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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the complainant against the acquittal of the accused under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Margao, by judgment dated 12-12-2003. The complainant alleges that the accused issued cheque No. 0310348 dated 01-09-2000 for Rs. 50,000/-, drawn on Madgaum Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., towards money due and payable. The cheque was presented through the complainant's bankers (Indusind Bank Limited) and was returned marked "funds insufficient" (intimation dated 10-01-2001). The complainant sent a legal notice dated 18-01-2001 by Registered Post A.D. calling for payment within 15 days; postal records indicate the notice was returned and marked by the postal authorities. When the accused did not pay, the complainant filed the complaint under section 138.

At trial the complainant (a registered company) adduced evidence including a board resolution authorizing the Managing Director, the cheque, the memo of return, the returned postal article and a copy of the notice. The accused did not call evidence; in his section 313 Cr.P.C. statement he said the cheque was issued as security (not as discharge of any liability) and that he was a contractor who claimed that the company owed him about Rs. 3.5 lakhs and that he had instituted a civil suit for recovery.

The trial Magistrate acquitted the accused on three grounds: (1) P.W.1 (the Managing Director) lacked authority to file the complaint and depose for the company; (2) the statutory demand notice was not duly served on the accused; and (3) the complainant's evidence was shaken in cross-examination so as to create a reasonable doubt about the accused's liability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Managing Director, having produced a board resolution, had authority to file the complaint and to depose on behalf of the complainant company.
  2. Whether the statutory demand notice (sent by Registered Post A.D.) was duly served on the accused or whether the returned postal article supports a presumption of service under section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
  3. Whether the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (that a cheque was issued for discharge of debt or liability) was rebutted by the accused, and if so whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the accused.
  4. Whether the appellate court should interfere with an acquittal order given the standard of appellate restraint in appeals against acquittal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Complainant) — submissions by Mr. A.F. Diniz

  • The Managing Director (P.W.1), having produced the board resolution signed by the Chairman (Exh. 11), had authority to institute the complaint and to depose for the company (relied on United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar and M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd.).
  • Once the postal article was sent by registered post to the accused's address, a presumption of due service arises in favour of the complainant under section 27 of the General Clauses Act; that presumption was not rebutted here.
  • The complainant submitted that the accused led no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption under section 139; reliance was placed on K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan to argue that denials alone do not shift the burden and the accused must lead cogent evidence to displace the presumption.

