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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from a decision of Chitty, J., made under Clause 18, Schedule 2 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (1909). The appellant, Jarwa Bai, claimed to be a secured creditor to the extent of Rs. 12,000, producing a promissory note and certain title-deeds which she said were deposited as security (an equitable mortgage) when the money was advanced. The respondent estate is that of Kissori Mohan Roy, who had been adjudged an insolvent.

At the inquiry before Chitty, J., the claim was resisted and ultimately disallowed on the ground that the transaction was not bona fide. Opposing participation at that inquiry were a group described as Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others (who actively cross‑examined witnesses) and the Official Assignee, who also appeared. Subsequently, on direction of the Court of Appeal, an issue was tried before Greaves, J., to determine whether Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others were in fact creditors. Greaves, J., decided that they were not creditors (they were purchasers), and therefore ought not to have been allowed to appear as opposing creditors in the original inquiry.

Because of that determination, the Court of Appeal excluded from consideration the evidence elicited at the instance of Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others. The appeal was heard by a bench including Sanderson, C.J., Woodroffe, J., and Mookerjee, J., and later there was a review/re-hearing (on 18 April 1916) prompted by an application for review by the respondent; that re-hearing resulted in a remand to the Insolvency Court for further inquiry.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged loan and deposit of title-deeds (the asserted equitable mortgage and a promissory note for Rs. 12,000) was a bona fide transaction or a fraudulent transaction.
  2. Whether evidence elicited by cross-examination conducted at the instance of parties who were ultimately not creditors (Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others) should be admitted or must be excluded from the record.
  3. Whether notes of the insolvent's public examination under Section 27(6) can be used against a claimant/creditor who had no opportunity to cross-examine the insolvent.
  4. Whether the matter should be remitted for further investigation by the Insolvency Court (i.e., whether a fresh inquiry should be ordered).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion contains several parties' contentions and the Court's summary of them; the principal arguments recounted in the text are summarized below.

Appellant's (Jarwa Bai) Arguments

  • The cross-examination conducted at the instance of Pitambar Nilambar Shah (who were not proper parties/creditors) should be eliminated from the record.
  • The notes of the insolvent's public examination under Section 27 could not be used against the appellant because she (and her representatives) had no proper opportunity to cross-examine under the circumstances.
  • The documents produced (promissory note for Rs. 12,000 and title-deeds) established a prima facie case that the transaction was genuine and that she was a secured creditor.

Official Assignee and Opposing Parties' Arguments

  • The Official Assignee and those appearing as opposing creditors pointed to suspicious circumstances to suggest fraud: absence of entries in the attorney's books recording a visit, no entry of fee for advice, and lack of proof that the promissory note was typed in the attorney's office.
  • It was argued that statements made by the appellant's son in cross-examination might be treated as admissions under Section 18 of the Evidence Act and hence could be used against the appellant.
  • On the question of remedy, some respondents sought that, if the appellant's objections succeeded, the matter be remitted for a fresh investigation so that those respondents might participate in any new inquiry.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reg. v. Erdheim (1896) 2 BQ 260 Authority that notes of a public examination of an insolvent are admissible against the insolvent under Section 27(6). The Court accepted the precedent's rule as to admissibility against the insolvent, but held that such notes could not be used against a creditor (here, the appellant) who had no opportunity to cross‑examine; accordingly, notes of the public examination could not be relied upon to defeat the appellant's claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded through a sequence of determinations addressing evidentiary and procedural questions before resolving the substantive claim:

