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Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: C.N. Radhakrishnan, A.C.G.S.C.
  • For the Respondent: K.P. Devarajan, C.V. Vasudevan, Advocate.
Judges
  • A.R Lakshmanan
  • D. Sreedevi, JJ.
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: C.N. Radhakrishnan, A.C.G.S.C.
  • For the Respondent: K.P. Devarajan, C.V. Vasudevan, Advocate.
Judges
  • A.R Lakshmanan
  • D. Sreedevi, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Judgment delivered by AR. Lakshmanan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment dated 11.7.1996 in O.P. 4188/93. The factual matrix, as stated in the opinion, is as follows:

  • K. Sudarsanan was employed under the second respondent in the General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF) from 5.2.1985 as a mason.
  • He was granted casual leave from 16.12.1989 to 31.12.1989 and died on 28.12.1989 due to a fall from a moving train while returning by Gauhati Express to resume duties.
  • He was unmarried and died leaving his parents, brother and sister. The appellants assert that all benefits due to the deceased were paid to Thankamma, the mother of the deceased, who had been nominated as next of kin.
  • On 7.3.1990 the first respondent applied to the appellants 1 and 2 for family pension and sought appointment for his eldest son Babu. Because Babu had completed 30 years of age, the first appellant advised nomination of another male dependent aged 18–30. Instead, the first respondent nominated his daughter, Sulekha, stating she was unemployed.
  • Due to a ban on recruitment of female employees in the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)/GREF, the first appellant forwarded a request (Ext. P3) to the third respondent asking consideration of the female ward (Sulekha) for compassionate appointment as LDC/any other suitable post in a lower formation of the Army and suggesting that if the girl was so appointed then a male dependent might be considered for GREF employment.
  • The first respondent filed the writ petition contending that the ban on recruitment of female employees is illegal and unsustainable. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the second respondent to give employment to the second petitioner (Sulekha) in any ministerial post of clerk or typist in any GREF establishment within four months.
  • The appellants appealed against that direction, raising issues including the national-level ramifications of the Single Judge’s order and disputing the eligibility of the proposed appointee for compassionate employment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ban on recruitment of female employees in the Border Roads Organisation/GREF is illegal and unsustainable (as contended by the first respondent in the writ petition).
  2. Whether a court may direct compassionate employment (appointment on compassionate grounds) to a dependent (here, the daughter Sulekha) as a matter of course, or whether such appointment is discretionary and must be considered in light of statutory rules and the Supreme Court's rulings.
  3. Whether the Single Judge was correct in directing immediate appointment of the second respondent (Sulekha) to a ministerial post in GREF, rather than directing reconsideration of her claim in accordance with law and existing precedents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants (respondents 1 to 4 in the Original Petition) submitted that a ban on employment of female candidates in GREF prevented appointment of the second respondent and that the request for family pension could not be acceded to under the Family Pension Rules, 1972 (as stated in their counter-affidavit dated 10.2.1997).
  • They contended that all benefits due to the deceased had been paid to the wife of the first respondent (as stated in their pleadings).
  • The appellants argued that the Single Judge’s direction to appoint the second respondent would have national-level ramifications and affect public policy, and that the Single Judge erred in treating eligibility as undisputed when, according to the appellants, eligibility had to be determined in light of indigent condition and settled Supreme Court rulings on compassionate employment.
  • They relied on several Supreme Court decisions (cited in the opinion) establishing that compassionate employment is intended to tide over immediate financial crisis and is not a vested right to be claimed as of course.

First Respondent / Writ-Petitioner (as described in the opinion)