Respondent (Accused) — submissions by Mr. C. Coutinho

  • The trial court's findings (including that the defence had rebutted the presumption under section 139) were a plausible view and appellate interference in an appeal against acquittal should be sparing (relying on the Division Bench decision in Mehmud Mohammed Chabukswar v. State of Maharashtra).
  • The burden to prove that the postal authorities intimated the accused rests on the complainant; the complainant should have called the postman to discharge that burden and the mere return of the postal cover is insufficient to prove receipt. Several authorities were relied upon to challenge deemed service.
  • The accused argued that the cheque was issued as security and not by way of liability, and that the complainant's evidence was insufficient to establish an existing liability — the presumption under section 139 can be rebutted by probabilising the defence (relying on Shri Prabhakar D. Naik v. Shri Jerry S. Viegas).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, 1996(6) S.C.C. 660 Relied upon by complainant to support authority of a company officer to file complaint and depose for the company. Cited by complainant's counsel; the court treated it together with MMTC but did not rely solely on it — court accepted that the Managing Director had authority due to the board resolution and similar principles.
M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 182 (and related reports) Held that anyone can set criminal law in motion by filing a complaint and a court cannot decline cognizance solely because the complainant was not competent; if a special statute prescribes eligibility that must be satisfied (in context, section 142's criterion that complaint be by payee or holder in due course). The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to hold that the Managing Director, backed by a board resolution, could file the complaint and depose on behalf of the company; therefore the trial court's first ground of acquittal was wrong.
Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar, 1983(4) S.C.C. 701 Foundation authority (as cited in MMTC) for the proposition that anyone can set criminal law in motion by filing a complaint and that competence alone is not a ground to decline cognizance. Referred to within the MMTC reasoning; used to support the conclusion that the company's Managing Director was competent to file and depose.
State of M.P. v. Hiralal, 1996(7) S.C.C. 523 Office report remarks (e.g., "not available in house", "house locked") may lead to a conclusion that notices were served — supports deemed service in certain factual matrices. Cited by both sides; the court relied upon the principles to support a presumption of service where postal endorsements indicated intimation and subsequent "out of station" return; the court held the trial court should not have dismissed for want of service.
K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, 1999 S.C.C. (Cri.) 1284; 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)178 Holds that where a notice is dispatched by post correctly addressed, section 27 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked: the notice can be deemed served unless the addressee proves non-service and lack of responsibility for non-service; distinguishes "giving" notice from "receipt" and rejects an interpretation which would allow willful evasion by drawer. The court applied this precedent to conclude that the postal endorsements ("Intimated" and "addressee out of station return to sender") supported a presumption of service and that the onus was on the accused to show he was not served and not responsible for non-service. The trial court's dismissal on service ground was reversed.
Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, 1989(1) S.C.C. 264 Explains delivery of registered acknowledgements, the role of postman, and the presumption of delivery under section 27 of the General Clauses Act where registered letters are properly addressed and posted; recognises practical limits on postman's duties. Used to support the view that posting a registered letter correctly addressed gives rise to a presumption of delivery under section 27; cited in the court's discussion of service of the statutory demand notice.
Malanbai Ratnaparkhi v. Govind R. Motade, 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (A.B.)481 This Court observed that presumption of deemed service is not to be drawn as a matter of course and depends on facts; but where notice is dispatched by registered post to correct address it should be deemed served unless rebutted. The court relied on its own authority to reinforce that dispatch of notice by registered post to correct address supports deemed service unless sendee proves otherwise; used to distinguish cases relied upon by accused and to support reversal of service-based acquittal ground.
K. Annaji Rao v. N. Krishna Raju Sekhar, 2004 Cri.L.J. 2911 Example where postal article was returned "addressee left" and no evidence established actual service; in that situation benefit of doubt was given to accused regarding service. Cited by the accused; the court found that the facts of the present case were different (presence of "Intimated" endorsement followed by "out of station") and therefore distinguished this authority.
Sunil Srivastava v. Shri Ashok Kalra, 2003(1) D.C.R. 104 Observed that presumption under section 27 depends on the evidence to be led at trial and that parties would get the opportunity to adduce evidence; deemed service depends on trial evidence. Cited by the accused; the court treated it as distinguishable because in this case the postal endorsements supported a presumption of intimation which shifted onus to the accused.
S.S. Ummul Habiba (Proprietor, Alim Auto Supplies) v. B. Rajendran, 2004(3) Crimes 505 Held that mere return of postal cover marked "Intimated-Unclaimed" may not amount to constructive notice where the complaint does not aver that the accused was evading service; presumption of deemed service is not automatic and requires factual basis. Cited by the accused; the court noted this authority but distinguished it on facts because the postal article in the present case bore two endorsements ("Intimated" and "addressee out of station") and thus supported presumption of intimation.
Pawan Enterprises v. Satish H. Verma, 2003 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (N.B.)474 Observed that to constitute offence under section 138 the complainant must prove receipt of notice by the accused; it is receipt (not mere giving) that starts the 15-day period. Cited by the accused; the court acknowledged the principle but found the present facts (postal endorsements) distinguishable and applied section 27 presumption together with K. Bhaskaran to hold that service was effectively established.
Shakti Travel & Tours v. State of Bihar, 2000(7) Supreme 90 Supreme Court noted that where complaint does not mention that demand notice was served, court may quash the complaint. Cited by the accused; the court distinguished that decision because in the present case the complaint and evidence did address dispatch and return of the postal notice with endorsements indicating intimation.
Sridhar M.A v. Metalloy N. Steel Corporation, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 320 Stated that notice should not be deemed served as a matter of course; where facts are unclear, benefit of doubt may be given to accused. Cited by the accused; the court held that the facts in the present record were clearer (two postal endorsements) and therefore Sridhar was distinguishable.
Mehmud Mohammed Chabukswar v. State of Maharashtra, 1999(Supp.) Bom.C.R. 409 Division Bench principle: appellate interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited — interference is warranted only if trial court's findings are grossly unreasonable or manifestly illegal resulting in failure of justice; if the trial court's view is a possible view, appellate court should not reverse. Cited by the accused to urge restraint; the court expressly acknowledged this standard of review but nevertheless found no merit in the appeal on the facts and law and dismissed the appeal.
K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2895 (and related reports) Holds that mere denials or averments in a reply do not by themselves shift the burden of proof; the accused must lead cogent evidence to prove absence of debt or liability rather than relying only on denials. Cited by complainant to argue trial court erred in giving benefit of doubt where accused led no evidence. The court considered the principle but found that in the present case the accused had, through cross-examination and section 313 answers, probabilised a defence sufficient to rebut the presumption.
Shri Prabhakar D. Naik v. Shri Jerry S. Viegas, 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (P.B.)623 Holds that to rebut presumption under section 139 it is not necessary to disprove beyond reasonable doubt; accused may rebut by leading evidence or relying on admissions and prosecution evidence — the standard is preponderance of probabilities (probabilisation). Cited by the accused; the court applied this principle in concluding that the accused had succeeded in probabilising his defence (stating the cheque was security; the company owed him money), and therefore the presumption under section 139 was rebutted to the requisite degree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the procedural defect alleged regarding authority to institute the complaint and service of the statutory notice; and (B) the substantive question whether the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rebutted.

