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  • Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 39 of the Code
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 39 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent initiated execution proceedings against the appellants for enforcement of an ex parte arbitral award dated 13-1-2006. The appellants raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Court under Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Prior to the objection, the Trial Court passed an order on 28-11-2008 directing appellant No. 2 to appear for examination. The appellants failed to appear on multiple occasions, resulting in the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The Trial Court initially stayed the warrant until 21-1-2009, but upon the appellants' continued absence, the stay was vacated and the order dated 28-11-2008 was directed to be implemented. The appellants impugned this order dated 27-1-2009, and the matter was made returnable on 17-2-2009.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Trial Court erred in vacating the stay on the warrant of arrest without first adjudicating the preliminary objection regarding territorial jurisdiction under Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to proceed with execution proceedings and examination of the judgment-debtor despite the objection to territorial jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Trial Court should not have vacated the stay on the warrant of arrest without hearing the preliminary objection on merits.
  • Reliance on the Supreme Court judgment in Mohit Bhargava v. Bharat Bhushan Bhargava, 2007 (4) SCC 795 (AIR 2007 SC 1717), particularly paragraph 7, which holds that execution against persons or property outside the executing Court’s jurisdiction is not permissible under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Reliance on a single Bench judgment of this Court in Smt. Uma Kanoria v. Pradip Kumar Daga, AIR 2003 Cal 162, for the proposition that further orders should not be passed by the executing Court pending decision on jurisdictional objections.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohit Bhargava v. Bharat Bhushan Bhargava, 2007 (4) SCC 795 (AIR 2007 SC 1717) Execution against persons or property outside the executing Court’s jurisdiction is not authorized under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure; no discretion to proceed or transfer execution. The Court held that these observations did not apply to the present facts as the examination of the appellant regarding property within territorial jurisdiction had not yet been completed.
Smt. Uma Kanoria v. Pradip Kumar Daga, AIR 2003 Cal 162 Once a jurisdictional objection is raised, further orders should not be passed by the executing Court until the objection is decided. The Court found this precedent inapplicable because no material was presented to show that the entire property was outside the Court’s jurisdiction, and the executing Court’s directions for examination were proper.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the applicability of Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mohit Bhargava. It emphasized that the execution Court’s jurisdictional objection arises only after the judgment-debtor’s examination regarding property within the Court’s territorial limits. The Court referred to Order 21, Rule 41(1) of the Code, which authorizes oral examination of the judgment-debtor to ascertain debts or property available to satisfy the decree. Since the appellant No. 2 failed to appear for examination, the Court held that the trial Court’s orders for examination and subsequent implementation of the warrant were neither illegal nor without jurisdiction. The Court rejected the appellants’ reliance on the single Bench judgment in Uma Kanoria, noting that the executing Court is not entitled to proceed against properties outside its jurisdiction, but no evidence was presented to establish that all properties were outside its jurisdiction. The Court thus concluded that the preliminary objection on jurisdiction could only be decided after examination, which had not occurred.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Trial Court’s orders directing examination of the judgment-debtor and implementation of the warrant of arrest stand affirmed. The appellants remain at liberty to raise their preliminary objection on territorial jurisdiction on merits before the Executing Court after examination. No new precedent has been set by this decision; it clarifies procedural propriety in execution proceedings involving jurisdictional objections.

    D.V.M Construction & Ors. v. Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd.

    We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. We have also perused the records. The appellants have impugned the order dated 27-1-2009 by which it has been directed that since the appellants were deliberately absent from the Court in spite of opportunity being granted on two separate occasions i.e 21-1-2009 and 27-1-2009 the direction issued in the order dated 28-11-2008 be implemented. The matter was made returnable on 17-2-2009.

