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Legal Opinion Summary — Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal under the Letters Patent from the judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J., in Second Appeal No. 492 of 1934. By that judgment Venkataramana Rao, J. reversed the decree of both the lower Courts and dismissed the suit with costs. The appeal raises the legal question concerning the limits within which a natural guardian under Hindu law can incur a simple-contract debt so as to bind the minor's estate.

On the facts before the Court, three promissory notes formed part of the consideration for the note sued on. The lower appellate Court had found that one of these promissory notes, Exhibit A-1 (for Rs. 1,000), was executed by the mother of the minor (the guardian) for purposes binding on the minor. That finding of fact was not challenged before this Court. The present Court was called upon to decide, as a matter of law, whether the minor's estate was liable on the promissory note executed by the guardian.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Within what limits can a natural guardian under Hindu law incur a simple contract debt that will bind the minor's estate?
  2. Whether a distinction should be drawn between (a) loans secured by charging, mortgaging or selling the property and (b) simple loans (personal covenants) for purposes of binding the minor's estate — i.e., whether a stricter rule applies to simple loans than to secured loans.
  3. Whether necessity or benefit (according to Hindu law) alone can render a simple loan enforceable against the minor's estate, or whether only a pre-existing liability will do.
  4. Whether a bona fide lender must prove the actual application of money advanced in order to recover against the minor's estate when the transaction is otherwise shown to be for purposes binding on the minor under Hindu law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (payee under the note)

  • The appellant relied on the Hindu law liability of the minor: that where a guardian incurs a debt for purposes which, under the personal law of the minor, bind the minor or his estate, the estate is liable regardless of whether the debt is evidenced by a promissory note or creates a charge.
  • The plaint was framed to raise the question of the liability of the minor on the underlying debt (the consideration), which the appellant treated as an obligation independent of the form of the instrument.

Respondent (guardian/minor's side; represented by respondent's counsel)

