Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 4 of Public Demands Recovery Act (III of 1913, B.C)
  • Public Demands Recovery Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 4 of Public Demands Recovery Act (III of 1913, B.C)
  • Public Demands Recovery Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs sued for recovery of possession of their moiety share in Touji No. 12713 of the Dacca Collectorate and for mesne profits. The plaintiffs are the minor sons of Sudhanya Chandra Roy (deceased). The Touji originally belonged to two brothers, Arun Chandra Roy and Sudhanya Chandra Roy, each owning 8 annas, as recorded in 1919. A certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act was issued on 16 September 1919 in respect of cesses due from the estate, naming Joylakshmi Debya (the mother) as "manager on behalf of (ka) Arun Chandra Roy and (kha) Sudhanya Chandra Roy." The certificate was filed and the property ordered to be sold. The property was sold for Rs. 50, purchased by Krishna Kishore, who later conveyed it to Defendant No. 1. The suit was instituted in April 1925 seeking a declaration that the sale did not pass title to the purchaser and for recovery of possession. Both the trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit; this appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a certificate issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act in the name of a person (here, the mother described as "manager") who was not the proper certificate-debtor prevented the sale under that certificate from passing any title to the purchaser.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The certificate was issued in the name of the wrong person (the mother described as "manager") and therefore did not properly charge the plaintiffs' predecessor with liability; consequently the sale could not have passed any title to the purchaser.
  • The certificate did not show that the plaintiffs' predecessors were minors or that the Certificate Officer had permitted their mother to represent them under the Act.

Respondent(s)' / Courts' Position

  • The District Judge observed that Arun and Sudhanya never registered their names in the Collectorate and allowed their mother to represent them there, concluding the certificate was legal and binding.
  • In the Lower Appellate Court it was urged that at the time the certificate was issued Sudhanya Chandra Roy was a major (an argument presented in support of upholding the certificate and sale).
  • The District Judge also found there was no evidence of service of notice under section 7 and that the sale price was very low, but declined to set aside the sale because there was nothing to show the inadequacy of price resulted from non-service of notice and because the suit was not brought within one year under section 36.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mussammat Raja Koer v. Ganga Singh That the effect of a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act is to pass to the purchaser only the right, title and interest of the person named as judgment-debtor in the certificate; if that person had no interest at the date of sale the purchaser acquires no right. The Court relied on this principle to support its conclusion that where the certificate was not made against the proper person (and thus the named person had no relevant interest), the sale could not have passed title to the purchaser.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining both the statutory framework of the Public Demands Recovery Act and the documentary record in the Collectorate.

Statutory framework considered:

  • Section 4: authorizes the Certificate Officer to sign a certificate in a prescribed form when satisfied a public demand is due; the form requires the name and address of the certificate-debtor.
  • Section 6: the certificate must be filed in the Certificate Officer's office; on filing, execution follows under section 7 and notice under that section must be served on the certificate-debtor in the prescribed form.
  • Section 7 and Section 8: service of notice effects attachment by a Civil Court and subsequent transfers are to be deemed void.
  • Section 9: gives the certificate-debtor a right (within 30 days of service or execution) to present a petition denying liability in whole or in part—this underlines the necessity that the certificate be made against the proper person and served on that person.
  • Part III and Section 20: on sale in execution of a certificate, the purchaser acquires merely the right, title and interest of the certificate-debtor at the time of sale—hence a proper certificate against the proper person is necessary to pass title.
  • Section 41: where the Certificate Officer is satisfied the certificate-debtor is a minor or of unsound mind, he shall permit representation by a suitable person; absence of such an order means no authorized representation by a manager is shown.
  • Section 36: prescribes a one-year limitation for suits seeking to set aside a sale on the ground that no notice under section 7 was served and that substantial injury resulted from the irregularity.
  • Section 37: provides that questions between certificate-holder and certificate-debtor are to be resolved by the Certificate Officer (except fraud), which presupposes existence of a valid certificate against the proper person.

