munsif's Court of Kattumanargudi for a declaration that the will was a forgery and that it would not alter the right of succession to the estate of Sarangapani. In that suit, a compromise was entered into on 27th of July 1924 (Ex. A-4), whereunder Balakrishna relinquished his half share in the estate and it was stipulated that the widow should enjoy the property for life, as a widow's estate, without any powers of alienation, and after her, her daughter should enjoy the same, as a daughter's estate, without powers of alienation, and the male heirs of the daughter will take the properties absolutely, after her lifetime, and if the daughter leaves no male heirs, Balakrishna's heirs would take them absolutely.

    4. The daughter, Valliammai, died in 1940 without any issues. Therefore, Arumbu Ammal took in adoption the first defendant, Venugopal, on 3rd November 1947 and executed a deed of adoption, which was registered (Ex. B.-1). Balakrishna died on 8th January 1963. On 7th May 1966, Arumbu Ammal executed a deed of settlement in favour of her adopted son conveying some items of the properties under Ex. B.-2 and put him in possession. She executed a Will (Ex. B.3) on 9th May 1966 bequeathing all her movables and outstandings and also the properties not by Ex. B-2, in favour of the adopted son the said adopted son is the first defendant. Arumbu Ammal died on 16th May 1966. Thus, the first defendant Venugopal became entitled to all the properties and be is in possession of the same through the tenants, defendants 2 to 6.

    5. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are the daughters and the 4th defendant is the widow of late Balakrishna, the natural brother of Sarangapani. It is their contention that under the compromise decree, Ex. A-4, Arumbu had only a limited estate. Therefore, on her death, they would be entitled to the suit properties. The settlement deed and the will, Exs. B-2 and B-3, cannot convey any valid title in favour of the first defendant, and by reason of Central Act XXX of 1956, Arumbu does not become a fuli owner. Hence, the suit.

    6. The first defendant, the adopted son raised, inter alia the following contention: The Will of Sarangapani, dated 10th February, 1921 is a forgery. The compromise was brought about by fraud, and undue influence, and therefore, not binding. Assuming that the compromise was binding, it only reaffirmed other provisions of the Will and consequently in view of S. 14(1) of Central Act 30 of 1956, she became a full owner of the estate, which she could validly convey in favour of the first defendant and this is what she did under Exs. B-2 and B-3. Therefore his title to the properties cannot be impeached, and he was validly in possession through his tenants.

    7. The tenants, viz., defendants 2 to 6 raised the plea that they were entitled’ to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1955).

    8. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the will, d. 10th February, 1921 is true, the compromise decree in O.S. No. 255 of 1963 is binding on the widow, Arumbu, and what was given to her under the compromise was a widow's estate, which become enlarged into absolute estate by virtue of S. 14(1) of Act XXX of 1956, and therefore, she had every right to execute the settlement and Will, viz., Exs. B-2 and B-3. Consequently, the first defendant had valid title and his possession could not be interfered with. On this reasoning the suit was dismissed.

    9. Therupon, A.S. No. 50 of 1968 was filed before the District Judge of South Arcot at Cuddalore, wherein the findings of the trial Court were confirmed. Hence, the present Second appeal.

    10. Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer argues, the summary of which is as follows:—

    (1) The construction placed by both the Courts below on Ex. A-4 is totally incorrect.

    (2) On a reading of the entire compromise, together with the Clauses under the will, dated 10th February, 1921, viz., Ex. A-1 it would be clear that what Arumbu got was a restricted estate, in which event, S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) alone would come into play.

    (3) Once the will has been found to be true, as has been done in the instant case, by both the Courts below, the possession of Arumbu must relate only to the Will dating back to the date of the death of the testator.

    (4) It is only by virtue of the compromise that Arumbu got this estate, and that being the foundation of her right, title and interest, it cannot be said that S. 14(1) would apply and her estate would become enlarged into an absolute one.

    (5) This being a compromise the restrictions contained under Ss. 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act, cannot apply.