  1. Effect of the finding that Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others were not creditors: Because Greaves, J., found (on remitted issue) that those persons were not creditors (they were purchasers), their participation in the original inquiry was improper. The Court therefore excluded from consideration all evidence elicited by or at the instance of those persons — including cross-examination they conducted and the answers elicited thereby. The Court held the right to cross-examine belongs to an adverse party (citing Section 137 of the Evidence Act), and a party who was not a creditor/ adverse party could not properly exercise that right.
  2. On admissions and Section 18 of the Evidence Act: The Court rejected the submission that statements made by the appellant's son in answers to the improper cross-examination could be treated as admissions under Section 18. Two reasons were given: (a) if the cross-examination is eliminated, the statements fall away; and (b) the son was not a party to the proceedings, nor properly an agent authorised (expressly or impliedly) to make admissions in the circumstances (answers to cross‑examination improperly put by a non‑party).
  3. On use of the insolvent's public examination notes: The Court acknowledged that notes of the public examination are admissible against the insolvent (Reg. v. Erdheim) but held they could not be used against a creditor who had no opportunity to cross-examine. The Court noted that although the insolvent had been examined afresh in the present proceeding, no attempt was made to contradict him by reference to the public examination notes.
  4. On the substantive onus and sufficiency of the remaining evidence: With the improperly obtained/cross‑examined material excluded, the Court examined the remaining record. It found a prima facie case that Rs. 12,000 was actually advanced and that title‑deeds were deposited as security. The Court placed the onus on the Official Assignee and those assisting him to show that the transaction was not bona fide (i.e., that it was fraudulent). Although the Court accepted that there were suspicious circumstances pointed out by learned counsel for the Official Assignee and the now‑disallowed opposing creditors (such as the lack of attorney's file entries), it concluded that the Official Assignee and others had not discharged the onus of proving fraud on the evidence properly before the Court.
  5. On whether to remit for further inquiry: The Court's position evolved. In an initial judgment (by Sanderson, C.J., with Woodroffe, J. concurring) the Court held that it should not remit: the Official Assignee, as the proper representative of all creditors, should have conducted the original investigation; it would be a dangerous precedent to allow an opposing creditor to obtain a re‑hearing for the purpose of having the inquiry completely re‑run so that that creditor could conduct the proceedings. Accordingly, the initial view was to allow the appeal and not remit.
  6. Review and re-hearing (18 April 1916): On review, matters were re‑argued and fresh facts came to light suggesting that some adoption by the Official Assignee of the cross‑examination conducted by Pitambar Nilambar Shah's counsel may have occurred (or at least there had been misapprehension as to the respective positions of parties at the time). Although Sanderson, C.J. stated he was not satisfied that the Official Assignee had adopted the cross‑examination in its entirety, the possibility of some misunderstanding and the fact that the issue affects the interests of all creditors and involves a large sum led the Court (on re‑hearing) to conclude that the interests of justice required remanding the matter to the Insolvency Court for further inquiry. The Court specified that the Official Assignee should appear and conduct the proceedings on behalf of all creditors in that further hearing.
  7. Costs and consequential directions: The Court addressed costs in detail: in the initial judgment (allowing the appeal and not remitting) directions were given about costs paid to the Official Assignee and opposing creditors; in the re‑hearing (remand) the Court said costs relating to a particular added respondent (Mr. Siroar's client) would be withheld pending the result of the further hearing, and other costs would abide the event of that hearing.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED. (The Court allowed the appellant's appeal from Chitty, J.'s order disallowing the claim.)

Final procedural disposition (after review/re‑hearing): the matter was remanded to the Insolvency Court for a further inquiry (to be conducted by and with the Official Assignee appearing on behalf of all creditors). The re‑heard judgment directed that the Official Assignee should appear and conduct the proceedings in the Insolvency Court and that any leave previously given to a private respondent to appear in the appeal does not confer a right to appear in the further hearing unless that respondent can show an independent right to do so before the Court of first instance.

Implications:

  • The appellant's claim to rank as a secured creditor was upheld by the Court on the merits of the admissible evidence before the Court (a prima facie finding that Rs. 12,000 was advanced and title‑deeds were deposited), subject to the further inquiry ordered on review.
  • Evidence elicited at the instance of parties who were subsequently determined not to be adverse parties/creditors must be excluded; cross‑examination by such parties is improper and answers elicited thereby cannot be treated as admissions under Section 18 of the Evidence Act in the circumstances outlined.
  • Notes of a public examination of an insolvent are admissible against the insolvent (per Reg. v. Erdheim), but cannot be used against a creditor who had no opportunity to cross‑examine the insolvent.
  • The Insolvency Court and the Official Assignee have the primary responsibility to conduct investigations on behalf of all creditors; private parties who are not proper creditors should not be permitted to take over or control the conduct of an inquiry so as to procure a re‑trial merely to secure a hearing for themselves.
  • No new general legal principle beyond application of existing evidentiary rules and insolvency procedure was announced; rather, the case illustrates the application of those rules (exclusion of improperly obtained cross-examination, limits on use of public examination notes) and the Court's willingness to remit for further inquiry when the interests of all creditors and the magnitude of the sum involved demand it.