  • The learned Judge below (Venkataramana Rao, J.) had adopted a rule (from Trevelyan on "Minors") that a guardian cannot bind the ward personally by a simple contract debt except to pay or keep alive a debt already binding on the estate; in other words, he drew a distinction between simple loans and loans secured on property, holding a stricter rule for simple loans.
  • Respondent's counsel was unable to cite authoritative precedent supporting the distinction between simple and secured loans for the purpose of binding the minor's estate.
  • Respondent's counsel further argued there was no proof that the money advanced under Exhibit A-1 had been applied to the benefit of the estate; and more generally argued that a simple loan might endanger the entire estate (e.g., by accumulation of interest), whereas a sale or mortgage affects only a portion of the estate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hunoomanpersaud's case (Judicial Committee) Provides the test for validity of borrowings by guardians and analogous persons: a guardian may incur liabilities for necessary or beneficial purposes; a bona fide creditor who advances money in the honest belief after due enquiry that the guardian acted for such purposes can recover against the estate even absent proved necessity. Regarded as the true test for deciding the binding character even of a simple loan; the Court relied on it as an integral principle governing guardians and analogous fiduciaries and applied its test to the facts.
Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishore Ghose (Privy Council) Cited below as a Privy Council decision relevant to guardian transactions; Venkataramana Rao, J. relied on it for a proposition about differing considerations for charges and personal contracts. The present Court found that the proposition attributed to this case by Venkataramana Rao, J. could not be found in the decision; the case was referred to and distinguished in earlier High Court decisions but was not accepted as supporting a stricter rule for simple loans.
Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin (Privy Council) Privy Council observations about the guardian's power; discussed in relation to whether guardian can bind estate by contract apart from creating a charge. The Court observed that the Privy Council's observations should not be understood so as to preclude recognition of a broad guardian power where the personal law confers it; the decision was discussed and read in light of subsequent High Court Full Bench decisions.
Maharana Shri Ranmalsingji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand Earlier authority interpreted as restricting guardian's power to bind by simple contract (Chief Justice's more limited construction). The Court held that this case cannot, after the Full Bench ruling in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan, be regarded as stating the law correctly on the point.
Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan (Full Bench) Full Bench proposition: the same test applies to both loans secured on property and simple loans; no decree should be passed against a minor or his estate on a guardian's contract (creating no charge) except where the estate would have been liable under the minor's personal law. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as a binding precedent and the central authority for applying Hunoomanpersaud's test equally to simple loans; it formed the principal basis for rejecting a stricter rule for simple loans.
Subramania Ayyar v. Arumuga Chetty Held a minor's estate liable on a promissory note executed by the mother to raise money for discharging the minor's share of a prior family debt; illustrated enforcement where a pre-existing liability or necessity existed. Referred to as a case applying the Hunoomanpersaud test; distinguished Privy Council decisions where there was no pre-existing liability; used to support the proposition that necessity/benefit can justify liability.
Duraisami Reddi v. Muthial Reddi Guardian executed simple bonds; the case applied the Hunoomanpersaud test in holding the estate liable where appropriate. Cited as one of the decisions following the Hunoomanpersaud test and supporting the Full Bench approach.
Venkitaswami Naicker v. Muthuswamy Pillai Guardian executed simple bonds; similar application of the rule that guardians may bind the estate for necessitous or beneficial purposes. Included among authorities that applied the Hunoomanpersaud principle and were followed by the Court.
Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal Liability sought to be charged on a promissory note executed by a guardian for purposes binding on the minor. Recognized as fitting the Full Bench principle and relied upon as supporting the enforceability of promissory notes against the minor's estate where the debt was for purposes binding on the estate.
Ramakrishna Reddiar v. Chidambara Swamigal Though not a debt case, it was noteworthy for judges' understanding of the Full Bench decision; included discussion about effect of earlier Full Bench ruling on related cases. Used to illustrate judicial interpretation of the Full Bench principle and confirm that Krishna Chettiar falls within that principle.
Meenakshisundaram Chetty v. Ranga Ayyangar Full Bench decision followed and decree rendered on a promissory note; approval of a rule that understood necessaries broadly for Hindu law purposes. Referred to as another case following the Full Bench approach and supporting liability on promissory notes where they serve purposes binding on the minor.
Satyanarayana v. Mallayya (Full Bench) Reviewed decisions and followed earlier Full Bench rulings; reiterated that a transaction entered into by a guardian will bind the minor's estate if the opposite party, if challenged, establishes that the transaction was for the benefit of the minor (i.e., necessity/benefit test). Cited by the Court as a recent Full Bench decision which affirmed the rule applied in this Court and from which the Court drew authority to apply the Hunoomanpersaud test to simple loans.
Seetharamayya Garu v. Sathiah Recent decision following the Full Bench principle that Hunoomanpersaud's test governs the question of binding simple loans. Noted as a recent follow-up decision in this Court which reinforces the binding authority of the Full Bench approach adopted by the Court in the present appeal.
Suchit Chaudhuri v. Harnandan Singh (Patna High Court) Patna High Court's view aligning with the broader power of guardians to bind the estate in appropriate cases. Referred to as supporting the wider view of guardians' powers in other Presidencies, consistent with the view accepted by this Court.
Zamindar of Polavaram v. Maharaja of Pittapuram Statement by Curgenven, J. to the effect that any liability to which the minor would be subject under Hindu law is not the less a liability because it was incurred by a guardian on his behalf. Cited to support the proposition that the fact the guardian incurred the liability does not diminish the estate's liability under Hindu law; relied upon by later Full Bench authority and by this Court's reasoning.
Srishchandra Nandi v. Sudhirkrishna Banerji English-law principle as applied to trustees/executors: a trustee or executor is prohibited by English law from binding the minor by a personal covenant; doctrine of subrogation applies where money is used for benefit of estate. Distinguished from guardians: the Court used this case to show that trustees/executors occupy a different position from guardians and that different equitable remedies (like subrogation) apply where direct contractual liability against the estate is not recognized.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court started by identifying the central legal principle: that a natural guardian under Hindu law may bind a minor's estate for purposes that are necessary or beneficial according to that law, and that a bona fide lender who advanced money believing after due enquiry that the guardian acted for such a purpose can recover from the estate even without proved necessity. This principle (derived from Hunoomanpersaud's case and equity considerations) has been consistently applied to various analogous positions (joint-family manager, female owners in possession, etc.).