  • The first respondent advanced that the ban on recruitment of female employees in GREF/BRO is illegal and unsustainable and sought compassionate appointment (and family pension).
  • The first respondent had earlier pursued departmental routes (Ext. P3, Ext. P4 and representations) and then filed the Writ Petition when departmental responses were unfavourable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
L.I.C. of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar ((1994) 2 SCC 718 : AIR 1994 SC 2148) That compassionate employment can be granted only to tide over the immediate financial crisis resulting from the employee's death and cannot be insisted upon as a matter of course; it is not a right to be claimed irrespective of lapse of time or after the crisis is over. The court relied on this ruling to underscore that compassionate employment is not an enforceable vested right and that appointment should not be ordered as a matter of course without considering the statutory scheme and the crisis-based purpose of such employment.
Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138 (As cited in the opinion) It is among the Supreme Court rulings on the scope and purpose of compassionate employment, indicating that such appointments are to address immediate financial distress and are not automatically claimable. The court treated this authority together with other Supreme Court decisions as part of the legal backdrop establishing that compassionate appointment is discretionary and intended to meet immediate financial need.
Union of India v. Bhagwan Singh (1996 (1) LLJ 1127) (As cited in the opinion) Presented as a supporting authority on the nature and limits of compassionate employment. The court considered this decision along with other Supreme Court rulings to support the proposition that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as of right and should be confined to its remedial purpose.
State of Bihar v. Samsuz Zoha ((1996) 4 SCC 546 : AIR 1996 SC 1961) (As cited in the opinion) Cited among Supreme Court rulings on compassionate employment, reinforcing that compassionate appointments address immediate economic distress and are not absolute rights. The court relied on this precedent as part of the body of Supreme Court authority indicating limited scope for compulsory compassionate appointment.
Syndicate Bank, rep. by its Chairman & Managing Director, Manipal v. N.S. Priya (1997 (1) MLJ 123) A Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that a dependent’s right to appointment on compassionate grounds is not a vested right; discretion is vested in the employer and must be exercised fairly and reasonably having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The court relied on this High Court decision (to which one of the present bench was a party) to reinforce that compassionate appointment is discretionary and must be exercised reasonably; this supported modifying the Single Judge’s mandamus for immediate appointment into an order for reconsideration in accordance with law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, strictly as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The court reviewed the factual background and the Single Judge's order directing the second respondent (Sulekha) be given employment in a ministerial post (clerk/typist) in any GREF establishment within four months.
  2. The court noted the appellants' contentions that eligibility for compassionate employment was disputed and that the appointment direction would have broader public policy ramifications because of the ban on female recruitment in GREF/BRO and statutory rules which had not been challenged.
  3. The court examined relevant Supreme Court decisions (including L.I.C. of India v. Ambekar and others) and a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court (Syndicate Bank v. N.S. Priya) to determine the legal principle governing compassionate appointment. From these authorities the court extracted the clear principle that compassionate employment is intended to tide over immediate financial crisis, is not a vested right, and is a matter of employer discretion to be exercised fairly and reasonably.
  4. Applying those principles, the court concluded that the Single Judge erred in issuing a mandatory direction for immediate appointment. Instead of directing appointment, the learned Single Judge should have directed reconsideration of the claim in light of Ext. P3 and the cited rulings.
  5. The court acknowledged that under Ext. P3 the first appellant had requested the third respondent to consider the female ward for appointment in lower formations of the Army and had suggested consideration for employment near the applicant's home town (Quilon, Kerala). The court used this departmental request as the basis to frame a remedial order requiring reconsideration rather than direct appointment to GREF.
  6. Consequently, the court modified the Single Judge’s order into a mandamus directing the third appellant to consider the second respondent’s name for appointment on compassionate grounds as LDC or any other suitable post in accordance with her qualifications in lower formations of the Army, preferably in Quilon District or nearby locations if no vacancy exists there. The court prescribed procedural steps and timelines for a fresh application and final decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Writ Appeal was disposed of with modification of the Single Judge’s order. The court held that the Single Judge erred in directing immediate appointment; instead it issued a mandamus directing reconsideration of the second respondent's claim for compassionate appointment in accordance with law and the cited precedents.

The specific operative directions given by the court were:

  • The third appellant is directed to consider the name of the second respondent for appointment on compassionate grounds as LDC or any other suitable post in accordance with her qualifications in lower formations of the Army at an early date in any unit located in Quilon District, Kerala State. If no vacancy exists there, consideration may be given in a nearby area.
  • The second respondent shall make a fresh application in the prescribed form within two weeks from the date of the judgment.
  • The third appellant shall consider the fresh application and pass final orders in accordance with law within three months thereafter.
  • Writ Appeal is disposed of and C.M.P. No. 5463/96 stands dismissed.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by setting aside the Single Judge’s mandatory appointment order and replacing it with an order for reconsideration and decision within specified timelines. The court relied on established Supreme Court and High Court precedent to emphasize that compassionate employment is discretionary and aimed at addressing immediate financial distress; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion; no outside facts or inferences have been introduced.

