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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit arose from a partition claim instituted on behalf of an infant plaintiff (son of Sobhanadri) by his mother as next friend after the father's death (16 May 1929). The plaint for partition was filed in October 1929 against the plaintiff's paternal uncle (defendant 1), the latter's son (defendant 2) and the plaintiff's step-mother (defendant 3). While the suit was pending and before any preliminary decree was passed, the infant plaintiff died on 21 March 1931.

The plaintiff's mother applied to be brought on the record as the plaintiff's legal representative and to continue the suit. The Subordinate Judge allowed that application, brought the mother on the record and framed an issue whether the suit had been instituted in the interests of the minor and whether, had he survived, a decree for partition would have been passed with effect from the date of the plaint. That order was challenged by the defendants by way of civil revision to the High Court.

The High Court Bench (Venkatasubba Rao and Reilly, JJ.) differed in opinion on the questions raised and referred the following two questions to a Full Bench for decision:

  1. Does a suit by a minor for partition abate if he dies before the Court has found that partition is for his benefit?
  2. Or is it open to his legal representative to proceed with the trial and obtain a decree on his showing that when the partition suit was instituted it was for the benefit of the minor?

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a partition suit instituted on behalf of a minor abates on the minor's death before the Court has found that partition would be for his benefit.
  2. Whether the minor's legal representative (heir) may be brought on record and continue the partition suit by showing that, at the time the suit was instituted, partition would have been for the minor's benefit (and, if decreed, whether the severance may be treated as dating from the date of the plaint).

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants / Appellants

  • The defendants contended that the suit abated on the death of the minor plaintiff before any preliminary decree was passed; in that event the minor died undivided and the rule of survivorship applied.
  • Defendants relied upon the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma (as supporting abatement) and similar authorities to the effect that where a minor's suit for partition has not resulted in a decree the legal representatives are not entitled to continue the action.

Respondent / Plaintiff's Mother (Next Friend)

  • The mother (as next friend) sought to be brought on the record as legal representative and to continue the suit, relying on the contention that the suit was instituted in the minor's interest and that the Court should be permitted to proceed to determine that question even after the minor's death.
  • The factual allegation (set out in the plaint and relied on in the application) was that the defendants had misappropriated the minor's share and that partition was sought for the minor's clear benefit; the mother sought to have the Court decide whether, on the evidence, the suit was for the minor's benefit and, if so, to pass a decree operating from the date of the plaint.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Akkanna v. Srirangaraja Bhattar, AIR 1930 Mad 486 Decision of Jackson, J. followed by the Subordinate Judge in this case; took a view differing from Chelimi Chetti on whether a single judge must follow it. Noted as a single-Judge decision followed below; discussed whether Jackson, J. was bound by Chelimi Chetti and whether later rulings shook Chelimi Chetti's authority.
Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, AIR 1918 Mad 379 Two propositions: (1) Filing a suit for partition on behalf of a minor does not itself effect severance of status (court must decide if partition is for minor's benefit). (2) If a minor plaintiff dies pending suit (before preliminary decree), his legal representatives are not entitled to continue the suit. Central point of contention. The Court analyses the two propositions separately: the first proposition is generally accepted by several later cases; the second proposition (that the suit abates and legal representatives cannot continue) is debated and ultimately addressed by the Full Bench questions.
Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain, 1913 35 All 80 Law relating to unilateral declarations of intention to separate: an unequivocal expression of intention to separate will effect severance in status (principle for adults). Used to explain the law for adult plaintiffs and to contrast the minor's situation with adult unilateral declarations.
Soundararajan v. Arunachalam, 1916 39 Mad 159 (Full Bench) Full Bench held that suing for partition amounts to separation in general; confusion arises because the plaintiff in that case was a minor but the Full Bench did not explicitly treat it as a minor's case. Discussed at length: some judges treat the Full Bench as having been interpreted in later cases (Chelimi Chetti) as not applying to minors; disagreement existed whether the Full Bench had overlooked the plaintiff's minority.
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj, AIR 1916 PC 104 Affirmed that filing suit for partition is evidence of intention to separate and creates severance for adults. Referred to as authority for adult cases where filing leads to severance; contrasted with minor cases.
Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh, AIR 1917 PC 39 Shows that dismissal of partition suit does not affect the rule that by filing a suit the plaintiff becomes divided (adult context): status created by assertion of right to separate even if consequential judgment not obtained. Referred to for the principle that filing a suit may effect division of status in adult cases even without final decree.
Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar, AIR 1925 PC 49 Where the plaintiff withdraws the suit before trial, filing plaint may not necessarily result in severance (adult context). Cited as limiting the effect of mere filing (withdrawal may prevent severance); used in the adult-law discussion.
Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan, AIR 1925 Mad 717 Holds that where the Court gives a decree to a minor for partition, the severance of status is treated as dating from the date of the plaint (i.e., decree operates retrospectively). Interpreted as showing that if a preliminary decree is passed for a minor, division may date back to the plaint; relied upon by several judges to support continuing suit and retrospective severance if decree ultimately passed.
Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, AIR 1927 Mad 801 Affirms the principle that the Court must determine whether partition is advantageous to the minor and, if the Court decrees partition, the imprimatur of the Court may be deemed to justify severance from the date of the plaint. Quoted as supporting Krishnaswami Thevan and interpreted as consistent with the view that severance may relate back to the plaint if decree is passed.
Ganapathy v. Subramanyam Chetty, AIR 1929 Mad 738 Decision that, in the specific facts, did not bear on the precise point at issue here; involved withdrawal/continuance issues for minors and major plaintiffs. Cited by the Court as not throwing direct light on the point under discussion in this appeal.
Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao, AIR 1930 Mad 326 Held that a minor is incapable of exercising intention to separate by himself; if the Court thinks fit to allow partition on behalf of the minor, one may say the minor has become divided, but until decree is passed one cannot assert that his interests are divided. Referred to as supporting the proposition that a minor is not severed simply by filing suit; used to show that Jackson, J.'s later views conflicted with his earlier participation in this case.
Lalta Prasad v. Sri Maha Deoji Birajman Temple, AIR 1920 All 116 Affirms the proposition that institution of a partition suit on behalf of a minor does not ipso facto effect severance. Quoted as supportive of the rule that a minor remains undivided until Court finds partition to be for his benefit.
Krishna Lal Jha v. Nandeshwar, AIR 1918 Pat 91 Decision of Patna High Court that a minor plaintiff was held to have become divided from the filing of the plaint (contrary to Chelimi Chetti); no discussion of Chelimi Chetti in that judgment. Mentioned as conflicting authority; noted that later Madras judges dissented from it.
Bachoo v. Mankore Bai, 1907 31 Bom 373 Approved the rule that the Court cannot pass a decree for partition for a minor unless it finds that partition would be for the minor's benefit. Invoked to show the settled rule that the Court must be satisfied of benefit before decreeing partition for a minor.
Balkrishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu, 1903 30 Cal 738 Privy Council held that private partition arrangements can bind minors represented by their mothers if fair; minors may later set aside if unfair. Used to demonstrate that minors can be represented and bound by partition arrangements outside Court, supporting the view that representation and volition on behalf of minors can operate in practice.
Nallappa Reddi v. Balammal, 1865 2 MHCR 182; Chanvirappa v. Dannava, 1895 19 Bom 593 Examples holding private partition by guardians representing minors can be binding (absent fraud). Referred to as illustrating historical practice that minors' interests may be represented and partitions effected on their behalf outside Court.
Gharitullah v. Khalak Singh, 1903 25 All 407 Held a guardian under Guardians and Wards Act cannot be appointed in respect of an infant's interest in undivided Mitakshara family property (such interest is not individual property for that Act). Referred to illustrate difficulty of appointing legal guardian for a minor's undivided Mitakshara interest; supports practice of mothers representing minors.
Krishnamurthy Pillai v. Surendramurthi Pillan, AIR 1932 Mad 381 Referenced incidentally to suggest an effective date of severance (mention of date of suit as significant in that case). Mentioned in argument about dating of severance to the date of the plaint.
Doraiswami Pillai v. Thungaswami Pillai, 1904 27 Mad 377; other English equity authorities General propositions about wardship of Court and the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over suits by or for infants. Used to support the proposition that the Court has wide powers to control proceedings in the interests of minors and to prevent vexatious or injurious proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench considered the competing lines of authority and divided reasoning among several judges. The Court's analysis can be summarised by reference to the principal opinions contained in the record:

Venkatasubba Rao, J. (leading analysis and reference)

  • Distinguished two separate points in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma: (a) the filing of a suit by/for a minor does not ipso facto effect severance; (b) whether, on the death of a minor pending the suit, his legal representatives can continue the suit.
  • Accepted later authorities as supporting the first proposition (that mere filing by a minor does not sever status) but noted that later cases (e.g., Krishnaswami Thevan) addressed the second point and supported continuation where a preliminary decree is passed and the Court finds that the suit was beneficial to the minor.
  • Applied the principle that suits should be tried on the cause of action as it existed at the date of commencement; held that if the Court is satisfied on the trial that the suit as originally instituted was for the benefit of the minor, the Court may pass a preliminary decree and treat the division as dating from the plaint.
  • Concluded the Subordinate Judge's course of framing an issue as to whether the suit was instituted in the minor's interests and bringing the mother on record was in principle correct and consistent with binding decisions, but because the point was important and there was divergence, he referred two specific questions to a Full Bench.

Reilly, J. (dissenting view)

  • Accepted the two-fold proposition in Chelimi Chetti: (1) filing a partition suit on behalf of a minor does not itself effect severance; and (2) if a minor dies before the Court finds partition to be for his benefit, the suit abates and his interest passes by survivorship.
  • Reasoned that the Court must act with single eye to the benefit of the minor and, at the time the Court decides whether partition is for the minor's benefit, the proper question is whether partition would be for the minor's benefit at that time (not hypothetically at the date of the plaint); circumstances may change materially during pendency of a partition suit.
  • Concluded as a necessary consequence that if the minor dies before the Court has found partition to be for his benefit, he dies undivided and the suit therefore abates; accordingly, he would not allow the legal representative to continue the suit.
  • Supported this interpretation by citing Chelimi Chetti and subsequent Madras decisions which, in his view, accepted its second proposition as a consequence of the first.

Ramesam, J., Anantakrishna Ayyar, J. and Cornish, J. (majority reasoning)

  • These judges developed the argument that (a) private partitions binding minors (when represented by mothers/natural guardians) are historically and judicially recognised; (b) a next friend or guardian can validly institute a suit for partition on behalf of a minor where partition is for the minor's benefit; and (c) the Court has supervisory powers to prevent vexatious or malicious suits by next friends.
  • Held that the filing of suit on behalf of a minor effects a conditional severance — conditional upon the Court later finding partition to be for the minor's benefit — and that, if upon trial the Court is satisfied the suit as instituted was for the minor's benefit, the Court may pass a decree which operates retrospectively (i.e., severance can be treated as dating from the plaint).
  • Reasoned that to hold otherwise (i.e., automatic abatement on the minor's death) would be to give undue prominence to a subsidiary procedural matter and unfairly prejudice the substantial property rights of the minor; the Court's supervisory powers and remedies (staying vexatious suits, refusing to allow malicious next friends to continue) provide adequate safeguards.
  • Cornish, J. emphasised that the minor's right to have his share defined is a proprietary right which should not be extinguished by the minor's accidental death pending suit; he saw no principled reason why the cause of action to obtain partition should not survive to the minor's legal representatives where the suit was properly instituted for the minor's benefit.

