Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 12-C(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act.
  • S. 12(c) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 12-C(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act.
  • S. 12(c) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from assessments of the firm K.V. Kandaswami Gounder and Brothers (the "assessees") under the Madras General Sales-Tax Act. For the assessment year 1947-1948 the assessees had an earlier assessment based on a declared turnover (an assessment order dated 6th October 1943 is recorded in the opinion). For the 1948-1949 year the assessees submitted an A Form return. On 15th March 1950 the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Salem, carried out a surprise inspection at the firm's factory and godown at Alagasamudram and seized several account books containing entries for 1945-1946 to 1948-1949 which did not tally with the returns. Notices dated 20th March 1950 proposed revision of the earlier assessment and disregard of the A Form return for 1948-1949. Assessment orders dated 27th March 1950 revised the turnover for 1947-1948 to Rs. 94,792-8-11 and for 1948-1949 to Rs. 1,51,500 and tax demands were raised. The assessees appealed to the Commercial Tax Officer who dismissed the appeals (orders dated 22nd November 1950). Revisions to the Deputy Commissioner were dismissed (dates recorded in the opinion). The assessees then invoked the Board of Revenue's revisional jurisdiction under S. 12(3) of the Act; the Board dismissed the revisions by orders dated 16th December 1952 and 19th January 1953. Three appeals (Nos. 213, 356, 357 of 1953) were filed to the High Court under S. 12(c)(1).

For the assessment year 1949-1950 the assessees had filed an A Form showing turnover Rs. 32,788-0-11. By notice dated 27th March 1951 the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer proposed rejecting the accounts and estimating turnover at Rs. 62,000 based on the seized books and suppressed transactions. Similar appellate and revisional proceedings followed and the Board of Revenue again dismissed the revisions; Appeal No. 357 of 1953 arises from that order.

A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeals was raised by the Assistant Government Pleader under S. 12-C(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act; the objection questioned whether S. 12(c)(1) permits appeals to the High Court only when the Board of Revenue acted "suo motu" under S. 12(3). In view of the objection, the assessees filed civil miscellaneous petitions seeking conversion of the appeals into revisions under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal to the High Court under S. 12(c)(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act lies only against orders of the Board of Revenue passed "suo motu" under S. 12(3)(i), and not against orders passed by the Board in proceedings initiated by a party under S. 12(3)(ii).
  2. Whether, in the interests of justice, the High Court should convert appeals found incompetent under S. 12(c)(1) into revisions under Article 227 and, if so, on what terms.
  3. On the merits under Article 227 (if conversion permitted): whether the seized account books were owned by the assessees and whether the assessment authorities erred in estimating turnover by attributing proportionate additions for periods not covered by the seized books.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Assessees') Arguments

  • Counsel urged a liberal construction of S. 12(c)(1), contending that it should be read to include every case in which the Board's revisional jurisdiction under S. 12(3) had been exercised (i.e., not limited to cases where the Board acted suo motu).
  • The assessees argued that the account books seized on 15th March 1950 did not belong to them but had been planted by their enemies; accordingly the seized books could not be used to revise assessments.
  • It was also contended that the seized books had been recovered from a room not in the exclusive possession of the assessees (a building partly occupied by a cooperative society), so ownership of the books by the assessees was doubtful.
  • They further argued there was internal evidence in the seized account-books that the transactions recorded could not be real, thereby militating against treating those books as genuine records of the firm's turnover.

Respondent's (Revenue's) Arguments

  • The Assistant Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection that S. 12(c)(1) permits appeals to the High Court only against Board orders passed suo motu under S. 12(3)(i) and not against orders resulting from a party-initiated revision under S. 12(3)(ii).
  • Implicit in the revenue's position (and reflected in the assessing and appellate orders) was that the seized books demonstrated suppression and justified revising the turnover and estimating suppressed transactions proportionately for periods not covered by seized books.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

On the preliminary question of maintainability the Court undertook a textual and structural construction of S. 12(3) and S. 12(c)(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act as recorded in the opinion.

