Spencer, J.:— The plaintiff, who died during the pendency of the suit, was one of the daughters of Jaila Rowther by his first wife Fatma Bi, and defendant 7 who was the principal of those who contested the claim is a daughter by a later marriage. The suit was brought for the recovery of the plaintiff's share of her father Jaila Rowther's share in the estate of the plaintiff's grandfather Ahamsa. It was resisted on the ground that the plaintiff's mother having been married to a Hindu husband named Maniya Gounden, her subsequent marriage to Jaila Rowther, while the first marriage was subsisting, was not legal, and therefore the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 5 were illegitimate and as such debarred by the form of Mahomedan law in force among Sunnis from inheriting as sharers. The suit failed in both the lower Courts and the plaintiff's legal representatives appeal by their next friend.
2. Five contentions based on questions of law have been put forward at the hearing of this second appeal, namely:
(1) By conversion to Islam defendant 1 became a good Mahomedan and the ??? of her marriage with a Hindu became hereby dissolved and her subsequent marriage to a Mahomedan was valid.
(2) A marriage of this kind, though regular, would be regarded by the Mahomedans as not invalid, and by the principle of factum valet the irregularity would be condoned by the couple living together as husband and wife.
(3) In considering whether the marriage is valid, it is necessary to apply the law prevailing in the French possessions in India. Hindus and Mahomedans ??? in French India are not necessarily governed by the law recognized in British India, and it is incumbent on the defendants to show that the French Courts have adopted the same principles ??? the Courts in British India.
(4) By the custom and usages of persons belonging to the Palli caste, marriage with a second husband during the lifetime of the first husband is permissible; and the onus lies on those who assert that such a custom is not applicable in a particular case to prove it.
(5) The finding of fact by the lower Courts amounts to the establishment of the fact that there was an acknowledgment on the part of Jaila Rowther of the legitimacy of his children by defendant 2. It is conceded that, if the marriage was invalid and the parties knew it, no acknowledgment could make legitimate the offspring of a union which had its inception in illegitimacy; but it is contended that it has not been proved that the parties to the marriage knew it to be an invalid one.
3. We may briefly dispose of the last three contentions by observing first, that the Mahomedan and Hindu laws being personal laws are attached to the followers of each religion wherever they may be living and that the facts found by the lower Courts are that the plaintiff's mother, Fatma alias Unnamalai, was married to Mania Gounden at Karimputtur in Pondicherry but her marriage to Jaila Rowther was performed at Sholavalli in the South Arcot District which is British territory, and therefore, as the marriage to Jaila Rowther has come before the British Courts, the law we must administer is that prevail-in British India; secondly that, assuming that there is a custom among Pallis or Vanniyans of allowing a woman to marry again during the lifetime of her first husband such a custom is contrary to public policy and to morality and appears to be condemned by the community: (see p. 103, Gazetteer of the South Arcot District), and therefore the Courts will refuse to recognize it, and thirdly, that a mere recognition of paternity is not equivalent to a recognition of legitimacy: vide, Abdul Razak v. Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindanim(1) and the acknowledgment cannot make legitimate, the offspring of zina (fornication or adultery): vide Mardan Sahib Gansusaheb v. Rajak Saheb Kashimsaheb(2). The questions of law arising out of the first two contentions, which may be taken together, are more difficult of solution, but we feel no doubt of the answer which must be given to them.
4. The District Munsif found that defendant 1's Hindu marriage with Maniya Gounden took place 40 years ago. In para. 38 of his judgment he stated that her marriage with Jaila Rowther might be presumed to have taken place more than 34 years ago, though in the last paragraph of his judgment he gave no definite finding as to the date of this marriage, and the District Judge has left it open. Assuming that defendant 1's conversion and marriage took place before the conception of the children who were born of this union, the point to be decided is whether they may be treated as legitimate offspring. In a Mahomedan country the law is that, when a woman is converted to the faith of Islam she must apply to the Kazi or Magistrate who will call upon the hubs and to embrace the faith also and if he refuses the Kazi will dissolve the marriage. In a foreign country if the wife becomes a Moslem and her husband is an infidel separation takes place after the lapse of three monthly courses: see pp. 176 to 179 of Hedaya, Vol. 1, and pp. 426 and-427 of Ameer Ali's Mahomedan law Vol. 2. Certain observations which occur at p. 12 of Norton's Leading Cases, Vol. 1, and the remarks of Kernan, J., in Sinammal v. Administrator-General of Madras(3) are quoted in support of the theory that when a Hindu married woman who deserts her husband becomes a convert to Mahomedanism and adopts the habits of and lives as the wife of a Mahomedan she is altogether out of the pale of the Hindu law and ceases to have any recognized legal status according to that she becomes civilly dead and that the marriage and the relation of husband and wife become thereby absolutely dissolved. The view taken by Kernan, J., was not completely followed by Parker, J., when the question of the same marriage between Sinammal and Kristna a native convert to Christianity, came up for his consideration. He pointed out that although Kristna's conversion to Christianity rendered him an out caste according to the Hindu law he might have been re-admitted to the status as a Brahman and his degradation might have been atoned for by renouncing Christianity and performing the rights of expiation enjoined by his caste. He therefore held that apostacy does not itself, dissolve the marriage tie: Administrator General of Madras v. Anadachari(4).