Holding and Implications

Holding (Full Bench): The Full Bench answered the reference and, by majority, concluded that a partition suit instituted on behalf of a minor does not necessarily abate on the minor's death before the Court has found partition to be for his benefit; the legal representative may be brought on record and continue the suit and obtain a decree if, on the evidence, the Court is satisfied that when the suit was instituted it was for the minor's benefit.

Implications (direct consequences and limits within the text):

  • Direct effect on the parties in this case: the mother's application to be brought on the record and the issue framed by the Subordinate Judge (whether the suit was instituted in the interests of the minor and whether a decree would have been passed from the date of the plaint) conform with the majority view that the Court may proceed to decide that question even after the minor's death.
  • If the Court (on trial) finds that the suit as instituted was for the minor's benefit, it may pass a decree for partition which, in accordance with earlier authorities relied upon by the majority (e.g., Krishnaswami Thevan), may be treated as operating from the date of the plaint for purposes such as determination of shares and accounts.
  • If the Court finds the suit was not for the minor's benefit, the suit can be dismissed and the minor's interest (having died undivided) will be governed by the rule of survivorship — i.e., no unjustified continuance of vexatious or mala fide proceedings will be allowed.
  • The Full Bench resolved a long-standing conflict in the Madras decisions canvassed in the record by clarifying that the first proposition of Chelimi Chetti (that mere filing by a minor does not ipso facto effect severance) stands, but that it does not automatically lead to the consequence of abatement on death; rather the legal representative can continue and the Court must decide benefit on the evidence presented.

Disposition in the Record: The two referred questions were answered by the Full Bench (the record states "Reference answered.").

    (Thavva) Rangasayi And Others v. (Thavva) Nagarathnamma Opposite Party.

    Venkatasubba Rao, J.:— The learned Subordinate Judge follows the decision of Jackson, J., in Akkanna v. Srirangaraja Bhattar . AIR 1930 Mad 486, and the question shortly resolves itself into this: Does the view of Jackson, J., receive support from some rulings at least of this Court, or, is it, while being opposed to Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma . AIR 1918 Mad 379, from which Jackson, J., differs, also at variance with the later authorities, as contended for by Mr. Varadachari? Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, deals with two points and the confusion has arisen by their not having been kept distinct. As I shall show presently, the first point alone has received the support of the later cases; but those cases have not, with the doubtful exception of Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao . AIR 1930 Mad 326, dealt with the second point, with which alone we are now concerned. I am not therefore prepared to hold that Jackson, J., was wrong in not having considered himself bound, while sitting as a single Judge, by the authority of Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma.

    2. The facts may be briefly stated: Sobhanadri, the plaintiff's father, died on 16th May 1929. The plaintiff was then an infant and his mother, on his behalf, filed the present suit for partition in October 1929, impleading as defendants, the plaintiff's paternal uncle (defendant 1), the latter's son (defendant 2) and the plaintiff's step-mother (defendant 3). While the suit was pending and before a preliminary decree was passed, the plaintiff died on 21st March 1931. The question is, did the suit abate on the plaintiff's death, as contended for by the defendants, or, was the mother entitled to be brought on the record as the plaintiff's representative? The learned Subordinate Judge allowing the mother's petition, brought her on the record and raised an issue in the suit to the following effect: Was the suit instituted in the interests of the minor and if he had survived, would a decree for partition have been passed with effect from the date of the plaint? It is this order that is questioned before us by Mr. Varadachari, the defendant's learned counsel. The law relating to unilateral declarations was for the first time clearly laid down by the Judicial Committee in Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain . 1913 35 All 80. Then the question arose, whether the filing of a suit for partition amounted to a definite and unambiguous indication of intention to separate. This was answered in the affirmative by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Soundararajan v. Arunaohalam . 1916 39 Mad 159, and later by the Judicial Committee in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj . AIR 1916 PC 104. The facts of Soundararajan v. Arunaohalam, are interesting, although it is an open question, whether the learned Judges that took part in it were or were not aware of the fact that the plaintiff in that casa was a minor. Jackson, J., in the case already cited seems inclined to the view that they could not have overlooked that fact. For my purpose, it is not necessary to make any such assumption. In that case, the sole defendant died pending the suit and the minor plaintiff claimed that he became entitled to the entire estate in the joint family property. It was held that he became separated in status by his having filed the partition suit and on that ground his contention was negatived and the mother, and defendant's personal representative, was brought on the record, as having succeeded to her son's divided interest. If the fact of the plaintiff's minority had been specially adverted to and considered in the judgment, this authority would have been decisive in favour of the present respondent. Another remark which I wish to make on this case is, that the defendant's death occurred before the passing of any preliminary decree. Passing on to the other case to which I have referred, Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj, its importance lies in the fact, that in spits of the plaintiff's death pending the suit, it was held that his status became one of severance. His widow was brought on the record as his heir and a preliminary decree was passed in her favour directing partition. There is another Privy Council case belonging to this group, Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh . AIR 1917 PC 39, which shows that the fact the partition suit is dismissed does not affect the rule, that by the filing of the suit, the plaintiff becomes divided. Their Lordships observe:

    “A decree may be necessary for working out the result of the severance and for allotting definite share, but the status of the plaintiff as separate in estate is brought about by his assertion of his right to separate, whether he obtains a consequential judgment or not,”

    3. Thus, in the case of an adult plaintiff, the claim in the plaint amounts to an intimation to his cosharers of his unequivocal desire for separation and this rule is not affected either by the fact that the suit is later dismissed or that pending the action the plaintiff dies: although the Judicial Committee has further held in Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar . AIR 1925 PC 49 that where the plaintiff has withdrawn from the suit before the trial, the filing of the plaint does not necessarily result in his-severance. So much, then as to the law when the plaintiff happens to be an adult; but if the suit has been brought on behalf of an infant, in what respect does his position differ? It must now be taken as settled, that the filing of the plaint does not ipso facto bring about his severance. It is this part of the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, that has been affirmed by the later rulings. But the case goes further and holds, that on the death of the minor plaintiff pending the suit, his legal representatives are not entitled to continue the action. The latter cases in my opinion, recognize the distinction. True, by the mere filing of the plaint the plaintiff's status does not become one of separation; but when, at a later stage, a preliminary decree is passed, the minor plaintiff becomes divided in interest and the division dates back from the institution of the suit. In Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma this distinction was not borne in mind and the extreme position was contended for, namely, that a minor plaintiff became divided in status the moment a suit for partition was filed on his behalf. It was this contention that was rejected and; if I may say so with respect, properly. But why should the Court not proceed with the trial and pass a preliminary decree, if it is satisfied that the suit as originally laid was for the benefit of the minor? In Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan . AIR 1925 Mad 717, Spencer, J., while affirming Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma in so far as it holds that the filing of a-suit does not ipso facto bring about the minor plaintiff's severance, goes on to observe:

    “But in cases where the Court gives a decree to a minor for partition, it seems to me, with due respect, that there should be no departure from the general rule that every suit has to 1 tried on the cause of action as it existed at to date of its commencement: vide Rai Charan Biswanath10. Therefore, in my judgment the only sound principle will be to regard ??? prayer in the minor's plaint for division as conditional request that, provided that Court sees fit, it may declare the status of minor divided as from the date of the ??? It is true that there can be no division of stat unless the Court sees fit to decree it, but the is no reason why the Court should not make decree take effect from the date of the institution of the suit”: see p. 468 of 48 Mad.

    4. This, in my opinion, does not amount to an approval of the second part of the rule laid down in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. On the contrary, as is pointed out in the judgment of Courts Trotter, C.J and Sundaram Chetti, J., in the later case of Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar . AIR 1927 Mad 801, (the names of the Judges are given wrongly in the report). Krishnasuiami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan far from affirming in toto Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma distinguishes the last-mentioned case. I may usefully quote the following passage from the judgment:

    “If such a suit proceeds to the state of a decree in the plaintiff's favour on the Court finding that the partition would conduce to the best interests of the minor, the further question is whether the severance of the joint status takes place only from the date of the preliminary decree or from the date of the plaint. On this question there is the direct authority of a recent decision of a Bench of this High Court reported in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Pula Karuppa Thevan. It has been held in that case, distinguishing the decision in Chelami Chetti v. Subbamma that a suit by a minor for partition, if it ends in a decree for partition, has the effect of creating a division of status from the date of the plaint”: see p. 870 of 50 Mad.

    5. Again in the same judgment, the following observation was made:

    “As to what would be the result if in such a suit the Court had passed a preliminary decree for partition, there was no necessity to decide in that case,”

    i.e in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma: see pp. 871 and 872 of 50 Mad. Let us now turn to the facts of Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan. The minor's suit for partition against his father was filed on 31st January 1919. Another son was born to the father in May or June 1920. Conception must have taken place about August 1919, after the filing of the plaint. The question arose, was the plaintiff's share diminished by the subsequent birth of the son? The answer depended upon, whether or not the suit had the effect of creating a division in status from the date of the plaint. The learned Judges held that the minor plaintiff became divided in interest from the date of the plaint and that his share did not suffer diminution. The point to note is, and that is very important, that it was subsequent to the birth of the second son that the preliminary decree was passed. Haying passed it, the Court held that the partition dated back from the institution of the suit. Supposing the event that happened did not have the effect of diminishing but increasing the minor plaintiff's share would the Court have come to a different conclusion? The judgment itself furnishes the answer. Spencer, J., observes in the passage already quoted:

    But in cases where the Court gives a decree to a minor for partition, it seems to me, with duo respect, that there should be no departure from the general rule that every suit has to be tried on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement: vide Rai Charan v. Biswanath”.

    6. This principle is affirmed by Courts-Trotter, C.J and Sundaram Chetti, J., in the subsequent case of Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, where they lay down:

    “Though the inquiry has necessarily to be made by the Court subsequent to the filing of the plaint ‘it is the state of affairs that existed on the date of the suit that determine the exercise of the Court's discretion.’ It seems to us therefore that the principle of the decision in Krishnaswmi Thevan v. Pulu Karuppa Thevan, has to be applied to the present case.”

