K.C Gupta, J.:— The facts disclosed in the writ petition reveal that the petitioner, who was posted as L NK No. 2480916A/25 Punjab, was detailed to perform guard duty at TCP Head Quarter 77-Mountain Brigade at Thakurbari (Assam) with effect from 13.3.1997 In all six other ranks were under the control of Guard Commander Hav. Amar Singh. The petitioner and Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh were detailed as Sentries from 1800 hours to 2200 hours by the Guard Commander Hav. Amar Singh.

2. Hav. Amar Singh, Guard Commander, after checking the Sentries, was in front of the TCP Main Gate, when he was challenged by the petitioner. However, Guard Commander Amar Singh forgot the passward but replied that he was Hav. Amar Singh, Guard Commander. It is alleged that it was moonlit night and Guard Commander Amar Singh disclosed his identity but still the petitioner abused him and hit with rifle barrel on his shoulder and chest and stated that he would kill him. Seeing it, Speoy Lakhwinder Singh, second Santry, asked the petitioner to leave Hav. Amar Singh and not to hit him. On hearing noise, Naik (MP) Samala Dasu also came out of the tent and asked the petitioner to leave Hav. Amar Singh. However, the petitioner asked Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh and Naik Samala Dasu to keep away and threatened that if anybody interfered, he would be killed. The petitioner further warned Hav. Amar Singh that he had just one minute before he would be killed and if he wanted to speak to anybody, he could do so. During the said period, the petitioner was hitting Amar Singh with his rifle barel and one round of SLR was also fired. It is alleged that the petitioner again cocked his rifle but the same got stuck due to double feeding of the rounds. Hav. Amar Singh managed to escape and reported the matter to Sub. Baldev Singh, who is turn reported the matter to the Commanding Officer. The petitioner was issued tentative charge-sheet under Section 40(a) of the Army Act on 14, 5.1997 vide Annexure P-1 i.e using criminal force to his superior officer. Thereafter the Commanding Officer heard two witnesses, namely, Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh and Sepoy Kamal Swarup but the petitioner refused to make any statement i.e according to Union of India, he had refused to cross-examine them and declined to make any statement, as is evident from Annexure P-2. Thereafter, the Commanding Officer ordered summary of evidence to be reduced in writing and accordingly, their evidence was reduced into writing and the petitioner refused to cross-examination them i.e the evidence of Hav. Amar Singh as witness No. 1, Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh as witness No. 2, Naik (MP) Samala Basu as witness No. 3 and that of Sepoy Kamal Swarup as Witness No. 4 were recorded. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 21.5.1997 The copy of the charge-sheet dated 21.5.1997 and copy of summary of evidence dated 20.5.1997 were handed over to the petitioner on 21.5.1997 vide Annexure P-5. Sub. Roshan Lal was appointed as Friend of the petitioner to assist him in the summary Court Martial and the said copies were also sent to him on 21.5.1997, well before time as the Summary Court Martial took place on 23.5.1997 During the Summary Court Martial, the petitioner pleaded guilty and Rules 115 of the Army Rules, 1954 was complied with the consequently the petitioner was punished with:—

a) to be reduced to two ranks;

b) to suffer R.I for four months; and

c) to be dismissed from service.

3. It is further alleged that under Section 162 the Army Act, the sentence was reviewed by the Brigade Commander and the portion of the sentence to be reduced to two ranks was set-aside being inoperative as Lans Naik was not a rank but only an appointment.

4. The petitioner, aggrieved by the said sentence, filed a petition under Section 164 of the Army Act, whose copy is Annexure P-10. However, the same was dismissed by the Chief of the Army Staff, respondent No. 2 vide Annexure P-11.

