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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • R.K.Singhal
  • L.S.Udavat
Judges
  • Mr. Milap Chandra Jain
  • Mr. Nagendra Kumar Jain
Acts
  • Section 4 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887, Section 22A, Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 and S. 21, Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972
  • Section 20A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be called the Act)
  • Civil Courts. Section 10(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • ARTICLE 38 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 12, M.P Civil Courts Act, 1958
  • Section 16, Rajasthan Civil Court
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • R.K.Singhal
  • L.S.Udavat
Judges
  • Mr. Milap Chandra Jain
  • Mr. Nagendra Kumar Jain
Acts
  • Section 4 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887, Section 22A, Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 and S. 21, Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972
  • Section 20A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be called the Act)
  • Civil Courts. Section 10(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • ARTICLE 38 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Section 12, M.P Civil Courts Act, 1958
  • Section 16, Rajasthan Civil Court
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Milap Chandra Jain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (identified in the opinion as a Bar Association) filed a writ petition seeking: (a) a declaration that Section 20A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 ("the Act") is ultra vires the Constitution; and (b) quashing of Notification No. F.12(26)Raj/Gr. I/77-II dated June 27, 1994 (Annexure 4) issued by the Revenue Department, Government of Rajasthan, which notified that the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar, would hold a place of sitting at Raisinghnagar for a week (a "camp court").

The petition alleged misuse of the power conferred by Section 20A for administrative convenience, claimed the provision confers absolute and arbitrary powers lacking guidelines, invoked Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and contended the impugned notification causes inconvenience and additional expense to the petitioner’s members. The petition also cited earlier challenges to similar notifications (including Ajij Khan v. State of Rajasthan, Mana Ram v. State, and Roopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan) and alleged the State had attempted to avoid judicial adjudication in those matters.

The State (through the Additional Advocate General) opposed the petition, arguing the camp court at Raisinghnagar benefited litigants because a large proportion of pending appeals before the Sri Ganganagar authority (2,000 out of 2,700) arose from the Raisinghnagar area, and that parties would have a choice to be heard either at Sri Ganganagar or at Raisinghnagar during the camp sittings. The State relied on the text of Section 20A and on established administrative practice of fixing places of sitting in light of institution and pendency of cases.

At the conclusion of the hearing the court dismissed the writ petition with costs and ordered copies of the order to be sent to the respondents for information and necessary action.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 20A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 is ultra vires the Constitution (specifically Articles 14 and 21) for lacking guidelines and conferring absolute or arbitrary power on the State Government.
  2. Whether Notification No. F.12(26)Raj/Gr. I/77-II dated June 27, 1994 (Annexure 4) — which designates Raisinghnagar as an additional place of sitting for the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar, for a week — is liable to be quashed.
  3. Whether the petitioner (a Bar Association) has locus standi to challenge the issuance of such a notification or the establishment of a new place of sitting for a court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The State Government is misusing Section 20A from time to time for its convenience and to achieve unspecified objectives; similar notifications in the past were challenged and stayed or modified, suggesting avoidance of adjudication.
  • The impugned notification (Annexure 4) imposes great inconvenience on members of the petitioner’s Association who will have to travel to Raisinghnagar or see their clients forced to engage local advocates, increasing costs for litigants.
  • Section 20A contains no guidelines and thus confers absolute and arbitrary power on the State Government, making it violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution; its validity has been challenged in other pending writ petitions (e.g., Roopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan).