    7. These cases seem, in my opinion, to be clear authorities for the principle that the death of a minor plaintiff pending his suit, does not render it any the less incumbent on the Court to decide, if so invited, whether or not the action when originally brought, was for the benefit of the minor. It is true that generally on a proper case being made out, the Court in a partition suit adverts to the circumstances as they existed on the date of the decree. But it must be remembered that this is an exception to the general rule so clearly laid down in the two decisions to which I have referred “that every suit has to be tried on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement.” Moreover when the minor plaintiff dies before the time arrives for the passing of the decree it would be idle to apply the test, would it be for the benefit of the deceased minor or not to pass a decree? There is thus no scope for the exception coming into effect and the general rule must prevail; in other words, the Court should address itself to the question—Would it have been for the minor's benefit, had he lived, to decree a partition in his suit “on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement.” This position is quite sound in principle, as it does not lead to but on the contrary avoids, the inconvenience and the hardship referred to in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. If in the event it turns out that the suit was improperly brought and the Court straightaway dismisses it, where is the question of any officious next friend being enabled to file a vexatious suit? The principle to which I have adverted contains within itself the necessary safeguard. To take an illustration, if the plaint alleges that the minor's uncle has been grossly ill-treating him and wasting the property, and that allegation is subsequently made good, why should the uncle be benefited by the fact that the minor died pending his suit? In that case, I see no hardship in his infant widow succeeding to his estate; on the contrary it seems to me eminently just. If however it turns out that the suit was in its inception vexatious, the Court refuses to decree a partition, and the uncle whose conduct according to this hypothesis, if free from blame, succeeds to the miner's share. Further, to treat a right to partition as a mere personal right is, in my opinion, wrong. If in the ordinary course, the minor's personal representative can get a benefit, I fail to see why the Courts, by importing a fiction, should hold that the state of jointness continues.

    8. Ganapathy v. Subramanyam Chetty . AIR 1929 Mad 738 throws no light on the point under discussion. Plaintiff 1 in that case filed the suit for partition on behalf of himself and his minor sons, plaintiffs 2 and 3. On plaintiff 1's death pending the suit, plaintiff 2, who had attained majority, elected to continue the suit not only on his own behalf but professed to do so also on behalf of his minor brother, plaintiff 3. But the latter's mother applied to be made his guardian and, stating that the partition was not in his interests, got him transposed as defendant 31. The only question that arose was—Was it or was it not open to plaintiff 3 to withdraw from the suit?— and the question was answered in the affirmative. It was held that the mere filing of the plaint by the father on be-half of his minor sons, did not necessarily effect a severance in status as regards the minors and that as plaintiff 3 must be deemed to have continued joint with the defendants, a decree should be given to the major plaintiff 2 alone for his share in the property. This case, as I have said, has no bearing upon the matter in hand. Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao, (a decision of Ramesam and Jackson, JJ.) supports Mr. Varadachari to the extent that it impliedly affirms the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. There again the only point raised seems to be whether by the mere filing of the plaint a minor becomes severed from the family. Granting that he does not, the further point was not argued, that notwithstanding the minor's death, the Court would or would not allow the case to proceed to trial “on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement.” Apart from this, the value of this ruling as an authority is impaired by the fact that not only the judgment contains no discussion but that one of the learned Judges who was a party to it (Jackson, J.) came to the very opposite conclusion in the case referred to already Akkanna v. Srirangaraja Bhatar some time later. Although I may not agree with all the reasons given by him in his judgment I agree, as I have said, with that conclusion. There remain only two cases to be dealt with, one of the Allahabad and the other of the Patna High Courts. Lalta Prasad v. Sri Maha Deoji Birajman Temple . AIR 1920 All 116, (relied on by the petitioners) merely affirms the uncontested proposition that the institution of a partition suit on behalf of a minor does not ipso facto effect a separation of the family. The point decided is thus stated in the judgment of Mears, C.J:

    “It has been argued before us that a minor, so represented by a next friend, can, by the very institution of a suit, effect the same immediate legal consequence as would admittedly follow from a suit brought by a man sui juris. We cannot agree with that contention at all.”

    9. That this and no more is the effect of this ruling is recognized both in Krishna, swami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan and Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar. In Krishna, Lal Jha v. Nandeshwar . AIR 1918 Pat 91 (relied on by the respondent), the minor plaintiff was held to have become divided from the filing of the plaint and his share did not suffer diminution by the birth of another son to the plaintiff's father, whose conception took place after the institution of the suit but before the passing of the preliminary decree. This case is referred to in the judgment of Spencer, J., in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the view taken by the lower Court is not only right in principle but is consistent with the decision binding upon it. But as my learned brother is taking a different view and as the point raised is of considerable importance I refer the following questions to a Full Bench:

    (1) Does a suit by a minor for partition abate it he dies before the Court has found that partition is for his benefit.

    (2) Or is it open to his legal representative to proceed with the trial and obtain a decree on his showing that when the partition suit was instituted it was for the benefit of the minor.

    Reilly, J.:— I regret that with the very greatest respect I am unable to agree with the judgment just pronounced by my learned brother. The plaintiff, a member of a Hindu joint family, sued as a minor with his mother as next friend for partition. At the date of the plaint he was under two years old. Before he was four, and before any decree was made in suit, he died. His mother applied to be brought on record as his heiress and legal representative and so to be allowed to prosecute the suit for her own benefit. The learned Subordinate Judge has allowed that in spite of the defendant's objection that with the death of the minor, plaintiff the suit abated; this petition is against the Subordinate Judge's order. It baa; not been disputed (before us that in a suit by a minor member of a Hindu joint family for partition the Court cannot make a decree for the plaintiff unless it is found that would be for his benefit. That rule has been established in a number of cases and was approved by the Privy Council in Bachoo v. Mankore Bai . 1907 31 Bom 373. The result of that is that the filing of a suit for partition by a minor through his next friend is not such a declaration of intention to divide by a co-parcener as itself effects a division in status and that this is an exception to the rule in Suraj Narain's case, Girja Rai's case and Kawal Nain's case. A minor on whose behalf such a plaint is filed remains undivided in status in spite of the plaint, and, if the Court never finds that partition would be to his benefit, his status as a member of a joint family remains undisturbed. If he dies before the Court has reached a decision that partition would be to his benefit, he dies undivided. That being so at the moment he dies undivided in status the rule of survivorship comes into play, and his suit for partition dies-with him. If that is so—and I think it is a necessary consequence of the rule that his plaint alone does not effect a division in status but that it must be supplemented and supported by a finding of the Court that partion is for his-benefit—it is sufficient for the decision, of this case. But I may add that I have no doubt that in such a partition suit, if the stage is reached at which the Judge has to decide whether partition is to the benefit of the minorr what he has to ask himself is whether at that date partition will be to the minor's benefit, not whether it would have been to the minor's benefit at the-date of the plaint. Partition suits are not always disposed of very promptly. On the contrary they are often pending for long periods. Between the date when the plaint is filed and the date of the Court's finding regarding benefit to the minor circumstances have often changed materially through the birth or death of other members of the family or from other causes. I do not think it can be seriously contended that, if by the time the question is tried the Judge finds that in consequence of the death of other parties or for other reasons it would be clearly detrimental to the-minor's interests to make a decree for partition, he is bound to do so because-it can be shown that had the circumstances at the time of the plaint remained unchanged, a partition would have been of benefit to the minor. That to my mind would be a travesty of the rule that the Judge must do what in his opinion is for the benefit of the minor, whose interests are in this way entrusted to him and on the contrary if it happens that the Judge comes to the conclusion that at the time it was filed the plaint was not in the minor's interest, but that circumstances have so changed that it is clearly to his benefit that partition be made, I can see nothing in the rule to suggest that the Judge must dismiss a suit, which as it turns out eventually, is to the minor's benefit, and drive him to the expense of another suit.

    10. As I understand the matter, what the Judge has to ask himself is what is to the minor's benefit, so far as he can see at the time when he make his decision. To interpret the rule in any other way would often be to compel the Judge knowingly to do harm to a minor under a rule intended, as is not disputed, for the minor's benefit. If the minor plaintiff dies before the Court has reached a finding that partition will be for his benefit, it can never afterwards be found that partition will be for his benefit in this world. On that consideration also it appears to me clear that, if the minor plaintiff dies at that stage, his suit must abate. Those appear to me to be logical consequences of the rule that a minor member of a Hindu joint family does not become divided in status by suing for partition unless something further happens, viz., the Court finds that partition is to his benefit.

    11. My interpretation of the rule and its consequences is, I think, well supported by authority in this Court. In 1917 in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, as the head-note of the report shows, Abdur Rahim and Oldfield, JJ., decided two propositions—firstly, that the institution of a suit for partition on behalf of a minor does not itself effect severance of status, for the reason that it is for the Court to decide whether partition will be beneficial to the minor, and secondly, that, if a minor plaintiff dies while such a suit is pending (i.e, before a preliminary decree has been made) his legal representative is not entitled to continue the suit, the reason obviously being that the minor has died undivided. The first proposition is the result of the discussion in the judgment: the second was the actual decision in the case, for which the first proposition was the basis. That decision clearly covers the present case. It has stood for 15 years, and it has never been overruled. On the contrary the first proposition—which is merely a re-statement of the old rule in a minor's suit as being still in force in spite of the Privy Council's rulings in regard to unilateral declarations of intention to divide from Suraj Narain's case onwards—has been repeatedly approved in this Court. In Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karwppa Thevan both Spencer and Devadoss, JJ., explicitly approved of that proposition, though they came to the conclusion that if the Court eventually finds that a partition will be for the benefit of the minor, the division in status will relate back to the date of the plaint, and the partition will be worked out accordingly and there is no doubt, I think, that they accepted also the second proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, as a consequence of the first. Devadoss, J., referred explicitly to the decision in that case “that the cause of action did not survive to the mother” and after discussing a contention that decision was wrong concluded by saying:

    “There is no reason to doubt the soundness of the decision in Chelimi Chetty v. Subbamma.”

    12. He also said:

    “Till the Court determines the question whether a partition should be effected in favour of a minor the joint status of the minor with other members of the family is not in any way severed,”

    from which it follows that, if the minor plaintiff dies before the determination is reached, he dies an undivided member of his family and the rule of survivorship applies. In Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, Courts-Trotter, C.J, and Sundaram Chetti, J., accepted as correct the proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma:

    “that the mere filing of a plaint on behalf of a minor would not ipso facto effect a severance of the joint family status, for in such a suit it is for the Court to determine whether the partition asked for will be beneficial to the minor.”

    which in its implication that, if the minor dies before the Court has so determined he dies undivided, is sufficient for the present case. They also quoted with apparent approval Lalta Prasad v. Sri Maha Deoji Birajman Temple, in which a minor on whose behalf a suit for partition had been filed was treated as still undivided in spite of the suit and by the decision got the benefit of the rule of survivorship. They went on to say:

    “If such a suit proceeds to the stags of a decree in the plaintiff's favour……. the further question is whether the severance of the joint status tabes place only from the date of the preliminary decree or from the date of the plaint;”

    and it was that further question which they set out to decide, arriving at the same conclusion as in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan which they pointed out was not in conflict with Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma,. In regard to the question whether the Court should consider the benefit to the minor as on the date of its decision or as on the date of the plaint it is true that they said

    “it is the state of affairs that existed on the date of the suit which determines the exercise of the Court's discretion.”