The Court observed that S. 12(3) clearly divides the Board's revisional jurisdiction into two distinct modes: (i) the Board may act suo motu; and (ii) the Board may act on an application by a party in respect of orders passed by subordinate authorities. The Court noted that S. 12(c)(1) explicitly enumerates "orders of the Board passed suo motu" under S. 12(3) as those from which appeals lie to the High Court within sixty days.

The Assistant Government Pleader's contention — that S. 12(c)(1) is restricted to suo motu orders — was accepted. The Court rejected the appellants' submission that S. 12(c)(1) should be given a liberal construction so as to cover every case where the Board's revisional jurisdiction had been exercised. The Court explained that adopting the appellants' construction would effectively nullify the word "suo motu" in S. 12(c)(1), but that word obviously refers back to S. 12(3)(i). Therefore the Court held that appeals under S. 12(c)(1) lie only from orders of the Board passed suo motu, not from orders passed following a party's application under S. 12(3)(ii).

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appeals before it were incompetent.

Turning to the civil miscellaneous petitions filed to convert the incompetent appeals into revisions under Article 227, the Court exercised its discretion in favour of permitting conversion in the interests of justice, noting that the construction question arose before the Court for the first time and the assessees sought indulgence. The Court allowed conversion but only on terms — payment of costs to the respondent fixed at Rs. 150.

Having permitted conversion, the Court proceeded to consider the merits under Article 227. The main factual contentions examined were:

  • The ownership of the seized account books: the Court treated the contention that the books were planted and that the seized place was not in the assessees' exclusive possession as an afterthought. The ownership point was not raised before the assessing officer but first surfaced in the grounds of appeal and at oral evidence before the Commercial Tax Officer. The Commercial Tax Officer had taken evidence and reached an adverse conclusion; the High Court found no basis to overturn that factual finding on revision under Article 227.
  • The internal reliability of the seized books (i.e., whether entries were genuine): the Court considered the submission but found no factual basis in the record sufficient to disturb the conclusions reached by the taxing authorities.
  • Estimation for periods not covered by the seized books: the Court accepted the taxing authorities' approach. The seized books showed suppression when compared with the regular books; consequently the regular books could not be relied upon to represent all turnover. The Court considered it permissible to estimate suppressed dealings and to attribute a proportionate addition for periods not covered by the seized books, particularly since the assessees had not produced books showing the suppressed transactions.

In sum, the Court found no jurisdictional error, no failure of justice, and no sufficient basis to interfere under Article 227 with the assessment orders or the Board's revision orders.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court held that appeals under S. 12(c)(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act lie only from orders of the Board of Revenue passed suo motu under S. 12(3)(i); where the Board's revisional jurisdiction has been invoked by a party under S. 12(3)(ii), S. 12(c)(1) does not provide a right of appeal to the High Court. Consequently, the appeals before the Court were declared incompetent.

The Court, however, exercised discretion to permit conversion of the incompetent appeals into revisions under Article 227 of the Constitution in the interests of justice, but only on the condition that the petitioners pay costs to the respondent (fixed at Rs. 150).

On the merits under Article 227 the Court dismissed the petitions (i.e., refused to interfere with the tax authorities' decisions). The opinion records the consequential costs order: the petitions were dismissed with costs in one (counsel's fee Rs. 100).

Implications: The decision clarifies the narrow scope of S. 12(c)(1) — appeals to the High Court are limited to Board orders taken suo motu under S. 12(3)(i). No broader rule of precedent beyond the case's holdings was stated in the opinion; the immediate practical effects were (1) the three appeals were held incompetent, (2) conversion to Article 227 revision was allowed on terms (costs Rs. 150), and (3) on the merits the revision petitions failed and were dismissed with costs (counsel's fee Rs. 100). The opinion does not state that a new general precedent was intended beyond the statutory construction and conclusions drawn in this case.


Prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added, inferred, or introduced beyond what appears in that opinion.