The Court rejected the attempt by Venkataramana Rao, J. to introduce a rigid distinction between simple loans and loans secured on property (mortgage, sale, charge) such that simple loans would attract a stricter rule. Venkataramana Rao had relied on a passage in Trevelyan summarised as saying a guardian "cannot bind the ward personally by a simple contract debt" except in limited circumstances (e.g., to pay or keep alive an existing debt). The Court found no authoritative precedent to support such a categorical distinction and held that to sanction a departure from the established test in Hunoomanpersaud's case would risk uncertainty for all analogous categories of limited owners.

The Full Bench decision in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan was treated as the controlling authority: it held that the same test governs both secured transactions and simple loans, and that no decree should be passed against a minor or his estate on a guardian's contract (not creating a charge) except where the minor's estate would have been liable under his personal law. The Court analysed the different opinions in that Full Bench but concluded the majority view and the ensuing line of High Court decisions support applying Hunoomanpersaud's test to simple loans as well.

The Court surveyed subsequent and prior decisions (including Subramania Ayyar, Duraisami Reddi, Krishna Chettiar, Meenakshisundaram Chetty, Satyanarayana v. Mallayya, and others) and determined that they consistently applied the Hunoomanpersaud test. It treated the dictum in Trevelyan as an incomplete statement that failed to account for the course of decisions in the Madras Presidency and therefore of limited value for this Court.

The Court also explained doctrinal distinctions: trustees/executors are governed by English-law prohibitions on binding the minor by personal covenant, but equitable doctrines like subrogation can provide reimbursement rights if money benefits the estate. By contrast, guardians governed by Hindu personal law can, where the personal law so permits, incur obligations that bind the estate substantively.

Applying these legal principles to the facts, the Court accepted the unchallenged finding of the lower appellate Court that Exhibit A-1 (Rs. 1,000) was executed by the mother for purposes binding on the minor. The Court held that the form of the instrument (promissory note executed by the mother and her agent without express capacity stated) was not a material defect because the surrounding circumstances and the recital that the funds were for family and pannai expenses supported the inference that the guardian acted for the minor and intended to leave the minor's estate liable. The Court further observed that a bona fide lender is under no obligation to see to the application of the money; proof of actual application is required only if the validity is to be tested under the notion of necessaries in the Contract Act, not under the rule of Hindu law adopted by the Court.

On that combined factual and legal analysis, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to succeed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J. is set aside and the decree of the District Munsif is restored with costs throughout. (The Court ordered that an application by the first respondent seeking benefit under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (IV of 1938) be referred to the District Munsif of Palni for inquiry and disposal according to law.)

Implications:

  • The Court reaffirmed that the test in Hunoomanpersaud's case (as interpreted and applied by the Full Bench in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan and subsequent High Court decisions) governs whether a guardian's simple contract will bind the minor's estate. The same test applies to both loans secured on property and simple loans/covenants.
  • As a direct consequence, where a guardian incurs a debt for purposes which, under the minor's personal law, bind the minor or his estate, the estate can be held liable even if the debt is evidenced by a simple promissory note rather than by creating a formal charge.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down a new rule of law but applied and reaffirmed existing Full Bench and High Court authority; it rejected the narrower construction that would require a pre-existing liability in all cases of simple contract debts.
  • The direct effect on the parties is restoration of the District Munsif's decree in favour of the appellant; the first respondent's application under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is remitted for enquiry.
A.S.V

    P.E.R.M. Annamalai Chetty v. Satyavadivel Muthuswami Maniagaran

    Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J.:— This is an appeal under the Letters Patent against the judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J. in Second Appeal No. 492 of 1934. By that judgment he has reversed the decree of both the lower Courts and dismissed the suit with costs throughout.