Show full summary ...

    Union Of India v. Kumaran

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    AR. Lakshmanan, J.:— Heard Mr. C.N Radhakrishnan, Special Central Government Standing Counsel for the appellants and Mr. K.P Devrajan for respondents. Hie appeal is directed against the judgment dated 11.7.1996 in O.P 4188/93.

    2. The appellants are respondents 1 to 4 in the Original Petition. The first respondent's son by name K. Sudarsanan was employed under the second respondent in the Original Petition in the General Reserve Engineering Force (GREF) with effect from 5.2.1985 as a mason. Sudarsanan was granted 12 days casual leave from 16.12.1989 to 31.12.1989 While he was returning by Gauhati Express to resume his duties he died on 28.12.1989 due to a fall from the moving train. He was unmarried. He died leaving his parents, brother and sister. According to the appellants all the benefits due to the deceased were paid to Thankamma, the mother of the deceased whom Sudarsanan has nominated as his next of kin. On 7.3.1990 the first respondent applied to the appellants 1 and 2 for grant of family pension and also a request for giving appointment to his eldest son by name Babu. Since Babu had completed 30 years of age, the first appellant advised the first respondent herein to nominate any other male defendant whose age is between 18 to 30 in a prescribed proforma. This communication was sent through Ext P2. However, first respondent nominated his daughter Sulekha stating that she was unemployed and there was no other person. Since it was not possible to provide employment in the GREF to female candidates as per rules, Ext. P3 request was sent by the first appellant to the third appellant.

    3. It is seen from Ext. P3 that the third respondent was requested to consider the name of the female ward of deceased GREF personnel for compassionate appointment as LDC/any other suitable post as per her qualification in lower formation of the army at an early date and if the said girl is given appointment on compassionate grounds in lower formations for the army, one male dependent of defence service person will be given employment in GREF and that the individual should be of the age group of 18 to 25 years and should most laid down medical standards. The home address of the applicant was also furnished in Ext. P3. The author concluded the said letter by requesting the third respondent to consider the female ward of the deceased for employment in any unit located near to her home town. Copy of the said communication was sent to other departments and also to the female ward of the deceased Sulekha. The first respondent passed Ext. P4 stating that they are unable to absorb the female ward of the deceased in their department in view of the ban of female employees in BRO. However, they had approached the Head Quarters Southern Command to ascertain feasibility of providing employment against vacancies of civilians in Defence in any of the establishment and that the response received was not favourable. Subsequently, the first respondent submitted representations to the first appellant and thereafter filed the Writ Petition contending that the ban on recruitment of female employees is illegal and unsustainable.

    4. The appellants filed counter affidavit dated 10.2.1997 highlighting the fact that in view of the ban on employment to female candidates in the GREF the second respondent could not be employed and that the request for family pension could not be acceded to under the Family Pension Rules, 1972. The appellants also contended that all benefits due to the deceased had been paid to the wife of the first respondent herein and that the ban on recruitment of female employees in the Border Roads Organisation is not violative of Arts. 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

    5. Learned single Judge however disposed of the Writ Petition by observing in para 5 as follows:—

    “It is stated that eligibility of the 2nd petitioner is not disputed by the respondents. Only argument is that there is ban for employees in GREF. Such a ban cannot be in respect of all posts. In respect of the posts in ministerial wing, necessarily females can be employed, otherwise it is an act of discrimination. In the above circumstances, Original Petition is allowed directing the 2nd respondent to give employment to the 2nd petitioner in any ministerial post of Clerk or Typist, in any of the establishment under GREF.

    6. With the above direction Original Petition is allowed. The direction shall be complied with within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.”