    K.V. Kandaswami Gounder v. State Of Madras

    (Delivered by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.)

    These three appeals have been filed by the firm of Kandaswami Gounder and Brothers (whom we shall refer to as “assessees”) who have been assessed to sales-tax under S. 12(c) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act against the orders of the board of Revenue passed under S. 12(3) of the said Act. A preliminary objection was taken to the maintainability of these appeals, a matter which we shall consider a little later; and in view of this objection, three civil miscellaneous petitions have been filed to convert these appeals into revisions by invoking our jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution.

    A few facts are necessary to understand first the preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeals which we are upholding and also the points that arise for consideration in the revisions under Art. 227.

    The assessees (the appellants in these appeals and the petitioners in these civil miscellaneous petitions) K.V Kandaswami Gounder and Brothers were a firm carrying on business as dealers in fibre, coir and rope the place of business being at Salem Junction with a factory and godown at Alagasamudram, For the assessment year 1947-1948 the assessment of the assessees was duly completed on the basis of a turnover of Rs. 30,300 accepting the returns submitted by them by an assessment order dated 6th October 1943. For the next year 1948-1949 the assessees submitted a return in A Form showing a not turnover of Rs. 23,109-13-11. Before this assessment was completed, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, salem, conducted surprise inspection of the assessees' factory and godown on 15th March 1950 at, Alagasamudram and seized a number of account books which pertained to the years 1945-1946 to 1948-1949. The entries in these accounts did not tally with the accounts on the basis of which the A Form returns had been furnished. After these accounts were seized and examined, notices were issued to the aseessees on 20th March 1950, (1) to show cause why the final assessment made for the assessment year 1947-1948 which had already been completed should not be revised and (2) why the A Form return submitted for 1948-1949 should not be disregarded and the turnover determined on the basis of the transactions as disclosed in the accounts seized. No satisfactory explanation was offered to these notices, and the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer accordingly gave effect to what he proposed to do in the notices issued on 20th March 1950 These assessment orders Were dated 27th March 1950, and by virtue of these the assessment for the year 1947-1948 was revised on the basis of a turnover of Rs 94,792-8-11 and that for the succeeding year was computed at Rs. 1,51,500. The appropriate tax due on this turnover was calculated and a demand was made for the payment of these sums. The assessees filed an appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer and in their grounds they put forward the contention that the account books seized at the surprise inspection and check on 15th March 1950 did not pertain to their business but had been planted in the place wherefrom they were seized, by their enemies. The Commercial Tax Officer, Salem, who heard these appeals dismissed them by orders dated 22nd November 1950. This appellate authority pointed out that the case put forward before him disclaiming the ownership of the account books was an after-thought, and treating the seized books as reflecting the transactions of the assessee firm he held that the turnover computed for the two years by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was correct. Against the Order of the Commercial Tax Officer the assessees preferred revision petitions to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Coimbatore Division. The revision in relation to 1947-1948 was disposed of on 12th December 1931 and that in relation to the succeeding year on 22nd February 1952. Both the petitions were dismissed. Against the orders of the Deputy Commissioner the assessees had an option to prefer appeals either to the Sales-Tax Appellate Tribunal under S. 12-A or to apply in revision to the Board of Revenue under S. 12(3). They chose the latter alternative and sought relief at the hands of the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue passed orders on 16th December 1952 and 19th January 1953 dismissing both the revisions. Appeal No. 356 of 1953 is directed against the order of the Board dated 19th January 1953 in relation to the assessment year 1947-1948 while Appeal No. 213 of 1953 is against the order in relation to the asses: merit year 1948-1949.

