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  • provision of the Limitation Act is Article 65
  • Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • Article 65 of the Limitation Act
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
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citation codes
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  • provision of the Limitation Act is Article 65
  • Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • Article 65 of the Limitation Act
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession "on the strength of title." The plaintiff's claim was founded on Ext. A10, a registered will dated 17-5-1974 executed by Honnammal (the plaintiff's mother-in-law), by which the suit property (a two-storeyed shop building in Manantoddy town) was devised to the plaintiff; other properties were devised to Honnammal's daughter, the 5th defendant (who is the plaintiff's wife).

Earlier, in O.S. No. 1166 of 1958 (a suit for recovery of Rs. 900 instituted by Krishna Goundan against the plaintiff's wife, the 5th defendant), the building in question was sold in execution at a court auction. The highest bidder and purchaser at that auction was the first defendant (the appellant's principal), for Rs. 3,020, and after adjusting the decree amount the balance consideration was paid to the 5th defendant. The plaintiff himself was not a party to O.S. No. 1166 of 1958.

Both the trial court and the appellate court denied the formal prayer for a declaration of title but granted the plaintiff recovery of possession on the strength of his title. The appellant (legal representative of the first defendant) appealed. The present opinion reviews issues including the effect of the earlier decree and sale, the title derived under Ext. A10, and the applicable period of limitation. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title (instituted on 4-7-1974) was barred by limitation under Article 113 (the residuary provision) of the Limitation Act, 1963, because nearly five years had elapsed since the court auction on 26-5-1969.
  2. Whether a suit for recovery of possession "on the strength of title" is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act (rather than by the residuary Article 113), making the suit timely.
  3. Whether the decree and sale in execution in O.S. No. 1166 of 1958 (where the 5th defendant was the sole defendant) bound the plaintiff and affected the plaintiff's title, given that the plaintiff was not a party to that suit and the 5th defendant allegedly had no right in the property.
  4. Whether the failure of the plaintiffs in the money suit (O.S. No. 1166 of 1958) to ascertain the existence of a will and to join proper parties rendered the execution and sale ineffective as against the plaintiff's title.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on Ext. A10 (registered will dated 17-5-1974 executed by Honnammal) as the source of his title to the suit property and contended that, on the strength of that title, he was entitled to recover possession of the building.
  • The plaintiff implicitly contended that the decree in O.S. No. 1166 of 1958 did not bind him because he was not a party to that suit and the 5th defendant had no right in the property sold in execution.

Appellant's Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellant (Shri V.R. Venkitakrishnan) submitted that the present suit (instituted on 4-7-1974) was barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (the residuary provision), because nearly five years had passed since the auction sale on 26-5-1969.
  • The appellant's counsel relied on certain precedents (discussed below) to support his position; the court, however, held those precedents not applicable on the facts of the present case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohd. Sulaiman v. Mohd. Ismail, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 792 This Supreme Court authority was cited by the appellant's counsel on a point concerning parties/representation. The court held that the principle stated in this case had no application to the present facts because only one of the five legal representatives had been joined and the sole devisee (the widow Honnammal) was ignored, making the earlier plaintiffs' omission unjustifiable negligence.
Daya Ram v. Shyea Sundari, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1049 Cited by the appellant's counsel in support of a position on party-joinder/representation issues. The court found this precedent inapplicable on the facts for the same reasons stated in relation to Mohd. Sulaiman: the necessary parties/beneficiaries had not been properly joined in the earlier suit.
Harihar Prasad v. Balmiki Prasad, (1975) 1 SCC 212 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 733 Cited by the appellant's counsel concerning party/joining principles. The court held this precedent did not apply to the present circumstances where the sole devisee and principal beneficiary was omitted from the earlier suit and the earlier plaintiffs had been negligent.
Hameed v. Sumithra, 1987 (1) K.L.T. 308 Cited by the appellant's counsel as a supporting authority on the point addressed above. The court held that this decision of the court likewise had no application given that the earlier suit had omitted the sole devisee and only joined one of the legal representatives, an omission characterized as reckless rather than bona fide.
Bankhelawan Sabu v. Bir Surendra Sahi, A.I.R. 1938 Patna 22, 26 (Full Bench) Discussed at length for the legal distinction between a "declaration" properly so called and a finding of fact necessary to grant a decree for possession; also relevant to valuation/court-fee considerations and the true nature of a suit for possession. The court relied on the Full Bench's analysis to conclude that a prayer for declaration in a suit for possession is often a surplusage (a finding of fact) and that the real remedy sought is possession. Applying this, the court treated the present action as a suit for recovery on the strength of title (governed by Article 65) rather than a residual declaratory suit under Article 113.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's decision proceeded through several linked legal determinations, applied to the facts as found in the record:

  1. Title under Ext. A10 and the identity of beneficiaries: The court accepted that the building had been devised to the plaintiff under Ext. A10 (registered will of Honnammal dated 17-5-1974). It also accepted that under an earlier registered will (Ext. A1 dated 13-4-1943) Goundan had devised all his properties in favour of his wife Honnammal, so that the daughters derived no interest under Ext. A1.
  2. Effect of Omission in the earlier money suit (O.S. No. 1166 of 1958): The court examined the conduct of the plaintiffs in the money suit, noting that a diligent plaintiff would have ascertained the existence of a will and the beneficiaries. The earlier plaintiffs failed to do such an inquiry, joined only one of the five legal representatives, and entirely ignored the sole devisee (the widow Honnammal). The court characterized this as unjustifiable negligence rather than a bona fide omission.
  3. Applicability of cited precedents: The court considered several Supreme Court decisions and a decision of this Court relied upon by the appellant's counsel, but held that those precedents had no application in the present circumstances given the negligent omission to join the sole devisee and other legal representatives.
  4. Nature of the present suit — declaration versus possession: The court adopted the Full Bench's analysis in Bankhelawan Sabu v. Bir Surendra to distinguish a true "declaration" from the finding of facts necessary to grant possession. The court concluded that the plaintiff's prayer for declaration was unnecessary and a mere surplusage; the real relief sought was recovery of possession on the strength of title.
  5. Applicable period of limitation: Because the suit was essentially one for recovery of possession on the strength of title, Article 65 of the Limitation Act (not the residuary Article 113) governed the limitation question. The court found the suit to have been brought within the period applicable under Article 65.
  6. Effect of the earlier decree and sale: Ext. B8 (the sale certificate) described the property as "property of the 5th defendant derived under a registered will." The court found that the 5th defendant had not derived any right in the suit property under any registered will; consequently the decree against her (as sole defendant in O.S. No. 1166) was not binding on the estate of Gundappaa and did not bind the plaintiff. The plaintiff's title, derived under Ext. A10, remained unaffected by that decree and sale.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and implications for the parties:

  • The plaintiff was not entitled to a separate formal declaration of title, but was entitled to recovery of possession on the strength of his title derived under Ext. A10; both courts were correct to deny the formal declaration and to grant recovery on title.
  • The decree and sale in execution under O.S. No. 1166 of 1958 did not bind the plaintiff and did not affect his title, because the 5th defendant had no right in the property under any registered will and the earlier plaintiffs had failed to join the proper parties.
  • The present suit was governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and was brought within the applicable limitation period.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs throughout.

The opinion does not purport to announce any broad new precedent beyond the application of established principles to the facts; the court limited its ruling to the direct effect on the parties in this case.