A. Authority of the Managing Director to file the complaint

  • The complainant produced a board resolution (Exh. 11) signed by the Chairman authorising the Managing Director to institute proceedings. The complainant relied on United Bank and M.M.T.C. (the latter being a Supreme Court decision which restated that any person can set criminal law in motion and a court cannot decline cognizance merely because of complainant's alleged incompetence).
  • The court accepted the concession by counsel for the accused that the trial Magistrate was not correct to dismiss on this ground. Applying MMTC (and referring to Vishwa Mitter as part of that reasoning), the court held the Managing Director had authority and the complaint could not be dismissed for want of authority.

B. Service of the statutory demand notice

  • The complainant produced the returned postal article (Exh. 15) which bore two endorsements: "Intimated" and "out of station return to sender". The complainant denied the suggestion that "Intimated" endorsement was fabricated.
  • Both parties relied on multiple authorities on the legal effect of returned registered postal articles. The court reviewed relevant authorities (Madan and Co.; K. Bhaskaran; State of M.P. v. Hiralal; Malanbai Ratnaparkhi; and others) which explain the presumption under section 27 of the General Clauses Act that a properly addressed posted letter is deemed delivered unless the addressee proves non-service and lack of responsibility for non-service.
  • The court found the accused's cited authorities distinguishable (those where returns were marked only "addressee left" or "unclaimed" or where there was no averment of evasion). Given the dual endorsements in this record the court accepted the inference that the postal peon had, at some stage, tendered intimation and that later the article was returned because the addressee was out of station.
  • Consequently, applying the presumption available under section 27 and K. Bhaskaran, the court concluded the onus lay on the accused to show he was not served and not responsible for non-service. The trial court was wrong to dismiss the complaint on the ground of non-service.

C. Merits — presumption under section 139 and whether it was rebutted

  • Section 139 creates a rebuttable presumption that a cheque-holder received the cheque for discharge of debt or liability. The court emphasised that the presumption is rebuttable and cannot be displaced merely by suggestions or a section 313 statement; the accused must either lead evidence or probabilise a defence via cross-examination or admissions.
  • The complainant argued (relying on K.N. Beena) that the accused had led no cogent evidence and that denials do not shift the burden. The accused relied on Shri Prabhakar D. Naik to argue that probabilisation (preponderance of probabilities) is sufficient to rebut section 139.
  • The court examined the trial record: P.W.1 (the Managing Director) admitted she did not know details such as date of loan or by whom the loan was given; P.W.1 admitted the cheque was given by the accused "to secure the loan from the Company". The accused, in his 313 statement, said the cheque was issued as security and not to be presented for encashment; the accused also showed (by cross-examination) that the company owed him money and he had a civil suit claiming recovery and the company had counter-claimed the cheque amount.
  • Given these facts, the court found the accused had successfully probabilised his defence and rebutted the presumption under section 139 by preponderance of probabilities. The court observed that the presumption cannot be rebutted merely by suggestion or silence; however, in this case the complainant's own witness admissions and the surrounding circumstances made the complainant's claim of an existing liability improbable.