    13. That with respect I venture to suggest is not in accordance with the principle that benefit to the minor is to determine the Court's decision, and, as will be seen, it is not in accord with a later case, where the question had to be decided. But the learned Judges were, as they explain, merely considering what was the question to be answered if the stage of answering it was reached. They said nothing whatever to throw doubt on the proposition that, until it is decided that partition is to the benefit of the minor (in respect of whatever date the benefit is to be considered) he remains in spite of his plaint undivided in status. On the contrary their quotation of Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma and Lalta Prasad v. Sri Maha Deoji Birajman Temple shows that they accepted it. In Ganapathy v. Subramanyam Chetty, Phillips and Madhavan Nayar, JJ., applied the first proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma that the filing of a suit for partition on behalf of a minor does not effect for him a division in status from the other members of his joint family until a preliminary decree has been made and applied also the consequential proposition that until the stage has been reached the minor remains undivided in status and they decided the question of benefit to the minor and disposed of the suit accordingly, not by the test of what would have been beneficial to him at the date of the plaint, but of what would be beneficial to him at the date of the preliminary decree. In another partition suit Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao, Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., said:

    “Plaintiff 2, being a minor, is incapable of exercising the intention to separate himself. The next friend does it for him. If the Court thinks fit to allow partition on behalf of the minor, one can well say that the minor has become divided: but until the decree is passed, one cannot say that the minor's interests are divided from the rest of the family.”

    14. And they went on to decide that, as the minor plaintiff 2 died before a preliminary decree had been made, his share passed by survivorship to his father, defendant 1 in the suit. The learned Judges adopted the first proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma though they did not mention that case, and they rested their decision on its consequence that, as the minor died before the Court had found partition to be for his benefit, he died undivided in status. That decision again covers the present case, as according to it the minor plaintiff in this case, when he died before the Court had found partition to be for his benefit, died undivided in status, and therefore his suit must abate. In Lalta Prasad v. Sri Maha Deoji Birajman Temple a Bench of three Judges agreed with the first proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma and applied it as aground for deciding that, when a minor's partition suit abated on the death of the only defendant, the minor was undivided in status and took that defendant's share by survivorship. On the other hand in Krishna Lal Jha v. Nandeshwar a Bench of two Judges decided that a minor's plaint in a partition suit itself affected a division in status. With respect I may mention that in the judgment there is no discussion of the question; Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma is not noticed; and there is nothing to suggest that the learned Judges remembered that the Privy Council had approved the rule that it is for the Court to consider whether partition is for the benefit of a minor and to grant or refuse partition accordingly and I may add that from the decision of the Patna High Court the learned Judges who took part in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan, dissented.

    15. On these decisions I think it is clear that there is overwhelming authority in this Court that a minor's plaint for partition does not itself make him divided in status, but that, if he dies before the Court has decided that partition is for his benefit, he dies undivided from his family. That the minor remains undivided after his suit for partition has been filed until the Court finds that partition is for his benefit was accepted as correct in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan and Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar and was the basis of the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, Ganapathy v. Subramanyam Chetty and Rama Rao v. Ranumantha Rao as well as in Lalta Prasad v. Sri Maha Deoji Birajman Temple. In the present case Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma was cited before the learned Subordinate Judge; but he refused to follow it and preferred to follow a later decision of a single Judge of this Court, who had not followed Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma but had made an order opposed to it. I do not understand on what principle the Subordinate Judge acted. The decision of the single Judge is that of Jackson, J., in Akkanna v. Srirangaraja Bhattar and the order which the learned Judge made is not only in conflict which the other cases of this Court which I have mentioned: it is in conflict with his own decision with Ramesam, J., in Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao which he appears to have overlooked. Jackson, J., does not hold himself bound by Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma because

    “at least by implication its authority is considerably shaken by other rulings.”

    16. The first of such rulings to which he refers is the opinion of the Full Bench in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam. That case was an earlier case than Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma and the opinion of the Full Bench was considered and interpreted in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. With great respect I do not understand what is meant in the circumstances by saying that the authority of Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma is shaken by Soundararajan v. Arunachalam. There is certainly, as Jackson, J., has pointed out, a remarkable feature in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam. The question before the Full Bench was:

    “Whether a member of a Hindu joint family becomes separated from the other members by the fact of suing them for partition.”

    17. The referring Judges felt a doubt whether the recent ruling of the Privy Council in Suraj Narain's case applied to a plaint for partition. The answer of the Full Bench was in effect that it did apply, an answer about which apart from the opinion of the Full Bench later decisions of the Privy Council have left no doubt. But it happened that in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam the plaintiff suing for partition was a minor. Nevertheless that was not held to take him out of the general rule adopted by the Full Bench, and eventually the case was decided on the view that by his plaint for partition he became divided in status from its date, as if the fact that he was a minor did not affect the question. It is certainly a very carious thing that the general rule was applied to a minor's plaint in that way. Bub there is nothing in the opinions or in the arguments in that case as reported to show that any contention was based on the fact that the plaint was that of a minor. Attention appears to have been confined to the question what is the effect of a coparcener's plaint for partition in its general form without drawing any distinction between a minor and a major plaintiff. But, if that case had not been interpreted in later cases, I think it would have been right to say that the Judges who referred the case-and who eventually decided it and it may be remarked that both of them were members of the Full Bench must, have been aware that the plaintiff was a minor and yet they applied the ruling of the Full Bench to him and so created an precedent. However that aspect of Soundararajan v. Arunachalam was noticed and considered in Chelimi chetti v. Subbamma.

    18. The opinion of the Full Bench was quoted before Abdur Rahim and Oldfield, JJ., but they interpreted it as not applying to a minor's plaint on the-ground that no question of the effect of a minor's plaint was raised before the Full Bench. In Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan both learned Judges referred to Soundararajan v. Arunachalam and both accepted the interpretation of it in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma as correct. It was referred to again in Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar and there, as also in Ganapathy v. Subramanyam Ghetty and Rama Rao v. Sanumantha Rao, the learned Judges who accepted the first proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma must have known that in accepting that proposition they were also accepting the interpretation of Soundararajan v. Aru-nachalam adopted in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. When the opinion of a Full Bench of this Court has been interpreted by a Bench of two Judges of this Court, a Judge of this Court sitting alone, as I understand the matter, is as much bound by that interpretation as he would be by the interpretation of a pronouncement of the Privy Council or of a provision, of a statute adopted by a Bench. In the present instance, as I have shown, the interpretation of the opinion of the Full Bench in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam, viz., that it does not apply to a minor's suit for partition, and the view that in spite of the opinion of the Full Bench a minor does not become divided in status from the members of his family by the filing of a plaint for partition on his behalf but nevertheless remains undivided until the Court has found that partition is for his benefit have been adopted, as my learned brother recognizes, by Bench after Bench of this Court.

    19. If a Judge sitting alone is really of opinion that a matter so well settled requires re-consideration, the usual course is, I believe, to refer the case before him to a Bench with such observations as he may think necessary; and the Bench, if its members agree with him may refer the matter to a Full Bench, though, when there is a long line of decisions, it is in my opinion extremely undesirable that they should do so save in exceptional cases. Jackson, J., also regards Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan as throwing doubt on Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. The learned Judges who decided Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan did not regard their decision as inconsistent with Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma nor did the learned Judges who decided Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar. On the contrary, as I have mentioned, both in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan and Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma was accepted as correct. Jackson, J., has also mentioned Krishna Lal Jha v. Nandeshwar. But, as he has noticed, not only is that decision in conflict with Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma but in Krishnaswami Theyan v. Karuppa Thevan dissent from it has been definitely expressed. His conclusion appears to be that the answer to the question whether, when a minor suing for partition (or a minor defendant claiming partition) dies before the Court has found that partition is for his benefit, he dies divided or undivided in status is not clear, and he left it to be debated in the suit. With the greatest respect, in my opinion, the answer is quite clear in principle, when we adopt, as we must adopt, the rule approved by the Privy Council that a minor can get partition by suit only after the Court has found that it is to his benefit, and is quite clear on the authority of a number of decisions of this Court, in one of which Jackson, J., himself joined.

    20. My learned brother agrees with me that the first proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma the proposition which Jackson, J., doubts, viz., that the institution of a suit for partition on behalf of a minor does not itself effect severance of status, is now incontestable. If that is so, the minor remains undivided in status even after the plaint is filed until something further happens, i.e, until the Court has found that partition is to his benefit. If he dies before that has been found, he dies undivided in status and the law of survivorship comes into operation. If the first proposition is accepted, as I understand that my learned brother accepts it, with the very greatest respect I do not see how the next step in the argument can be avoided, viz., that the minor plaintiff remains undivided in status even after the plaint has been filed. If he dies while undivided, no further question arises: the rule of survivorship comes into play. To attack that rule directly would be hopeless. When a member of a joint family, whether a major or a minor, dies and at the moment of his death he is undivided in status, his share goes to his coparceners by survivorship. At the moment he died the minor plaintiff in this case was undivided: no one can deny that unless the first proposition in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma which my learned brother recognizes as correct and well established, is overruled, as Jackson, J., would like to overrule it: if nothing more happened, for instance if no one took any further interest in the suit, by the rule survivorship the minor's share must go to his coparceners.

    21. But it is suggested that ex post facto by an inquiry into what would have been to the benefit of this unfortunate infant if he had lived, which he did not, and had not died, which he did, the fact that he died a joint member of his family may be properly converted into a fiction that he died divided in status and this is to be done by a Court which has to act with a single eye to the minor's benefit. Under the guise of a rule intended for the benefit of the minor plaintiff to embark after his death on a hypothetical inquiry, which no longer can have any relation to existing facts, and to do this, not for the benefit of the minor, who is beyond all human benefit, but for the benefit of his heirs, in respect of whom the Court has no special duty or responsibility, appears to me a very artificial way of evading the law of survivorship. As I have indicated, in my opinion there is no doubt how the Subordinate Judge should have disposed of the application before him. But, as I am unfortunate enough to be in disagreement from my learned brother and as the learned advocates on both sides have requested that the matter be referred to a Full Bench, I agree that the questions proposed by my learned brother be so referred.

    Opinions.

    Ramesam, J.:— The facts out of which this revision petition arises are as follows: O.S No. 36 of 1930 was filed for partition in the Subordinate Judge's Court of Ellcre on behalf of an infant plaintiff by his mother as next friend. Defendant 1 is an uncle of the plaintiff; defendant 2 is his son and defendant 3 is the plaintiff's half-brother. The plaintiff, his deceased father and the defendants were members of a joint family. The plaintiff's father died 16th May 1929, and the suit was instituted on 29th October 1929, on the allegation that the defendants were misappropriating the plaintiff's share in the family properties and that they re fused to deliver the plaintiff's share though demanded and turned him and his mother out of the family house in September 1929. While the suit was pending the plaintiff died on 21st March 1931. His mother then applied to be brought on record as legal representative. The Subordinate Judge passed an order directing that the plaintiff's mother be brought on record as legal representative. He also directed that an issue be framed in the suit as to whether the suit was instituted in the interests of the minor and whether, had he survived, a decree for partition with effect from the date of the plaint at the latest ought to have been passed. Against this order the defendants filed this revision petition. The revision petition originally came on for arguments before our brothers Venkatasubba Rao and Reilly, JJ., who differed and referred the following questions to a Full Bench:

    “1. Does a suit by a minor for partition abate if he dies before the Court has found that partition is for his benefit?