Application to the facts:

  • The Court examined the original Collectorate register and the original certificate. The register (1919) recorded Arun and Sudhanya as holding 16 annas of the touzi; there was no notation that the mother, Joylakshmi Debi, represented the minors.
  • Nothing on the record explained how the mother came to be described as "manager" of the minors in the certificate; the Certificate Officer's file did not show an order under section 41 permitting her to represent the minors.
  • The District Judge's conclusion that the minors had "allowed their mother to represent them" was not supported by the Collectorate record; thus the District Judge's observation was incorrect according to the Court's inspection of documents.
  • Given the Act treats a certificate as equivalent to a Civil Court decree in effect, a certificate (or decree) that affects the interests of minors must show the appropriate protective steps (representation permitted by the Certificate Officer); no such showing was present.
  • Relying on Mussammat Raja Koer v. Ganga Singh, the Court reiterated that a purchaser gets only the rights of the named certificate-debtor; because the certificate was not properly framed against the true person entitled to be charged, the purchaser could not have acquired title.
  • The Court noted ancillary findings by the District Judge (no proof of service under section 7; very low sale price) but observed that the District Judge declined to set aside the sale on limitations and causation grounds (no showing inadequacy was due to non-service; suit not within one year under section 36). Those points did not alter the primary defect in the certificate itself.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; the certificate was not a proper certificate to charge the plaintiffs' predecessor and the sale under it did not pass any title to the purchaser.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court:

  • The appeal succeeds and the decree of the Court below is set aside.
  • The plaintiffs' suit is decreed with costs in all the Courts against Defendant No. 1.
  • The matter is remanded to the trial Court for ascertainment of mesne profits.

The opinion does not assert that it establishes a new broader precedent; it rests on statutory construction and application of the pre-existing principle (as illustrated by Mussammat Raja Koer v. Ganga Singh) that a sale under the Act conveys only the interest of the person named as the certificate-debtor, and that a certificate must be validly made and served on the proper person.

(End of summary)

    Kalipada Roy v. Mukunda Lal Roy

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was for recovery of possession of the Plaintiffs' moiety share of Touji No. 12713 of the Dacca Collectorate and also for mesne profits. The Plaintiffs are the minor sons of one Sudhanya Chandra Roy deceased. It appears from an examination of the papers of the Collectorate produced in this case that the Touji originally belonged to two brothers, Arun Chandra Roy and Sudhanya Chandra Roy, who owned 8 annas share each. This was the state of things in 1919. In 1920 Sudhanya was recorded as the sole proprietor. A certificate was issued by the certificate officer on the 16th September 1919, under the Public Demands Recovery Act in respect of cesses due from the estate. In the certificate the certificate-debtor's name was mentioned as Joylakshmi Debya, manager on behalf of (ka) Arun Chandra Roy and (kha) Sudhanya Chandra Roy. This certificate was duly filed and the property was ordered to be sold. In 1890 it was brought to the notice of the certificate officer that Sudhanya had become the sole proprietor and he ordered the sale proclamation to be issued in his name only. The property was subsequently sold for Rs. 50 and purchased by one Krishna Kishore, who conveyed it later to Defendant No. 1. This suit was instituted in April 1925, for declaration that the sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act did not pass any title to the purchaser and for recovery of possession of the property from Defendant No. 1. Both the Courts below have found against the Plaintiffs and dismissed their suit.

    The only question raised before us is that the certificate having been issued in the name of a wrong person the right, title and interest of the owner did not pass by the sale and the purchaser accordingly obtained no title to the property. This question was not raised in this form in the Courts below. There is no reference to it in the judgment of the trial Court, but in the Lower Appellate Court it was urged on the ground that at the time the certificate was issued Sudhanya Chandra Roy was major. The question however is of some importance and does not depend upon any extraneous evidence but has to be decided on the documents filed in this case. We have therefore to consider as to whether the certificate was properly made in this case and was duly filed. Under sec. 4 of Public Demands Recovery Act (III of 1913, B.C) when the Certificate Officer is satisfied that any public demands payable to the Collector is due, he may sign a certificate in the prescribed form being form No. 1 in the appendix to the Act. The third column of the form requires that the name and address of the certificate-debtor should be given. Under sec. 6 the Certificate Officer has to file the certificate in the prescribed form and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office. On the filing of the certificate further execution will issue under sec. 7, and notice under that section shall be served on the certificate-debtor in the prescribed form. The notice should specify that a certain sum has been found to be due from the certificate-debtor on account of some demand from him under sec. 4 or 5 of the Act. The service of the certificate upon the certificate-debtor has the effect under sec. 8 of an attachment by a Civil Court and any transfer thereafter of the property or any of his immoveable property is to be deemed bad in law. Sec. 9 is an important section and has to be considered in this connection. If a certificate is duly made and ??? by service of notice effected on the certificate-debtor, he may, within 30 days from the service of notice under sec. 7 or from the date of execution of any process for enforcing the certificate, present to the Collector or the Certificate Officer a petition denying his liability in whole or in part. This section gives a valuable right to the certificate-debtor and therefore it is necessary that the certificate should be made against and served on the proper person from whom the amount of the debt is due. Part III of the Act deals with execution of certificates. Sec. 20 declares that if a property is sold in execution of a certificate, there shall vest in the purchaser merely the right, title and interest of the certificate-debtor against whom the certificate has been issued, at the time of the sale. The following sections deal with the steps to be taken by the certificate-debtor for having the sale set aside. Now under sec. 20 what the purchaser gets in a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act is the right, title and interest of the certificate debtor. It is therefore necessary in order to pass any title to the purchaser to make the certificate against the proper certificate-debtor.