    11. Mr. K. Gopalachari, learned Counsel for the respondent, in meeting the above, raised the following contentions, which in brief, could be noted as follows:—

    (1) The compromise, Ex. A-4, recognises only the pre-existing rights of the widow and it does cot, in any mancer, restrict her rights. (2) The intention in the minds of the parties fin 1924 should be ascertained, in order to find out the true effect of the compromise, (a) Merely because the Will has been upheld in these proceedings, it would not mean that the possession of the widow is traceable to the Will, and, therefore her rights would remain unaffected. (4) If what Arumbu got under Ex. A-2 was a widow's estate, by virtue of her being in possession, it would become enlarged into an absolute estate, by the operation of S. 14(1) of the Act.

    12. I will take up these points in serial. The first question that arises for determination is the construction to be placed on Ex. A-4, in order to appreciate the scope and effect of the compromise. The provisions of the will in question Ex. A-1, dated 10th Febuary 1921, may be taken cote of. That reads:

    Tamil

    It would be seen that Sarangapani, under this Will, gave a life estate to his wife and after her life, the daughter Valliammai, and brother Balakrishna were conferred an absolute right and in the event of Valliammai dying without any male issues, the entire property would devolve absolutely on Balakrishna. It was this Will, which was challenged in O.S. No. 255 of 1923. That suit, as seen above, resulted in a compromise which I extract in full, for a proper appreciation of the respective contentions:

    Tamil

    13. The Points that require to be noted concerning this Ex. (4) are: (1) This compromise is in accordance with the provisions of the will. That is clear because it states (Tamil) (2) Broadly speaking, it confers a life estate, without powers of alienation. (I say ‘broadly speaking’, since the entire controversy centres as to what is the nature of the estate conferred on her) (3) Balakrishna relinquishes his rights made available under the will, after the life time of Arumbu. (4) Valliammai, the daughter is conferred a ‘daughter's estate”, without powers of alienation, (5) In the event, the daughter died without male issues, Balakrishna would take the property absolutely.

    14. The fervent plea of Mr. K. Gopalachari is, having regard to the law that was prevalent in 1924, and further, having regard to the fact that the compromise was drafted by men of law, the “widow's estate” must be given the proper meaning. According to him, under the law, as it stood then, the widow took a life estate without powers of alienation, excepting for necessities, and it was this, which came to be incorporated stating (Tamil) Whatever restrictions, the widow had, with regard to the alienations under Hindu law, they alone would prevail and it cannot be contended that under no circumstances, the widow could alienate, even for necessities, since it is said that “widow's estate (Tamil).

    15. The forceful reply of Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer is that such a construction ignores very many aspects: (i) Ex. A-1 is the fore-runner to the compromise, (ii) The language employed is (Tamil) which means “no alienation whatsoever”, (iii) Vested remainders have been conferred upon the daughter and also Balakrishna.

    16. On a careful consideration of the above arguments, I am inclined to hold that Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer is right in his submissions, because the construction sought to be placed by Mr. Gopalachari would be only highlighting the rights of Arumbu, while all the other provisions should be rendered nugatory. It is not necessary, as Mr. Gopalachari contends, that the widow should stand benefited by the compromise. Even assuming that to be so, the benefit that is conferred on her is the vested remainders in favour of the daughter and Balakrithna. As is well-known in a compromise, there is always give and take. Balakrishna relinquish shed his rights obtained under the will, Ex. A-1, while Arumbu was cotters with a life estate, without any power of alienation (including for legal necessities). In my view, the accent should be on the words (Tamil) and the proper meaning to the ascribed to the words “widow's estate (Tamil) is enjoyment for life. This conclusion is fortified, since, as seen above, the compromise itself was in harmony, or in accordance with the provisions of the will. Therefore, the conclusion, to my mind, is that what was conferred on Arumbu was only a restricted estate, as otherwise, if it were to be held that it is a widow's estate, it would defeat the latter clauses in the compromise relating to conferment of remainders.