    Jarwa Bai v. Pitambar Nilambar Shah And Others

    Sanderson, C.J:— This is an appeal from a decision of Chitty, J., who heard the application which was made under Cl. 18, Sch. 2, Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of 1909. The application was made by the appellant Jarwa Bai, and the learned Judge has disallowed the claim on the ground that he thought that the alleged transaction between Jarwa Bai on the one hand and the insolvent on the other was not a bona fide transaction. At the hearing certain opposing creditors appeared, the opposing creditors being named Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others, and in addition the Official Assignee appeared. The conduct of the case seems to have been mainly undertaken by the opposing creditors, and a considerable amount of cross-examination was undertaken by the opposing creditors, the learned counsel appearing for them cross-examining first, and the gentleman who appeared for the Official Assignee coming next. Now, it has been decided that those people who appeared as opposing creditors were not creditors at all. I need not go into the details of the procedure by which that decision has been arrived at. It is sufficient for me to say that under the direction of the Court of appeal an issue was tried by Greaves, J., the issue was as to whether Pitamber Nilambar Shah and others were in fact creditors of the insolvent or not, and the learned Judge has decided that they were not creditors, and the result is that Pitamber Nilambar Shah and others ought never to have been allowed to appear at the inquiry which was held by the learned Judge. It is further to be pointed out that they were allowed to appear in spite of the opposition of the applicant Jarwa Bai.

    2. The result of that has been that during the hearing of the appeal we decided that the evidence which was adduced by Pitamber Nilambar Shah and others who then appeared as opposing creditors ought not to be looked at: and not only that, but that the evidence which was elicited by cross-examination from the claimant and the insolvent by counsel appearing for those parties ought not to be looked at, and, therefore, for the purpose of deciding whether this appeal should be allowed or not on its merits, we have to consider only the evidence which appears in the paper-book, other than that referred to above. Now, on that evidence it appears that the claimant claims to be a creditor to the extent of Rs. 12,000, that she holds a promissory note for that amount given to her by the insolvent, which she alleges to be a promissory note given to her in the ordinary course of money-lending business, and she also claims to be the holder of certain title-deeds which were deposited by the insolvent at or about the time the money was lent, and she therefore, claims as equitable mortgagee of the property mentioned in these deeds. Prima facie therefore she comes forward as a creditor producing a certain document which on the face of it purports to be a promissory note, and in addition to that she holds some title-deeds of the insolvent relating to some part of the insolvent's property. It therefore lies upon the Official Assignee and those who are assisting him to show to the satisfaction of the Court that the transaction, as alleged by the claimant who produced these documents, was not a bona fide transaction, but in fact, as they alleged, was a fraudulent transaction. Now, I think soma of the comments which have been made by the learned counsel for the Official Assignee and by the learned counsel appearing for the opposing creditor in this Court, in so far as they suggest that there were suspicious circumstances connected with the case, are to a certain extent justified. I have fully considered the points which they put forward, and I thick there is weight in some of them, as for, instance, the fact that there apparently was no entry in the attorney's books of the visit which the agent of the claimant is alleged to have paid to the attorney; that there is no entry of any charge made for the advice which is supposed to have been given on that date, and that nobody was produced from that office to prove that the promissory note was typed in that office. But giving all due weight to the comments and criticisms of those two learned counsel upon the case, in my judgment, the Official Assignee and the opposing creditor have not discharged the onus, and, upon the evidence which, is now before us, they have not satisfied me that this was a fraudulent transaction.

