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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The decree-holder (plaintiff) filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 4 August 1971. The trial court granted the decree in favour of the plaintiff, awarding possession of a 3/4 share of the disputed house and directing the plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs. 11,500 within one month and to bear stamp and registration costs for the eventual sale deed.

An appeal was filed against the trial court's decree. During the pendency of that appeal, this Court (on 13 September 1974) confirmed a stay of execution provided the appellant (judgment-debtor) furnished a security bond to satisfy the decree if he failed to set it aside; the order also provided that the plaintiff-respondent would be entitled to withdraw amount(s) deposited by him until further direction.

The decree-holder had deposited Rs. 11,500 within one month as directed by the trial court (the opinion records a deposit on 25 April 1974), but the amount was withdrawn in view of this Court's 13 September 1974 order. The appellate court later dismissed the appeal (the opinion contains operative language of dismissal). The decree-holder again deposited the sale price and applied for execution: the opinion records deposits by the decree-holder on 19 October 1976 in one place and on 29 October 1976 in other places.

Objections were filed by the judgment-debtor in the execution proceedings, invoking section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and contending that the agreement stood rescinded because the plaintiff had not deposited the balance within the prescribed time after the appellate decision. The executing court framed three issues (see below) and held that the deposit made (recorded in the opinion as on 29 October 1976) was not proper because it was not within one month from the appellate court's order or from an order of this Court in a regular second appeal, and consequently held the agreement rescinded and the decree impossible of performance. The decree-holder filed the present revision petition challenging that executing-court order.

Note: The opinion contains differing date references in places (for example, deposits and dismissal dates are variously recorded). This summary reproduces the dates and descriptions as they appear in the provided opinion without reconciling them.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree for specific performance is liable to be rescinded on the grounds alleged in the objection petition (i.e., for non-deposit of the balance purchase money within the time alleged to be prescribed)?
  2. Whether the deposit made by the decree-holder (as recorded in the execution proceedings) was a proper deposit?
  3. What relief, if any, should follow from the determination of the above issues?

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holder (Petitioner's) Arguments

  • After furnishing security pursuant to this Court's order dated 13 September 1974, it was incumbent on the judgment-debtor to satisfy the decree; the judgment-debtor did not do so even after his appeal was dismissed.
  • The appellate Court had not given any direction fixing when the balance sale price was to be re-deposited; therefore there was no specific time-limit imposed by that court on re-depositing the amount.
  • The decree-holder re-deposited the amount (recorded in the opinion as on 29 October 1976) and sought execution before any application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act was moved by the judgment-debtor; the deposit should be deemed to have been made within reasonable time.
  • The executing Court's acceptance of the deposit operated as permission and an exercise of discretion to extend the time for deposit.
  • Relied on authorities including Sarupi v. Har Gian (AIR 1975 P&H 231), Dharan Dass v. Peare Lal (AIR 1955 NUC (Allahabad) 3555) and Gurdit Singh v. Jagjit Singh (1987-1 PLR 129).

Judgment-debtor's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • Time allowed by the appellate Court while disposing of the appeal should be presumed to be the same time allowed by the trial court (i.e., 30 days). Since the balance was not re-deposited within that period, the deposit on 29 October 1976 was belated and the agreement stood rescinded.
  • The decree-holder never applied to the appellate Court for an extension of time to re-deposit the amount; therefore the executing Court was correct in holding the deposit improper and rescinding the agreement.
  • Relied upon authorities including Dattatraya v. Shaikh Mahaboob (AIR 1970 SC 750), Satyaji v. Sakharlal (AIR 1914 Bombay 132), Sulleh Singh v. Sohan Lal (1975 Punjab Law Journal 400) and Panni v. Daya Ram (1985-2 PLR 157).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarupi v. Har Gian, A.I.R. 1975 Punjab and Haryana 231 The opinion quotes the ratio: where a decree is silent as to consequences of purchaser's failure to pay within the time fixed, the decree does not lapse automatically; the vendor may apply for rescission under section 28(1), but until such an application is made the decree subsists and the decree-holder can still execute it by depositing the purchase money within the time allowed or extended. The Court applied this ratio to hold that because the judgment-debtor had not applied for rescission under section 28 before the decree-holder re-deposited the money, the decree subsisted; accordingly the re-deposit could cure default and execution could proceed.
Dharan Dass v. Peare Lal, A.I.R. 1955 NUC (Allahabad) 3555