5. The petitioner has challenged the Summary Court Martial proceedings, Annexure P-7 and order of Chief of the Army Staff Annexure P-11, before this Court, being arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and passed in violation of the provisions of Military Act and Rules as well as principles of natural justice, on the grounds that there was no material available before respondent No. 3 Col. R.S Bhadwal at the time of hearing of the charge under Rule 22(1) and as such, no opinion could have been formed to proceed with the charge; that no witness was produced before the Commanding Officer and the same were not examined in the presence of the petitioner and Rule 129 was not complied with at the time of recording of summary evidence on 20.5.1997 He also contended that action was taken by him when intruder failed to respond to his challenge and rather started running and he, in the lawful exercise of his duty, had used the most minimum force and there was no mensrea or ill will on his part and Hav. Amar Singh did not tell the password when he was challenged. He also stated that it was a concocted story that he had used force against Hav. Amar Singh. So, he prayed that the orders be quashed.

6. The respondents contested the petition and filed written reply. They took preliminary objections that the petitioner was posted in the Slate of Assam, when the offence was committed and after commission of offence, investigation in the form of hearing of charge, recording of summary evidence and Summary Court Martial proceedings took place within the State of Assam and thus, no cause of action had arisen within the States of Punjab and Haryana or Union Territory of Chandigarh. So, this Court had got no territorial jurisdiction to hear the present Criminal Writ Petition. They further stated that the petitioner himself had pleaded guilty to the charge and as such, is estopped from filing this petition. On merits, they denied the allegations of the petitioner and stated that the petitioner had used force against his superior officer inspite of the fact that he was told by his colleague, Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh, who was the second Sentry, that he was Hav. Amar Singh and he should not hit him. They further stated that due procedure was adopted and the sentence has been passed in accordance with law.

7. Counsel for the respondents further contended that the petitioner, at the relevant time i.e on 12.5.1997, was posted as Lans Naik and was detailed to perform guard duty at TCP Head Quarter 77-Mountain Brigade at Thakurbari (Assam) with effect from 13.3.1997 He further contended that on 12.5.1997, the petitioner and Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh were detailed as Sentries from 1800 hours to 2200 hours by Hav. Amar Singh, Guard Commander TCP Head Quarter 77, Mountain Brigade at Thakurbari (Assam). He further contended that the occurrence” on 12.5.1997, had taken place in the territorial jurisdiction of Assam and further Summary Court Martial had taken place in the territory of Assam and he was sentenced in the Territory of Assam and further the petitioner had filed an appeal under Section 164 of the Army Act and the same was dismissed by the Chief of the Army Staff, Army Head Quarters, New Delhi, vide Annexure P-11. Thus, he contended that no part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of either Punjab or Haryana State or Union Territory of Chandigarh.

8. The petitioner has not stated in the petition as to how the cause of action had arisen to him in the State of Punjab or Haryana or the Union Territory of Chandigarh. Simply because there is a Military office at Chandigarh, cannot bestow jurisdiction to the petitioner to file Criminal Writ Petition in this Court. The Supreme Court for the first time, interpreted the jurisdictional aspect of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210. The question determined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was whether the Madras High Court had validly entertained a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, so, to restrain the Election Commission from enquiring into the alleged disqualification of the respondent. It would be pertinent to mention that the Election Commission is a statutory authority constituted by the President of India, with its office permanently located a New Delhi. A Single Judge of the Madras High Court had entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and issued a writ prohibiting the Election Commission from proceeding with the enquiry after overruling the preliminary objection on the issue of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court while holding that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, observed as under:—

“The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Art. 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction”.

9. The Supreme Court again considered the issue of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in K.S Rashid and Son v. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., AIR 1954 SC 207. The aforesaid case arose as a consequence of orders passed by the erstwhile High Court of Punjab at Simla, which had declined to entertain a writ petition on account of lack of jurisdiction. The writ petition before the High Court had been filed by the appellants before the Supreme Court under the Texation of Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, praying for the issuance of a writ of prohibition so, as to restrain the Income tax Investigation Commission, located at Delhi, from proceeding with the investigation of cases referred to it under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. The plea, raised was that the assessees against whom the investigation was initiated by the Commission belonged to Uttar Pardesh. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the assessment proceedings of the petitioners relating to income tax including reference therefrom, would lie to the High Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Investigation Commission was located at Delhi, and on that account, proceedings against the Commission's orders would lie only to the High Court at Delhi. The Punjab High Court accepted the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and declined to entertain the petition on the ground that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. The Supreme Court, while determining the controversy, reiterated the legal position recorded in Election Commission India's case (Supra). The same issue came up for consideration before the Supreme Court again in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union Of India & Another, AIR 1961 SC 532. In the aforesaid case, the two questions which came up for consideration before the Apex Court were, firstly, whether the Government of India can be said to be located in a particular place viz. New Delhi irrespective of the fact that its authority extends over all the States and its officers function through out India, and secondly, whether there is any scope for introducing the concept of “cause of action” as the basis of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The first question was answered by the Supreme Court in the following manner:—

