JUDGMENT
Oldfield, J. — This Appeal and the revision petition relate to an order by the District Munsif which the District Judge has confirmed, setting aside a sale in the following circumstances. The decree under execution directed the sale of items in a particular order, and the sale proclamation followed it. They were, however, sold in a different order, and the sale was confirmed. The judgment-debtor then moved the Court unsuccessfully under Order XXI, Rule 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure After an appeal against the order dismissing that petition had failed he, applied under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, obtaining an order excusing his delay in doing so. The District Munsif held that no case of interference under that rule had been established, but set aside the sale in the exercise of his inherent powers. The learned District Judge in the order under Appeal held that the delay could not be excused with reference to sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, but that the exercise of the Court's inherent powers was not subject to the law of limitation and was justified by the circumstances of the case. He confirmed the District Munsif's order without deciding explicitly whether there was irregularity in the conduct of the sale or consequent loss, either with reference to Rule 89 or generally.
The existence f the inherent powers of Courts was first recognised by statute in the present Code, though it has frequently been the basis of decisions. It is necessary to scrutinise cases, in which it is relied on, closely in order that it may not, owing to the recognition or otherwise lead to arbitrary disposal, actuated by individual sentiment or mere disinclination for the exertion involved in investigation of the law. It is necessary, in order to such scrutiny here, to ascertain what the necessity was for resort by the judgment-debtor (the petitioner before the District Munsif and the 1st Respondent here) to the inherent powers of the Court; that is, what remedies he had under the Code of Civil Procedure and what obstacle by way of limitation or otherwise there was to his taking them. The appellant's contention is, shortly, that he had his remedy under Order XXI, Rule 90 or section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but lost it through his delay and that in such circumstances the use of Court's inherent powers for his benefit is not justified.
Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the circumstances, in which sales may be vitiated by irregularity in their conduct; and here, no doubt, the complaint was that the Court had no jurisdiction to sell as it did, because the decree under execution authorized it to sell item 3 only after item 4, instead of, as it did, before it. There was, therefore, it is argued, not an irregularity to which Rule 90 applied, but an illegality. Now, it is doubtful whether this distinction is open to 1st respondent who proceeded statedly under Rule 90. Vide
Venkata v. Sama and Tasaddak Rasul Khan v. Ahmad Husain. But I pursue that argument no futher, because if the proceedings are not under Rule 90, they were certainly under Section 47. In the former case it would have been necessary for the 1st respondent to prove substantial loss. But in both cases he would have been out of time.
It is not disputed that his petition was presented too late, if it was one under Eule 90. If however it was under Section 47 it is urged that Article 181, Schedule II, of the Limitation Act applied and he was in time, the special Article No. 166 covering only applications under rules 89 and 90. This restriction of Article 166 corresponds with nothing in its wording which is absolutely general; and the attempt to impose it has been supported by reference to the fact that the article was substituted for Articles Nos. 166 and 172 in the prior Act of 1877 which related only to applications under sections 310 A and 311 of the Code then in force. It is said that this is borne out by the Statement of Objects and Reasons connected with present Act. But it has not been showw how reference to such a statement is a legitimate or necessary aid to the interpretation of a provision, the language of which is clear. The 1st respondent's application, though it may have been made under section 47, was one to set aside a sale, and under Article 166 it must, be held to have been out of time. It is not contended here that, if the application is subject to the Limitation Act either section 5 or 14 would have enabled the District Munsif to excuse the delay in its presentation.
The questions are then whether (1) the inherent powers of the court can be invoked for an object, which resort to its statutory powers could have secured (2) whether such invocation is subject to any limitation. It may be stated at once that, as (1) must be answered in the negative, there is not and is not likely to be any authority dealing with (2). It is only necessary to add that, though no doubt article 18, Schedule II, of the Limitation Act, the general article, is not exhaustive. Vide Devidas Jagivian v. Pirjada Begam and Dwarka Nath Misser v. Barinda Nath Misser. The cases exempted from it form a well defined class to which further reference will be made, those where the inherent power exercised is ministerial or impliedly necessary in order to the performance of the Court's statutory duties.
As regards (1) reliance has been placed mainly on a very widely expressed dictum in Syud Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan v. Rughoonath Pershad and its adoption in Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh. “To proceed, so far as the practice of his Court will allow him, to recall and cancel an invalid order is not simply permitted to, but is the duty of a Judge’ who should always be vigilant not to allow the act of the Court itself to do wrong to the suitor.”
By this general statement what did their Lordships of the Privy Council intend to decide? Firstly, it may be doubted whether their reference to the practice of the Court was not intended to safeguard the Court's duty to respect, not only the practice, but also the law. And next, though the application of the dictum is somewhat obscure, it is doubted whether it was meant to authorise the unconditional license) for which 1st respondent argues. As appears from the statement of facts, there had been a sale alleged (without contradiction) to have become absolute, of property, which no Court could sell. The Judge set the sale aside of his own motion, though he afterwards heard the purchaser. The observation quoted was made in appeal against the decision in the latter's suit to enforce his right under the sale; and it apparently meant no more than that he could not disregard the order of attachment and rely on the absolute character of the sale, since the decision of the merits, which follows, could not have been necessary on any other interpretation. It did not mean that such an order of cancellation created or annihilated rights or was more than declaratory of the void nature of a transaction, which was void ab initio; and there was no question raised of the order having been passed, under any procedure similar to that under section 47, or of such procedure being available to the aggrieved person. In the other case referred to it was not suggested that there was any question of statutory power of the Court, by the use of which the same result could have been reached; and it may (with all due respect) be doubted whether the reference to the Court's right to recall an erroneous order was necessary or justified, since (for all that appears) the order of transfer to the file of District Court, which was in question, was proper when it was passed, and a retransfer appeared necessary only later. The case then, as the judgment also specifies, really fell under the other heading of the exercise of inherent power already referred to, that recognised as legitimate in cases not provided for by statute. Here again, there was accordingly no question, as there is in the present case, of a form of procedure available, of which advantage has not been taken.