    To complete the narrative we shall set out the facts in relation to Appeal No. 357 of 1953. For the assessment year 1949-1950 the assessees disclosed in their A Form return a turnover of Rs. 32.788-0-11. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer called upon the assessees by notice dated 27th March 195 1 to show cause why the accounts on the basis of which the turnover return was computed should not be rejected and why the turnover should not be estimated at Rs. 62,000. This figure was arrived at by computing the turnover taking into account the seized account books and adding to the transactions disclosed those which had been suppressed but which were found entered in the seized books. Except denying the ownership of the account books the assessees offered no other acceptable explanation and when this contention was rejected the assessing authority estimated the turnover at the figure indicated in his notice. There was again an appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer and the same process of appeal and revision in the same manner as regards the previous years was gone through in regard to this assessment also. From the final order of the Board of Revenue rejecting the revisions under S. 12(3) of the Act, Appeal No. 357 of 1953 has been filed.

    When the appeals were opened, the learned Assistant Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection to their maintainability based upon the terms of S. 12-C(1) of the Madras General Sales-Tax Act. To understand this objection it is necessary to advert to S. 12(3) of the Act under which the assessees invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue. That provision runs thus:

    “Section 12(3): The Board of Revenue may

    (i) suo motu, or

    (ii) in respect of any order passed or proceeding recorded by the Deputy Commissioner under Sub-S. (2) or any other provision of this Act and against which no appeal has been preferred to the Appellate Tribunal under S. 12-A on application,

    call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded under the provisions of this Act by any officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order, or as to the regularity of such proceeding, and may pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.”

    The material portion of S. 12(c)(1) under which these three appeals have been preferred to this Court runs thus:

    “12(c)(1): Any assesses objecting to an order relating to assessment passed by the Board of Revenue suo motu under S. 12, Sub-S. (3), may appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date on which the order was communicated to him.”

    The point raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader was that an appeal lay to this Court under S. 12(c)(1) only where the Board of Revenue acted “suo motu” under S. 12(3) and not in cases where the Brand of Revenue did not act suo motu but where its revisional jurisdiction was invoked by an application preferred by a party. He pointed out that from the order of the Deputy Commissioner of commercial Taxes, the assessee could elect either to appeal to the Sales-Tax Appellate Tribunal and then apply to this Court in revision under S. 12 B, or to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue, in which case that order would attain finality without an appeallying to this Court under S. 12(c)(1). In our judgment this contention is well founded and the preliminary objection has to be upheld. S. 12(3) divides the manner in which the revisional proceeding can come up before the Board of Revenue into two distinct heads distinguishing them by two Sub-Clauses. Sub-Cl. (1) enables the Board by itself, without reference to a party, to take cognizance of orders passed by subordinate authorities and to exercise revisional jurisdiction over them. Sub-Cl. (ii) contains another mode in which this revisional jurisdiction could be brought into operation and this is by an application by a party. The latter Subsection makes it clear that the remedy by way of revision to the Board, which an assessee might invoke, is an alternative to the remedy by way of appeal under S. 12-A. When we come to S. 12-(c)(1) it is found that it specifically enumerates “orders of the Board passed suo motu” from among the orders passed by it under S. 12(3) as those in regard to which appeals lie to this Court under that provision. It is therefore clear that an appeal lies to this Court under S. 12(c)(1) only in those cases where the matter has been taken up by the Board suo motu and that cases where an assessee has invoked the Board's revisional jurisdiction under S. 12(3)(ii) are not within the class of orders, against which appeals lie under S. 12(c)(1).

    Mr. Kesava Aiyangar learned Counsel for the appellants however urged before us that we should adopt a liberal construction of a provision which enables an appeal to be filed and read S. 12(c)(1) as including every case where the revisional jurisdiction of the Board had been exercised under S. 12(3). Learned Counsel pointed out that, though under S. 12(3) the mode, in which the revisional jurisdiction of the Board could be invoked was divided into two clauses, designated respectively by different numerals, still S. 12(c)(1) had not stated “under S. 12(3)(1)” but had referred to the entire Sub-S. (3). We feel wholly unable to follow this argument. The construction contended for by learned Counsel would in effect delete the words “suo motu” used in S. 12(c)(1) and unless this were done, the result which Counsel seeks to achieve cannot be reached. We cannot con-sides the expression “suo motu” as superfluous, since it obivously refers us back to the terms of S. 12(3)(1) from where it has obviously been taken. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that S. 12(c)(1) does not enable an appeal to be filed from orders of revision passed by the Board where the assessee has invoked its revisional jurisdiction by an application under S. 12(3)(ii).