D. Appellate restraint

  • The court acknowledged the principle (from Mehmud Mohammed Chabukswar) that appellate interference in appeals against acquittal is limited and should be made only where findings are grossly unreasonable or manifestly illegal. The court considered that standard, but on the combined facts regarding service and rebuttal of section 139 it found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The acquittal of the accused by the Judicial Magistrate is upheld — the appellate court found no error on the merits that would justify overturning the acquittal regarding the evidence that the cheque was issued for a debt or liability (the accused successfully probabilised that the cheque was issued as security and that the company owed him money).
  • On the service issue: the appellate court held that where a registered postal article is returned with an "Intimated" endorsement and subsequently "out of station return to sender", a presumption of service under section 27 of the General Clauses Act arises and the onus shifts to the accused to prove non-service and lack of responsibility for non-service; accordingly the complaint should not have been dismissed for lack of service.
  • No broader novel precedent: the judgment applies established authorities (including Supreme Court and High Court decisions) to the facts before it; it does not claim to establish any new general legal principle beyond the application of those precedents to the facts of this case.

This summary is limited to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information outside the opinion has been used or inferred beyond the court's express statements.

    Santan Financers Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. Devapa A. Sarvi Another

    Cases referred :

    1. United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, 1996(6) S.C.C. 660.

    2. M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd., 2002(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)218 : 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (S.C.)11 : A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 182.

    3. Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar, 1983(4) S.C.C. 701.

    4. The State of M.P. v. Hiralal, 1996(1) Supreme 753 : 1996(7) S.C.C. 523.

    5. K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)178 : 1999 S.C.C.(Cri.) 1284.

    6. Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand, 1989(1) S.C.C. 264.

    7. Malanbai Ratnaparkhi v. Govind R. Motade, 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (A.B.)481 : 2002 Cri.L.J. 1188.

    8. K. Annaji Rao v. N. Krishna Raju Sekhar, 2004 Cri.L.J. 2911.

    9. Sunil Srivastava v. Shri Ashok Kalra, 2003(1) D.C.R. 104.

    10. S.S. Ummul Habiba, Proprietor, Alim Auto Supplies v. B. Rajendran, 2004(3) Crimes 505.

    11. Pawan Enterprises v. Satish H. Verma, 2003 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (N.B.)474 : 2003(2) All.M.R. 756.

    12. Shakti Travel & Tours v. State of Bihar, 2000(7) Supreme 90.

    13. Sridhar M.A v. Metalloy N. Steel Corporation., 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 320

    14. Mehmud Mohammed Chabukswar v. State of Maharashtra, 1999(Supp.) Bom.C.R. 409 : 1998(3) Mh.L.J. 731.

    15. K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, 2002(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)342 : 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (S.C.)91 : A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2895.

    16. Shri Prabhakar D. Naik v. Shri Jerry S. Viegas, 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (P.B.)623 : 2002 All.M.R. (Cri.) 607.

    Advocates appeared :

    A.F. Diniz, for appellant.

    C. Coutinho, for respondent No. 1.

    S.N. Sardessari, P.P., for respondent No. 2.

    BRITTO N.A., J.: - This is complainants appeal against the acquittal of the accused under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act, for short) by judgment/order dated 12-12-2003 of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Margao.

    2. The case of the complainant was that the accused had issued to the complainant a cheque No. 0310348, dated 1-9-2000 for Rs. 50,000/-, drawn on Madgaum Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. towards money which was due and payable to the complainant by the accused, and, when the complainant presented the said cheque for payment through its bankers, namely, Indusind Bank Limited the same was returned with endorsement "funds insufficient" as intimated by the said Indusind Bank Limited to the complainant on 10-1-2001.

    3. The complainant claimed that thereafter, he issued a legal notice to the accused dated 18-1-2001 by Registered Post A.D. informing the accused about the cheque and calling upon the accused to make payment due on the said cheque within 15 days. According to the complainant, the accused was intimated about the notice by postal authorities on 26-1-2001 and the said postal notice was returned by the postal authorities, and, as the accused failed to make the payment, the complainant filed the complaint against the accused under section 138 of the Act.