    2. Is it open to his legal representative to proceed with the trial and obtain a decree on his showing that when the partition suit was instituted it was for the benefit of the minor?”

    22. So far as an adult plaintiff is concerned, it is now established law that the filing of a suit for partition amounts to a definite and unambiguous intention to separate: vide Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain. A member of a joint family can separate from the family even prior to a suit provided he declares a definite and unambiguous intention to separate and communicates it to the other members of the family: vide Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj. The question now arises how far are these principles to be applied to the case of a minor. If it can be said that a suit for partition can always be filed on behalf of a minor and there are no limitations as to the granting of a decree in such a suit, no difficulty arises. But while a suit on behalf of a minor can be filed by any person as next friend, Courts have laid down that in the case of a suit for partition the suit ought not to be decreed unless it is for the benefit of the minor. The reason for such a limitation imposed by the Courts is not that there cannot be a partition between a minor and the other members of the family, but it is possible that the suit may not be for his benefit. When it is remembered that any person can sue on behalf of a minor as a next friend it is easy to imagine cases where the partition is not for his benefit. If the property is not being properly managed or if his rights are denied, it is obvious that he should have a partition: vide Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi . 1866 3 MHCR 94.. But where the property is being well managed and the minor is well looked after; there is no need of a suit for partition and it is possible that a meddlesome next friend without keeping in his mind the minor's interest may file a suit for partition on account of some misunderstanding of his own with the members of the family or some other motive. It is to avoid such a contingency that the rule has been observed by the Courts. In Nallappa Reddi v. Balammal . 1865 2 MHCR 182., a private partition in which the minor was represented by a proper guardian was held to be binding: see also Chanvirappa v. Dannava . 1895 19 Bom 593..

    23. From the facts of the Privy Council decision in Balkrishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu . 1903 30 Cal 738, it appears that two of the parties to the ikrarnama in that case were minors represented by their guardian. It was held that the ikrarnama was binding on the minors. An adult member can separate from the family even if there are minors by communicating his intention to the other adult members and in the case of minors to some person properly representing them. The question therefore that arises before us is what is the effect of such a rule of practice conceived in the interests of minors? When it is said that the Court does not grant a decree for partition in favour of a minor unless it is shown to be required for his benefit, is it merely a limitation on the passing of the decree or on the maintainability of the suit? If until the Court actually applies its mind to the facts and passes a decree directing a partition the minor cannot be said to be separated from the family, how is it that there can be a private partition even without the machinery of the Court? If a guardian representing the minor can obtain a partition on his behalf or in other words if be can assert the right for a division on behalf of the minor outside the Court why can he not assert such a right by the filing of a plaint? In Soundararajan v. Arunachalam, the suit was filed on behalf of an illegitimate son for partition. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that his paternity was not proved. On appeal the High Court found on the facts that it was proved and referred to a Full Bench the question of the quantum of his share. During the pendency of the appeal the defendant (the legitimate son) died. At this stage it was contended on behalf of the minor that he was entitled to the whole property. It was held that the was not. It was also held by the Full Bench that he was entitled only to the share to which he was entitled at the time of the filing of the plaint. It was suggested both before the Division Bench and before us that the fact that the plaintiff was a minor was overlooked by the Judges and the counsel in the case and that decision should not be regarded as an authority. The actual judgments make no reference to the fact of the plaintiff being a minor.

    24. But for this the suggestion could not be made. Jackson, J., in Akkanna v. Srirangaraja Bhattar, thought that the learned Judges could not have overlooked the fact. I am inclined to agree with Jackson J.'s view. I cannot imagine that the very eminent Judges who dealt with the case and the eminent advocates (Messrs A. Krishnaswami Ayyar and S. Srinivasa Ayyangar) that appeared in it could have overlooked such a fact. In my opinion that decision is authority for saying that a suit having been filed on behalf of a minor plaintiff there being obvious differences in the family, the plaintiff being the illegitimate son and the defendant the legitimate son and there being no question as to the desirability of a partition, the plaintiff became separated by the filing of the plaint. However that is not the point referred to the Full Bench and as the point was not discussed, it is desirable to consider the point apart from the weight of that decision. In Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma, the Court upheld the view now contended for by the defendants. At p. 444 of 41 Mad it is observed:

    “That prima facia implies that the member who exercises such discretion must be of an age capable of exercising discretion in law. That will not be the case with a minor at least if he is of an age when discretion cannot be imputed to him.”

    25. This rather suggests that if the minor is of an age capable of exercising discretion, then there may be severance. But that is not consistent with the cases. The cases show that the volition indicating a desire for separation and an unambiguous intention to separate cannot be expressed by the minor himself but must be exercised on his behalf by some other person—by a guardian in a private partition and by a next friend in the filing of a plaint. At p. 445 of 41 Mad. it is observed:

    “This clearly does not amount to anything more than this: that it is open to a person who chooses to act on behalf of a minor member of a Hindu family to exercise the discretion on his behalf to effect a severance.”

    26. This sentence clearly shows that it is not the minor's volition but the next friend's volition that matters. But the learned Judges further proceed to say:

    “What causes the severance of a joint Hindu family is not the existence of certain facts which would justify any member to ask for partition, but it is the exercise of the option which the law lodges in a member of the joint family to say whether he shall continue to remain joint or whether he shall ask for a division.”

    27. If in the case of a minor the option cannot be exercised by him but should be done by somebody else on his behalf, why should not the exercise of that opt ion on his behalf effect a severance as in the case of an adult? The learned Judges say:

    “In the case of a minor the law gives the Court the power to say whether there should be a division or not, etc.”

    28. As I said, this is a rule conceived in the interests of minors. It does not mean that the exercise of the discretion is totally inoperative until the Court records its finding. In such a case it seems to me that the proper way of describing the situation is that the exercise of the option on behalf of the minor effects a severance conditional on the Court finding that it was for the benefit of the minor. In Krishnaswami Thevan v. Pulukaruppa Thevan it was held that there was a division of status from the date of the plaint. There the suit was on behalf of a minor plaintiff, and his prayer was described as a conditional request that, provided that the Court sees fit, it may declare the status of the minor divided as from the date of the plaint. But it was added:

    “It is true that there can be no division of status unless the Court sees fit to decree it.”

    29. This case is not conclusive either way. In Sriranga Thathachariar v. Srinivaaa-Thathaihariar, Courts Trotter, C.J observed:

    “When the Court thinks fit on a consideration of the circumstances set forth in the plaint to decree partition of the family properties, the imprimatur of the Court must be deemed to have been placed on the allegations made in the plaint justifying the effecting of a partition.”

    30. No doubt the preceding part of the sentence assumes that a severance in the status of the family could not be effected by the individual volition of the minor's next friend; still the latter part of the sentence seems to indicate that the decree operates only as “guinea stamp” whereas the essential factor is the volition exercised on behalf of the minor. However this decision too is not conclusive. In Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao in which I delivered the judgment this point did not arise and our observations were made with reference to the actual contentions in the case. The major plaintiff in that case claimed a two-thirds share on the ground that the share of his brother (the minor plaintiff) came to him by survivorship. Merely saying that the minor plaintiff was also divided from the rest of the family was not enough for the major plaintiff. The major plaintiff had to show not only that the minor plaintiff was separated from his father but remained joint with the major plaintiff. With reference to this claim the actual observations were made. I observed in that case:

    “Plaintiff 2, being a minor, is incapable of exercising the intention to separate by himself. The next friend does it for him.”

    31. I there indicated my opinion that the next friend exercised the volition on behalf of the minor. Then I said:

    “If the Court thinks fit to allow partition on behalf of the minor, one can well say that the minor has become divided; but until the decree is passed one cannot say that the minor's interests are divided from the rest of the family,”

    32. All that I said in this sentence was that until the decree was passed one is not in a position to assert that the minor's interests are divided. I did not say that the minor's interests are divided only from the date of the decree. The decree gives us information enabling us to say that the minor has become divided. In my opinion there is nothing in the judgment against the contention of the legal representative in this case. In Krishnamurthy Pillai v. Surendramurthi Pillan . AIR 1932 Mad 381, I observed at p. 569 [of 55 Mad)

    “In the present case, neither the father nor the Official Assignee has any power to deal with the son's share after 11th February 1927.”

    33. From the facts at p. 560 (of 55 Mad) it appears that was the date of the suit filed on behalf of the minor son. This seems to indicate that there is a severance of the son's interest by the filing of the plaint. However the matter was not discussed. It seems to me that the decision of the case depends upon whether the essential act on behalf of the minor is the volition of the guardian expressed on his behalf or whether it is the discretion exercised by the Court. This can be tested in the following way:—Suppose a suit for partition was filed on behalf of a minor of 17. By the time the case comes on for trial the minor attains majority and he continues the suit. In such a case is a finding by the Court necessary that the suit when filed was for the benefit of the minor? If in such a suit one defendant dies prior to the plaintiff attaining majority can the minor's share be augmented by that death or would it be limited to his own share? Now, if it is the Court's judgment that effects the severance in such a suit the Court has still to give a finding that when the suit was filed it was conceived for his benefit. If it was not conceived for his benefit though in the events that happened the suit proceeds the severance was not effected from the date of the plaint and the plaintiff would get the benefit of survivorship on account of the death of the defendant. But if the suit was well conceived at the date it was filed, then the plaintiff becomes completely separated on the date of the plaint. I do not think that in practice in such a suit any Court addresses itself to the question whether the suit was for the benefit of the minor. Or again suppose in such a suit when the case comes on for trial there was still three months for the plaintiff to Attain majority. There is an issue in the case whether the filing of the suit was for the benefit of the minor. From the point of view of common sense the most obvious course would be to avoid the trial of that issue and adjourn the case for the remaining three months.

    34. Again let us take the case of a suit filed on behalf of a minor by a next friend and while the suit was pending the next friend retires from the case or dies and no other person comes forward to continue the suit as next friend. In such a case the suit cannot be dismissed. The strictly logical course in such a case is if no other next friend can be found to wait until the minor attains majority and then proceed with the suit or not according to the wishes of the quondam minor. Again, if a suit is filed by a father for himself and his minor son for partition is it necessary to decide the issue that the partition is beneficial to the minor? In such cases, except in special circumstances, the son follows the father. Both became divided from the filing of the plaint. The opposite view involves the anomaly that in the same suit, while the father became divided from the date of the plaint, the son becomes divided after the Court records a finding that the suit is beneficial to the minor. In such a case, the father and son are together severed from the rest of the family from the date of the plaint. These instances show that the object of the issue whether the suit was for the benefit of the minor is really to remove the obstacle in the passing of the decree. It is no objection to the maintainability of the suit. In the instances I have given the suits are perfectly maintainable. The condition is somewhat analogous to the production of a succession certificate before the decree is passed. In my opinion therefore in all such cases the severance is effected from the date of the suit conditional on the Court being able to find that the suit when filed was for the benefit of the minor. If so the legal representative can bring himself on record and ask for the decision of such an issue in the trial of the suit which is to be continued at his instance. It is unnecessary to refer to the other decisions of the single Judges cited before us. In my opinion the view of Venkatasubba Rao, J., is correct and I accordingly answer the questions referred to us.