    The further contention of learned Counsel was that it was against an order of revision passed by the Board that an appeal is provided for under S. 12(c)(1) and that as the order would be the same and would be arrived at by the same process of reasoning, however the proceedings be initiated, we should hold that the terms of S. 12(c)(1) were satisfied. This is merely a re-statement of a contention which we have already rejected and does not require independent consideration.

    We therefore hold that the appeals are incompetent.

    After the arguments on the preliminary objection, learned Counsel for the appellants filed the C.M.Ps we have referred to above, to convert these appeals into revisions under Art. 227 of the Constitution in case we were to uphold the preliminary objection. In view of our upholding the preliminary objection we consider that in the interests of justice we should permit the conversion so as to enable the assessees to satisfy us that there was no material on the record on the basis of which the assessment orders could be sustained. We are impressed by the fact that the construction of S. 12(c)(1) comes up before us for the first time. But in view of the assessees seeking our indulgence and taking into account the delay in filing the petition we consider that this should be permitted only on terms of the petitioner paying costs to the respondent and this we fix at Rs. 150.

    Learned Counsel realised the precise scope of our jurisdiction under Art. 227 and he accordingly took us through records in an effort to show that there was no material on which the assessment orders could be sustained.

    As we have already indicated, the main burden of the assessees' case was that the account books which were seized on 15th March 1950 by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Salem, did not belong to them. Before the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer who effected the re-assessment for the year 1947-1943 and the assessment for 1948-1949 the point as regards the ownership of the account books was not raised. It was however formulated before the Commercial Tax Officer in their grounds of appeal to him. The Commercial Tax Officer took evidence on the point and it was after considering this evidence that he reached a conclusion adverse to the assessees. In regard to this matter. Mr. Kesava Aiyangar made two submissions: (1) that the books had been recovered from a building which was occupied in part by a co-operative society and that the place or room where from these account books were recovered was one which was not in the exclusive possession of the assessees, but that on the other hand other people had access to it and (2) that the account-books themselves contained transactions which could not be real, that there was therefore sufficient internal evidence furnished by the books themselves which would militate against their being a record of genuine transactions.

    We shall consider these two objections in that order. The fact is as regards the ownership of the books based upon their having been recovered from a place not in the exclusive possession of the assessees, we are clearly of the opinion that this objection was an after thought. It was not formulated in the grounds of appeal to the Commercial Tax Officer, though it was sought to be made out when it came to adducing oral evidence before this appellate authority.

    (After discussing the facts and the evidence in the case, His Lordship held).

    We see therefore no basis on which the assessees could successfully invoke our jurisdiction to interfere under Art. 227 with the order of the tax authorities.

    The last of the contentions urged was that the seized accounts did not cover the entire period of assessment for the three years, and that the authorities erred in computing the turnover for the periods not covered by the seized books by attributing to such periods a proportionate addition to the turnover. We do not see any error of jurisdiction in following this procedure either. There had certainly been a suppression by the assessees in the regular books maintained by them, of some of the transactions entered into, as would be clear from the entries in the seized books. The regular account books produced could not therefore be relied upon as representing all their turnover. There had to be an estimate of the suppressed dealings. We do not see any error in law or any failure of justice in the process adopted by the taxing authorities in treating the assessses to have perused a uniform course of conduct of suppressing the same proportion of the turnover. In any event the assessees cannot have any complaint because they had not produced to the tax authorities the books which would have contained the suppressed transactions. We see therefore no substance in the last of the arguments urged and wereject it.

    The result is that these petitions also fail and are dismissed with costs in one. (Counsel's fee, Rs. 100).

    V.C.S

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    K.V. Kandaswami Gounder v. State Of Madras
    (Apr 26, 1957)