    2. On a perusal of the pleadings in the petition it transpires that the respondent had initiated execution proceedings against the appellants for execution of decree being ex parte arbitral award dated 13-1-2006 made and published by the arbitrator. It also transpires from the pleadings of the appellants that a preliminary objection was raised with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court in receiving the execution application in view of Section 39(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Prior to such objection being raised, the Trial Court had already passed an order in 28-11-2008. In this order it is noticed, that by order dated 6-11-2008, judgment debtor No. 2 was directed to present herself for examination. None appeared before the trial Court on behalf of the appellants nor was appellant No. 2 present for examination by the Court. Consequently warrant of arrest was issued which has been made returnable three weeks hence. As noticed earlier, thereafter, the application was filed for dismissal of the execution application and as an interim measure prayer was made for stay of the order dated 28-11-2008. On that date the trial Court stayed warrant of arrest till 21-1-2009. Thereafter, it appears on 21-1-2009 the matter was not taken up and it came up for hearing on 27-1-2009. Again, the appellant No. 2 failed to be personally present in Court. In these circumstances, the trial Court directed that the order dated 28-11-2008 be implemented.

    3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the trial Court ought not to have vacated the stay order in relation to the warrant of arrest which had been granted on 15-1-2009 without first hearing the preliminary objections on merits. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the matter is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohit Bhargava v. Bharat Bhushan Bhargava, 2007 (4) SCC 795 : (AIR 2007 SC 1717). Learned counsel placed strong reliance on the observations made in paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid paragraph that if execution is sought to be proceeded against any person or property outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the executing Court, nothing in Section 39 of the Code shall be deemed to authorise the Court to proceed with the execution. It is also held that it is not a matter of discretion for the Court either to proceed with the execution of the decree or to transfer it for execution to the Court within the jurisdiction of which the property is situated. However, in our opinion, these observations would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. As narrated above, when the execution application came up for consideration, the trial Court issued the necessary directions under Order 21, R. 41(1). The aforesaid rule clearly provides as under :

    “41. Examination of judgment-debtor as to his property,— (1) Where a decree is for the payment of money the decree-holder may apply to the Court for an order that —

    (a) the judgment-debtor or

    (b) (where the judgment-debtor is a corporation), an officer thereof, or

    (c) any other person,

    be orally examined as to whether any or what debts are owing to the judgment-debtor and whether the judgment-debtor has any and what other property or means of satisfying the decree; and the Court may make an order for the attendance and examination of such judgment-debtor, or officer or other person, and for the production of any books or documents.”

    4. A perusal of the aforesaid rule would clearly show that where there was a decree for payment of the money, the decree holder may apply to Court for an order that judgment-debtor be orally examined as to whether any or what debt are owing to the judgment-debtor and whether the judgment-debtor has any and what other property or means of satisfying the decree. The Court may make an order for attendance and examination of the said judgment-debtor and for production of any books or documents. In our opinion, the impugned orders passed by the trial Court for examination of the appellant No. 2 cannot be said to be either illegal or without jurisdiction. The question of transferring the execution proceeding would only arise upon examination of the appellant in Court on the question as to whether she holds any property within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and as to whether she has any further debts within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Without this question being answered in favour of the appellants i.e to the effect that the entire property of the appellants is outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the question of transferring the decree may not even arise at this stage. It may also be noted that learned counsel for the appellants has also relied on a single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Uma Kanoria…Plaintiff; v. Pradip Kumar Daga…Defendant., AIR 2003 Cal 162 for the proposition that as soon as the objection with regard to the jurisdiction is taken, further orders cannot be issued by the executing Court till the objection is decided. We are of the considered opinion that this judgment is also of no assistance to the learned counsel. A perusal of the observation made by the trial Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment clearly indicates that the Executing Court would riot be entitled to proceed against the properties which are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In the present case, no material has been presented to this Court to show that the entire properties of the judgment-debtor/appellant are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It was for this purpose that the trial Court had issued direction for the examination of the appellant No. 2. Had the appellant No. 2 appeared and satisfied the Executing Court that all the properties sought to be proceeded against were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Executing Court, the appellants would perhaps fall within the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court as also the ratio of the judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court.

    5. In view of the above we find no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed.

    6. We, however, make it clear that the aforesaid observations have been made by us purely for the purpose of the disposal of the appeal. The appellant, is at liberty to submit on the merits of the preliminary objection before the Executing Court.

    7. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    D.V.M Construction & Ors. v. Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd.
    (Mar 2, 2009)