“Now it is clear that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by Art., 226 does not depend upon the residence or location of the person applying to it for relief, it depends only on the person or authority against whom a writ is sought being within those territories. It seems to us therefore that it is not permissible to read in Art. 226 the residence or location of the person affected by the order passed in order to determine the jurisdiction of the High Court. That jurisdiction depends on the person or authority passing the order being within those territories and the residence or location of the person affected can have no relevance on the question of the High Court's jurisdiction.”

10. On the second question, the Apex Court held as under:—

“As we read the relevant words of Art. 226 (quoted above) there can be no doubt that the jurisdiction conferred by that Article on a High Court is with respect to the location or residence of the person or authority passing the order and there can be no question of introducing the concept of the place where the order is to have effect in order to determine which High Court can give relief under it. It is true that this Court will give such meaning to the words used in the Constitution as would help towards its working smoothly. If we were to introduce in Art. 226 the concept of the place where the order is to have effect we would not be advancing the purposes for which Art. 226 has been enacted. On the other hand, we would be producing conflict of jurisdiction between various High Courts as already shown by the illustration given above. Therefore, the effect of an order by whomsoever it is passed can have no relevance in determining the jurisdiction of the High Court which can take action under Art. 226.

The seat of a Government is sometimes mentioned in the Constitutions of various countries but many a time the seat is not so mentioned. But whether the seat of a Government is mentioned in the Constitution or not there is undoubtedly a seat from which the Government as such functions as a fact. What Art. 226 requires is residence or location as a fact and if therefore there is a seat from which the Government functions as a fact even though that seat is not mentioned in the Constitution the High Court within whose territories that seat is located will be the High Court having jurisdiction under Art. 226 so far as the orders of the Government as such are concerned.”

11. Later on, the Parliament approved 15th amendment by which clause (1A) was added to Article 226. It was subsequently re-numbered as clause (2) by the Constitution's 42nd amendment. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as under:—

“(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.”