    The appeal raises a question of importance involving a decision as to the limits within which a natural guardian under Hindu law can incur a simple contract debt so as to bind the minor's estate. That such a guardian has the power to borrow by charging, mortgaging or even by selling the estate or a sufficient portion of it, for purposes termed necessary or beneficial according to that law, cannot at this time of the day be questioned. It is also settled that even in the absence of a proved necessity or benefit, an honest creditor can still recover the debt from the estate if he can show that in advancing the money he acted in the bona fide belief after due enquiry that the guardian was acting or such a purpose in incurring the debt. These principles, which are based as much on Hindu law as on general considerations of equity, have been held to afford a test of the validity of similar transactions by other persons also who occupy an analogous position. The manager of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara, female owners in possession of inherited property, the head of a mutt, and the dharmakartha of a temple are among the class of persons whose powers are so limited. Indeed, it can be truly said that what the Judicial Committee said with regard to a guard an in Hunoomanpersaud's case has become an integral part of the branch of the law relating to the borrowing powers of all qualified owners, in the case of all such persons there exists in fact no difference in the test to be applied whether the money is obtained by pledge of sale of the property, or by way of a simple loan.

    The decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., if we understand it aright appears to introduce into this branch of the law a distinction between simple loans and loans borrowed on the security of property, and to lay down with respect to the former a stricter rule than that which obtains in regard to the latter. We are no doubt in this case concerned with, the powers of a mother and natural guardian but it is none the less necessary to bear in mind that any interference with a rule so general in its application as that laid down in Hunoomanpersaud's case may tend to create uncertainty in the administration of the law as regards also the other persons who belong to the same group and are governed by the same principles. We should, therefore, hesitate to sanction a departure from what appears to be a well-established principle unless we are satisfied that there is clear authority to the contrary.

    The learned Judge has expressed the Opinion that the law is correctly summed up in the following statement in Trevelyan on “Minors” at page 169:

    “Although a guardian may under certain circumstances sell or charge the ward's property he cannot bind the ward personally by a simple contract debt, by a covenant, or by any promise to pay money or damages unless such promise is made merely to pay or to keep alive the debt for which the ward's property was liable.”

    This passage means according to Venkataramana, Rao, J., as indeed it does seem to mean, that a guardian cannot without charging the estate contract so as to bind the minor, except it be to pay or keep alive a debt already in existence, and binding on the estate. On this view a pre-existing debt or liability could alone support a simple contract debt and not necessity or benefit. In fact he says:

    “The test is not a mere question of benefit nor the mere fact that the debt was incurred for necessary purposes; the observations made in some of the cases that where the debt is incurred by the guardian for necessary purposes, the estate can be rendered liable are too broadly made.”

    The learned Advocate for the respondent has been unable to cite any authoritative precedent which recognizes such a distinction between the one class of debts and the other. In support of his view Venkataramana Rao, J. has referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishore Ghose as authority for the proposition

    “that the considerations by which the validity of a charge is judged are not the same in adjudging the binding nature of a contract or a covenant entered into by the guardian”.

    We can find no such proposition laid down in this decision or indeed in any other decision to which our attention was drawn except the one in Maharana Shri Ranmalsingji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand(2). This case, however, cannot after the Full Bench ruling in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan(3) be regarded as stating the law correctly on the point. That ruling, as we understand it, lays down the proposition that the came test is applicable to both classes of borrowings. The majority view was that

    “no decree should be passed against the minor or his estate on a contract entered into on his behalf by a guardian under which covenant no charge is created on the estate except in cases in, which the minor's estate would have been liable for the obligations incurred by the guardian under the personal law to which he is subject”.