Respondent/State (Additional Advocate General) Arguments

  • Statistical averment in the petition shows approximately 2,700 pending cases before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar, of which about 2,000 arise from Raisinghnagar — i.e., roughly 74% — and the camp court at Raisinghnagar serves the convenience of that litigant population.
  • The camp court will relieve litigants from having to travel to Sri Ganganagar for filing and pursuing appeals; parties will have the choice to request hearing either at Sri Ganganagar or at Raisinghnagar.
  • The State fixes places of sitting of Revenue Appellate Authorities with regard to institution and pendency of cases, and the petitioner has not demonstrated how the power under Section 20A is being misused or what is being achieved by such misuse.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.B. Khare (Dr.) v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 Rejection of the approach that the validity of a statutory provision should be decided on the assumption that the government will abuse the power conferred; courts should not invalidate a law merely on apprehension of misuse. The court relied on this principle to hold that it is improper to assume misuse of Section 20A when considering its validity; therefore, the petitioner's argument based on an assumed abuse of power could not be the basis for striking down the provision.
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 Discretionary power conferred on government is not necessarily discriminatory; abuse of governmental discretionary power should not be assumed lightly. The court cited this authority to reinforce that discretionary powers vested in the government do not ipso facto amount to unconstitutional discrimination and that abuse of such discretion should not be presumed.
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 Limits on lawyers' locus standi: lawyers do not automatically have standing to challenge every matter concerning judges, courts or administration of justice (e.g., establishment of a new court) on grounds of professional prospects. The court applied this principle to conclude that the petitioner (a Bar Association) lacked locus standi to challenge the establishment / sitting of a camp court at Raisinghnagar on the ground that such a change would affect their professional prospects.
Ajij Khan v. State of Rajasthan (Writ Petition No. 952/90) — (as referred in the petition) Referenced in the petition as an instance where a notification changing jurisdiction was challenged, a stay was granted and the notification subsequently modified. The court recorded the petitioner's reference to this earlier challenge but found no convincing evidence that the State was misusing Section 20A to avoid adjudication; the court did not treat the earlier litigation as establishing invalidity of Section 20A.
Mana Ram v. State (Writ Petition No. 2929/88) — (as referred in the petition) Referenced in the petition as an instance where a notification dated Aug 19, 1988 was challenged and kept in abeyance after a stay. The court noted the petitioner's reliance on this earlier challenge but found that such past litigation does not establish that Section 20A is void for want of guidelines or that the State is misusing the provision.
Roopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan (Writ Petition No. 5944/93) — (as referred in the petition) Referenced as another pending challenge to the validity of Section 20A. The court recorded the existence of that pending challenge but did not rely on it to invalidate Section 20A; instead, the court assessed Section 20A on its text, analogous statutes and constitutional principles.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through several discrete analytical steps, grounded in the text of the statute, analogous statutory provisions, constitutional principles, and precedent:

  1. Textual analysis of Section 20A: The court reproduced Section 20A, noting subsection (1) authorizes the State Government to appoint not less than three officers as Revenue Appellate Authorities, and subsection (2) permits the State Government to specify place(s) at which each officer shall sit.
  2. Analogous statutory practice: The court observed that multiple statutes (e.g., provisions in various Civil Courts Acts and Criminal Procedure Code provisions) empower the State or High Court to fix or alter places of sitting for courts by notification, and that none of those provisions had been held ultra vires for lack of guidelines. This comparative statutory context weighed against invalidating Section 20A for want of guidelines.
  3. Rejection of assumption of misuse: Citing N.B. Khare and Matajog Dobey, the court held it would be improper to invalidate a statutory provision on the mere assumption that the government would abuse its power; discretionary governmental powers are not to be equated automatically with discriminatory or arbitrary powers.
  4. Focus on litigant convenience and constitutional directives: The court identified the paramount consideration for fixing places of sitting as the convenience of litigants. It invoked Directive Principles (Article 38) and Article 39A to show that locating a camp court at Raisinghnagar advanced elimination of inequality in facilities and promoted equal opportunity to access justice.
  5. Reliance on petition's own averments: The court accepted the petition's factual averment that 2,000 out of 2,700 pending cases (approximately 74%) related to Raisinghnagar. Given the impugned notification provided only a week of camp sittings at Raisinghnagar, the court found that parties would still have the option to be heard at Sri Ganganagar or at Raisinghnagar during camp sittings, and that the petition did not aver any abridgment of the right of the petitioner's members to appear or conduct cases where they had filed vakalatnama.
  6. Practical considerations: The court noted that future institution of cases by settlers of Raisinghnagar could occur at Raisinghnagar during camp days, potentially obviating the need to engage two advocates. It also observed that after disposal of pending Raisinghnagar cases the pattern of sittings might change and the Government could consider shifting headquarters if warranted.
  7. Locus standi: The court held that the petitioner, being a Bar Association, lacked locus standi to challenge establishment of a new court or its sitting place on the basis of prospective adverse professional impact; it relied on S.P. Gupta to that effect.
  8. Conclusion on validity: Bringing together the textual permissibility of Section 20A, analogous statutory authorizations, the lack of evidence of actual misuse, the constitutional imperative to improve access, and the petitioner's lack of standing, the court concluded that Section 20A was not ultra vires and that the impugned notification could not be quashed on the grounds advanced.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed with costs. The court recorded the operative direction: "Petition dismissed." Copies of the order were to be sent to the respondents for information and necessary action.

Implications:

  • The direct legal consequence for the parties is that Notification No. F.12(26)Raj/Gr. I/77-II dated June 27, 1994 (Annexure 4) remains in force; the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar, may hold a place of sitting at Raisinghnagar for the week as notified.
  • The court refused to declare Section 20A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 ultra vires the Constitution; therefore the statutory power to appoint revenue appellate authorities and to specify their places of sitting remains valid as applied in this case.
  • The court emphasized litigant convenience and constitutional directives (Articles 38 and 39A) as supportive of the impugned arrangement; the judgment does not purport to lay down a novel legal rule invalidating contrary positions but applies existing principles and precedents to the facts before it.
  • No broader new precedent purporting to invalidate similar statutory provisions was established; the decision resolves the petition on the facts and legal principles described above and on the petitioner's lack of locus standi to challenge the change in places of sitting.