    4. In support of the complaint, the complainant, which is a registered company, examined its Managing Director and produced the necessary documents, namely, a resolution of the company, the said cheque, the memo of return of cheque unpaid, the postal article/notice returned by the Postal Authorities and a copy of notice. The accused did not produce any evidence, but in his statement recorded under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Code, for short), stated that he had issued the said cheque as a security and not by way of any liability. The accused also stated that he was a Contractor and had taken up the contract of erecting a building for the complainant company which owed to him Rs. 3 lakhs and a half and he had filed a Civil Suit against the said company for the recovery of the same. The accused stated that he did not owe any amount to the company.

    5. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, after assessing the evidence produced by the complainant acquitted the accused under section 138 of the Act on three counts. Firstly, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, held that P.W. 1, Deepali Kumar, as a Managing Director of the complainant company had no authority to file the complaint and to depose on behalf of the company. Secondly, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, held that the notice of demand was not duly served on the accused. Thirdly, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, also held that the evidence of complainant was shaken in cross-examination on the point of actual liability of the accused and that the accused had succeeded in creating a reasonable doubt about the claim of complainant of his existing liability.

    6. According to Mr. C. Coutinho, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the accused, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, has actually held that the presumption available to the complainant that the cheque was issued towards the discharge of existing debt or liability was rebutted by the accused, though the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class did not state the same in so many words.

    7. On the first count, Mr. A.F. Diniz, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant, in support of his submission that P.W. 1, Deepali, being the Managing Director of the complainant-company and having produced the resolution Exh. 1, signed by the Chairman of the company had authority to file the complaint and depose on behalf of the complainant has placed reliance on the case of (United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar & others)1, 1996(6) S.C.C. 660 and (M/s. M.M.T.C. Ltd. & another v. M/s. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P.) Ltd.)2, 2002(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)218 : 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (S.C.)11 : A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 182.

    8. I need only refer to this last decision, in view of the concession fairly made by Mr. Coutinho, the learned Counsel of the accused that the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class was not right on this count. Indeed, in the case of M/s. M.M.T.C. Ltd. & another v. M/s. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court stated that as far back, as in the case of (Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar)3, reported in 1983(4) S.C.C. 701, the Supreme Court had held that it is clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance. The Court further observed that no Court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. It has been held that if any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, then the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. The Court further observed that in that case the only eligibility criterion prescribed by section 142 was that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criterion was satisfied as the complaint was made in the name and on behalf of the appellant company.

    9. As already stated, the complaint in the case at hand was filed by the company through its Managing Director pursuant to the resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the said company which was signed by the Chairman and produced at Exh. 11 before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class. In the light of that, the complaint could not have been dismissed for want of authority on the part of the said Managing Director either to file the complaint or to depose on behalf of the said complainant.

    10. On the second count, on behalf of both parties reliance has been placed on various judgments. As far as the facts go it was stated by the complainant in the complaint that the complainant had issued a legal notice to the accused dated 18-1-2001 by Registered Post A.D. calling upon the accused to make the payment within 15 days. P.W. 1, Deepali, had produced the said postal article at Exh. 15, an article which was returned by the Postal Authorities and apparently with two endorsements, one "intimated" and the other "out of station return to sender". In course of cross-examination, the complainant had denied a suggestion that the said postal article Exh. 15 was returned to the complainant by the Postal Authorities only with the endorsement "out of station return to sender". The complainant had also denied the suggestion that the endorsement "intimated" was written by the complainant.

    11. Mr. Diniz, the learned Counsel of the complainant has submitted that once the postal article was sent to the registered address of the accused there was a presumption of due service in favour of the complainant, a presumption which was not at all rebutted by the accused in this case.

    12. On the other hand, Mr. Coutinho, the learned Counsel of the accused, has submitted that the burden that the accused was intimated regarding the said postal article by the Postal Authorities was upon the complainant and the said burden could have been discharged only by examining the postman.