    Anantakrishna Ayyar, J.:— I agree. Sobhanadhri and defendant 1 were undivided brothers. Defendant 3 is the son of Sobhanadhri by his first wife and the minor plaintiff is the son of Sobhanadhri by his second wife. Defendant 2 is the son of defendant 1. After the death of Sobhanadhri, the minor plaintiff, through his next friend, his mother, instituted O.S No. 36 of 1930 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Ellore for partition of the joint family properties of the parties. The plaint contained certain allegations with a view to show that it was for the clear benefit of the minor that partition should be decreed. The plaint also stated that prior to suit in September 1929 the plaintiff's next friend declared to the defendants that it was in the interests of the plaintiff to separate, and asked the defendants to partition the family properties, which the defendants declined to do. The defendants filed written statements denying the allegations in the plaint and contending that it was not in the interests of the plaintiff to separate from the defendants. After issues were framed, the plaintiff died on 21st March 1931 before the suit came on for trial. The plaintiff's mother filed I.A No. 352 of 1931 praying that she might be brought on record as legal representative of the deceased plaintiff with a view to continue the suit. Her application was opposed by the defendants. The learned Subordinate Judge by his order dated 20th April 1930 observed that:

    “If the present case be proceeded with it was quite possible that the Court may hold, if the suit be tried in the circumstances as they stood on and prior to the date of the plaint that the suit was beneficial to the minor plaintiff; that had the plaintiff survived, the decree for partition would have been passed, and that therefore the plaintiff must be considered to have become separated in status at least from the dote of the plaint. If such a finding is possible, the petitioner mast, I think be brought on record. I allow the petition; an issue will however be framed in the suit as to whether the suit was instituted in the interests of the minor and whether had he survived a decree for partition with effect from the date of the plaint at the least would have been passed.”

    35. Against that order, defendants 1, 2 and 3 preferred a civil revision petition to the High Court. When the civil revision petition came on before me for final disposal, having regard to the importance of the question, I referred the revision petition to a Bench for disposal. The learned Judges who ultimately heard the revision petition differed in their opinion, with the result that the following two questions have been referred to the decision of a Full Bench:

    1. Does a suit by a minor for partition abate if he dies before the Court had found that partition is for his benefit? 2 Is it open to his legal representative to proceed with the trial and obtain a decree on his showing that when the partition suit was instituted it was for the benefit of the minor?

    36. Before proceeding to discuss the question, I must state that the decision of the Full Bench in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam (Sir John Wallis, C.J, Sadasiva Ayyar Sand Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ.) seems in effect to answer the exact questions now referred to us. The Full Bench held that a member of a joint Hindu family becomes separated from the other members by the fact of suing them for partition. It was brought to our notice that, as a matter of fact, the-plaintiff was a minor in that case, and that as that fact is clear, it must be taken that the Full Bench answered the question with reference to a minor plaintiff suing for partition. Though very able counsel argued that case, the-opinions of the learned Judges given in answer to the Full Bench reference do not specifically refer to the fact that the plaintiff was a minor. If the answer given by the Full Bench in Soundararajan v. Arunachalam should be taken to be given with reference to the facts appearing in that case, where the plaintiff was a minor, then, it goes without saying that, that decision prima facie binds the present Full Bench. However as we have heard elaborate arguments from learned counsel in this case, I proceed to consider the arguments advanced before us, and to state what in my opinion should be the answers to the two questions referred to us. This question came directly for decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma and the: learned Judges decided that:

    “where a minor plaintiff dies during the pendency of the suit, his legal representatives are not entitled to continue the suit.”

    37. The correctness of this decision has been questioned before us. It has been held by the Privy Council that partition, in the case of an adult coparcener in as joint Hindu Mitakshara family is the severance of joint status, that it is a matter of individual volition, and that a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of such a joint family to separate himself from the family constitutes a partition in status; and, whether the others assent to it or not, there is in law an immediate severance of the joint status of such a member. There are various ways by which such intention may be evinced: Suraj Narain v. Iqbal Narain and Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj. Such a notice given by a coparcener may be withdrawn with the consent of all coparceners. The institution of a suit for partition against all the other coparceners would also be evidence of an expression of such an intention and would work division in status in the case of an adult plaintiff: Kedar Nath v. Ratan Singh . 1910 32 All 415 and Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkataohala Moniagar. The result of withdrawal of such a plaint is thus expressed by the Privy Council at p. 258 of 48 Mad of Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar:

    “The fact that any member of a joint family property has separated himself from his coparceners may be proved by his suing for a partition of the joint family property, and if the suit is decreed the date of his severance from the joint family will, if nothing else is proved, be treated as the date when the suit was instituted. In Kedar Nath v. Ratan Singh a member of a joint Hindu family had filed a plaint claiming a partition but afterwards had withdrawn it and the Board held that no severance of the joint status resulted. Their Lordships see no reason to depart from that view, although such a plaint even if withdrawn, would unless explained, afford evidence that an intention to separate had been entertained [see Girja Baih v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj and Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh.]”

    38. Again, if the suit of an adult coparcener—plaintiff—for partition is decreed, the date of his severance from the joint family will, if nothing else be proved, be treated as the date when the suit was instituted. The question we have now to consider relates to a suit filed on behalf of a minor plaintiff when the minor died before any decree was passed in the suit. As observed by the Privy Council at p. 257 of 48 Mad of Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar:

    “that the coparceners in a joint Hindu family can by agreement amongst themselves separate and cease to be a joint family, and on separation they are entitled to partition the joint family properties is now well-established law.”

    39. It is rarely that a joint Hindu family Consists only of adult coparceners without any minors. But it has been held that a valid partition could be made outside Court by the members of a joint family though some were minors at the time. In Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu the Privy Council observed as follows;

    “The question upon which their Lordships have felt most difficulty is whether the document can be considered as binding upon the coparceners who were minors at the date of it. But they think that in these proceedings they must treat it as binding upon them. There is no doubt that a valid agreement for partition may be made during the minority of one or more-of the coparceners. That seems to follow from the admitted right of one coparcener to claim a partition; and (as has been said) if an agreement for partition could not be made binding on minors, a partition could hardly ever take place. No doubt if the partition was unfair or prejudicial to the minor's interests, he might on-attaining his majority, by proper proceedings, set it aside so far as regards himself. Some evidence was given to show that the mothers of the two minors were acting under the control and influence of Ramjiban. But as against this it may be pointed out that in the proceedings for a certificate which led to the execution of the ikrarnama they seem to have been acting independently of, and even adversely to, Ramjiban. For he can hardly be thought to have prompted a petition which contained an allegation that he was ready to waste the property of the minors. It should also be said that the partition on the face of it was not unfair; and in fact the shares, allotted to the minors were at least as large as and perhaps larger than they were strictly entitled to.”

    40. It is open to the adult coparceners to-express their intention to separate from, the others, and even though some coparceners were minors, such intention to separate may be communicated to the mothers or other natural guardians of the minors. A partition effected by the-adult coparceners with the mothers or other natural guardians of the minor coparceners representing the minors would, be a valid partition, and would be binding upon the minors. No doubt it would be open to the minors when they come of age to take steps to have such a partitition modified if their proper shares of the joint family property had not been secured to them; but they cannot impugn the partition on the simple ground that it ought not have been entered into when they are minors. It is a right of the adult members including, the kartha or the manager, to claim partition with a view to have their-shares separated. The result in such a case would be that the minor also is-separated from the other members and his share ascertained and taken charge of by his mother or other natural guardian. The kartha or the manager of the whole family, when he himself is claiming separation from the minor, could not represent the minor's interests in such a partition.

    41. The practice in such cases is to have the minor's interest represented by the minor's mother or other near relation interested in the minor whose interests are not adverse to the minor. Such a practice has been approved by the Privy Council in the case reported as Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain and a partition arrangement in which the minors were represented by their mothers was held by the Privy Council to be binding on the minors in the absence of fraud, etc., when the proper shares of the minors were allotted and delivered to their mothers. It has been considered, or felt in practice, that as the kartha or the manager who desires partition is the legal guardian of the minors of the joint family no partition outside Court could be effected for want of legal guardians for the minors. As already remarked the minors' mothers or other natural guardians have been held entitled to represent the minors on such occasions. The Privy Council has held in Gharitullah v. Khalak Singh . 1903 25 All 407 that a guardian of the property of an infant cannot properly be appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act in respect of the infant's interests in the property of an undivided Mitakshara family, such interest not being individual property and therefore not property with which a guardian if appointed would have any-thing to do. This circumstance has not been allowed to stand in the way of the mother of the minor representing the minor in partition arrangements made outside Court among members of a joint Hindu family. Thus, it will be noted that it is open to an adult coparcener to become divided by the communication of his unilateral intention to separate from the other members of the joint family; that the kartha or the manager could do so, so far as he is concerned by communicating his intention to do so to the minor coparcener's mother: that a partition among coparceners would be valid though some coparceners are minors if they were represented by their mothers and the arrangement be proper and bona fide; and that it is not correct to say that partition among members of a joint Hindu family could be effected only by proceedings taken in Court.

    42. The decision of the Privy Council in Balkishan Das v. Ram Narain Sahu is clear that a partition arrangement could be entered into among members of a joint Hindu family though some of the coparceners were minors. That the Privy Council has only recognised a long standing practice existing in the country is clear from reported decisions. In Nallappa Reddi v. Balammal the minor's father died in 1835, leaving a minor three years old. The minor's mother entered into a partition, with the paternal uncle of the minor in 1837. It was held there being no proof of fraud or that undue advantage was taken of the plaintiff's minority, that the division was valid and binding upon the plaintiff. In Chanvirappa v. Danara the partition took place in 1872, the plaintiff being represented by his mother and natural guardian. The Court held that the partition made by the mother as the guardian of her minor son was valid but that the minor on coming of age will have a right to set aside the division if it can be shown to be illegal or fraudulent or even if it was made in such an informal manner that there are no means of testing its validity: see also Ramamurthi v. Ramamma . 1916 33 IC 961.. This principle has been extended to cases arising under Marumakkathayam Law in force in Malabar where partition could not be had unless agreed to by all the members of the tarwad; but a partition arrived at when some members were minors, but were represented by their mothers, was upheld as binding on the minors, unless fraud or serious prejudice be shown: Naraini Kutti Amma v. Achuthan Kutti Nayar . AIR 1919 Mad 573 in which case the partition would be re-opened so far as the minors are concerned, so that they may be awarded the proper share which should have been set apart for them: V. Chirudevi v. V. Tarwad Karnavan . 1917 34 IC 818..

