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  • Order 39 Rule 4 of the C.P.C2.
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C
  • Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Order 39 Rule 4 of the C.P.C2.
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C
  • Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (plaintiff in the trial Court) sued the respondent for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 15.5.1984 and moved I.A. under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C for a temporary injunction. An ex parte temporary injunction was granted on 2.6.1984. After the defendants appeared and filed a written statement on 18.9.1984 they filed I.A. No. II under Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C to vacate the injunction. The Munsiff, Basavakalyan, after hearing, dismissed I.A. No. II and made the injunction absolute. The respondents appealed (M.A. No. 37 of 1985) to the Civil Judge, Bidar; the Additional Civil Judge allowed the appeal by order dated 26.8.1987, set aside the Munsiff's order, allowed I.A. No. II and dismissed I.A. No. I. The petitioner filed this Civil Revision Petition challenging the Additional Civil Judge's order. The High Court (Mirdhe, J.) heard counsel, reviewed records and restored the Munsiff's order, setting aside the Additional Civil Judge's judgment and directing the Munsiff to dispose of the suit within two months.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a plaintiff alleging an agreement of sale and claiming possession under part performance is entitled to relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C (temporary injunction).
  2. Whether the lower appellate court was justified in setting aside the trial Court's order by relying on a Ruling (A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99) that did not take into account the Division Bench decision in Mahadevamma v. B.S Lingaraju (1981 2 KLJ 388).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.N Sharma v. Puttegowda1 Held that where in a suit for permanent injunction the plaintiff alleged agreement of sale and the execution is denied by the defendants, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. The Additional Civil Judge relied on this Ruling to set aside the Munsiff's order; the High Court noted this Ruling but considered it inconsistent with later Division Bench authority and therefore not controlling.
Mahadevamma v. B.S Lingaraju . 1981 2 KLJ 388. Holds that an intending transferee under a contract for sale, who is put in possession in part performance, can bring an action for the possessory remedy of an injunction in protection of his possession against the transferor. The High Court treated this Division Bench ruling as authoritative and held that it supports the plaintiff's entitlement to temporary and permanent injunctions where conditions for injunction are satisfied; it used this to fault the Additional Civil Judge's reliance on A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99.
Ranachhoddas Chahaganlal v. Devaji Supdu Dorik . 1977 3 SCC 584 Explains part performance: possession taken in part performance must be referable to the contract; the doctrine of part performance protects possession against the transferor's challenge. The High Court quoted this Supreme Court authority to support the principle that part performance (possession under contract) justifies protective relief like injunctions and to reinforce the Mahadevamma view.
A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99 This earlier Judgment of the Court was relied upon by the lower appellate Court (as interpreted by that Court) to deny relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 in cases alleging agreement of sale. The High Court concluded that the law laid down in A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99 cannot be said to be good law because it did not take into consideration the earlier Division Bench ruling in 1981 (2) KLJ 388; accordingly, reliance on it by the Additional Civil Judge rendered that judgment unsustainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first identified conflicting authorities: a single-judge Ruling denying entitlement to relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 when execution of the agreement is denied, and a Division Bench decision (Mahadevamma v. B.S Lingaraju) supporting injunctive protection for an intending transferee put in possession under part performance. The court quoted the Supreme Court in Ranachhoddas Chahaganlal v. Devaji Supdu Dorik to explain the doctrine of part performance and its role in protecting possession.

Because the Division Bench ruling (1981 2 KLJ 388) pre-dated and was not considered by the later single-judge decision relied on by the Additional Civil Judge (A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99), the High Court found the lower appellate Court's reliance on that later Ruling misplaced and concluded the Additional Civil Judge's judgment could not be sustained.

The court then assessed whether the trial Court's order could stand. It noted prima facie material placed by the plaintiff: production of the (unregistered) original agreement, affidavit evidence by the plaintiff, scribe and attesting witnesses (with the scribe ultimately supporting the plaintiff), and an allegation of possession given as per the agreement. It observed that the defendants produced tax receipts only for 1984-85 and had not taken prompt steps to vacate the ex parte injunction (issued 2.6.1984) until 18.9.1984, conduct inconsistent with being in possession. Concluding the Munsiff had not acted capriciously, arbitrarily or unjustly in exercising judicial discretion, the High Court held the lower appellate Court erred in interference.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed: the order of the Additional Civil Judge, Bidar, is set aside and the order of the Munsiff, Basavakalyan, is restored.

Direct effect: the trial Court's order making the temporary injunction absolute is restored; the Munsiff is directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously and in any event within two months. The opinion does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond applying existing Division Bench and Supreme Court authority.

    Kantappa v. Krishnabai

    Mirdhe, J.:—

    This Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioner who was the plaintiff in the trial Court against the order dated 26.8.1987 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Bidar, in M.A No. 37 of 1985 allowing the Miscellaneous Appeal and setting aside the order dated 8.8.1985 passed by the Munsiff, Basavakalyan, in O.S No. 79 of 1984 dismissing I.A No. II filed by the respondent under Order 39 Rule 4 of the C.P.C

    2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent and perused the records of the case.