    A reading of the judgment makes it plain that the observations of the Privy Council in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin are not to be understood literally so as to preclude the recognition of a large power in the guardian where the personal law of the minor confers it. Wallis, C.J who delivered the dissenting judgment was inclined to accept the more limited construction of the guardian's power taken in Maharana Shri Ranmalsingji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand. He would limit it to necessaries supplied to the minor within section 68 of the Contract Act though in deciding what should be regarded as necessaries, the position of the minor and the expenses which are properly chargeable to his estate under the personal law by which he is governed may lave to be taken into account. That this is his view appears from the observation that

    “what are necessaries must depend upon the facts of each case, and in the case of a Hindu, money advanced for the expenses of a marriage which the minor has to perform or to pay off a debt binding on him may be recoverable under this head from his estate”.

    Apart from necessaries, there as also the power to acknowledge an already existing valid debt or promise to pay it, which, though denied in Maharana Shri Ranmalsingji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand, has been since recognized in Annapagauda Sangadigyapa which on this point overruled the earlier decision. According to the learned Chief Justice, all the decisions are capable of being brought under one or other of these two heads of liability, which are both independent of contract. A direct contractual liability enforceable against the estate had been according to him definitely negatived by the Privy Council. If, as the Chief Justice was inclined to hold, the term necessaries is understood in an expired sense so as to cover all those purposes which are sufficient according to Hindu law to support an alienation, the difference virtually disappears leaving only the head of benefit about which as an independent source of authority there has been a conflict of opinion. Seshagiri Ayyar, J., with whom Ayling, J. concurred, took a more liberal view and rested the decision on what he described as the broader ground disclosed by the decisions of the Courts in the Madras and the other Presidencies. Differing from the Chief Justice, he held that there was a power in, the guardian contract to bind the minor's estate according to Hindu law if the circumstances indicated a case of necessity or benefit; On an examination of the cases both before and after the Privy Council decision in Waghela Rajsanji's case he reached the conclusion that according to all the High Courts the liability of the minor under the Hindu law is not affected by the circumstance that it was the guardian who had incurred the obligation. That result was in his opinion not opposed to the decisions of the Privy Council as their Lordships should not be held to have intended

    “to lay down that under no circumstances can the guardian bind the estate of the ward, except it be by creating a charge”.

    As we understand it, the difference in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan between the Chief Justice on the one hand and the other two learned Judges on the other consisted in the former denying a power in the guardian to bind the minor by contract apart, from necessaries, while the latter admitted such, a power to reside in him subject, however, to the conditions imposed by the personal law of the minor. The passages occurring at page 195 make it sufficiently clear that no distinction is to be made between, a charge and a simple loan according to this decision, and none seems to exist on principle so far as we can see.

    It is perhaps unnecessary to undertake a reinvestigation of the earlier case-law which appears to have been amply considered in the Full Bench decision which we regard as furnishing a binding precedent for the decision of this appeal. In that case, money had been borrowed on a mortgage which was however ineffectual as the property was inalienable; yet the debt was declared enforceable against the estate on the ground that it had been incurred, for a necessary purpose. In Subramania Ayyar v. Arumuga Chetty the minor's estate was held liable on a promissory note executed by the mother to raise money for discharging the minor's share of a prior family debt contracted by the uncle and manager. Two Privy Council decisions, Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin and Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishore Ghose(4), were referred to and distinguished on the ground that in them there was no “Pre-existing liability” such as there was in the case before the Court. But it is to be observed that there is really nothing in this judgment to support the theory that necessity by itself could not justify the incurring of the debt. We feel no doubt that the reference to a “pre-existing liability” was only illustrative of the general doctrine of necessity on which the decision in fact proceeded. This case was followed in Duraisami Reddi v. Muthial Reddi and Venkitaswami Naicker v. Muthuswamy Pillai, in both of which the guardian had executed simple bonds, as also in Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal in which the liability was sought to be charged on a promissory note. In all these cases it will be seen that it was the test laid down in Hunoomanpersaud's case that formed the basis of the decision. The criticism that these decisions did not give full effect to the opinion of the Privy Council expressed in Waghela Rajsanji v. Shekh Masludin(5) and Indur Chunder Singh v. Radhakishore Ghose(6) led to the reference in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan(7) with the result already mentioned. The case of Ramakrishna Reddiar v. Chidambara Swamigal(8), though not a case of debt, is noteworthy for the way in which the learned Judges understood the effect of the Full Bench decision. Wallace, J. considered that Krishna Chettiar v. Nagamani Ammal, which had held that a promissory note executed by a guardian of a Hindu minor for purposes binding on him is enforceable against his estate, fell directly within the principle of the Full Bench decision. Thiruvenkatachariar, J. was more explicit and recognized the power of the guardian to contract loans without charging the estate for necessary purposes, the term to be understood as comprising

