1. This appeal has been preferred under S. 11(4) of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 by the Mysore Iron and Steel Works Labourers Association by its Secretary, A. Nagaraj. The appellant was a trade union registered under the provisions of the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926, hereinafter referred to as the Act. By the order dated 21st December, 1965 passed under S. 10(b) of the Act, the respondent-the Commissioner of Labour and Registrar of Trade Unions in Mysore, Bangalore cancelled the registration of the appellant-trade union. The appellant being aggrieved by the said order of the respondent, preferred an appeal under S. 11(1), (b) of the Act to the Court of the District Judge at Shimoga. The learned District Judge having dismissed the appeal, this miscellaneous second appeal has been preferred by the appellant under S. 11(4) of the Act.
2. Sri Kadidal Manjappa, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the learned District Judge committed an error of law in holding that the appeal presented before him by the Mysore Iron and Steel Works Labourers Association was not maintainable. The learned District Judge has taken the view that after the cancellation of registration of the trade union, the trade union was not competent to prefer an appeal under S. 11(1) of the Act. S. 11(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“11(1). Any person aggrieved by any refusal of the Registrar to register a Trade Union or by the withdrawal or cancellation of a certificate of registration may, within such period as may be prescribed, appeal—
(a) where the head office of the trade union is situated within the limits of a Presidency town, to the High Court, or
(b) where the head office is situated in any other area, to such Court, not inferior to the Court of an additional or assistant Judge of a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, as the (appropriate Government) may appoint in this behalf for that area.”
3. It is clear from S. 11(1) that any person aggrieved by the cancellation of a certificate of registration may prefer an appeal before the appropriate forum. As already mentioned, the appeal was preferred by the Mysore Iron & Steel Works Labourers Association. The question for consideration is as to whether the aforesaid trade union is a ‘person aggrieved’ within the meaning of that expression occurring in S. 11(1) so as to entitle it to prefer an appeal questioning the correctness of the order passed by the respondent cancelling certificate of registration. The view taken by the learned District Judge is that as by the order appealed against, the registration of the trade union was cancelled, the trade union whose registration was so cancelled, was not ‘an aggrieved person’ who could prefer an appeal under S. 11 of the Act. The learned District Judge has also observed that the expression ‘person aggrieved’ used in S. 11 does not include within its ambit a ‘juridical person’. I find it very difficult to agree with this proposition. The expression ‘person’ not having been defined in the Act, we have to look for its definition under the General Clauses Act. S. 3(42) of the General Clauses Act defines a ‘person’ as follows:
“‘person’ shall include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not”.
4. The expression ‘person’ is therefore, wide enough to include within its ambit a ‘juridical person’. I also do not agree with the view of the learned District Judge that the appellant whose registration was cancelled by the Registrar is not ‘an aggrieved person’ within the meaning of that expression occurring in S. 11 of the Act. S. 10 of the Act empowers the Registrar to cancel registration if the conditions mentioned in that section are satisfied.
5. S. 11 provides for an appeal against an order passed by the Registrar cancelling registration of the trade union. Before the Registrar the trade union registered under the Act, was a party. The expression ‘person aggrieved’ has not been defined in the Act. Their Lordships of the Queen's Bench had occasion to construe the expression ‘person aggrieved’ in the decision in Re. Reed Rower & Co.: Ex parte Official Receiver(1). Their Lordships explained that a ‘person aggrieved’ is one, against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongly refused to him something which he had a right to demand. It is the registered trade union against which the decision was pronounced by the Registrar. By that decision it is complained that the registration is sought to be wrongfully cancelled. In support of his contention Sri Kadidal Manjappa relied upon a decision of the Privy Council in Durayappaiah v. Ferande(2). That is a case in which the Minister of Ceylon Government made an order u/s. 277 of the Municipal Council Ordinance dissolving and superseding the Jaffna Municipal Council on the ground that the Council was not competent to perform the duties imposed on it. The order of the Minister was challenged by Mr. Alfred Thangarajah Durayappa of Chundikuly, the Mayor of the dissolved Council, on the ground that the order was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice ‘audi alteram partem’. Their Lordships of the Privy Council came to the conclusion that the impugned order of dissolution was liable to be set aside at the instance of the Council that was dissolved and not at the instance of the Mayor as he was not representing the Council. The ratio of this decision of the Privy Council is, that the Council which was dissolved by an order of the Minister is ‘an aggrieved party or person’. If the same principle is applied to the facts of the present case, it would be clear that the party against whom an adverse order was passed by the Registrar is a ‘person aggrieved’. It is clear to my mind that the expression ‘person aggrieved’ includes a party against whom an order cancelling the registration is made, by the Registrar. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the learned District Judge has committed an error of law in taking the view that the appellant before him was not an ‘aggrieved person’ and was therefore, not competent to prefer an appeal.