Order: Writ petition dismissed with costs. Copies to respondents for information and necessary action.

Show full summary ...

    Bar Association, Sri Ganganagar v. State Of Rajasthan And Others

    Milap Chandra Jain, J.:— Courts exist for the litigants and not for Judges and Lawyers and litigants' interest is Supreme.

    2. This writ petition has been filed for declaring Section 20A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be called the Act) as ultra vires of the Constitution and for quashing the order No. F. 12(26)Raj/Gr. I/77-II dated June 27, 1994 (Annexure 4) of the Revenue Department (Group I), Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur issued under Section 20A of the Act notifying that the Revenue appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar will have his place of sitting at Raishinghnagar also for a week.

    3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the State Government is misusing its power from time to time just to suit its convenience and to achieve something by pressing into service the provisions of Section 20A of the Act. He further contended that similar notification dated April 4, 1980 by which the jurisdiction of the Revenue Appellate Authorities, Jodhpur and Ajmer was sought to be changed was challenged in Writ Petition No. 952/90 Ajij Khan v. State of Rajasthan, stay was granted, subsequently the notification was modified and as such the writ petition was not pressed, he also contended that the writ petition No. 2929/88 Mana Ram v. State has been filed challenging another similar notification dated August 19, 1988, stay has been granted, thereon the said notification dated August 19, 1988 was kept in abeyance, the writ petition became infructuous and it is thus clear that the State Government does not want verdict of the High Court about the validity of Section 20A of the Act. He further contended that due to the impugned notification Annexure 4, the members of the petitioner's Association have been put to great inconvenience they shall be required to go to Raisinghnagar for conducting the cases in which they have been engaged otherwise their clients will be forced to engage Advocates at Raisingnagar, they have to incur additional expenditure to pay their fees and as such holding of a camp court at Raisinghnagar will tax the litigants more instead of giving relief to them. He also contended that Section 20A of the Act does not provide any guidelines, it confers absolute and arbitrary powers upon the State Government, it is ultra vires of Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and its validity has been challenged in writ petition No. 5944/93 Roopa Ram v. State of Rajasthan.

    4. At the time of the admission-hearing, the learned Additional Advocate General was requested to assist the Court. He contended that in para 10 of the writ petition it has been averred that about 2700 cases are presently pending before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar, out of them as many as 2000 cases are of the area of Raisinghnagar Sub-Division, this shows that 74% cases (revenue appeals, revisions and references) arise out of the Raisinghnagar Sub-Division and only 26% cases arise out of Sri Ganganagar Sub-Division, thus issuance of the said notification Annexure 4 is in the interest of the litigant public of Raisinghnagar Sub-division, they will not now be required to come to Sri Ganganagar for filing their cases before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar as they can file before him during days of his camp court at Raisinghnagar and the lawyers who represent them before the trial court can file and argue them. He further contended that the parties of 2000 cases pending will have choice, they may request the Revenue Appellate Authority to hear them either at Sri Ganganagar or at Raisinghnagar. He also contended that the State Government fixes the places of sitting of the Revenue Appellate Authorities keeping in view institution and pendency of the cases arising out of the areas comprised within the territories of various places of sitting. He lastly contended that in para 4 of the writ petition it has been averred that the State Government is misusing its powers under Section 20A of the Act from time to time to suit its convenience and to achieve something, it has not been shown as to how the power is being misused and what is being achieved by misusing it and their necessary particulars have not been given.

    5. Section 20A of the Act runs as under:—

    “20A. Revenue appellate authority— (1) The State Government may appoint such number of officers not being less than three, as may be found necessary, to receive, hear and dispose of appeals, revisions and references in revenue judicial cases and other matters specifically provided for by law.

    (2) Every officer so appointed shall be designated as revenue appellate authority and shall for the exercise of his jurisdiction and the performance of his duties, sit at such place or places, as the State Government may from time to time direct.”