    3. I quite recognise, as Mr. Begram argued before us, that it may be that the deposit of title-deeds without at the same time giving a memorandum of the deposit may be contrary to the general practice in Calcutta. On the other hand, it is alleged that such transactions as these are sometimes loosely done, and title-deeds are taken without the memorandum of deposit being given—it very largely depending upon what the relations are between the parties at the time the transaction is effected. I need not however say anything except that the Official Assignee and the opposing creditor who is now before us have not satisfied me that the transaction was a fraudulent one. For this reason I think the appeal ought to be allowed.

    4. Then comas the farther question as to whether we ought to remit this matter for further investigation by the learned Judge to inquire again whether this transaction was a fraudulent one or not. I have come to the conclusion that we ought not to do so, and for this reason. In my opinion, the proper person to investigate a matter of this kind was the Official Assignee. It was pointed out at the outset by the learned counsel appearing for the claimant that the parties who claimed to be creditors ought not to be allowed to appear, and, as I understand, even at that early stage there was a dispute as to whether they were creditors or not, and further that even if they were creditors they ought not to be allowed to appear. In these circumstances, the proper thing for the Official Assignee to do was to take charge of the proceedings, ask such questions as he might think right, and, if he wanted any information which he himself did not possess but which was in the hands of the creditors, to get such information and to conduct the investigation not only on behalf of the opposing creditors but on behalf of all the creditors of the estate whom he represented in his position as Official Assignee. As regards Mr. Sircar's client, to my mind, it would be a very dangerous precedent for us to allow an opposing creditor to coma in on an appeal, not merely for the purpose of assisting the Official Assignee to argue the appeal which apparently was the ground upon which Mr. Sircar's client was allowed to appear in this Court, but for the purpose of getting this Court to order the inquiry to be started all over again in order that his client, who did not appear at the original application, might have the application re-heard from start to finish and that his client might have the conduct of the proceedings. I do not think that this is an application to which this Court ought to accede. Therefore I think this appeal ought to be allowed with costs.

    5. With regard to the costs in the Court below, the learned Judge ordered the claimant to pay two sets of costs, one to the Official Assignee; With regard to these costs, any costs which have been paid to the Official Assignee must be repaid by him to the claimant out of the general assets of the estate. The learned Judge also ordered another set of costs to be paid by the claimant to the people who were than called the opposing creditors, namely Pitambar Nilambar Shah and others. Now, inasmuch as they are not here to-day, it would not be right for this Court to make any order as to costs in their absence. I am of opinion that they were largely responsible for the costs which were incurred in the Court below. I think they ought to be given notice by the claimant to come here and show cause in this Court why they should not be directed to repay the costs which they received in the Court below and why such other order should not be made as to this Court may seam proper. As regards the costs of this appeal, the costs will be paid in the ordinary way, that is, by the Official Assignee out of the general assets of the estate. The costs of the Official Assignee will be paid out of the assets of the estate, as between attorney and client. It is impossible for this Court to say how much of the Rs. 33,000 the claimant is entitled to in respect of her mortgage. The Official Assignee will have to deal with that. If he has any doubt, it will be open to him to apply to the Judge in insolvency.

    Woodroffe, J.:— I agree.