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Gurdit Singh v. Jagjit Singh, (1987-1) Punjab Law Reporter 129 The opinion records that it was observed in this case that the power under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act is discretionary and a court should not annul a decree on flimsy grounds; a clear case of default must be established for rescinding a contract or nullifying a decree of specific performance. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that the judgment-debtor had not established a clear case of default sufficient to rescind the contract or nullify the decree.
Dattatraya v. Shaikh Mahaboob, A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 750

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Satyaji v. Sakharlal, A.I.R. 1914 Bombay 132

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Sulleh Singh v. Sohan Lal, 1975 Punjab Law Journal 400

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Panni v. Daya Ram, (1985-2) Punjab Law Reporter 157

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded from the established facts and the parties' pleadings and then examined the executing Court's conclusions and the legal principles cited by both parties.

  1. The executing Court had concluded that the deposit made by the plaintiff (recorded in the opinion primarily as 29 October 1976) was improper because it was not made within one month from the appellate Court's order or from an order of this Court in a regular second appeal (the executing Court treated non-deposit as leading to rescission and impossibility of performance).
  2. The Court observed that rule 12-A of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure (introduced by a Code amendment referred to in the opinion) was not applicable to this case and that even under that rule the effect of failure to deposit is not specifically provided as to rescission — rather, section 28 of the Specific Relief Act contemplates rescission in such situations.
  3. The Court noted that no time had been fixed by the lower appellate Court when disposing of the appeal despite the earlier order of this Court dated 13 September 1974 that contemplated a time for re-deposit. On the facts the Court concluded that the re-deposit on 29 October 1976 was within reasonable time.
  4. The Court emphasized that the judgment-debtor had furnished security as directed by this Court's order and that the judgment-debtor had not moved any application under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act until after the decree-holder had re-deposited the amount. The Court held that as long as the vendor (judgment-debtor) does not apply for rescission under section 28, the decree subsists.
  5. The fact that the executing Court permitted the decree-holder to deposit the amount was treated as an exercise (or implicit exercise) of discretion by the executing Court to extend time for deposit; the appellate court's silence as to time and the executing Court's allowance of deposit led this Court to presume an extension of time.
  6. The Court found the authorities relied upon by the judgment-debtor to be inapplicable on the facts; it relied on Sarupi (supra) and Gurdit Singh (supra) to support the view that rescission is discretionary under section 28 and cannot be lightly granted: a clear default must be shown.
  7. Concluding from the above, the Court held that the executing Court's view that the deposit was improper and that the contract stood rescinded was erroneous.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition succeeds and is allowed; the impugned order of the executing Court is set aside.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The matter is remitted to the executing Court for proceeding with the execution application in accordance with law.
  • The parties were directed to appear in the executing Court on 15 April 1987 and the records of the case were ordered to be sent back forthwith.
  • The revision is allowed with costs.
  • The opinion applies existing legal principles (notably the ratios in Sarupi and Gurdit Singh) and does not purport to lay down a novel principle of law; the decision reverses the executing Court's conclusion and restores the decree-holder's right to proceed with execution subject to law (i.e., the decree-holder's deposit being treated as within reasonable time and the absence of a prior rescission application by the judgment-debtor). The Court observed that time for deposit may be presumed extended where the executing Court allows deposit and where the vendor/judgment-debtor has not sought rescission under section 28 prior to re-deposit.

Petition allowed; impugned order set aside and matter remitted for execution (as recorded in the opinion).

    Amar Nath Jain Petitioner, v. Ram Parkash Dhir .

    J.V Gupta, J. — This is decree-holders revision petition where execution of application has been dismissed by the executing Court vide impugned order dated February 16, 1979.

    2. The facts are not in dispute and, in brief, are follows. The plaintiff decree-holder filed the suit for the specific performance of the agreement to sell dated August 4, 1971, which was decreed by the trial court and passed the decree to the following effects;

    “I decree the plaintiff's suit with costs. I grant his prayer for possession of 3/4th share of the disputed house by specific performance of agreement dated 4-8-71. The plaintiff shall deposit the balance amount of Rs. 11,500/- within one month. He shall have to bear the costs of stamp and registration of the sale deed that may be executed ultimately.”