    13. Mr. Diniz, the learned Counsel has placed reliance in support of the aforesaid submission on the case of (The State of M.P. v. Hiralal & others)4, 1996(1) Supreme 753 wherein the Supreme Court observed that "in view of the office report, it would be clear that the respondents obviously managed to have the notice returned with postal remarks "not available in the house", "house locked" and "shop closed" respectively and in view of that it ought to be deemed that the notices were served on the respondents. Mr. Diniz, also placed reliance on the case of (K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & another)5, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)178 : 1999 S.C.C. (Cri.) 1284. Before referring to this case it will not be out of context to refer to the case of (M/s. Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand)6, 1989(1) S.C.C. 264 wherein the Supreme Court dealt with a notice despatched by registered post and in this context the Supreme Court observed that all that a landlord can do to comply with this provision is to post an acknowledgement due or otherwise containing the tenants correct address and once he does this and the letter is delivered to the post office, he has no control over it. It is then presumed to have been delivered to the addressee under section 27 of the General Clauses Act. Under the rules of the post office, the letter is to be delivered to the addressee or a person authorised by him. Such a person may either accept the letter or decline to accept it. In either case, there is no difficulty, for the acceptance or refusal can be treated as a service on, and receipt by, the addressee. The difficulty is where the postman calls at the address mentioned and is unable to contact the addressee or a person authorised to receive the letter. All that he can then do is to return it to the sender. The Indian Post Office Rules do not prescribe any detailed procedure regarding the delivery of such registered letters. When the postman is unable to deliver it on his first visit, the general practice is for the postman to attempt to deliver it on the next one or two days also before returning it to the sender. However, he has neither the power nor the time to make enquiries regarding the whereabouts of the addressee; he is not expected to detain the letter until the address chooses to return and accept it; and he is not authorised to affix the letter on the premises because of the assessees absence. His responsibilities cannot, therefore, be equated to those of a process server entrusted with the responsibilities of serving the summons of a Court under Order V of the C.P.C. The Supreme Court further observed that they had to choose the more reasonable, effective equitable and practical interpretation and that would be to read the word "served" as "sent by post", correctly and properly addressed to the tenant, and the word "receipt" as the tender of the letter by the postal peon at the address mentioned in the letter. No other interpretation, would fit the situation as it was simply not possible for a landlord to ensure that a registered letter sent by him gets served on, or is received by, the tenant.

    14. Coming to the case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vadhyan Balan and another (supra) the Supreme Court was considering whether a cause of action would arise in a case where the notice was returned with endorsement as "unclaimed" and the Supreme Court held that on the part of the payee he has to make a demand by giving notice in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of "giving", the travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened but the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days "of the receipt". It is, therefore, clear that, giving notice" in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer at the correct address. The Court then referred to the Blacks Law Dictionary and observed that if a strict interpretation is given that the drawer should have actually received the notice for the period of 15 days to start running no matter that the payee sent the notice on the correct address, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by different strategies and he could escape from the legal consequences of section 138 of the Act. It must be borne in mind that the Court should not adopt an interpretation which helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee as that would defeat the very legislative measure. Referring to a notice which is unclaimed the Supreme Court proceeded to refer to section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and observed further that no doubt section 138 of the Act does not require that the notice should be given only by "post". Nonetheless the principle incorporated in section 27 can profitably be imported in a case where the sender has despatched the notice by post with the correct address written on it. Then it can be deemed to have been served on the sendee unless he proves that it was really not served and that he was not responsible for such non-service. Any other interpretation can be proved to lead to a very tenuous position as the drawer of the cheque who is liable to pay the amount would resort to the strategy of subterfuge by successfully avoiding the notice.

    15. Mr. Diniz, has also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of (Malanbai Ratnaparkhi v. Govind R. Motade & another)7, 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (A.B.)481 : 2002 Cri.L.J. 1188 and another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Hiralal, 1996(7) S.C.C. 523. This Court referring to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court observed that the said decision did not speak about absence of presumption of deemed service once the party is able to establish that the notice as been despatched by registered post with the correct address of the sendee written on it. This Court further observed that the said decision only rules that presumption of demand service should not be drawn as a matter of course and should be decided based on the facts of each case. Referring to the case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan & another (supra) this Court held that once the sender establishes the fact that the notice was despatched by post with correct address written thereon, it should be deemed to have been served on the sendee unless he establishes that it was really not served and that he was not responsible for such non-service. This Court further observed that since the case related to section 138 of the Act, it was primarily for the petitioner to rebut the presumption regarding the service of notice sent to her by respondent No. 1.