    6. Notification No. F. 12(26)/Raj/Gr. I/77-II dated December 3, 1992 (Annexure 3) issued under Section 20A of the Act shows that at present 12 officers have been appointed as Revenue Appellate Authorities and their territorial jurisdiction and places of sitting have been specified therein. The places of sittings are specified under Section 20A(2) of the Act keeping in view the institution and pendency of the cases arising out of the territorial areas attached with those places. Section 16, Rajasthan Civil Court Ordinance, 1950 enshrines that the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, fix and alter the place or places at which any civil court under this Ordinance is to be held. Similarly, Section 4 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act 1887, Section 22A, Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 and S. 21, Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 empower the respective State Government to fix and alter the place or places at which any civil court under the Acts is to be held by notification in the official gazette. Section 12, M.P Civil Courts Act, 1958 empowers High Court to fix places of the sitting of various Civil Courts. Section 10(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that the court of sessions shall ordinarily hold its sitting at such place or places as the High Court, by notification, specify. Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 states that in every district there shall be established as many courts of Judicial Magistrates of Ist Class or of IInd Class and at such places as the State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification, specify. None of the aforesaid provisions has so far been held ultra vires of the Constitution for want of any guidelines in them. It is improper to decide the validity of a provision of an Act with the assumption that the Government misuses its power. It has been observed in N.B Khare (Dr.) v. State Of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 at page 214 para 6 (end), as follows:—

    “…….Moreover, this whole argument is based on the assumption that the Provincial Government when making the order will not perform its duty and may abuse the provisions of the section. In my opinion it is improper to start with such an assumption and decide the legality of an Act on that basis. Abuse of power given by a law sometimes occurs but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension.”

    It has been observed in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , AIR 1956 SC 44 at page 48 para 15.

    “It has to be borne in mind that a discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power and that abuse of power is not to be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in the government and not in a minor official.”

    7. Paramount consideration for specifying the places of sitting is the convenience of litigants. Article 38 of the Constitution of India also requires that the State shall endeavour to eliminate inequalities in facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas. Article 39A enshrines that the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity. Specifying Raisinghnagar as an additional place of sitting of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar for a week by the impugned notification Annexure 4 is in the direction of the aforesaid directive principles of the State Policy.’ It goes to eliminate inequalities in facilities and opportunities which existed prior to the issuance of the said notification (Annexure 4) in between the residents of Sri Ganganagar Sub-division and of Raisinghnagar Sub-division in respect of the court of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar. After its issuance, the residents of both the Sub-divisions i.e Sri Ganganagar and Raisinghnagar, have equal facilities and opportunities for the court of the Revenue Appellate Authority. It cannot, therefore, be said that the provisions of Section 20A of the Act are ultra vires of the Constitution.

    8. It has been averred in para No. 10 of the writ petition “It may be relevant to mention here that at present the number of cases before the Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar is about 2700 and out of those 2700 cases as many as 2000 cases are from the area falling within the sub-division of Raisinghnagar.” This itself shows that 74% of the pending cases arise out of the area of Raisinghnagar Sub-division. By the impugned notification, the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar has his camp court at Raisinghnagar for a week only. These 74% cases of the area of Raisinghnagar Sub-division may be heard either at Sri Ganganagar or Raisinghnagar during the days of camp court as may be desired by the parties. Moreover, it has not been averred in the writ petition that the right of the members of the petitioner-Association to appear and conduct cases in which they had filed vakalatnama on behalf of their clients was in any way abridged. By the impugned notification (Annexure 4), pending cases relating to the area attached with Raisinghnagar are not necessarily to be heard at Raisinghnagar. Even otherwise, one thing is clear that pecuniary gain or advantage has never been allowed to assume primary importance in the discharge of professional duties. Cases to be instituted in future by the parties of the area of Raisinghnagar Sub-division may be instituted at Raisinghnagar before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar during the day of his camp court there and thus the parties will not be required to engage two lawyers, one at Sri Ganganagar and another at Raisinghnagar. It cannot, therefore, be said that the State Government has misused its power under Section 20A of the Act by issuing impugned notification Annexure 4. After the disposal of the said 2000 pending cases, the Revenue Appellate Authority may be required to sit for more days at Raisinghnagar than at Sri Ganganagar and his headquarter may be required to be shifted at Raisinghnagar. The Government may consider it at the appropriate time.

    9. There is yet another aspect of the matter, the petitioner being a Bar Association has no ‘locus standi’ to file the writ petition. Lawyers cannot question the establishment of a new Court. It has been observed in the famous case of S.P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (Seven Hon'ble Judges) at page 571 para 974, as follows:—

    “It has, however, to be made clear that it cannot be said that lawyers only because they have a right to practise in a court have ‘locus standi’ to file petitions in respect of every matter concerning judges, courts and administration of justice. There are many such matters in which they have no ‘locus standi’ to ask for relief. By way of illustration, lawyers cannot question the establishment of a new court on the ground that their professional prospects would be affected thereby.”

    10. No other point was pressed.

    11. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Copies of this order be sent to the respondents for information and necessary action.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Bar Association, Sri Ganganagar v. State Of Rajasthan And Others
    (Sep 15, 1994)