    Against the said judgment and decree of the trial court, appeal was filed which was ultimately heard by the first Additional Distt. Judge, Ludhiana who dismissed the same on February 11, 1979. During the pendency of the appeal; the judgment-debtor was granted the stay of the execution of the decree by this court passing the following order on September 13, 1974;

    “The stay is confirmed, provided the appellate furnishes security bond to the satisfaction of the trial Court to satisfy the decree in case he failed to get the decree set aside. In that case, the plaintiff-respondent will be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by him, till further direction in that respect to be given by the Court deciding the appeal.”

    Admittedly, the decree-holder had deposited the amount of Rs. 11,500/- within one month as direction by the trial Court, i.e on April 25, 1974. However, the said amount was withdrawn in view of the above-said order passed by this Court. While disposing of the appeal no time was allowed to re-deposit the amount as was contemplated by the order of this Court dated September 13, 1974, noticed above. The operative part of the decree of the appellate Court reads as under;

    “I do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed, with costs, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.”

    Having waited for compliance of decree by the judgment-debtor, for which he had furnished security bond in compliance of this Court order dated September 13, 1974, the decree-holder, of his own deposited the sale price on October 19, 1976 and, thereafter, sought the execution of the decree on November 3, 1976. In the said execution application, objections were filed on behalf of the judgment-debtor-purporting to be under section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, (hereinafter called ‘the Act’). According to the judgment-debtor, the agreement to sell stood rescinded because it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to deposit the sum of Rs. 11,500/- within one month of the order of the appellate Court which had confirmed the order of the trial Court, but the plaintiff defaulted in depositing that amount within time as he was not ready with the said money earlier and could deposit the same only on October 29, 1976. The agreement and the decree accordingly, stood discharged. It was contested on behalf of the decree-holder inter alia on the ground that the appellate Court had not given any direction as to when the balance sale price was to be re-deposited. More over, the judgment debtor had given security for complying with the decree and. He waited for the judgment-debtor to make a move in that direction. However, when the judgment-debtor failed to do the needful within a reasonable time, he applied to the Court and re-deposited the amount under the orders of the Court which tantamounted to the permission of the Court to deposit the amount by exercising the discretion to extend the time for such deposit According to him, the balance having been already deposited under the orders of the Court and there being no direction by the appellate Court as to when the balance sale price was to be re deposited, the decree-holder must be deemed to have complied with the decree and that the objections raised by the judgment-debtor were not tenable. On the pleadings of the parties, the executing Court framed the following issues;

    1. Whether the decree for specific performance is liable to be rescinded on the grounds alleged in the objection petition?

    2. Whether the deposit is proper?

    3. Relief.

    The learned executing Court came to the conclusion that it stood established that the deposit made by the plaintiff on October 29, 1976, was not a proper one as he had not deposited the amount within one month from the order of the first appellate Court or in any case from the order of this Court in the regular second appeal which was dismissed in limine on June 9, 1976, It was consequently, held that the agreement to sell stood rescinded with the result that the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff had become impossible of performance. Dissatisfied with the same, the decree-holder, has filed this revision petition in this Court.

    3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that after furnishing security in view of the order of this Court dated September 13, 1974, it was obligatory on the judgment-debtor to satisfy the decree: more particular when his appeal was dismissed up to this Court. Moreover the judgment debtor never moved the application under section 28 of the Act, before re deposit of the amount by the decree-holder on October 29, 1976. The amount will be deemed to have been deposited within reasonable time. In any case, in the circumstances of this ease, the deposit will be deemed to have been made within the extended time which may be presumed in this case. Since the amount was deposited before any application was filed by the judgment-debtor under section 28 the Act, argued the counsel, the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree. In support of the contention, the learned counsel relied upon Sarupi v. Har Gian A.I.R 1975 Punjab and Haryana 231; Dharan Dass v. Peare Lal, A.I.R 1955 NUC (Allahabad) 3555 and Gurdit Singh…Petitioner, v. Jagjit Singh…., (1987-1) Punjab Law Reporter 129.