    43. It is unnecessary to multiply instances found in law reports of private arrangements of partition in joint Hindu families made outside Court when some of the co-parceners were minors represented by their mothers or other natural guardians. Further, in the case of an adult coparcener the filing of a suit for partition by such a co-parcener has been held to bring about severance in status, and also that the decree in such a suit works out severance as from the date of the plaint. It is not necessary now to consider the effect of withdrawal of such a plaint. That being the law in the case of adult co-parceners, what grounds are there to come to a different conclusion in the case of a minor co-parcener, when the Court is satisfied that partition is for the benefit of the minor.

    44. We have seen that a minor's mother may accept a communication from the adult co-parceners expressing their intention to separate from the minor. The question arises whether she could not on behalf of the minor co-parcener communicate a similar intention on behalf of the minor to separate from the adult co-parceners, if it is proved to be for the benefit of the minor so to separate. Even in a proper case, when a minor's mother as his guardian expressed on behalf of the minor the intention to separate, and communicated the same to the other co-parceners, it may happen that her request may not be granted by the other co-parceners, and she may, as the next friend of her minor son, have to institute a suit for partition. No doubt, any person (not necessarily a mother, or in fact any relation at all of the minor) may institute a suit on behalf of a minor, as his next friend. A suit for partition may be similarly instituted by a stranger as next friend of a minor. Such a stranger might have, prior to suit, expressed such intention to the other co-parceners. Is the minor necessarily to be bound by such acts and is the Court helpless in the matter? On the other hand, if the said acts be proved to be beneficial to the minor, is it, or not, open to the Court to give necessary relief to the plaintiff in such cases? These are relevant considerations that arise in such cases.

    45. It has been laid down by a series of decisions that a suit on behalf of a minor co-parcener for partition will lie if the interests of the minor are likely to be prejudiced by the property being left in the bands of the other co-parceners: see Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi, Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, Thangam Pillai v. Suppa Pillai . 1889 12 Mad 401., Palani Gavandan v. Kasi Gavandan . AIR 1919 Mad 275, Bachoo v. Khushal Das . 1902 4 Bom LR 883., Bhola Nath v. Ghasi Ram . 1907 29 All 373, Shadagopa Nayudu v. Tirumalaswami Nayudu . 1915 30 IC 272. and Hahadev Balvant v. Lakshman Balvant . 1895 19 Bom 99.. In fact, the Privy Council decision in Bachoo v. Mankore Bai is decisive on the point. The Court could not pass a decree for partition in a suit for partition brought on behalf of a minor coparcener unless it finds that the partition is for the benefit of the minor, as advancing his interests or protecting them from danger. It is clear that a decree for partition, could not be passed unless the Court records a finding to the above effect. But is there any further peculiarity in a suit for partition instituted on behalf of a minor? This becomes important in cases like the present when the minor happens to the before a decree is passed in his favour in the suit.

    46. The present is not a case of a personal action which is said to the with the person—actio personalis moritur cum persona. Nobody has contended before us that the present suit comes within the above principle. Right of partition is a right relating to property. Prima facie such a suit, if properly instituted, should not abate, but on plaintiff's death his legal representatives should be in a position to carry on the litigation. The very same question which will have to be decided in the suit itself, namely, whether partition is for the benefit of the minor—will also decide whether his interests were passed by survivorship to the other co-parceners or have passed to his (minor's) heir, widow, daughter or mother, as the case may be. I am not able to see any insuperable obstacle or anything illegal in holding that the suit does not abate in such circumstances. The minor may the after the suit is dismissed after full trial and when an appeal on his behalf is pending, one of the questions raised in appeal being that the finding arrived at by the trial Court on the evidence that the suit was not for the benefit of the minor is erroneous. It is open to the appellate Court to come to a different conclusion on the evidence on that question.

    47. It has been decided in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan, Sri Ranga, Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar and Ganapathy v. Subramaniyam that if a decree is ultimately passed in favour of a miner for partition, the status of division is created as from the date of the plaint, with reference to the quantum of the minor's share, and the date from which accounts should be taken, etc. If persons other than strictly legal guardians can represent a minor co-parcener in a partition arrangement outside Court, and if no legal guardian could, under the Guardians and Wards Act be appointed with reference-to the minor's share in the joint family property it would be anomalous if the minor's mother or other natural guardian could not act on behalf of the minor in proper cases, in the matter of expressing intention to separate from the other co-parceners, and in demanding partition and also—if necessary—in instituting a suit for partition (if the same should become necessary) to enforce the just rights of the minor, I am assuming that proper circumstances exist for demanding such partition. It is clear that the kartha or the other legal guardians of the minor would not take any steps in the matter as their interests would be adverse to those of the minor, and, according to the hypothesis, they are acting to the prejudice of the minor.

    48. In fact, it is their acts that are complained against, and it is from their wrongful acts that the minor is sought to be protected. I am not forgetting that any stranger could institute a suit for partition on behalf of the minor as his next friend, and such a person might have demanded partition outside Court and might have communicated to the other co-parceners the intention to separate, on behalf of the minor. Is the minor necessarily to be bound by such acts of strangers? The answer seems to be that the Court has got control of the suit and the proceedings; and if it should find that the suit was instituted owing to malice or bad faith by the next friend to wreak his vengeance against the adult co-parceners and out of pure private spite, the Court has got the remedies in its on hands. Question of benefit for the minor may not be confined to considerations purely and solely personal to the minor only. Considerations concerning the minor's own mother or widow of daughter in relation to the minor may have to be kept in view.

    49. The question is a rather novel one in which Hindu law texts afford no help. Some English decisions are cited in Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi, and also in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 17, pp. 134-135, which show that the Courts have got power to control proceedings and to prevent vexatious suits from being proceeded with, and if necessary to proceedings to be stayed. I am anxious not to say anything about the merits of the suit. It will depend upon the evidence and circumstances of each case. I am only now concerned to note that Courts have full powers in the matter to see that no injustice is done. The decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma directly holds that the death of a minor prior to decree causes such a suit to abate. The learned Judges are, if I may say so, quite right in stating that it depends upon the (volition) discretion of a member of a joint Hindu family whether he is to continue the joint status or whether there should be individual separation. But when they proceed to infer from the same that

    “the member who exercises such discretion must be of an age capable of exercising discretion in law.”

    50. I think they have not paid due regard to the circumstances already mentioned by me with reference to such a discretion (volition) of a minor being exercised on the minor's behalf by the minor's mother or possibly by other natural guardians of the minors when partition is effected outside Court between the members of a joint Hindu family. If such a thing could be done on behalf of the minor by his mother etc., outside Court when partition is effected by private arrangement, I do not see sufficient reason for holding that such a thing could not be done in a proper case on behalf of the minor when a suit for partition on behalf of the minor becomes necessary. No doubt a partition by a private arrangement outside Court could be impugned by the minor when coming of age on particular grounds, and it is open to him to file a suit with a view to get his proper share.

    51. But when a suit for partition on behalf of a minor is instituted, the Court takes care to examine the circumstances with a view to satisfy, itself whether it is beneficial to the minor. Obviously it is inconvenient, if not against sound legal principles also to have a decree for partition passed on behalf of a minor made the subject of complaint in a subsequent suit, when no fraud in the conduct of the suit is alleged but all that is complained of is that the petition is not in the interests of the minor. To avoid such inconvenience the Court before passing the decree examines the circumstances with a view to find out whether the partition claimed is to the benefit of the minor. But to hold that should the minor the before decree, the Court has no jurisdiction to examine the question and that the suit should be taken to have abated, would be to give undue prominence to a subsidiary matter, and allow subsidiary considerations to overlord and govern substantial rights. I think it is possible to give effect to the subsidiary incidental matters and at the same time to give effect to substantial rights if we were to hold that it is open to the guardian of a minor to exercise the discretion or volition on behalf of a minor in such a case prior to suit when proper circumstances exist to justify such an exercise and also to institute a suit on behalf of the minor for partition. Neither the exercise of such discretion, nor the institution of the suit, nor both combined, could bring about severance in status of the minor, unless the Court was satisfied, that having regard to the circumstances, partition was to the benefit of the minor. But when the Court comes to such a conclusion, it would seem to follow that severance in status should be deemed to have taken place at least on the institution of the suit.

    52. I say “at least,” because, logically, it would seem to follow in a proper case, that the severance should be deemed to have taken place when the discretion or volition was exercised on behalf of the minor and the necessary communications made to the other co-parceners prior to the institution of the suit. I may repeat that I am quite alive to the circumstance that it is open to any stranger to institute such a suit as the next friend of the minor; but in the view above stated, I do not think that there need on that account be any cause for alarm, seing that the Court would take that circumstance also into account in coming to its conclusion whether the suit was for the benefit of the minor or not. The minor might have attained age of discretion in the sense that his opinion might have to be taken by the Court to be the result of intelligent discussion by him in his own mind of the pros and cons of the question. But the next friend might be the mother of the minor, and the partition might have been demanded against the stepbrothers or other relations of the minor who are acting prejudicially to the minor. In all cases, it is necessary that the reasons alleged in the plaint and the whole of the circumstances of the case should be considered by the Court. The Court can also in proper cases stay the suit as frivolous or vexatious if brought by a next friend merely to satisfy his own personal grudge against the defendants. These relate to considerations of matters of evidence. In considering the principle of law applicable, we should not forget that the ultimate approval or imprimatur is by the Court. If regard he had to all the considerations, the suggestion of,

    “great hardship and inconvenience if it were left to the discretion of any person who chooses to file a suit on behalf of a minor to decide whether the family of which the minor is a member shall continue joint or become separate,”

    should not be taken to be conclusive of the question. I respectfully agree that the logical result would be that even a notice given by such a person on behalf of a minor to the other members of a family would be effectual in working a severance of the joint status, provided the Court finds in the suit for partition that it was to the benefit of the minor. On the other hand, it needs no effort to imagine a case (not uncommon is practice) where a suit on behalf of a minor plaintiff is instituted by his mother, the defendant being the minor's stepbrother. It is possible that the stepbrothers find it impossible to get on together peacefully the step-mother also finding it impossible to get on with the defendant—the step-son. Again the minor plaintiff might have been married before suit. In the circumstances the minor, so far as he could exercise his discretion in the matter, and his mother and near ralations might well have come to the conclusion that partition is the only solution to put an end to misery and bring peace to the parties. Even if the minor should die before decree in such cases, it is possible that the Court might come to the conclusion that in all the circumstances, it was for the benefit of the minor to have partition. I doubt whether one is consned to considerations purely personal to the minor—minor's personal comforts or inconvenience—though that would naturally be a very material consideration.

