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  • S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act
  • Madras Act V of 1922
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act
  • Madras Act V of 1922
Smart Summary

Summary of Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-petitioner, a Mittadar, filed a suit seeking a declaration that he was entitled to take water from the Cauvery free of irrigation cess and for a refund of about Rs. 50 which he alleged had been illegally levied. The trial Court required the plaintiff to pay Court-fee under S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act read with the proviso added by the Madras Amendment (Madras Act V of 1922). Effectively, the lower Court held that the plaintiff should value the suit and pay Court-fee on the basis of half the value of the plaint-mentioned properties calculated under Cl. (v) of S. 7. The plaintiff filed a revision petition challenging that assessment of Court-fee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prayer for a declaration can be read as ancillary to the prayer for refund (i.e., whether the two prayers should be read together or independently).
  2. Whether the proviso added to S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) by Madras Act V of 1922 — the proviso applying where "the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property" — applies to this suit, thereby affecting valuation and Court-fee.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The revision petition contended that the lower Court's view requiring valuation under the Madras proviso was incorrect.
  • It was argued that the plaint could be read so that the prayer for declaration was ancillary to the prayer for refund; alternatively, even if the prayers were read independently, the principal question concerned application of the Madras proviso.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Venkatakrishna Pathar Jackson, J.'s prima facie interpretation that the phrase "the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property" should be understood to mean the dispute ought to relate to the title to immovable property; and that other constructions lead to difficulties and anomalies. The Court relied on Jackson, J.'s interpretation to read the proviso as directed to disputes involving title or possession of immovable property and to reject an expansive reading that would apply the proviso to the present suit.
Vaiyapuri Chetty v. Ramachandra Thevar(2) Reference to the observation that a declaration of the right of easement "may be said to be with reference to immoveable property," but also the clarification that the proviso should be read to mean matters involving possession of land, houses or gardens, and thus not applicable to easements. The Court noted how Jackson, J. distinguished this case to show that easements fall under sub-clause (e) (not (c)) and that the Madras proviso amends only sub-clause (c); this supported the conclusion that the proviso does not apply to the present suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first acknowledging that the plaint might, on one reading, make the declaration ancillary to the claim for refund. However, even assuming the prayers are to be read independently, the suit would fall within S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. The decisive question thus became whether the proviso added by Madras Act V of 1922 — applicable where "the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property" — applied.

The Court accepted the prima facie interpretation, endorsed in Jackson, J.'s opinion in In re Venkatakrishna Pathar, that "with reference to any immovable property" should be taken to mean a dispute relating in some sense to title (or possession) of immovable property. The opinion emphasized Jackson, J.'s observation that reading the proviso more broadly would create anomalies.

Further, the Court considered Jackson, J.'s treatment of Vaiyapuri Chetty v. Ramachandra Thevar and his clarification that, while an easement may superficially be said to relate to immovable property, the proviso ought to be read in connection with matters involving possession (and thus would not apply to easements). The Court noted that easements are dealt with under sub-clause (e) of S. 7(iv), whereas the Madras amendment adds a proviso only to sub-clause (c).

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observed that there was no dispute about the plaintiff's title to his mitta and that the plaintiff was not seeking a declaration of an easement in the strict sense. The plaintiff sought only immunity from assessment and recovery of money. Reading the words "the relief sought" in the proviso as relating to "consequential relief" in Cl. (c) of the Act, the Court found that the consequential relief here related to recovery of money rather than to immovable property. Consequently, the Madras proviso did not apply.

Holding and Implications

The order of the lower Court is set aside.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the Madras proviso to S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) does not apply to this suit, and that the suit was properly valued in the first instance.
  • The petitioner is entitled to his costs in the Civil Revision Petition.
The opinion does not discuss broader precedential consequences beyond the direct effect on valuation, Court-fee assessment and costs in this case.

    E.R. Gurunatha Chettiar v. Secretary Of State For India In Council

    JUDGMENT

    This revision petition raises a question of Court-fee. The plaintiff-petitioner who is a Mittadar, brought the suit for a declaration that in respect of certain lands in his mitta he is entitled to take water from the cauvery free of irrigation cess and for refund of a sum of Rs. 50 and odd which, according to him, had been illegally levied from him. The Court below has called upon the plaintiff to pay Court-fee under S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act read along with the proviso added by the Madras Amendment to that clause. In effect it has held that the plaintiff should value the suit and pay Court-fee on the basis of half the value of the plaint-mentioned properties calculated under Cl. (v) of S. 7.

    In the revision petition it has been contended before me that this is not a correct view. It is not impossible to read the plaint in such a way as to make the prayer for declaration ancillary to the prayer for refund. But assuming for the sake of argument, that the two prayers have to be read independently, the case will fall, no doubt, under S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. The only question is whether the proviso added to that clause by Madras Act V of 1922 applies to the present case. The amendment provides for a case where “the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property.” In seems to me that the prima facie interpretation of that expression is that the dispute should in some sense relate to the title to immoveable property. This is obviously Jackson, J.'s opinion In re Venkatakrishna Pathar. The learned Judge points out the difficulties and anomalies to which any other construction will lead. It is true that in that case the lower Court had asked the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on the basis of the Madras amendment to S. 7 Cl. (iv)(c). But there was no complaint against it by the plaintiff, and the learned Judge had only to deal With the defendant's contention that the suit must be valued as one for possession.

    The way Jackson, J., distinguishes Vaiyapuri Chetty v. Ramachandra Thevar(2) shows the inclination of his opinion. The observation of the learned Judge that “inasmuch as the relief sought is the declaration of the right of easement, the relief may be said to be with reference to immoveable property” must be understood in the light of the succeeding observation that “the proviso should be read with the clause, so as to make ‘with reference to’ mean involving the possession of land, houses or gardens; and then the proviso would not be applicable to easements at all”. If the suit is substantially one for easement, it will fall not under sub-clause (c) of S. 7(iv) but under sub-clause (e), and the Madras amendment introduces a proviso only to sub-clause (c) and not to sub-clause (e).

    In the present case, there is no dispute about the plaintiff's title to his mitta; nor is he seeking a declaration even in respect of a right of easement in the strict sense. He is merely asking for an immunity from assessment. It seems to me to be putting a very unnatural interpretation on the words of the proviso to say that in the present suit relief is sought with reference to immoveable property. I would also point out that the words “the relief sought” in the proviso must be read as relating to the words “consequential relief” in Cl. (c) of the main Act. If so, the consequential relief in the present case does not relate to immoveable property at all, but is only a claim for recovery of money. I am therefore of opinion that the case does not fall within the proviso added by Madras Act V of 1922 and that the suit was properly valued in the first instance.

    The order of the lower Court is accordingly set aside. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs in the Civil Revision Petition.

    Order set aside.

    N.R.R

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    E.R. Gurunatha Chettiar v. Secretary Of State For India In Council
    (Nov 18, 1935)