    “all that is necessary to meet the wants of the minor and of other members of his family who have claims either against him personally or against his estate”.

    In Meenakshisundaram Chetty v. Ranga Ayyangar the Full Bench decision was again followed without question, and a decree against the estate was rendered on a promissory note. The learned Judges referred with approval to the rule in the form stated by Thiruvenkatachariar, J. in the case last cited, observing that learned Judge had correctly understood the effect of the Full Bench decision. More recently there has been another Full Bench decision reported as Satyanarayana v. Mallayya in which the liability of a minor's estate on promissory note executed by the guardian came up once again for consideration. Ramesam, J. reviewed the relevant decisions bearing upon the point; and, referring in particular to the earlier ruling in Ramajogayya v. Jagannadhan, he said that decision had always been followed in this Court as setting the law and that nothing had happened since to justify a departure from it. He accented the statement of the law by Curgenven, J. in Zamindar of Polavaram v. Maharaja of Pittapuram to the effect that any liability to which the minor would be subject under the Hindu law is not the less a liability because it was incurred by a guardian on his behalf. That he understood the earlier Full Bench decisions in the sense in which Thiruvenkatachariar, J. understood them is clear from his observation

    “that ill, no transaction entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor can the opposite party succeed, if challenged, without establishing some fact such as that the transaction was for the benefit of the minor or some such other fact”.

    The learned Judge had obviously in mind the rule in Hunoomanpersaud's case as governing the question. This Full Bench decision has very recently been followed in Seetharamayya Garu v. Sathiah to which one of us was a party. In the face of such overwhelming authority which clearly binds us only one conclusion is possible, namely, that Hunoomanpersaud's case contains the true test for deciding the binding character even of a simple loan. We may also perhaps add that justice and equity regarded both from the point of view of the minor and the lender, are in consonance with the view which has all along been accepted in this Court. The statement of the law in Treveyan's book, on which Venkataramana Rao, J. has relied, merely purports to state the effect of the cases mentioned, in the footnote without noticing the, course of decisions in this Presidency, interpreting the Privy Council decisions. This is a serious omission which is sufficient in itself to deprive the statement of real value, so far at any rate as this Court is concerned. The Patna High Court also seems to take the I same view of the powers of a guardian; see Suchit Chaudhuri v. Harnandan Singh. As I have said in Ramanathan v. Palaniappa:

    “It is difficult to appreciate an argument which denies to a guardian a power to contract a simple debt while conceding to him in identical circumstances a power to charge or even sell the estate in spite of the greater strictness with which the Hindu law regards transactions affecting immovable properties.”

    To this proposition an answer was attempted. A sale or a mortgage, it was said, affects that portion only of the minor's estate which is involved in the particular transaction whereas a simple loan might endanger the entire estate by reason of the possibility of a limitless expansion by way of accumulating interest. Even if this is a sound proposition, which we doubt, there is no reason why it should not equally apply to other limited owners whose position is analogous to that of the guardian. Such is not however the case. The evil, if any, is due not to the honest creditor who lends the money, but to the irresponsible guardian who negligently omits to take prompt steps to repay it. In this connection it is not, to be forgotten that the creditor has to make out a necessity not merely for the loan advanced but also for the rate of interest charged.