    17. If this be the true position, what is the correct law that has to be applied, is the next question that has to be considered. S. 14 of the Act states as follows:—

    (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

    Explanation : In this sub-section, “property” includes to the movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever’ and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

    (2) Nothing contained in sub-S. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”

    Whatever doubts were there earlier, the law is well settled in the present day, that if the compromise, or the award, or the deed, etc., is the source or the foundation of the right of the widow, restrictions prescribed thereunder would govern and to such a case, S. 14(2) alone would apply. On the contrary, if what the compromise, award or the document does is nothing more than to restate the law, as it then stood, the intervention of the same will not affect the rights of the widow in which event, S. 14(1) will apply. It is also well settled that S. 14(2) is in the nature of an exception to S. 14(1). I need hardly refer to any authority, excepting to quote the following passage from Mulla's Hindu Law (Fourteenth Edition, 1974) at Page 906.

    “Thus for instance if the female Hindu bad prior to the date of the decree title to the property and what the decree really does Is to declare that title she cannot be said to have acquired the property under that decree. In order to invoke the application of this sub-section it is necessary to satisfy the essential condition that the instrument which limits or restricts the estate should itself be the source or foundation of the female's title to the property. If she had an existing interest in the property, the inter-position of any instrument will not affect the operation of sub-S. (1). The instrument, for instance, may be a decree or order or deed or partition but if the pre-existing right was there, sub-S. (2) cannot have the effect of taking the property out of the coverage of sub-S. (1)”.

    And the ruling in Badri Pershad v. Kanso Devi A.I.R. 1970 SC. 1963, wherein it was held at page 1966:

    “Sub-S. (2) of S. 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-S. (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property”.

    18. In this case, therefore, under the compromise, Ex. A-4, Arumbu took a restricted estate. She cannot, therefore, put forth the plea that she is absolutely entitled to the properties as per S. 14(1) of the Act. Nor, is it open to her to put forth the contention that she would not be bound by the restrictions prescribed under the compromise. The compromise, without declaring her pre-existing title, brought about the agreement between the parties conferring certain rights mentioned under that compromise, in which event it would be binding upon the parties thereto.

    19. Similar is the case of Seetharama Piilai v. Sevu Pillmi 83 L.W. 226 which decision, I have considered in detail under an earlier decision of mine in Second Appeal Nagarathanammal v. Peria Munuswamy Gounder and 4 others No. 671 of 1972, dated 4th March 1979. The decision relied on by Mr. K. Gopalachari in B.B. Patil v. Genga bai A.I.R. 1972 Bom. 16 will be of no assistance to him.

    20. In the final analysis, what emerges is, that under the compromise Arumbu took a life estate without any power of alienation whatsoever, and after her demise the vested remainders fell upon the daughter and Balakrishna, and if this was the nature of compromise entered into between the parties, in 1924, the fact that she contiuued in possession even after the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would not enable her to contend that S. 14(1) would apply. In my view, there is no necessity to cite much case law on this aspect and there is a pre-ponderence of the same, since as laid down by the Supreme Court in Badri Pershad v. Konso Devi A.I.R. 1970 SC. 1963 the section has to be read as a whole and it would depend on the facts of each case whether the same is convered by the first Sub-Section or sub-S. (2).

    21. This is more or less a case like Karmi v. Amru A.I.R. 1571 S.C. 745 where a widow succeeded to the properties of her deceased husband on the strength of a Will executed by her husband, under which only a life estate was conferred, it was held that she could not claim to have become an absolute owner under the Act, and this ruling also supports the submission of Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer, learned Counsel for the appellants.

    22. The proper test in the words of the Division Bench in Hastan Uduman v. Venkatachala Mudaliar 1974 II M.L.J. 275; 87 L.W. 583 is:

    “Before applying S. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the proper question to ask is: does the instrument or decree prescribe a restricted estate in the property or does it merely acknowledge and recognise (and not prescribe) a pre-existing estate upon which the Hindu law bad imposed a restriction, because the holder of the estate was woman?

    In the instant case, my answer is that the compromise decree under Ex. A-4 does prescribe a restricted estate and it does not acknowledge or recognise her pre-existing right, and, therefore, S. 14(2) alone applies. The Court below are wrong in holding that by application of S. 14(1). The widow's estate became enlarged into an absolute one.