    53. I Only Remark That Considerations in Relation to the Minor's wife, minor's daughter, minor's mother, etc., may not be quite irrelevant again, a hindu father might have left minor sons by different wives. The minors and their mothers might not have been able to get on peacefully at all. In such cases, if the respective mothers could arrange for a valid partition outside court, why should they be helpless if litigation is found necessary while agree with the learned judges that it must be left to the court to decide whether there should be partition or not, find myself unable to agree with their reasoning that the death of the minor has the result of causing the suit to Abate. It had been held in several cases by this court that when once the court comes to a conclusion on the evidence that the suit is for the benefit of the minor, then, the decree that is passed works out a severance of the status from the date of the plaint: see Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan. There the question arose with reference to the quantum of share to which the minor plaintiff was entitled when there were subsequent births of co-parceners in the family after the date of the plaint. The learned Judges—Spencer and Devadoss, JJ. held that,

    “a suit by a minor for partition, if it ends in a decree for partition, has the effect of creating a division of status from the date of the plaint.”

    54. Logically, I think that it must be said that the decision of the learned Judges in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan is not consistent with principle of the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. It is not from the date of the Court's finding that the suit is for the benefit of the minor that severance is to be worked out, but from the date of the plaint at least. I respectfully agree with the considerations mentioned by the learned Judges which induced them to hold that the date of severance should not be from the date of the decision by the Court. If this view be accepted, then, the real basis for the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma would have been greatly shaken. In the next case, Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar, decided by Sir Murray Courts Trotter, C.J, and Sundaram Chetti, J., (not Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.) when a question arose as to the exact date of severance of status in a case where the Court passes a decree for partition, with a view to fix the date from which accounts had to be taken, the learned Judges held at p. 872 of 50 Mad. as follows:

    “Accepting the principle that in a suit for partition brought by the minor it is for the Court to determine whether the partition would be advantageous to the minor or not, and that a severance in the status of the family could not be effected by the individual volition of the minor's guardian or next friend, still, when the Court thinks fit on a consideration of the circumstances set forth in the plaint to decree partition of the family properties, the imprimatur of the Court must be deemed to have been placed on the allegations made in the plaint justifying the effecting of a partition. That being so, the Court must be deemed to have determined that even on the date of the plaint, it would have allowed a partition to be effected as it was beneficial to the minor Though the inquiry has necessarily to be made by the Court subsequent to the filing of the plaint, it is the state of affairs that existed on the date of the suit that determine the exercise of the Court's discretion.”

    55. The principle of the decision in Krishnaswami Thevan v. Karuppa Thevan, was therefore followed by the learned Judges in Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar. This also, in my view, is against the real principle of the decision in Chelimi Chetti v. Subbamma. In Rama Rao v. Hanumantha Rao, Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., held at p. 859 of 52 Mad. as follows:

    “The 2nd plaintiff, being a minor, is incapable of exercising the intention to separate by himself. The next friend does it for him. If the Court thinks fit to allow partition on behalf of the minor, one can well say that the minor has become divided: but until the decree is passed, one cannot say that the minor's interests are divided from the rest of the family.”

    56. It was held by the Calcutta High Court in the case reported as Raicharan v. Biswanath, and by the Privy Council in the case reported as Palani Ammal v. Muthu Venkatachala Moniagar, that if a suit for partition is decreed, the date of severance from the joint family will, if nothing else in proved, be treated as the date when the suit was instituted. It however seems to be logical to hold that severance should be considered to have taken place, if a decree for partition is passed, ordinarily from the date of the expression of the discretion or volition on behalf of the minor and communication thereof to the other coparceners before suit, in the absence of other circumstances. Instances of the Court staying suits instituted on behalf of the minor when the same was considered purely vexatious, are mentioned in Kamakshi Ammal v. Chidambara Reddi citing Da Costa v. Da Costa . 3 P.W 150., Fox v. Suwerkrop . 1839 1 Beau 583. and Sale v. Sale . 1839 1 Beau 586.. This is ordinarily a sufficient safeguard to prevent vexatious suits. There is also jurisdiction in Courts to direct the next friend personally to pay the costs of the proceedings.

    57. It may perhaps be useful to bear in mind the exact nature of the jurisdiction possessed by Courts with reference to suits and proceedings instituted on behalf of minors. While any person who is not himself incapable of instituting proceedings and who is not connected with the defendant or otherwise interested adversely to the infant may file a suit on behalf of an infant as next friend, preference will be given to the father or mother or guardian or some other of the relatives or connexions of the infant or their nominee. The next friend is an officer of the Court appointed to look after the interests of the infant and has the conduct of the proceedings in his hands. Upon the application of the defendant, or of a next friend of the infant appointed for the purpose, the Court can, if it thinks fit, direct an inquiry whether the proceedings are for the benefit of the infant and, if it appears that they are not, can deal with the proceedings as it thinks fit. See pp. 134 and 135 of Halsbury's-Laws of England, Vol. 17, S. 312. Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., made similar observations in Doraiswami Pillai v. Thungaswami Pillai . 1904 27 Mad 377. that

    “a suit relating to the estate or person of an infant and for his benefit has the effect of making him a ward of the Court; and no act could be-done affecting the property of the minor unless under the express or implied direction of the Court itself: see also the observations of Scott, J., in Karmali Rahimbhoy v. Hahimbhoy Habibhoy . 1889 13 Bom 137., and Story's Equity Jurisprudence, S. 1353.”

    58. Having regard to the provisions of O. 32, Rr. 6 and 7, among others, of the-Code of Civil Procedure relating to receipt, by next friend or guardian of a minor, of money or other movable property on behalf of the minor, and relating to an agreement or compromise by next friend or guardian of the suit, it is not generally deemed necessary for the Court to interfere with acts of next friends and guardians ad item of minors at every stage of the suit in ordinary cases. Their general principle of law is, as stated above, that an infant litigant becomes a ward of the Court and the Court has got-the right and also the duty to see that next friends act properly and bona fide in the interests of minors, and that no-suits are instituted or carried on by next friends for their own benefit only irrespective of the benefit of the minors. The Court would have jurisdiction in every case in which a minor is a litigant-to see that proceedings are all carried on properly, and any suit instituted by a next friend which is proved to be not in the interests of the plaintiff could be-stayed by order of the Court. Having regard to the importance of partition, suits to co-parceners of joint Hindu, families, Courts take particular care when such suits for partition are instituted on behalf of minors. By staying, such suits or dismissing them on the ground that they are not for the minor's, benefit the Court is only exercising a part of its general jurisdiction with reference to minors generally. It seems to me that the exercise by the Court of its general jurisdiction over minors should not be taken to affect in any way the substantive rights of minors. It is a maxim of law that “acts of Courts injure nobody.” In this view also, if, the suit for partition on behalf of the minor is proved to have been for his benefit when instituted, the same should not be rendered ineffective simply because the minor should happen to the before the Court could satisfy itself of the beneficial nature of the action and that the action was properly instituted. Substantial rights of minors should not be prejudicially affected by the exercise by Courts of a jurisdiction which they possess in the interests of the minor and with a view to see that the rights of minors are not prejudiced.

    59. When we consider what is happening outside Court when partition arrangements amongst co-parceners of a joint Hindu family, some of whom are minors, are carried out as a matter of course, and when we consider the real nature of the jurisdiction exercised by Courts in suits in which minors are plaintiffs, the conclusion is irresisitible that the accidental death of a minor plaintiff in a suit for partition should not have the result of abatement of the suit, if otherwise, the suit would be decreed in favour of the minor had he been alive at the date of the decree. There are no Hindu law texts to which our attention was drawn which would govern the decision of the exact question now before us. Our attention was not drawn to any case directly deciding this question, excepting the case reported as Chelimi Chetty v. Subbamma already referred to, and a decision of the Patna High Court in the case reported as Krishna Lal Jha v. Nundeshwar, in which—however—a view contrary to the decision in Chelimi Chetty v. Subbamma, was taken. On general principles by which we should in such cases be guided, I think the correct view to take is that the suit does not abate in such cases but that the Court should proceed with the trial of the suit, and if it should come to the; conclusion on the evidence that the suit as instituted was for the benefit of the minor, it should pass a decree the benefit of which will go to the legal, heirs of the deceased minor. The above line of reasoning has led me to answer;the first question referred to as in the negative and the second question in the affirmative.

    Cornish, J.:— Except for Chelimi Chetty v. Subbamma, no case covering the question referred to us has been brought to our notice. In that case it was held that on the death of the minor plaintiff in a partition suit before decree a legal representative was not entitled to be brought on record to continue the suit. But there is no discussion of the topic in the judgment. The judgment merely accepts the respondent's contention that as there was no partition, whatever rights the minor had in the co-parcenary property survived to his co-parceners. I think the explanation suggested by Venkatasubba Rao, J., in the referring order must be correct, that the contention put forward by the appellant in that case was that, without anything more, a minor became divided in status from his co-parceners at the moment of instituting his suit for partition. The judgment must be taken as proceeding upon and refuting that proposition. There can be no doubt upon the authorities that in the case of a minor suing for partition through his next friend severance of status is only accomplished if the suit is decreed, but the severance will be deemed to have taken place from the date of the plaint. The effect of the Court's decree is to affirm the minor's right to separate from his co-parceners. This seems to me to be the implication from what is said in Sri Ranga Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar that

    “when the Court thinks fit on a consideration of the circumstances set forth in the plaint to decree partition, the imprimatur of the Court must be deemed to have been placed on the allegations in the plaint justifying the effecting of a partition.”

    60. The question is, what is the position when the minor plaintiff dies pending suit? If the suit is discontinued the minor's undivided interest in the joint property will, of course, survive to his remaining co-parceners. But the suit will only abate if the cause of action does not survive. A right of a co-parcener to have his share defined and divided from the joint property is incidental to co-parcenership. In the case of an adult co-parcener the institution of a suit by him is regarded as such an unequivocal expression of an intention to separate that he is deemed to have become thereby divided in status and should he thereafter the while the suit is pending, his share is severed from the co-parcenary property. If he is solely entitled to that share it will form part of his separate estate. In the case of a minor the assertion by suit of his right to separate is, as we have seen, an inchoate right until perfected by a decree of the Court. But whether the plaintiff be an adult or a minor there is no distinction as regards the date from which divided status begins: Krishnaswami Thevan v. Pulu Karuppa Thevan. Now the minor's right to enforce a partition being solely dependent upon the approval by the Court of the circumstances alleged in the plaint for justifying a partition, I can sea no reason why the justification should be treated as ceasing to exist with the subsequent death of the minor. Why should his death debar the Court from confirming his right to a partition? The interest or benefit of the minor which is said to be the guiding consideration with the Court in decreeing the suit is not simply an interest or benefit personal to the minor. It involves the existence of special rights to property. In my judgment the accident of the minor's death pending suit ought not to present the pursuit of those rights for the benefit of the minor's estate by his legal representative.

    P.R.S/R.K

    61. Reference answered.

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    (Thavva) Rangasayi And Others v. (Thavva) Nagarathnamma Opposite Party.
    (Jan 19, 1933)