JUDGMENT
Manjula Chellur, C.J
Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned Standing Counsel for the respondent.
2. It is not in dispute, appellant is a registered Trust under the name and style “Dawn Educational and Charitable Trust” running a school named ‘Dawn International School’. An application came to be filed seeking registration under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act so as to get income tax exemption on the ground that they are imparting education and therefore it is a trust meant for charitable purpose. Respondent authority made an enquiry to satisfy himself whether the activity done factually is in the direction of object of the trust, i.e, charitable purpose or not. Commissioner of Income Tax, who is an authority to grant registration under Section 12AA of the Act, was of the opinion, assessee intends to run a posh international school in the name of charitable activity, therefore, assessee was not entitled for such registration. Reasons for rejection of application were, though the trust says main object of it being to run educational institutions and establish institutions of training and rehabilitation for mentally retarded persons, physically handicapped persons etc., enquiries revealed that activity of the trust is only to bring under its ambit the already existing Dawn International School run by the Managing Trustee Dr. Johnson Luckose. Commencement of the school is in 2006 and the trust formed in 2007. The school is run in a building where air conditioned class rooms with breakfast and lunch are provided. The school is maintained and meant for benefit of children of non resident Indians. Fee structure indicated huge amount collected even in kindergarten classes in the year 2006. For play school, which is pre-kindergarten, they were charging 6,000/- per month.
3. Apart from above factual situation, clause 6 of the trust deed further indicates that the trust is at liberty having absolute discretion to accept contributions as donation and contributors have no right or control over the management or in the administration of the trust. All these facts borne on record revealed during the enquiry persuaded the Commissioner to reject the application. This came to be confirmed by Appellate Tribunal endorsing views of the Commissioner.
4. Learned counsel arguing for appellant contends, charitable trust does not mean, it imparts education only to the poor. Even if poor children are excluded, it could still be charitable as long as running an educational institution. He tries to convince the Bench with his stand placing reliance on the decision reported in Nedumchalil C. Trust v. Municipal Commissioner (1991 (2) KLT 180). The question that arose was whether the fact of special wards for patients who pay full price are run or that salary is paid inclusive of the expenditure for the trustees will not change the nature of the trust, i.e, charity and charitable purpose. In that context, referring to Section 101(1)(d) of the Municipalities Act, 1961 (Kerala) with reference to general meaning of charitable purpose learned Single Judge of this Court opined what amounts to charity so far as Municipalities Act. We are not concerned with similar situation and further said judgment can only have a persuasive value and not binding on the Division Bench. We have to consider the controversy before us with reference to Income Tax Act how an application for registration under Section 12A of the Income Tax Act has to be considered. It is well settled that even if nomenclature of the trust may indicate it is meant for charitable purpose, but if activities reveal otherwise, that should weigh with the authorities who grant registration. Similarly, while considering claim of exemption, authorities under the Act would look into the actual activity of the institution, especially main activity of the institution. In the absence of facts indicating that the activities carried on attracts definition of charitable purpose, one cannot find fault with rejection of registration. When the school is running on commercial lines under the clad of charitable purpose, the parties were justified making enquiries and rejecting the application.
We find no good ground to interfere with the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.