    3. The petitioner has filed a suit against the respondent for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 15.5.1984 He also filed an I.A under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C for temporary injunction and a temporary injunction came to be issued on 2.6.1984 exparte. After the defendants appeared in the suit and filed a written statement on 18.9.1984 they filed I.A No. II for vacating the temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C The trial Court after hearing both sides and perusing the material on record dismissed I.A No. II filed by the respondents and made the temporary injunction issued on 2.6.1984 absolute. The respondents were aggrieved by this order and they have challenged the said order in Appeal in the Court of the Civil Judge, Bidar, and that Appeal came to be heard by the Additional Civil Judge, Bidar, and he allowed the Appeal and set aside the order of the Munsiff, Basavakalyan, and allowed I.A No. II filed by the respondents and dismissed I.A No. I. It is this order that is challenged in this case.

    4. The basis for the Additional Civil Judge to set aside the order of the Munsiff is the Ruling of this Court in U.N Sharma v. Puttegowda1. In that Ruling this Court has held where in a suit for permanent injunction the plaintiff alleged agreement of sale and the execution is denied by the defendants, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C This is a Ruling delivered by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court. There is another Ruling reported in Mahadevamma v. B.S Lingaraju . 1981 2 KLJ 388., wherein the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Hon'ble M.N Venkatachalaiah and N.R Kudoor, JJ., have held as follows:—

    “An intending transferee under a contract for sale of immovable property, who is put in possession of the property in part performance of the contract, can as a plaintiff bring an action for the possessory remedy of an injunction in protection of his possession against the transferror.”

    Their Lordships have quoted the Ruling of the Supreme Court in Ranachhoddas Chahaganlal v. Devaji Supdu Dorik . 1977 3 SCC 584, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:—

    “One of the limbs of part performance is that the transferee has in part performance of the contract taken possession of the property. The most important consideration is the contract. The true principle of the operation of the acts of part performance seems to require that the acts in question must be referred to some contract and must be referred to the alleged one; that they prove the existence of some contract, and are consistent with the contract alleged. The doctrine of part performance is defence. It is a sword and not a shield, (sic). It is a right to protect his possession against any challenge to it by the transferor contrary to the terms of the contract.”

    This Ruling though on earlier day was not brought to the notice of this Court when this Court passed a Judgment reported in A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99. In view of the Judgment of the Division Bench delivered by this Court in 1981 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 388, the law laid down in the Ruling reported in A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99 cannot be said to be a good law. The lower appellate Court relied, on the Ruling reported in A.I.R 1986 Karnataka 99 which cannot be said to be a good law in view of the fact that the said Ruling has not taken into consideration the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in 1981 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 388. There are no other grounds given by the Additional Civil Judge in allowing the Appeal of the respondents. Since the lower appellate Court has based its Judgment on a Ruling of this Court which cannot be said to be holding the field in view of the earlier Division Bench Ruling of this Court quoted above, the Judgment of the Additional Civil Judge cannot be sustained and it is liable to be set aside.

    5. The next question to be considered by the Court is whether the judgment of the trial Court is sustainable in law. It cannot be disputed now in view of the law laid down by this Court in 1981 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 388 quoted above that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction as well as temporary injunction if he is able to satisfy the conditions required for issue of injunction in his favour. The petitioner has filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 15.5.1984 He filed the suit on 1.6.1984 and an exparte temporary injunction came to be issued on 2.6.1984 He has also produced the original of the agreement of sale which is an unregistered one. In prima facie proof of that document, he filed his affidavit and the affidavit of the scribe and two attesting witnesses. The scribe has supported the case of the respondents. Subsequently he seems to have switched over his loyalty to the petitioner and he has filed his affidavit supporting the case of the petitioner. The attesting witnesses have filed an affidavit in support of the case of the petitioner. Therefore, there is prima facie material placed by the petitioner that defendant-1 executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 15.4.1984 agreeing to sell the suit schedule property in his favour and as per the averment in the agreement she has also put him in possession of the property. Though the defendants have produced the tax paid receipts for the year 1984-1985, they have not produced any further receipts to show that they have paid any tax subsequent to 1985-1986. Their paying tax for the year 1984-1985 will not come to their aid because they might have paid it before the execution of the agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner. On the other hand the conduct of the defendants is to be seen. Though the injunction was issued on 2.6.1984 till 18.9.1984 they did not take any steps for getting the temporary injunction vacated. This cannot be the conduct of a person who is in possession of the property and against whom an exparte temporary injunction is issued. Such a person will approach the Court at the earliest will try to and get the temporary injunction vacated. Taking into consideration all these aspects the trial Court dismissed the I.A filed by the respondents under Order 39 Rule 4 C.P.C and made the temporary injunction issued by it absolute. After going through the order of the trial Court it cannot be said that the trial Court has exercised judicial discretion vested in it either capriciously or arbitrarily or unjustly. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was wrong in interfering with the order of the trial Court.

    6. Hence I proceed to pass the following order:—

    The Petition is allowed. The order of the Additional Civil Judge, Bidar, is set aside and the order of the Munsiff, Basavakalyan, is restored. Since the suit is of the year 1984, the Munsiff, Basavakalyan, is now directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible but not later than two months from today.

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    Comments

    Kantappa v. Krishnabai
    (Oct 25, 1994)