12. Counsel for the petitioner contended that after/the amendment of the Constitution (noted above), the jurisdiction of High Court was enlarged substantially and the High Court could entertain a writ within a jurisdiction of which even a part of cause of action had occurred. There is no dispute about it that if a part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of Punjab and Haryana High Court, then certainly it can entertain the wit. For this contention, he had placed reliance upon an authority of Division Bench of this Court in Capt. Yashpal (1C-43335) v. Union of India, 1999 (2) RSJ 726. The facts of the aforesaid case disclose that the petitioner was dismissed from the Army on the conclusion of a court of inquiry. The order of dismissal was passed while the petitioner was posted in Uttar Pradesh. This Court entertained the writ petition impugning the order of dismissal and the rejection of his statutory representation/appeal on account of the fact that the order of rejection of the statutory representation/appeal preferred by him against the order of dismissal from service was conveyed to the petitioner at Thanesar in the State of Haryana. In Umasankar Chatterjee v. Union of India, 1982 (2) SLR 724, it was held that the order of removal became effective only when it was served on Umasankar Chatterjee at Calcutta. It was, therefore, concluded that a part of the cause of action having, arisen at Calcutta; the Calcutta High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. Reliance was also placed on Chairman and Managing Director, Punjab National Bank v. Dilip Kumar De, 1988 (1) SLR 171, wherein a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against the action of the Punjab National Bank in not revoking the order of the petitioner's suspension. In order to justify the aforesaid conclusion, the High Court took into consideration the fact that the suspended employee was residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, during the period of suspension, he received subsistence allowance through the Calcutta Branch of the Punjab National Bank, he was also making correspondence with the Bank from the place of his residence within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, and the Bank administration had also responded to the same at his residential address within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, and further that the impugned order (rejecting the request of the respondent for a revocation of the order of suspension) was also communicated to the petitioner at his aforesaid address. In view of the said facts the High Court concluded that it was not correct to contend, “no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court”. Reliance was also placed on Union of India v. P. Kunhabdulla, 1984 (3) SLR 426, wherein a Division Bench of Kerala High Court arrived at the conclusion that it had jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition filed by the respondent impugning the order of his removal from service which he had received while he was at Badagara in the State of Kerala. The Court concluded that the order of removal had become effective only when it was served on the respondent within the territorial limits of the High Court Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in Dr. Satish Sharma v. The Union of India, 2000 (2) SLR 695. In the aforesaid case, the action of the Medical Council of India in not recognizing the degree possessed by the petitioner, and thereby not accepting the petitioner's request for registration was a subject matter of challenge. While examining the issue whether the decision of the Medical Council of India in denying registration to the petitioner under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, could be entertained by this Court, it was noticed that the Medical Council of India had addressed the impugned communications to the petitioners in response to the applications made by them for grant of registration at their respective residences located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court; and on that basis concluded that a part of the cause of action had occurred to the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In addition to the decision rendered by the various High Courts, referred to above, learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, JT 2000 (10) SC 61 wherein the Supreme Court interpreted the 15th amendment of the Constitution by which clause (1A) was added to Article 226 (which was subsequently re-numbered as clause (2) by the Constitution's 42nd amendment). In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court opined that the object of introducing the amendment made to Article 226 by the 15th amendment of the Constitution was to overcome the limits of jurisdiction expressed by the Supreme Court in Election Commission's case (supra) and in order to extend the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also concluded that the amendment was aimed “at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by the High Courts”. On the basis of the extension of the jurisdiction which came about after the amendment to Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and in the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that a part of the cause of action having arisen within the jurisdiction of the State of Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In a separate concurring judgment rendered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.T Thomas, it was observed:

“We make it clear that the mere fact that F.I.R was registered in a particular State is not the sole criterion to decide that no cause of action has aroused even partly within the territorial limits of jurisdiction of another State. Nor are we to be understood that any person can create a fake cause of action or even concoct one by simply putting into the territorial limits of another State or by making a sojourn or even a permanent residence therein. The place of residence of the person moving a High Court is not the criterion to determine the contours of the cause of action in that particular writ petition. The High Court before which the writ petition filed must ascertain whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It depends upon the facts in each case.”

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also invited attention of this court to a short judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff, (2001) 9 SCC 525, wherein, the Supreme Court observed as under:—

“The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court at Allahabad to quash a communication sent to his wife which stated that the appellant had been tried by a Summary Court Martial and had been found guilty of using criminal force against his superior officer and awarded the sentence of dismissal from service. The High Court dismissed the wit petition at the admission stage by holding:

“In view of the fact that the summary court-martial proceedings were conducted in the State of Punjab and orders were also passed in Punjab by the West Command, we are of the view that this Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.”,

The writ petition was filed in 1992. The impugned order was passed in 1999. This is a fact that the High Court should have taken into consideration. More importantly, it should have taken into consideration the fact that the Chief of Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the country. Placing reliance only on the cause of action, as the High Court did, was not justified.

The Appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. The writ petition (CMWP No. 39209 of 1992) is restored to the file of the High Court to be heard and disposed of on merits, expeditiously.”

14. Counsel for the petitioner relying upon the aforesaid judicial precedents contended that a part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court as the statutory appeal filed by the petitioner to the Chief of the Army Staff was rejected and rejection was conveyed at his native place i.e Village Mandauli, Tehsil Rajpura, District Patiala, Punjab. So, a part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. However, nothing has been mentioned in the writ petition as to how cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court.