    Mookerjee, J.:— This appeal is directed against a determination by Chitty, J., under Cl. 18 of Sch. 2 to the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, that the appellant had failed to establish her claim against the estate of the insolvent on the basis of an equitable mortgage. The case for the appellant is that on 10th January 1911, she advanced, on a deposit of title-deeds by the borrower, a sum of Rs. 12,000 through her son Lachmi Chand Karnawat to one Kissori Mohan Roy, who has been subsequently adjudged an insolvent. When the appellant discovered that her name had not been included in the schedule, on 5th February 1914 she made an application for an investigation of her mortgage under Cl. 18, Sch. 2 to the Insolvency Act. In the course of these proceedings, her claim appears to have been resisted by a firm named Pitambar Nilambar Shah, who had been described as creditors of the insolvent, although they asserted that they were not mortgagees but purchasers of a part of the estate of the bankrupt. If the position they took up was correct, they would not be necessary or proper parties to the proceedings and their right to intervene therein was, as might be expected, challenged at an early stage. They were permitted however to take an active part in the inquiry held under Cl. 18, without any determination of their precise position. Indeed the record shows that the cross-examination of the witnesses was conducted principally by counsel on their behalf; the Official Assignee was no doubt represented; but the appears to have taken only a subordinate part in the inquiry. The result was that, after a full investigation, Chitty, J., came to be conclusion that the mortgage-debt of the appellant was not established. When the present appeal to which Pitambar Nilambar Shah were jointed as opposing creditors was taken up for disposal sometime ago, the Court of Appeal directed that their status should in first instance, be determined and an issue to that effect was sent down for investigation. It has now transpired, on an inquiry made by Greaves, J., pursuant to the order of the Court of Appeal that Pitambar Nilambar Shah were purchasers and not mortgagees of the estate of the insolvent. The consequence follows that they are not creditors of the insolvent; they were thus not proper parties to the proceedings in the Court below, nor are they proper parties to this appeal; and as a matter of fact they have not been represented at this the final hearing of the appeal before this Court.

    6. On behalf of the appellant, two points have been urged, namely first that all the cross-examination held at the instance of Pitambar Nilambar Shah should be eliminated from the record, and secondly that the public examination of the insolvent under S. 27 cannot be used as evidence against her. In my opinion, both the objections are well founded and must prevail. As regards the first point, it has been argued on behalf of the Official Assignee as also of a creditor, who did not appear in the Court below but who upon his own application has been made a party respondent to this appeal, that the course proposed should not be adopted, and that, if the argument of the appellant prevails, the case should be remanded for a fresh investigation. Mr. Siroar, who appeared on behalf of the added respondent has further argued that the statements made by the son of the appellant in cross-examination may in any event, be treated as admissions with in the meaning of the Evidence Act, and may accordingly be considered by the Court in the determination of this appeal. In my opinion it is obvious that the cross examination at the instance of Pitambar Nilambar Shah must be entirely eliminated from the record. The right to cross-examine belongs, as is clear from Section 137 of the Evidence Act, to an adverse party. The firm of, Pitambar Nilambar Shah did not in reality occupy the position of an adverse party as has now been finally decided. Consequently no right to cross-examine was vested in them. It follows conclusively that they should not have been allowed to intervene in the proceedings and to take part in the cross-examination of the witnesses and the record must be restored to the condition it would, have attained had there been no cross-examination at their instance. It is also clear that the ingenious argument that the statements made by the son of the appellant may be treated as admissions, is entirely untenable. Section 18 of the Evidence Act, upon which reliance has been placed, provides that:

    “Statements made by a party to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party whom the Court regards under the circumstances of the case as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them are admissions.”

    7. In the first place it is clear that S. 18 can be, of no avail if the cross-examination is, as I hold it must be, eliminated; in the second place, it is clear that the statements mentioned were not made by a party to the proceedings, nor were they made by an agent to any party whom the Court may properly regard under the circumstances as expressly or impliedly authorised by him to make them. We cannot reasonably hold that the son of the appellant was even impliedly authorised to make those statements under the circumstances in which they were made, namely in answer to the questions improperly put in cross-examination by a party not entitled to participate in the proceedings. I hold accordingly that the statements in cross-examination conducted at the instance of Pitambar Nilambar Shah must be ignored. As regards the second point, it is incontestable that the notes of the public examination of the insolvent though admissible against him under S. 27(6): Reg. v. Erdheim . 1896 2 BQ 260, cannot be used against a creditor who had no opportunity to cross-examine him, and it is noteworthy that though the insolvent was examined afresh in the present proceeding, no attempt was made to contradict him by reference to the notes of his public examination. We must accordingly consider the case on the remainder of the evidence and when we do so it becomes plain that the decision of Chitty, J., cannot be supported. There is a prima facie case established on the evidence that the transaction which forms the basis of the claim of the appellant was real and that a sum of Rs. 12,000 was actually advanced by the appellant to the debtor, as alleged by her son. This case has not been successfully met by the Official Assignee or by any of the creditors; her claim to rank as a secured creditor of the insolvent must consequently succeed.