    23. The next aspect to be considered is what is the effect of the will being upheld under this proceedings For my part, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. K. Gopalachari that because the widow is not a party to the proceedings, her rights would remain unaffected, since this contention ignores the fact that Venugopal (the first defendant) claims under the Will, The effect of the Will being upheld would mean to relate the possession of Arumbu to this Will since the Will dates back to the death of the testator, Sarangapani. In such an event, it is not open to her to set up a title other than the one under the Will. Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer is, therefore, right in referring to and relying on the passage occurring in Chitaley & Rao—Limitation Act, 1963 (4th 1963 Edition—Vol. II) at pages 1261-1262.

    “It is also a fundamental principle that where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason is that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another title. The leading case on the point is Thomas v. Thomas (1855) 110 R.R. 107 110; 25 L.15 J.Ch. 139 decided by the court of Chancery in the year 1855. In that case X was entitled under the marriage settlement of his father and mother to certain real estates upon the death of his mother' to whom a life estate had been given therein. The mother died in 1882, X attained majority in 1836. The father remained in possession of the settled estate till his death in 1852. The question was whether the father's possession was adverse to X or whether it must be deemed to have been as guardian of X. Wood, V.C., observed as follows:

    “But there Is another principle which affects this case, namely that possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title, Ad Important authority on this point is Doe d. Milner v. Brightwen (1809) 10 East 583 (594): 103 E.R. 897) where a party who had taken possession of copy holds on the death of his wife, by an adverse title, lived more than twenty years after wards and it was then found that there was old custom of the manor by which be had a right to courtesy, and therefore his possession was referred to that title which was consistent with the title of the other party.

    In this case a father, who had several children entitled to estates on the death of his wife, all the children being under age at that time, entered upon the estates I think I must reasonably infer that the entry was an entry on their behalf and as their guardian and was totally different from the case of a mere stranger entering upon the property under similar circumstances.

    Then it is said that, though the entry might have been lawful in its inception, the retention of the property after the children attained twenty-one barred their right under the statute of limitation; but I think the better and sounder view here is that, if this gentleman entered as guardian this Court would never allow him to set up any other title to the estate.”

    24. This it what Grose, J. held in Doe v. Brtghtwen (English Reports Vol. CIII-K.B.D. XXXII, Page 897) at page 901:

    “On the part of the defendant, who claimed under the present Lord Harewood, it was contended, 1st, that here bad been an adverse possession from the death of Mrs. Lascelles in 1764, upwards of 40 years. To this it was answered, that by the custom of the manor the husband was entitled to hold the copy hold tenements of his wife, after her death for his life, in the nature of tenant by the courtesy, and that Lord Harewood having survived his wife, and lived till 1795, there was no possession adverse to the title of the lessor of the plaintiff till after that time; in as much as the heir at law of Mrs. Lascelles could not recover the possession of the premise while her husband's estate by the courtesy existed. ..

    In the present case Mrs. Lascelles's title was as heir to the three coparceners; her title was complete without admission, to all purposes, except as against the lord, with respect to his right to his fine, and therefore, we think that the entries given in evidence were sufficient to support the custom of tenancy by the courtesy, without the qualification of admittance of the wife, in as much as her title was such as not to require admittance to perfect it.”

    25. Lastly, the applicability of Ss. 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act may be referred to. I am afraid, on this aspect of the matter, the Courts below have misdirected themselves. S. 10 relates to a transfer of property with a condition restraining alienation while S. 11 speaks of restriction repugnant to an absolute interest. In this case, neither the Will, Ex. A-1, nor the compromise, Ex. A-4 confers an absolute estate. Even that apart, there is no scope for applying these Sections to a compromise, since a compromise is not a transfer.

    26. For all the above reasons, I come to the conclusion that the findings of both the Courts below are incorrect and I, therefore, set aside the same. The second Appeal will stand allowed with Costs. There will be a decree in favour of the plaintiffs, as prayed for. However, I grant leave.

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    Thayyanayaki Ammal Others v. Venugopala Pillai By Agent And Brother K.V. Ramu Others
    (Mar 30, 1975)