15. In response to the submissions made by/the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in the present case no part of the cause of action can be stated to have occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is vehemently contented that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present controversy despite the fact that the introduction of Clause (1A) by the 15th Amendment (re-numbered as clause (2) by the 42nd Amendment) of the Constitution, of India has widened the jurisdictional limits of the High Courts while exercising jurisdiction under/Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to supplement the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in EX. Const./Dvr. Satpal Singh v. Union Of India, 1997 (1) RSJ 299. In the aforesaid case the services of the petitioners were terminated under the provisions of Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, by the Commandant, 105 BN RAF (CRPF), Guwahati (Assam). The petitioners made an administrative representation which was rejected by the competent authority and communicated to him at his native village Dhin (located in district Ambala in the State of Haryana). On account of the communication of the decision (on the administrative representation) at village Dhin, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court. The writ petition was not entertained on account of lack of jurisdiction. While dismissing the writ petition, reliance was placed on two other judgments rendered by this Court, wherein the jurisdiction of this Court was sought to be entertained on account of mere communication of the order passed in response to the representation made by the petitioners, namely, Rajinder Singh v. Union of India, (1993-1) P.L.R 562 : [1993 (2) SLR 450 (Pb. & Hry.)] and Ex. Major Gumam Singh v. Union of India, 1994 (4) S.L.R 76. Reliance was also placed on State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217, wherein the Apex Court held that mere service of notice under section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, on the owner of land situated in the State of Rajasthan intimating the State Government's proposal to acquire the land for public purpose does not constitute an integral part of the cause of action sufficient to vest the Calcutta High Court with jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notification acquiring the land. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, it was noticed by the Apex Court that the notification issued by the State Government under section 52(1) of the aforesaid Act became effective the moment it was published in the official gazette as the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances immediately on the issuance of the said notification. The notice served on the respondent did not constitute an integral part of the cause of action, as it had no bearing on the validity of the notification issued by the State Government. Consequently, the Apex Court set aside the ad-interim ex-pate prohibitory order passed by the High Court restraining the State Government from taking steps to take possession of the land of the respondent after concluding that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711, the Supreme Court considered the same issue. The facts in this case which were taken into consideration were that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (hereinafter referred to as “ONGC”) issued an advertisement in leading newspapers of the country inviting tenders for setting up of a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at ONGC's Hazira Complex in Gujarat. The tenders were to be communicated to Engineers India Ltd. (Who was acting as consultants for the ONGC. NICCO having its registered office in Calcutta, on reading the Times of India (circulated in Calcutta), became aware of the advertisement. NICCO submitted their tender in response to the aforesaid advertisement. All the tenders were scrutinized at New Delhi. NICCO's bid was rejected on the ground that it did not fulfil the requisite experience criterion. The final decision in respect of the acceptance of the tender was taken by the Screening Committee at New Delhi. The tender was awarded to some other Company. NICCO filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking to restrain the ONGC from awarding the contract to any other party, without considering the claim of NICCO. According to NICCO, the Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the controversy in view of the fact that NICCO had come to know of the tender from a newspaper circulated within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The registered office of NICCO was also situated within the same jurisdiction. The tender/offer was made by NICCO from its registered office. Likewise when NICCO's tender was not accepted, it issued a justice demand notice from its registered office, the response to which was addressed to NICCO at its registered office by the ONGC. The Calcutta High Court, on the facts narrated above, entertained the writ petition and directed the ONGC to consider the offer of the petitioner (NICCO) along with others, and in case the petitioner's offer was found to be valid as well as the lowest, it should be accepted. The appeal before the Supreme Court was confined to the preliminary objection raised by the ONGC before the High Court, namely, that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as no cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment observed as under:—

“From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO it became aware of the contract proposed to be even by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it is submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinized at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993 cannot be construed as conveying the rejection of the offer, as that fact occurred on 27.1.1993 We are, therefore of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”