    4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor submitted that since time was allowed by the appellate Court while deposing of the appeal, it would be presumed that the decree-holder was entitled to re-deposit the amount within the same time, i.e, 30 days, which was allowed by the trial court. Since the amount was not deposited within the said period, the deposit made on October 29, 1976, by him, was berated. Moreover, the decree-holder never moved any application for extension of time to the appellate Court. Therefore, no fault could be found with the impugned order of the executing Court. Reliance in support of this contention was Dattatraya v. Shaikh Mahaboob, A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 750; Satyaji v. Sakharlal, A.I.R 1914 Bombay 132; Sulleh Singh v. Sohan Lal, 1975 Punjab Law Journal 400 and Panni v. Daya Ram, (1985-2) Punjab Law Reporter 157.

    5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the case law cited at the bar, I am of the considered opinion that on the facts and circumstances of this case, the money re-deposited by the decree holder on October 29, 1976, was deposited within the reasonable time and in any case, extension for depositing the same will be presumed when it was allowed to be deposited by the executing Court. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the judgment-debtor are not all applicable to the facts of this case. In the present case, the trial Court passed the decree on March 28, 1974 and the appellate Court dismissed the appeal on February 11, 1976. Therefore, even rule 12-A of Order XX of the Code of Civil. Procedure, as introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 197, which reads as follows:

    “Where a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property orders that the purchase money or other sum be paid by the purchaser of lessee, it shall specify the period within which the payment shall be made”.

    has also no applicability to this case. Besides, in case a decreeholder fails to deposit the amount within the time allowed, its effect has also not been provided thereunder, as has been done under rule 14 of the said order. It is section 28 of the Act, which contemplates such a situation. In that situation, the vendor may apply in the same suit in which the decree was made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application, the Court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. Admittedly, no time was fixed by the lower appellate Court while disposing of the appeal as was specifically required by this Court's order dated September 13, 1974, but in any case, the amount was deposited within the reasonable time on October 29, 1976, by the decree-holder. The judgement-debtor pad not moved any application under section 28 of the Act till then. Not only that, the decree-holder was allowed to deposit the amount by the executing Court itself. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it will be presumed that the time was extended for depositing the said amount. It is well established that no one should be allowed to suffer for the act of a Court. In any case, section 28 of the Act itself inter alia provides for the ex??? of time. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of this case, time could be extended even in this revision petition. It was a fit case where the executing Court should have itself extended the time; more particularly when the decree-holder was allowed to deposit the amount on October 29, 1976. As observed earlier, the judgment-debtor had already furnished security for the performance of the decree to be passed in appeal. He never moved the execution Court that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the decree but he was unable to do so because the decreeholder had not deposited the amount. Before any application could be filed by the judgment-debtor under section 28 of the Act, the decree holder had already deposited the amount on October 29, 1976. On the facts and circumstances of this case, the ratio of the decision of this Court in Sarupi's case (supra), will apply, wherein it was observed:—

    “When decree is silent as to what is to happen if the purchase money is not paid within the time fixed, the decree will not lapse automatically on the plaintiff's failure to pay within the prescribed time. The default will, however, entitle the vendor to apply for rescission of the contract under section 28(1). But so long as the vendor does not apply for such relief, the decree subsists and the decree-holder can still execute it within the period of limitation by depositing the purchase money within the time allowed or extended.”

    In Gurdit Singh's case (supra), it was observed by this Court that the power under section 28 of the Act is undoubtedly discretionary and the Court cannot on flimsy grounds annul the decree once passed by it. A clear case of default has to be established against the decree-holder for rescinding a contract or to nullify the decree of specific performance. No such case was made out by the judgment-debtor so far as the present case is concerned. The view taken by the executing Court that since no specific order was passed extending the time, nor any application had been made for extending the time, it could not be deemed that the Court had used its discretion for extending time for such deposit, is wholly misconceived. Admittedly, the Court had the power to extend the time and once the decree-holder was allowed to deposit the amount, on the facts and circumstances of this case, it will be presumed that the time was extended even though no application in that behalf was made.

    6. Consequently, this revision petition succeeds and is allowed, with costs. The impugned order is set aside and the case in sent back for proceeding with the execution application in accordance with law. The parties have been directed to appear in the executing Court on April 15, 1987. The records of the case be sent back forthwith.

    Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Amar Nath Jain Petitioner, v. Ram Parkash Dhir .
    (Mar 6, 1987)