6. The learned District Judge, has on merits, come to the conclusion that the cancellation of registration was justified. The learned District Judge took the view that the action of the trade union in not convening a general body meeting, amounts to rescinding the rules providing for matters for which provision is required to be made under S. 6 of the Act. But it is necessary to note that is not the ground on which the registration was cancelled by the Registrar. The Registrar cancelled the registration on the ground that the trade union has wilfully contravened the notice calling upon the trade union to convene a general body meeting within two months. Therefore, the learned District Judge was clearly in error in sustaining the order of cancellation passed by the Registrar on grounds on which the order itself did not rest. The learned District Judge has not addressed himself to the question as to whether the Registrar was justified in cancelling the registration on the ground stated by him in his order, namely that the union has wilfully and after notice, not convened the general body meeting within the specified time. The Registrar issued a notice on 28th August 1965 calling upon the trade union to hold the general body meeting to conduct elections of office bearers as per rules within two months from the date of service of the notice. The notice was served on 3rd September, 1965. After issuing the notice dt. 28th August 1965, the Registrar waited till 20th December 1965 and passed an order on that day cancelling the registration. S. 10 of the Act which empowers the Registrar to cancel the registration reads thus:
“A certificate of registration of a Trade Union may be withdrawn or cancelled by the Registrar—
(a) on the application of the trade union to be verified in such manner as may be prescribed, or
(b) if the Registrar is satisfied that the certificate has been obtained by fraud or mistake, or that the trade union has ceased to exist or has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of this Act or allowed any rule to continue in force which is inconsistent with any such provision, or has rescinded any rule providing for any matter provision for which is required by S. 6:
Provided that not less than two months' previous notice in writing specifying the ground on which it is proposed to withdraw or cancel the certificate shall be given by the Registrar to the Trade Union before the certificate is withdrawn or cancelled otherwise than on the application of the Trade Union.”
7. It is clear from S. 10 of the Act that before the Registrar can take action to cancel the registration on the ground that the trade union has wilfully and after notice from the Registrar contravened any provision of the Act, a notice has to be given by the Registrar of a duration of not less than two months specifying the ground on which it is proposed to cancel the registration. The object of giving a notice under the proviso to S. 10 is obviously to give an opportunity to the trade union to show cause against the proposed action. In my opinion, the notice contemplated under the proviso to S. 10 of the Act is mandatory. The Registrar is not competent to pass an order cancelling registration without in the first instance giving the requisite notice and giving an opportunity to the trade union to show cause against the proposed action. In this case no notice was given by the Registrar as required by the proviso to S. 10 of the Act. If after the Registrar called upon the trade union by his notice dt. 28th August 1965 to convene the general body meeting, the trade union did not convene the meeting, the Registrar was required to give another notice after the expiry of the said period of two months under the proviso to S. 10 of the Act, before taking any action for cancellation of registration. As no notice was issued as provided under the proviso to S. 10 of the Act, the order passed by the Registrar cancelling the registration cannot be sustained. As the order of cancellation of registration issued by the Registrar is liable to be set aside on this ground, it is unnecessary to consider the other question as to whether the trade union wilfully and after notice contravened any provisions of the Act.
8. IA. No. 2 filed for impleading additional respondents was not pressed by Sri Kotre and therefore, the same is dismissed. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed, the orders passed by the learned District Judge and the respondent, cancelling the registration are set aside.
9. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.