    16. Mr. Coutinho, has also referred to several decisions, the case of (K. Annaji Rao v. N. Krishna Raju Sekhar & another)8, 2004 Cri.L.J. 2911 being first of them. That was a case where the postal article was returned with endorsement "addressee left" and there was no evidence to show that the notice sent under certificate of posting was in fact served upon the accused and in such a situation the Court proceeded to give benefit of doubt to the accused as regards the service of notice.

    17. In the case of (Sunil Srivastava v. Shri Ashok Kalra)9, 2003(1) D.C.R. 104 the Delhi High Court held that the parties were yet to go for the trial and in the trial they would get an opportunity to adduce evidence to prove whether the notice was received or not and the presumption under section 27 of the General Clauses Act of deemed service would depend upon evidence which would be adduced in the trial.

    18. In the case of (S.S. Ummul Habiba, Proprietor, M/s. Alim Auto Supplies v. B. Rajendran)10, 2004(3) Crimes 505 the Madras High Court referring to the case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (supra) held that :

    "27. "Giving Notice" to the drawer in the correct address itself was held to be sufficient in the factual matrix of the case and the same cannot be applied to the case in hand. In my view the return of postal cover as "Intimated-Unclaimed" by itself would not amount to constructive notice when it is not averred by the complainant in the complaint that the accused is evading the service. Although, in appropriate cases, deemed service is to be accepted by the Court, such presumption of deemed service is not a matter of course in all cases. To raise the presumption of deemed notice, there should be clear averment in the complaint that the appellant/complainant had sent the statutory notice on demand intimating the dishonour of cheque and that the respondents/accused were evading the service. In the absence of such averment, no such presumption of deemed notice could be raised."

    19. In the case of (M/s. Pawan Enterprises v. Satish H. Verma)11, 2003 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (N.B.)474 : 2003(2) All.M.R. 756 this Court observed that to constitute an offence under section 138 of the Act, the complainant is obliged to prove its ingredients which include the receipt of notice by the accused under Clause (b). It is not the "giving" of the notice which makes the offence but it is the "receipt of the notice by the drawer which gives the cause of action to the complainant to file the complaint within the statutory period". It may be noted that the case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (supra) was not cited before this Court in this case.

    20. In the case of (M/s. Shakti Travel & Tours v. State of Bihar & another)12, 2000(7) Supreme 90 the Supreme Court noted that the complaint had not mentioned that the demand notice was served on the accused and, therefore, the Supreme Court proceeded to quash the complaint.

    21. In the case of (Sridhar M.A v. Metalloy N. Steel Corporation.)13, 2000(5) Bom.C.R. 320 the Supreme Court stated that notice should not be deemed to have been served as a matter of course. Considering the facts of that case, which are not quite clear the Supreme Court therefore, proceeded to give benefit of doubt to the accused.

    22. In the light of facts stated by the complainant in this case and which I have reproduced herein above, the cases cited on behalf of the accused are clearly distinguishable. This is a case where the postal article was returned to the complainant-sender with two endorsements, one "Intimated" and the other "the addressee out of station return to sender." All that was done by the accused was to suggest that the first endorsement was returned by the complainant itself. The submission that in case the accused was out of station that he could not be intimated has got to be rejected. It is certainly probable that when the postman went with the postal article for the first time that intimation was given and later when an attempt was made for the second time that it was found that the accused was not available to be served with the said notice. In such a situation, the onus was clearly on the accused in the light of the presumption available to the complainant under section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and as stated by the Supreme Court in the case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaram Vaidhyan Balan (supra) that he was really not served and he was not responsible for such non-service. In the light of that, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class was not right in dismissing the complaint for want of service of notice.

    23. Coming to the merits of the case and the presumption available to the complainant under section 139 of the Act that the cheque was issued for the discharge of debt or liability, Mr. Coutinho has submitted that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class is a plausible conclusion which the Court sitting in appeal against acquittal ought not to interfere and in support of this submission Mr. Coutinho has placed reliance on Division Bench JUDGMENT of this Court in the case of (Mehmud Mohammed Chabukswar v. State of Maharashtra)14, 1999(Supp.) Bom.C.R. 409 : 1998(3) Mh.L.J. 731, wherein the Division Bench observed that although the Criminal Procedure Code makes no distinction between the powers of Appellate Court in an appeal against conviction from those in an appeal against acquittal but the case law which has crystallized as a result of catena of decisions of the Apex Court is that interference in an appeal against acquittal is to be made only if either the findings on facts are grossly unreasonable or the order of acquittal is manifestly illegal resulting in failure of justice. The Division Bench further observed that the Apex Court, times out of number, has held that in an appeal against acquittal if the view taken by the trial Court is a view which can be categorized as a possible view then the mere circumstance that had the Appellate Court been the trial Court, it would have taken a different view will be no reason to reverse the order of acquittal.