    7. The learned Judge issued a direction to the second appellant herein to give employment to the second respondent herein in any ministerial post of clerk or typist in any of the establishment under GREF and allowed the O.P on the said ground and also further directed the appellants to comply with the directions within four months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment Learned Judge proceeded with the case that a ban cannot be in respect of all posts in GREF and therefore, directed the second appellant to give employment to the second respondent in any ministerial post of clerk or typist in any of the establishment under GREF. Learned Central Government Standing Counsel submitted that the ramifications and impact of such judgment would be at the national level and since larger public policy is involved in the issue the appellants have filed the above appeal. It is also pointed out by the appellants counsel that there is dispute with regard to the eligibility of the second respondent for employment However, the learned Judge has found that there is no dispute by the appellants with regard to the eligibility of the second respondent herein which is not correct According to the learned Central Government Standing Counsel such eligibility has to be determined on the basis of the indigent condition of the family of the respondents and the rulings of the Supreme Court reported in L.I.C of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar ((1994) 2 SCC 718 : AIR 1994 SC 2148), Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138), Union of India v. Bhagwan Singh (1996 (1) LLJ 1127) and State of Bihar v. Samsuz Zoha etc. ((1996) 4 SCC 546 : AIR 1996 SC 1961). It has been ruled by the Supreme Court that compassionate employment can be granted only to tide over the immediate financial crisis resulting from the employees death and the same cannot be insisted upon as a matter of course. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which he face at the time of death of the sole bread winner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.

    8. According to the learned counsel this issue has not been considered by the learned single Judge and hence the judgment is not correct At the maximum the learned Judge should have merely directed consideration of the claim of the second respondent in the light of Ext. P3 communication and rulings of the Supreme Court on the issue and that the direction to appoint the second respondent in GREF would only put the appellants herein in piquant situation especially when such appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions which remain unchallenged.

    9. We are of the opinion that the direction issued by the learned Judge to appoint the second respondent herein in any of the ministerial post of clerk or typist in any of the establishment under GREF within four months is not correct As pointed out by counsel for the appellants the learned Judge should have merely directed the appellants the consideration of the claim of the second respondent in the light of Ext. P3 communication and the rulings of the Supreme Court and of this Court. The Courts have held that there is no fundamental right or enforceable civil rights in the matter of compassionate appointment especially when the Supreme Court has laid down the law on the issue in L.I.C of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar ((1994) 2 SCC 718 : AIR 1994 SC 2148). In this case, the statutory rules and its correctness have not been challenged nor file learned single Judge had the occasion to examine them. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court to which one of us (AR. Lakshmanan, J.) is a party in the judgment reported in Syndicate Bank, rep, by its Chairman & Managing Director, Manipal v. N.S Priya (1997 (1) MLJ 123) held that a right of dependent to get appointment on compassionate basis is not a vestal right and discretion given to the employer to offer appointment on compassionate grounds and such discretion has to be exercised fairly and reasonably having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. A reading of the statutory rules it is manifestly clear that the appointment of the dependants of the deceased employee on compassionate ground is left to the discretion of the appellants. At the same time, we should not forget that such appointment on compassionate ground is provided to release the economic distress by the unexpected and sudden demise of the sole bread winner of the family. It is on the above basis the problem in question has to be approached. As already noticed the first appellant has no objection for this court in issuing a direction for consideration of the claim of the second respondent herein in the light of Ext. P3 communication and the rulings of the Court on the issue. Under Ext. P3, a request was made by the first appellant to consider the female ward of the deceased GREF personnel for appointment on compassionate basis as LDC/any other suitable post as per her qualification in lower formation of the army at an early date and that the second respondent's name be considered for employment in any unit located near to her home town, namely Quilon, Kerala State. We therefore, modify the direction issued by the learned Judge to the following terms.

    10. We therefore, issue a mandamus directing the third appellant herein to consider the name of the second respondent herein for appointment on compassionate ground as LDC or any other suitable post in accordance to her qualification in lower formation of the army at an early date in any unit located in Quilon District, Kerala State. If for any reason no vacancy is available in the said area they may consider her name for appointment in any other nearby area. The second respondent respondent shall make a fresh application in the form prescribed within two weeks from today and the third appellant shall consider and pass final orders in accordance with law within three months thereafter. Writ Appeal is disposed of. C.M.P No. 5463/96 stands dismissed.

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    Comments

    Union Of India v. Kumaran
    (Jun 24, 1998)