The distinction between the use of inherent powers proposed in the present case and that, which is permitted in cases not contemplated by statute, may be illustrated by contrast between two sets of decisions, in both of which the cancellation of erroneous orders was in question. In the first Badaricharya v. Ramchendra, Ramsing v. Babu Kisansing and Ramchandra Narayan Kulkarni v. Draupadi, a Court, constituted by special enactment, to whose procedure the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, was in question and recourse was permitted to its inherent powers to justify a review and its setting aside of an order passed ex parte. But in the case of Courts subject to the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held that they are bound by its provisions. In Reasut Hossein v. Hadjee Abdoollah, the District Judge had recalled his erroneous order statedly on the ground that he could do so notwithstanding the absence of “any rule laid down for such a proceeding'’ in the Registration Act, under which his first order was passed. But the Privy Council holding that the Code of Civil Procedure applied, devoted its Judgment to bringing a case within its provisions. In Ramkirpal Shakul v. Mussamut Rup Kuari inherent powers were not mentioned; but it was held that the adjudication of a competent Court could not be set aside or disregarded by a Superior Court except in an appeal properly preferred. And in Chandi Charan Laha v. Manoranjan Chattopadhaya, the grant of a review on grounds other than those contemplated by Order 47, Rule 1 and in the exercise of inherent powers was held to be unsound, the proper course being to leave the party to seek his remedy in appeal.
The principle to be deduced from the cases referred to and others is clear, that the inherent powers of the Court are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who has his remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure, much less for one, who having his remedy has lost it by his own delay. The result is that the decisions of both the lower courts must be set aside, the Appeal Against Appellate Order being allowed with costs throughout. The case falling under section 47, the Civil Revision Petition is unncessary and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
Tyabji, J. — It is admitted that the execution sale was not in accordance with the terms of the decree, inasmuch as the decree required that the third item of property should be sold after the 4th but the 3rd was actually sold before the 4th.
It was not contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no remedy open to the respondent. It was suggested that a suit may be available to him; but that Order 21, Rules 89 and 90 provided for cases in which sales could be set aside; that section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code provided for the forum and the method by which those rights were to be enforced: and that as the present case did not come within the terms of those provisions of a self-contained Code, the Court could not add to these provisions any more than to the rules relating to res judicata [Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh]. The answer to this argument seems to me to be that, though the result in this case may have to be brought about by setting aside the sale (to which process Sect. 47 and Rules 89 and 90 apply) what is sought to be done is primarily to rectify a wrong procedure followed by the Court. The power to rectify their own manifest errors of the kind here in question, it seems to me, Courts must always have. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Courts were right in considering the case to fall within their inherent jurisdiction [Syud Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan v. Raghoonath Pershad]. I entirely agree, however, with my learned brother that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court is not to be used so as “to lead to arbitrary disposals, actuated by individual sentiment or mere disinclination for the exertion involved in investigation of the Law.”
The next question is whether the application was barred by limitation. In my view the error was of a nature similar to that in the cases cited by me, and it was within the power and, subject to what I am about to say, it was the duty of the court, to set its procedure right when its error was brought to its notice. In my view therefore article 166 of the Limitation Act does not directly apply.
But though the bar of limitation would not, in my view be directly applicable, it seems to me that the Courts would not only be justified in considering the question in the light of the period of limitation allowed by the legislature for applications resulting in a similar way, but that, for the reasons I am about to state, the courts are bound to consider it in that light (Cf) Athikarath Nanu Menon v. Erathanikat Komu Nayar. Taking the facts of the present case it seems to me that though there was an error which the court would have been justified in rectifying of its own motion, it was incumbent on it to consider whether the error having been committed it would be proper to exercise a discretionary jurisdiction arising from its inherent powers. The expression inherent power implies that the power is not conferred by or affected by an Act of the legislature. Where the jurisdiction of the Court is expressly given by the legislature it is the legislative jurisdiction that arises and there is no room for speaking of the inherent jurisdiction. In deciding the question whether the Court will exercise its inherent powers, it may well proceed on the basis that if the party aggrieved by the error of procedure has acquiesced in the error, and has not chosen to apply to the Court with due diligence, his laches would not indeed deprive the Court of the inherent jurisdiction to set right its own error; but indicate that it might be a greater error to set about rectifying a long past error to the detriment, perhaps, of persons who have honestly proceeded on the basis that the action of the Court was right. Such conduct of the party alleging himself to be aggrievied would also point to the injury suffered by him having been slight. The court may reasonably take as a guide for the standard of the diligence to be exercised by the parties concerned the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act: and for its guidance as to circumstances which would justify interference the provisions of law contained in regard to matters most nearly analogous to those brought in question by reason of the Court's inherent powers. This will prevent “arbitrary disposal” in the manner above referred to. In the present case by analogy it seems to me that the courts would have been right in guiding themselves by the provisions of article 166 of the Indian Limitation Act and Order 21, Rules 89 and 90 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Considering the question in this light I find that there were applications by the respondent under Order 21, Rules 89 and 90, both of which were dismissed; and in the course of the decision in the latter (which alone is printed for our use) it is stated that no case for relief under Order 21, Rule 90 was established, by which I understand that no substantial injury had been sustained by reason of the irregularity in the sale.
In such a case it seems to me to be clear that the Courts exercised that inherent jurisdiction wrongly, and their order setting aside the sale should he reversed. I agree therefore in the order proposed by my learned brother.
Appeal allowed.