    24. Mr. Diniz, the learned Counsel of the complainant has submitted that the learned trial Court was very much conscious of the fact that there was a presumption available in favour of the complainant in terms of section 139 of the Act that the cheque was issued in discharge of the debt or other liability but since the accused had not led any evidence to rebut the said presumption, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class was wrong in giving benefit of doubt to the accused. Mr. Diniz, has placed reliance on the case of (K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan & another)15, 2002(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)342 : 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (S.C.)91 : A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2895. In this case, the Supreme Court stated that admittedly, the first respondent had led no evidence except some formal evidence and the High Court appeared to have proceeded on the basis that the denials/averments in his reply dated 21-5-1993 were sufficient to shift the burden of proof on to the appellant/complainant to prove that the cheque was issued for a debt or liability. This is an entirely erroneous approach. The first respondent had to prove in the trial, by leading cogent evidence, that there was no debt or liability. The first respondent not having led any evidence could not be said to have discharged the burden cast on him. The first respondent not having discharged the burden of proving that the cheque was not issued for a debt or liability, the conviction as awarded by the Magistrate was correct and the High Court had erroneously set aside that conviction.

    25. On the other hand, Mr. Coutinho, has submitted that the presumption could be displaced by probabilising the defence of the accused and in support of this submission Mr. Coutinho has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of (Shri Prabhakar D. Naik v. Shri Jerry S. Viegas & another)16, 2002 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) (P.B.)623 : 2002 All.M.R.(Cri.) 607, wherein this Court observed that for rebutting the presumption under section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, it is not necessary for the accused to rebut it by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The accused can rebut the said presumption either by leading evidence himself or by relying upon admissions and circumstances as appearing in the evidence of the prosecution. The accused is required to rebut the presumption by preponderance of probabilities. In other words, the accused is required to probablise his defence.

    26. Section 139 of the Act deals with presumption in favour of holder, and, it provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.

    27. There can be no dispute that the said presumption available under section 139 of the Act in of the complainant is a rebuttable presumption. However, that presumption could not be rebutted only by way of suggestions or a statement given by the accused under section 313 of the Code. The presumption could be rebutted either by the accused leading evidence or bringing facts on record in cross-examination of the complainant which could make the case of the complainant improbable that the cheque was issued in discharge of any debt or other liability or through other documents produced and proved through the complainant. In the case at hand, it is an admitted position that the accused was engaged as a contractor by the complainant-company and there has been a dispute regarding the payment of dues of the accused by the complainant regarding which the accused has filed a Civil Suit against the complainant for the recovery of the said dues and I am told across the Bar that the complainant has raised a counter-claim against the accused for an amount of the cheque, namely of Rs. 50,000/-. Firstly, it is to be noted that P.W. 1, Deepali did not make any categorical statement in her evidence that this cheque was given in repayment of any particular loan of a particular amount. In fact, P.W. 1, Deepali did not know the date on which the loan was given, by which of the Directors of the Company it was given or in repayment of which of the different loans, the cheque was given and in such a situation only because a cheque issued by the accused was found with the Company, it could not be presumed that it was given in discharge of a debt or liability. Secondly, in this case the accused was able to show through the cross-examination of P.W. 1, Deepali that it is the company which owed him money on account of the work done by him. In order words, the accused has been able to rebut the presumption that he had no existing debt or liability towards the said company. Thirdly, P.W. 1, Deepali, in terms admitted "that the cheque was given by the accused to them to secure the loan from the Company". The accused has also stated in his statement recorded under section 313 of the Code that "the cheque was not to be presented for encashment. It was issued towards security", and, if that was the case the complainant was not justified in presenting the said cheque for payment and upon dishonour to initiate proceeding under section 138 of the Act.

    27. I, therefore, find that there is no merit in this appeal. Consequently, the same is hereby dismissed.

    Appeal dismissed.

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