    A trustee or an executor stands in a different position and to him the principles of the English law which prohibits him from binding the minor by a personal covenant are rightly applied; see Srishchandra Nandi v. Sudhirkrishna Banerji. To him however no less than to the guardian, the doctrine of subrogation is applicable. This doctrine is to be invoked in cases where there is no direct contractual liability enforceable against the estate. Where the trustee or the executor does not sell or charge but merely contracts or covenants, the effect of the transaction is that it binds him personally and not the estate and consequently there is no direct recourse against the estate available to the creditor. But the law goes to this extent to his help, that if the money is utilized for the benefit of the estate, he will be entitled to such rights of reimbursement as the borrower himself may have out of it.

    It is necessary to sound a note of caution against the error of thinking that the promissory note evidences, a contract binding on the mind by force of the instrument itself. The liability does not arise on the instrument, but on the debt evidenced by it, and is enforced against the estate, not on account of the fiction that the contract of the guardian is the contract of the minor, but on account of the substantive principle of the personal law of the minor which creates the liability. It is scarcely necessary to add that the liability of the estate, though personal in the English law sense of the word, is not personal in the sense that the person of the minor even after majority can be arrested in execution. A personal liability arising out of the contract of the guardian is a liability of the minor's estate only.

    Coming to the facts of the present case the lower appellate Court has definitely found that out of the three promissory notes which formed the consideration for the note sued on, one only, namely. Exhibit A-1 which was for a sum of Rs. 1,000, had been executed by the mother of the minor-first respondent for purposes binding on the latter. That is a finding of fact which cannot be, and has not been, challenged before us, and is enough in our view of the law to sustain the decree passed by the District Munsif. It is true that promissory note was executed by the mother and by her agent signing their names without purporting to do so on behalf of the minor. But that is not a material defect. For the circumstances proved in the case, taken along with the recital that the money was borrowed for family and pannai, etc., expenses, are sufficient to support the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge that the promissory note was executed by the mother not in her personal capacity but in her capacity as he guardian acting for the minor. The intention of the makers must have been to exclude the personal liability of the guardian and her agent, and leave the minor estate alone liable. This intention can be properly inferred, according to Satyanarayana v. Mallayya, from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances, which is precisely what the Subordinate Judge has done, and we can find no error of law in it. Nor is there anything in the pleadings which prevents the appellant, who is the payee under the note, from relying on the Hindu law liability of the minor. The plaint has been framed in such a way as to raise the question of the liability of the minor on the consideration, that is, the debt, which is an obligation different from, and external to the note, though arising out of it under the personal law. There is therefore no valid objection to the appellant's claim.

    There is one more argument of the respondents' Counsel which may be briefly noticed. He contended that there was no proof that the money advanced under Exhibit A-1 had been utilized for the benefit of the Estate. Assuming that there is no such proof, still it is difficult to appreciate the argument. It is settled that a bona fide lender is under no obligation to see to the application of the money. As observed by the Judicial Committee in Hunoomanpersaud's case:

    “The purposes for which a loan is wanted are often future, as regards the actual application, and a lender can rarely have, unless he enters on the management, the means of controlling and directing the actual application. Their Lordships do not think that a bona fide creditor should suffer when he has acted honestly and with due caution, but is himself deceived.”.

    Proof of actual application will be necessary only if the validity of the transaction is to be tested from the point of view of necessaries under the Contract Act and not if it is to be decided on the rule of Hindu law. If a different rule has been enunciated in Maharana Shri Ranmalsinghji v. Vadilal Vakhatchand of in any other case we must express our inability to accept it as correct.

    On the law to be applied to the facts found in this case the appellant is entitled to succeed. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the judgment of Venkataramana Rao, J. is set aside and the decree of the District Munsif restored with costs throughout. The first respondent has filed an application claiming to be an agriculturist and praying for the benefit of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (IV of 1938). This petition will be referred to the District Munsif of Palni for enquiry and disposal according to law.

    A.S.V

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    P.E.R.M. Annamalai Chetty v. Satyavadivel Muthuswami Maniagaran
    (Feb 24, 1939)