    Now to come to the facts of the present case. As we have said, the certificate was issued against the mother of the minors in which she was described as the manager on behalf of her minor sons. The objection has been thus answered by the learned District Judge in appeal. “Arun and Sudhanya never registered their names in the Collectorate and allowed their mother to represent them in the Collectorate. Therefore the certificate made was legal and binding upon Sudhanya, the father of the Plaintiffs.” The accuracy of this statement was challenged before us and we had therefore to send for the original D register of the Collectorate and the original certificate issued. We have now looked into these papers and we find that in 1919 in the collectorate register the names of Arun and Sudhanya stood in respect of 16 annas of this touzi. There is no mention in the register of the name of the mother Joylakshmi Debi as representing the minors. There is nothing on the record to show as to how she came to be described as the manager of the minors. The District Judge therefore is not right in his observation that these minors allowed their mother to represent them in the Collectorate and that therefore the certificate was binding upon them. A certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act is considered as equivalent to a decree of a Civil Court. A decree in the form in which the certificate was issued if made by a Civil Court must undoubtedly be held not binding on the minors whose interest is sought to be affected he it. In the case of minors there is a provision in the Public Demands Recovery Act, which has been held to be a complete code in itself except on points to which the Civil Procedure Code has open made applicable. Sec. 41 of the Act lays down that when the Certificate Officer is satisfied that the certificate-debtor is a minor or of unsound mind he shall in any proceeding under the Act, permit him to be represented by any suitable person. The certificate does not show that Arun and Sudhanya were minors at the time when it was issued and if minors that their mother was allowed to represent them in the proceeding. She has been described as the manager. Under sec. 4 of the Act a manager is not a person from whom a public demand is due. If they were treated as minors, there is no order by the Certificate Officer permitting the mother to represent them in the certificate proceeding. In Mussammat Raja Koer v. Gang a Singh (1) it was held that the effect of a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act being to pass to the purchaser merely the right, title and interest of the person named as judgment-debtor in the certificate, the purchaser acquires no right if the person appears to have no interest in the property at the date of the sale. In that case the registered debtor had lost his interest before the sale by the Collector and it was held that the purchaser did not get any title under it.

    Reference has been made to secs. 36 and 37 of the Act. Sec. 36 prescribes the period of one year within which a suit has to be brought, if the sale is sought to be set aside on the ground that no notice under sec. 7 was served and that the Plaintiff has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity. The present suit is not of that character and does not come within the purview of the section. Sec. 37 says that every question arising between the certificate-holder and the certificate-debtor shall be determined, not by suit but by order of the Certilicate Officer, excepting that a suit may be brought in a Civil Court on the ground of fraud. This section presupposes the existence of a valid certificate, for it is the existence of a valid certificate against the proper person that gives jurisdiction to the Certificate Officer to sell the property of that person. It is well settled that when there are no arrears the Certificate Officer has no jurisdiction to issue certificate and to sell any property under it on the ground that the Act comes into operation on the existence of a public demand for the recovery of which action has to be taken. On the same principle the Certificate Officer is entitled to take action under the Act when there are arrears, but he has no jurisdiction to sell the property of a person unless he has made and filed a proper certificate charging that person with liability.

    As regards the merits of the case, it has been found by the learned District Judge that there is no evidence of service of notice under sec. 7 and that the value fetched at the sale was certainly very low. But the learned Judge does not give effect to these findings on the ground that there is nothing to show that the inadequacy of price was due to non-service of notice under sec. 7 and that the suit was not brought within one year from the date of sale under sec. 36 of the Act.

    Giving our anxious consideration to the facts of this case we have come to the conclusion that the certificate as made was not a proper certificate to charge the Plaintiffs' predecessor with liability and that the sale under it did not pass any title.

    The result is that this appeal succeeds, the decree of the Court below is set aside and the Plaintiffs' suit decreed with costs in all the Courts against Defendant No. 1. The case is remanded to the trial Court for ascertainment of mesne profits.

    S.C.M

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kalipada Roy v. Mukunda Lal Roy
    (Jun 12, 1929)