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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit brought by a putnidar (the plaintiff) against a seputnidar (the defendant) seeking arrears of rent. The putnidar had previously created a durputni in favour of Umesh Chandra Biswas, under which Umesh became liable to pay rent at Rs. 244 per annum. Subsequently Umesh executed a document creating a seputni in favour of the defendants fixing a jama of Rs. 344. The seputni document contained a provision that, out of the settled seputni jama of Rs. 344, the defendants were to pay Rs. 244 (the durputni rent) to the putnidar, take the rent receipt in Umesh's name, and pay Umesh the rent receipt and the remaining Rs. 100 as per the schedule.

Procedurally, the trial Court decreed the claim in part. The lower Appellate Court reversed that decision, allowed the defendant's appeal and dismissed the suit. The present appeal concerns whether the plaintiff can recover the moneys in suit as rent or otherwise.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff (putnidar) has made out a claim to recover from the defendant the moneys in suit as rent or otherwise.
  2. Whether the plaintiff could recover as assignee of the rent from the durputnidar (i.e., whether any assignment of rent to the plaintiff was proved).
  3. Whether past payments by the defendant to the putnidar created an implied contract obliging the defendant to continue paying the plaintiff in future.
  4. Whether, under equitable principles, the plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary (cestui que trust) could enforce an obligation undertaken by the seputnidar to pay Rs. 244 to the plaintiff by virtue of the instrument creating the seputni.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Putnidar / Plaintiff) Arguments

  • The plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum claimed either as rent or by virtue of the instrument creating the seputni, advanced under three grounds:
  • First ground: the plaintiff was entitled as assignee of the rent from the durputnidar.
  • Second ground: since the defendant had paid Rs. 244 to the putnidar over a period of years (as payable under the seputni), there was an implied contract that the defendant would pay that rent to the plaintiff in future.
  • Third ground: the instrument creating the seputni contained an obligation by the seputnidar to pay Rs. 244 to the plaintiff; that obligation conferred a benefit on the putnidar which in equity entitled the plaintiff to enforce the obligation against the defendant (relying on equitable authorities such as Deb Narayau v. Chuni Lal).

Respondent's (Defendant) Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the defendant's legal arguments in this Court's judgment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deb Narayau v. Chuni Lal Cited by the appellant to support the proposition that where a sum is payable by A.B for the benefit of C.D, C.D can claim under the contract as if it had been made with himself (quoting Lord Hatherley). The Court considered this authority but treated the Lord Hatherley passage as requiring qualification in context; it did not accept the appellant's contention on that basis for the facts of this case.
Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Company Quoted for Lord Hatherley's statement that where a sum is payable by A to B for the benefit of C, C can claim under the contract as if it were made with him; in the reported facts Walker was treated as holding the sum as trustee for the plaintiff. The Court observed that in Touche the facts showed Walker acted as trustee; therefore Lord Hatherley's broad proposition must be read with reference to that context, and cannot be applied generally without qualification.
In re Empress Engineering Co. Authority where Jessel, M.R., observed that generally when A contracts with B to pay money to C, C has not been held entitled to sue in equity unless there is a declaration of trust or the payer held as trustee; emphasized limits on third-party enforcement. The Court relied on Jessel, M.R.'s observations to show that a mere agreement between two parties to pay a third does not generally make that third a cestui que trust; applied this restrictive view to reject the plaintiff's equitable claim.
Gregory v. Williams Referred to in In re Empress Engineering as an example where the agreement was to pay out of property and one party constituted himself trustee for the third person; illustrates circumstances where third-party enforcement may arise. The Court noted this case as an example of a factual situation that could create a trust; contrasted it with the present facts where no such trust or proprietary charge was shown.
Gandy v. Gandy Cotton, L.J.'s statement of the true rule: generally a third person cannot enforce a contract between A and B, except where the contract, though in form with A, is intended to secure a benefit to B so that B has a beneficial right as cestui que trust and may enforce it in equity. The Court cited this articulation of the rule and applied it to conclude that the seputni instrument was not executed for the plaintiff's benefit in the necessary equitable sense, so the exception did not apply.
Khawaja Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begam Illustrative authority supporting Cotton, L.J.'s rule that a third party can enforce only where intended to secure a benefit creating a beneficial right (cestui que trust). Used as an illustration of the principle; the Court treated such authorities as consistent with the restrictive approach to third-party enforcement and applied that approach to the facts before it.
Deb Karayan v. Chuni Lal Referred to as based upon the same ground as the rule in Gandy's case (i.e., third-party enforcement only where equitable trust/benefit is intended). The Court grouped this with other cases that rest on the same equitable principle and relied on that line of authority to deny the plaintiff's claim.
Dwarika Nath v. Priya Nath Cited along with Deb Karayan as being based on the same equitable ground permitting third-party enforcement only in limited circumstances. The Court took this case to be part of the consistent line of authorities supporting the restricted application of the equitable exception and applied that restriction to the present instrument.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the plaintiff's three contentions in sequence and rejected each for reasons grounded in fact and established equitable principles:

  1. Assignment contention: The Court noted there was no finding by the lower Courts, nor any contention before the Court, that the durputnidar had assigned the rent to the plaintiff. The Court concluded that no assignment of rent to the plaintiff had been proved and therefore the plaintiff could not recover as an assignee.
  2. Implied contract contention: The Court rejected the argument that past payments of Rs. 244 by the defendant to the putnidar established an implied contractual obligation on the defendant to pay the plaintiff in future. The Court held that mere payment by A to B cannot alone found a legal obligation on A to pay C in the future, and additionally there was no consideration passing to the defendant from the plaintiff to support such an agreement.
  3. Equitable or third-party beneficiary contention: The Court examined the equitable doctrine invoked by the plaintiff (that a third party may enforce a contract between two parties if the contract was intended to benefit that third party, making him a cestui que trust). The Court reviewed authorities (including Touche, In re Empress Engineering, Gandy v. Gandy and related cases) and emphasised that the broad statement in Lord Hatherley's judgment in Touche must be read in context: in Touche Walker was treated as holding the money as trustee. The Court relied on Jessel, M.R.'s and Cotton, L.J.'s formulations to underline that a mere agreement between A and B to pay C will not generally make C a cestui que trust. The Court concluded that the instrument creating the seputni was not executed for the plaintiff's benefit; at best it made the plaintiff a nominee of the durputnidar to receive a portion of the seputni rent. Because the equitable exception applies only in rare and exceptional cases (e.g., where a trust or clear intention to benefit the third party is shown), the Court held the equitable rule did not apply here.

On this basis the Court held that the plaintiff had not established any right to recover the moneys sued for either as rent or under the instrument creating the seputni.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The Court ordered dismissal with costs. The core ruling may be stated as: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the plaintiff (putnidar) is not entitled to recover the claimed sums from the defendant (seputnidar) on any of the three bases advanced—assignment, implied contract from past payments, or equitable third‑party enforcement under the seputni instrument.
  • The Court applied and reiterated established equitable principles limiting third‑party enforcement: a third party cannot generally enforce a contract between two others unless the contract was intended to secure a benefit to the third party in a manner that makes him a cestui que trust (for example, where one party holds or receives property as trustee for the third party). The Court found those conditions absent on the facts before it.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any new law; it applies and construes existing authorities and restricts the equitable exception to cases where the facts show a trust or clear proprietary or nominee relationship entitling the third party to enforce the obligation.

Note: Cuming, J. concurred.

    Jiban Krishna Mullik v. Nirupama Gupta

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Page, J.:— The suit in respect of which this appeal arises was brought by a putnidar against a seputnidar for arrears of rent. The putnidar had created a durputni in favour of one Umesh Chandra Biswas under which Umesh became liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 244 per annum. Subsequently, Umesh executed a document by which he created a seputni in favour of the Defendants under which a jama of Rs. 344 was fixed. It was further provided that “by virtue of the seputni right you shall be in title and possession of the same and out of the settled seputni jama of Rs. 344 you shall pay Rs. 244, the durputni rent, to the putnidar and shall take the rent receipt in my name and you shall pay me the said rent receipt and the remaining Rs. 100 as per ??? in the schedule below.” It is unnecessary to consider the other provisions in the document creating the seputni.

    The trial Court decreed the claim in part. But the lower Appellate Court allowed an appeal by the Defendant and dismissed the suit.

    The question which we have to determine in this appeal is whether the Plaintiff has made out any claim to recover from the Defendant the moneys in suit as rent or otherwise.

    Dr. Pal on behalf of the putnidar contended that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum claimed either in the form of rent or by virtue of the instrument under which the seputni was created upon three grounds.

    He contended that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the arrear of rent as the assignee of the rent from the durputnidar. But it was neither found by the lower Courts, nor has it been contended before us that there was any assignment of the rent to the Plaintiff by the durputnidar. It is enough to say that there is no substance in the contention that any assignment of the rent by the assignor to the plaintiff was proved:

    The learned vakil further contended inasmuch as the Defendant had paid Rs. 244, which was payable as rent under the seputni, to the putnidar over a period of years the Court ought to hold that there was an implied contract that the said rent should be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff in future. We are unable to accede to this view. The mere payment of a sum of money by A to 13 cannot be made the foundation of a legal obligation on the part of A to pay to B a like sum in like circumstances in the future. Moreover, there was no consideration passing to the Defendant from the Plaintiff to found any such agreement. In our opinion this contention also facts.

    Thirdly, Dr. Pal contended that inasmuch as under the document by which the seputni was created an obligation was undertaken by the seputnidar to pay Rs. 244 to the Plaintiff, that obligation conferred a benefit upon the putnidar which in equity entitled the Plaintiff to enforce the obligation against the Defendant. In support of his contention the learned vakil referred to the case of Deb Narayau v. Chuni Lal . In that case in the course of his judgment Jenkins, C.J, observed that—“There is a valuable exposition of the law by Lord Hatherley in the first of these last two cases that is, [Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Company ] which was adopted by Lord Justice Cotton in the second. The Lord Chancellor said: ‘The case comes within the authority that where a sum is payable by A.B for the benefit of C.D, C.D can claim under the contract as if it had been made with himself.’”