16. Reliance was also placed on Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567. In the aforesaid case the respondents approached the Gujarat High Court claiming the benefit of the “Passbook Scheme” framed under the “Import Export Policy” introduced with effect from 1.4.1995, in relation to certain credits to be given on export of shrimps. None of the respondents arrayed in the petition was stationed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court. The passbooks on account of which the respondents claimed benefits were issued from Chennai. The export of prawns made by the respondents and the import of the inputs, benefit for which, was being claimed by the respondents in the writ petitions were made through Chennai. The Union of India opposed the said petitions asserting that the Gujarat High Court had no territorial jurisdiction on the issues raised by the respondents. The aforesaid objection was overruled by the High Court, whereupon the controversy raised by the respondents was adjudicated on merits. In the appeal preferred by the Union of India, the Supreme Court while referring to Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, observed as under:—

“It is clear from the above constitutional provision that High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Court. In this regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu (SCC at P.13) wherein it was held.

“Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. The expression ‘cause of action’ means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the court. Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. Thus the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial.”

17. Therefore, in view of the discussion above, it is to be seen whether a cause of action or part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. Each and every fact pleaded by the petitioner in his petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the same gives rise to cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the, case. In such circumstances, mere receipt of intimation of rejection of appeal by the Chief of Army Staff by the petitioner at his native village does not constitute a cause of action but it only gives rise to right of action. Hence, I hold that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to try the present Criminal Writ Petition. On merits also, the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to find holes in the case of the respondents in as much as he contended that under Rule 22(1) of the Army Rules, 1954, it was required that the charge should have been heard by the Commanding Officer in the present of the petitioner (accused) and if the Commanding Officer was of the opinion that the charge ought to have been proceeded with, then he should have adjourned the case for the purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing. In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is not tenable. Annexure P-1 shows that the Commander had heard the charge against the petitioner on 14.5.1997 in the presence of the petitioner as is clear from Annexure P-2 and the petitioner refused to make any statement, meaning thereby, he did not disclose his defence or did not try to cross examine the witnesses orally. It is stated that the Commanding Officer had heard the statement of Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh and Sepoy Kamal Swarup. Thereafter, on 20.5.1997, he got reduced into writing the statements of the witnesses, namely, Hav. Amar Singh, Sepoy Lakhwinder Singh, Sepoy NK (MP) Samala Dasu and Sepoy Kamal Swarup but the petitioner refused to cross-examine them. Then vide Annexure P-5, a copy of the charge-sheet dated 21.5.1997 and copy of the summary of evidence recorded on 20.5.1997 were handed over to the petitioner on 21.5.1997 Thereafter, Summary Court Martial was held on 23.5.1997, as is clear from Annexure P-6. Sub. Roshan Lal was appointed as a Friend of the petitioner However, the petitioner pleaded guilty and accordingly, statement was recorded. A certificate, as required under Rule 115(2) of the Army Rules, was given that the charge had been explained to the petitioner and he had understood the contents of the charge and had pleaded guilty and the Court was satisfied that the petitioner had understood the charge and, thus, his plea of guilty was accepted and the petitioner was accordingly punished. Later on, the sentence awarded to him was amended vide Annexure P-9 on 13.6.1997 and the punishment to be reduced to ranks awarded by the Court on 23.5.1997 was set-aside. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Chief of the Army Staff under Section 164 of the Army Act, which was dismissed vide letter, Annexure P-11, dated 4.6.1998 and conveyed to the petitioner at his home address at Village Mandauli, Tehsil Rajpura, District Patiala. Thus, there is compliance with mandatory provisions of Rule 115(2) of the Army Rules. Further Rule 129 comes into play only when a Summary Court Martial is initiated. At a pre-trial stage, there is no requirement of law that a Friend of the accused must be provided to assist the accused. Thus, after going through the file, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the trial of the petitioner as well as awarding of the sentence on his plea of guilt. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner did not understand the meaning of guilt and his statement was recorded mechanically, rather he had made the statement voluntarily.

18. In such circumstances, the Criminal Writ petition is dismissed, as this Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to try the same.

19. Petition dismissed.