    8. But it has been argued that the Official Assignee as also the added respondent should be allowed an opportunity to have the matter re-investigated in their presence. I think we should not accede to this application. The added respondent did not appear in the Court below. I need not decide whether he was entitled as a matter of right to intervene in the proceedings; if he was so entitled he should have availed himself of the opportunity and cannot now claim an indulgence; if he was not entitled to appear he cannot now ask for a re-trial. The Official Assignee is in no better position; he did appear in the Court below and no good reason has been assigned why he took a subordinate part in the proceedings and why he permitted the cross-examination of the witnesses to be conducted in the main by a party who was not only not admitted to be a creditor but whose right to intervene in the proceedings at all was challenged. On these grounds, I hold that this appeal must be allowed and the order of Chitty, J., discharged.

    9. The respondent applied to the High Court for review of the above judgment. His application was granted and on 18th April 1916 their Lordships re-heard the appeal and delivered the following judgment:

    Sanderson, C.J:— In my judgment this is a somewhat difficult case, and the circumstances are quite out of the ordinary and I hope exceptional. When the case was last before us, we decided the appeal upon part of the evidence which was given before Chitty, J. We did not look at the other pars of the evidence on the ground that evidence had been elicited by a party who,;in our opinion, had no right to be present in the proceedings. There was no statement, made when that hearing was taking place, to the effect that the cross-examination of the witnesses by the counsel appearing for Pitambar Nilambar Shah had been adopted by the Official Assignee; since then, facts have been brought; to our notice, with regard to what took place in the Court below, upon which the allegation was based that the cross-examination by the learned counsel who was appearing for Pitambar Nilambar Shah had in fact been adopted by the Official Assignee. Speaking for myself, I am not even now satisfied that the cross-examination was adopted in such a way as to make it clear to the Court that the Official Assignee was adopting in its entirety the cross-examination by the learned counsel for Pitambar Nilambar Shah. But it has been made clear to me that it is probable that there was some misunderstanding, some misapprehension, as to what the position of the various parties was; and as this is not a matter confined to the claimant on the one hand and Mr. Sircar's client on the other, but is a matter which affects the interests of all the creditors in the estate, and inasmuch as the sum involved is a large sum, I think that the interests of justice will only be served by having this matter further inquired into. Therefore the case should be remanded to the Insolvency Court for the purpose of having the inquiry held: and when that inquiry is held, the Official Assignee will appear on behalf of all the creditors. Mr. Sircar's client was given leave to appear at the hearing of the appeal in order that he might assist the Official Assignee in the argument on the appeal. He has so appeared and the proceedings in connexion with the appeal are now at an end. Therefore Mr. Sircar's client's right to appear in these proceedings also comes to an end. It is our opinion that when the further bearing takes place the Official Assignee—and I think that this was intended by the Insolvency Act—should appear and conduct the proceedings on the part of all the creditors and in the interests of all of them. Mr. Sircar's client will have no right to appear in that further hearing, unless he can convince the Court of first instance that he has a right to do so independent of the leave which was given by the Appeal Court to appear in the hearing of the appeal. As regards the costs of this appeal, Mr. Sircar's client gave an undertaking to be responsible for them if the Court thought right to make him pay them; or the Court may deal with them in any way it thinks fit. It may turn out that the further hearing may be wholly in fructuous: and if that contingency does arise then these infructuous proceedings will have been taken at the instance of Mr. Siroar's client. Therefore we propose to withhold our decision with regard to the costs of Mr. Siroar's client, until we know the result of the further hearing. With regard to the costs of Mr. James's client and of the Official Assignee I think they should abide the event of the further hearing. I should add that this order which we have made must be takenas having been made at the instance of the Official Assignee for whom Mr. Bagram appears, and who has stated this morning that he asked us for this order of remand.

    Woodroffe, J.:— I agree.

    Mookerjee, J.:— I agree.

    V.B/R.K

    10. Appeal allowed.

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    Jarwa Bai v. Pitambar Nilambar Shah And Others
    (Jan 31, 1916)