    Padmavathi v. Kesava Reddi

    JUDGMENT

    1. The appellant is the legal representative of the first defendant in a suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Both the courts denied the declaration sought, but allowed recovery on the strength of title. The claim of the plaintiff is based on Ext. A10 which is a registered will dated 17-5-1974, executed by his mother-in-law Honnammal, by which the suit property was devised to the plaintiff. All other properties were devised to her daughter the 5th defendant, who is the wife of the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that by virtue of the devise under Ext. A10, he was entitled to recover possession of the building which had been brought to sale in a court auction in execution of the decree in O.S No. 1166 of 1958 which was a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 900/- instituted by a Krishna Goundan against the plaintiff's wife (the 5th defendant in the present suit). The plaintiff himself was not a party to that suit. In that auction the highest bidder being the first defendant, the building in question was sold to him for a total consideration of Rs. 3020/-. After adjusting the decree amount, the balance consideration was paid to the 5th defendant.

    2. Both the courts found that the 5th def endent had no right in the property sold in execution of the decree in O.S No. 1166 of 1958.

    3. That building had been devised to the plaintiff under Ext. A10. Although the 5th detendant was the plaintiff's wife, the decree against her in that suit could not have been validly enforced against her husband's property.

    4. The property in question is a two storeyed shop building in Manantoddy town and it belonged to the plaintiff's father-in-law Gundappaa who died on 12-6-1951. He had executed a pronote dated 26-10-1949 in favour of Krishna Goundan for a sum of Rs. 900/-. His legal representatives were his wife Honnammal and his four daughters including the 5th defendant. Under Ext. A1 registered will dated 13-4-1943 Goundan had devised all his properties ia favour of his wife Honnammal. His daughters derived no interest under Ext. AL At the time of the institution of O.S No. 1166 of 1958, Honnammal was alive. A diligent and prudent plaintiff who sought to use Che estate of the deceased debtor would have ascertained whether the deceased had left a will and if so who were the beneficiaries. A diligent investigation would have disclosed that Honnammal was the sole beneficiary under Est. A1 and that she along with her four daughters were the legal representatives of the deceased. No such investigation was apparently conducted by the plaintiffs in that money suit (the present defendants 3 and 4). In the circumstsacces, the principle stated on the point by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Sulaiman v. Mohd. Ismail, A.I.R 1966 S.C 792, Daya Ram v. Shyea Sundari, A.I.R 1965 S.C 1049, Harihar Prasad v. Balmiki Prasad, (1975) 1 SCC 212 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 733 aad by this Court in Hameed v. Sumithra, 1987 (1) K.L.T 308 aad relied on by the appellant's counsel shri. V.R Venkitakrishnan has no application. Of the five legal representatives, only one person was brought on the party array, and the sole devisee, the widow of the deceased, was totally ignored. This was a reckless act on the part of the plaintiffs who sued for recovery of money owned by a person who to their knowledge had died several years earlier. This was not a bona fide omission after a diligent and prudent enquiry, but unjustifiable negligence.

    5. Shri. Venkitakrishnan submits that the present suit, which was instituted in 1974 for declaration of title, was barred by limitation, for under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is a residuary provision, the period prescribed is three years. The suit was instituted on 4-7-1974 which was nearly five years after the court auction on 26-5-1969.

    6. Both the courts held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration but he was granted a decree for recovery on the strength of title. In a suit, for recovery on the strength of title, the relevant provision of the Limitation Act is Article 65 and not the residuary Article 113. The prayer for declaration in such a suit is a mere surplusage. What is sought is to recover property which the plaintiff has been dispossessed of and the recovery sought is on the strength of his title which must be established on proof of the relevant facts. What is sought in such a suit is not a declaration as to status, or the holding of an office or the scope and meaning of a public document, but the finding of facts evidencing title. Tne nature of such a suit was discussed at length by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court is Bankhelawan Sabu v. Bir Surendra sahl, A.I.R 1938 Patna 22, 26 (F.B). Although the discussion on the point in that case arose under the Court Fees Act, 1870, it is pertinent to the question as to the nature of the suit and the relief sought. In view of the importance of the question, I shall extract in full the relevant passages:

    “It would seem that there is much misunderstanding in India as to the legal meaning of the word ‘declaration’ as applied to a remedy to be granted by a Court. The habit has grown up of describing a suit for possession on property as being a suit ‘for a declaration of title together with a decree for possession of the property In suit’, and the word ‘declaration’ has been used to mean what would more correctly be described as the finding of fact necessary before the decree for possession can be granted. In every Buit for possession the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he proves the facts necessary to establish his title, but the real remedy which he seeks is a decree for delivery of possession. The distinction between the remedy sought and the finding of fact necessary to justify the granting of that remedy may be simply tested by considering whether the plaintiff obtaining an order for possession but Having been refused a formal ‘declaration’ in the decree could come to the appellate Court with a complaint that he had not received the whole of the remedy for which he had asked. If the Appellate Court is in a position to tell the plaintilf that the remedy of possession is all that the plaintiff is entitled to ask and that the so-called ‘declaration’ claimed in the plaint is merely a finding of the Court set forth in the judgement as distinct from the decree, the jurisdiction for granting the remedy, then the so-called ‘declaration’ claimed in the plaint is not a declaration at all.

    If, on the other hand, the Appellate Court should find that the plaintiff is really making a claim to a declaration properly so called and that the decree for possession is merely consequential relief, it may under S. 12 of the Act adjust the matter of the court-fee in accordance with S. 7, Para. (iv). It is this very difference which is at the basis of the practice under which the Court will not ordinarily grant a mere declaration and the plaintiff must claim consequental relief also. S. 7, Para. (iv)(c) has application to declaration properly so called, such for instance as declarations of public status, or a declaration that the plaintiff holds a public office, or a declaration as to the meaning of a will or a trust deed or other public document. It has no reference to the kind of declaration in the sense of a finding of fact as to the plaintiff's title necessary for granting a decree for possession. It is not in the least necessary for a plaintiff in a suit for possession to claim a declaration. Indeed declarations in the true sense are rarely required. The plaintiff should only allege the facts necessary to establish bis title and that the defendant is wrongfully in possession. If he goes on to claim, in the manner so beloved of pleaders, a declaration of title in addition to an order for possession, the Court may and should treat the case as a claim for possession pure and simple, and ignore entirely the claim for a ‘declaration of title. Suits for possession of land, houses and gardens are to bear a court-fee as provided by para, (v), that is to say, if the land forms an estate paying revenue to Government, at a multiple of the revenue so payable. There are also provisions for valuing the suit where the land does not pay revenue to Government, and also for valuing the suit if the subject matter is a house or garden. Therefore, the valuation of the suit for, court-fee purposes is to be determined by the question of whether the suit is really one for a declaration in the true sense of the word, or whether it is a suit for possession; and, if there be a claim in the plaint for a declaration, the plaint should be examined to see whether it is a declaration properly so called, or whether it is an unnecessary claim and the suit is really a suit for possession.”

    7. It is thus clear that the prayer for declaration was unnecessary, and was therefore not granted, and what was in fact necessary and granted was a decree for recovery of possession on the strength of title. Such a suit was governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act and it was brought well within time.

    8. What was sold in court auction in O.S No. 1166 of 1958 was property which belonged to the present plaintiff and he was not a party to that suit. The 5th defendant who had no right in the property was liable to be sued only as one of the legal representatives of her father who was the debtor. Ext. B8 sale certificate shows that what was sold was “property of the 5th defendant derived under a registered will”. The 5th defendant having not derived any right in the suit property under any registered will, the decree against her as the sole defendant was not binding on the estate of Gundappan. The plaintiff was not bound by the decree. It was rightly so held by both the courts. The plaintiff's title was, therefore, unaffected by the decree in O.S No. 1166 of 1958. The plaintiff on the strength of his title derived under Ext. A10 registered will was, as rightly found by both the courts, entitled to recover the suit property. He brought the suit well within time. In the circumstances, the appeal fails. It is dismissed with costs throughout.

    M.MDismissed.

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    Comments

    Padmavathi v. Kesava Reddi
    (Jul 14, 1987)