    Jenkins, C.J, added: “That appears to me to be a principle which is of distinct use in the consideration of this case.” Now, if the broad proposition laid down by Lord Hatherley is to be accepted without qualification it would support Dr. Pal's contention. But these observations of Lord Hatherley must be taken with reference to the context in which they appear; and in Touche's case it is clear that Walker was treated as holding the sum which he received from the Company under the agreement between himself and the Company as the trustee for the Plaintiff. Lord Hatherley's observations in Touche's case were considered in In re Empress Engineering Co. . In that case Jones and Pride were solicitors who claimed in the liquidation of the Company for work done in connection with the promotion of the Company upon instructions received by one of the promoters. In the course of the argument Jessel, M.R, observed, in reference to Gregory v. Williams that—“In the case Sir W. Grant appears to have considered that there was a declaration of trust. I know of no case where, when A simply contracts with 13 to pay money to C, C has been held entitled to sue A in equity.” Referring to Touche v. Metropolitan Railway Warehousing Co. , Jessel, M.R, observed that—“In that case the Lord Chancellor finds, as a fact, that Walker was to receive the money as a trustee for the Plaintiff. If you can make out that Jones and Pride are costuis que trust, that alters the case. It appears to me that they are not. The promoters were liable to Jones and Pride who are simply their creditors. A being liable to B.C agrees with A to pay B. That does not make B a cestui que trust.” In the course of his judgment Jessel, M.R, after holding that inasmuch as the agreement by the promoters with the solicitors was made as agents for the Company, which then was non-existent, such a contract could not subsequently be ratified by the Company after incorporation, and the Company was under no liability to the solicitors, added: “Supposing, however, that there was, it is then contended that a mere contract between two parties that one of them shall pay a certain sum to a third person not a party to the contract, will make that third person a cestui que trust. As a general rule, that will not be so. A mere agreement between A and B that B shall pay C (an agreement to which C is not a party either directly or indirectly) will not prevent A and B from coming to a new agreement the next day releasing the old one. If C were a cestui que trust it would have that effect. I am far from saying that there may not be agreements which may make C a cestui que trust. There may be an agreement like that in Gregory v. Williams where the agreement was to pay out of the property and one of the parties to the agreement may constitute himself a trustee of the property for the benefit of the third party. So again, it is quite possible that one of the parties to the agreement may be the nominee or trustee of the third person.” In Gandy v. Gandy the equitable principle again came under consideration by the Court of Appeal, and the true rule was laid down by Cotton, L.J, in the following terms: “Now, of course, as a general rule, a contract cannot be enforced except by a party to the contract, and either of two persons contracting together can sue the other, if the other is guilty of a breach of or does not perform the obligations of that contract. But a third person—a person who is not a party to the contract—cannot do so. That rule, however, is subject to this exception; if the contract, although in form it is with A, is intended to secure a benefit to B, so that B is entitled to say he has a beneficial right as cestui que trust under that contract, then B would, in a Court of equity, be allowed to insist upon and enforce the contract. That, in my opinion, is the way in which the law may be stated.” His Lordship proceeded to refer to Touche v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. and after citing the passage from Lord Hatherley's judgment which I have cited observed: “Now, if that is intended, to lay down the rule as a general proposition of law in the general terms there used, it is not consistent with the other cases referred to in In re Empress Engineering Co. ; but it may be that on the facts of the former case it was considered that the contract between Walker and the Company was entered into by Walker as a trustee for and on behalf of the Plaintiffs; and, if so, that is in accordance with what I understand to be the law.” His Lordship then added that the observations of Jessel, M.R, in In re Empress Engineering Co. which I have cited above “show that the general terms used by Lord Hatherley must be taken with some qualification as laying down the general law.” The rule laid down by Cotton, L.J, in Gandy's case is illustrated by Khawaja Muhammad Khan v. Husaini Begam and the cases of Deb Karayan v. Chuni Lal and Dwarika, Nath v. Priya Nath must be taken to have been based upon the same ground. Applying the equitable rule to the facts of this case it is clear from a consideration of the terms of the instrument by which the seputni was created that, that instrument was not executed for the benefit of the Plaintiff in any sense, and that so far as the Plaintiff was concerned the only effect of the instrument was that the seputnidar agreed with the durpidnidars to pay a portion of the rent due under the seputni to the Plaintiff as a nominee of the durputnidar. The equitable rule should only be applied in rare cases and under exceptional circumstances, and can have no application in a case such as the one under appeal.

    For these reasons in my opinion the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    Cuming, J.:— I agree.

    H.C.S
    Appeal dismissed with costs.

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    Jiban Krishna Mullik v. Nirupama Gupta
    (May 6, 1926)