1. After the order in these C.M Ps. was pronounced by me on 12-2-1976 in open Court by dictation to the shorthand writer, Mr. Obulapathl Chowdary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the C.M.P No. 660 of 1976 appeared in the after-noon and urged that he would withdraw the C.R.P itself and therefore I should not sign the order pronounced by me.
2. Mr. P.A Chowdary, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the other three petitions took objections to this course as the order had already been delivered and it cannot be altered even though, the C.R.P could be withdrawn by a subsequent act. Regarding the powers of the Court to alter orders in such circumstances, I heard both the learned counsel. Mr. Obulapathy Chowdary learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sangam Lal v. Rent Controller Eviction Officer (A.I.R 1966 All. 221 F.B) and urged that until the Judgment is signed it can be altered or amended or even changed completely, provided notice is given to the parties and they are heard before the proposed change is made.
3. On the ocher hand Mr. P.A Chowdry learned counsel for the respondents submitted that when a Judgment or order is delivered, it is not permissible for the Court to change it even though the judgment has not been signed.
4. Both the parties have placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R 1954 S.C 194). On a close scrutiny of the proposition laid down in that decision, I am inclined to agree with the submissions made by Mr. P.A Chowdary, Bose J., speaking for the Bench observed in paragraph 10 about the meaning of a judgment as follows:—
“In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the Court intimated to the parties and the world at large by formal ‘pronouncement’ or ‘delivery’ in open Court. It is a Judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there; that can neither be blurred nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its content and matter can be cured; but not the hard ???, namely the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open Court. The exact way in which this is done does not matter. In some Courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced. In some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection.”
5. It is no doubt true their Lord-ships have observed in paragraph 12 that upto the moment the Judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind and have got a sort of ‘Locegus Paenitentle’. But that would arise only in a case where the judgment has not been delivered as stated by their Lordships in paragraph 10.
6. I am also fortified in this view by the observations made by them in paragraph 14, wherein their Lordships have further stated, that if a judgment happens not to be signed but is inadvertently acted on and executed the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication. Their Lordships further laid down in the decision that when once the delivery of judgment is made in open court to the knowledge of the parties and to the world at large, the other things, viz., the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated or signed, or the signing and sealing are all subsidiary things, which no doubt are designed to secure certainty about its content and matter, but they have got no effect upon the hard core viz., the formal intimation of the decision of the court, which is a judicial act, which has been performed.
7. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the order pronounced by me on 12-2-1976 was not delivered even though the transcript of the order has not been signed by me when a request for the withdrawal of the C.R.P has been made. It stands as a valid order whether it was signed by me or not.
8. Mr. Chowdary has also drawn my attention to the same view expressed in Holtby v. Hodgson (Queen's Bench Division Vol. XXIV), wherein Lord Easher, M.R, observed at page 107, in a decision which starts at page 103, as follows:—
“The expression “where any judgment is pronounced by the court or a judge in a court’ is intended to contrast with the well-known expression “The Court or a Judge” in many other rules, that is to say, to exclude the case of a judge sitting in chambers; and the intention of rule clearly is that from the moment when the judge has pronounced judgment, and entry of the judgment has been made, the judgment is to take effect not from the date of the entry, but from the date of its being pronounced; it is an effective judgment from the day when it is pronounced by the judge in court.
(Emphasis is mine).
9. This view of the learned Lord has also been approved by the other two Lords viz. Lindley L.J, and Lopes L.J
10. Moreover under Order 20 Rule 1 C.P.C the court after the “………case has been heard, shall pronounce Judgment in open court, by dictation to shorthand writer”. “Wherever it is permissible, it bears the date on which it pronounced.’ The date of the judgment is never altered by the date on which the signature has been put subsequently. The date of the decree under Order 20, Rule 1 C.P.C would also be the date on which the judgment was pronounced. It is therefore clear that under the C.P.C stress is laid upon the pronouncement or delivery of the judgment on a judicial act, which has got legal effect.
11. The Allahabad High Court no doubt has held in the Full Bench case to the contrary. But with all respect to the learned Judges, I cannot hold that the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in A.I.R 1954 S.C 1941 glves any support for the proposition lid down by the Allahabad High Court. Mr. Nagarajarao, learned counsel appearing for Mr. Obulapathy Chowdary, had also relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Matheran Tramway v. Lang (A.I.R 1927 Bomby 113) On the facts of that case, the transcript of the judgment has not even been verified or approved by the Judge. But he sent a letter from abroad for his brother Judge to pronouuce it in open court. That decision in my opinion does not assist the petitioner in any manner.
12. For the above reasons I am satisfied that I cannot but sign the order already delivered by me on 12.1.1976 in these C.M.Ps It is open to the revision petitioner to withdraw the main C.R.P If he is so advised, or to keep it pending in this court till it is finally disposed of Post the C.R.P for further orders after ten days.