5. This question has now been settled beyond all reasonable doubt by the decisions of In the matter of Ram Kumari(5) which was followed in Emperor v. Lazar(6), also by Sundari Letani v. Pitambari Letani(7), by Government of Bombay v. Ganga(8), and by Jamna Devi v. Mal Raj(9) where the questions arising for determination Were similar to those in the present suit.
6. Where a conflict occurs between persons, belonging to different religions the Courts must apply, the rules of justice, equity and good conscience: vide Subbaraya Pillai v. Ramasami Pillai(10).
7. In considering whether defendant 1's first marriage was subsisting or not at the time of her second marriage with Jaila Rowther the principles of Hindu law must be applied but in testing the validity of her second marriage with Jaila Rowther the principles of Mehomedan law must be applied. According to Hindu law her Hindu marriage was not dissolved by her apostacy. According is Mahomedan law the marriage of a man with the wife of another man is not permitted so long as the first marriage is subsisting. Such a union will not be merely invalid (fasid), but altogether void (batil) and illegal: vide Liaqet Ali v. Karim-un-nissa(11) and p. 332, Cl. (c) of Ameer Ali's Mahomedan law, Vol. 2. The dictum in Norton's Leading Cases, Vol. 1, p. 12, must be considered to have been overruled by subsequent decisions and to be no longer good law.
8. It is argued that because the conversion of a non-Moslem wife to Mahomedanism in a foreign country dissolves the wife's marriage with her non-Moslem husband after the completion of three of her periods, the marriage in the present case would be perfectly valid supposing that the Moslem husband waited for three months after the woman's conversion before he married her; and that even if ??? marriage had been performed during lose three months the marriage would ??? merely irregular: see Tyabji's, J. principles of Mahomedan law pp. 102 and) ??? for the principle that a marriage iring the iddat or three months period which must elapse between the termination of one marriage and that into which a ??? may subsequently enter is only regular. As it must be held on the authority of the decisions to which I ??? referred that defendant 1's marriage with her Hindu husband was still sub-sting in spite of her conversion, her marriage to another man of a different ??? was not merely irregular in the ??? of Mahomedan Law, but absolutely legal and prohibited. The plaintiff must ??? be regarded as an illegitimate child of Jaila Rowther, even adopting the facts lost favourable to her contention. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with ??? of respondents 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 one set).
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— I entirely agree with the judgment just now pronounced ??? my learned brother, and I do not link that I can usefully add anything ??? my own words. I might however ??? endorse his view that, if here is a custom among any community allowing a woman to marry again during the lifetime of her first husband without any defined rules by which the carriage with her first husband is ??? before the second marriage is ??? such a custom is contrary to ??? policy and morality, and cannot ??? recognized by the Courts. The sentence quoted however by the learned vakil for the appellants from the South Acrot District Gazetteer (p. 103) does tot, in my opinion, speak to the existence if the large, ill-defined custom relied upon by the appellants. As regards the ??? of factum valet neither in the Hindu nor the Mahomedan law, does it ??? excuse the violation of a legal rule to as to make acts performed in such dotation legally valid. That doctrine only ??? that a precept which merely belongs to the domain of ecclesiastical admonitory precepts has not “in the ??? of Vyavahara” or secular law he same force as a positive and a clear rule of the Vyavahara law has. As Sirkar says, in his book on Hindu Law, 3rd Edn., pp. 16 and 17, the text of Vyasa which prohibit one to alienate one's own share in a joint family property or one's own self-acquired property are moral precepts and cannot weigh against the man's legal rights to exercise the right of alienation which the positive civil law gives, as “it is an axiomatic principle of the Vyavahara law that a co-sharer can dispose of his share and that one can dispose of his self-acquired property.” On the question of conversion to Islam of a Hindu wife and her marriage thereafter to a Mussalman husband during the lifetime of her first husband, I shall merely quote a few passages from Ameer Ali's Mahomedan Law, Vol. II: “The Native Converts' Marriage Dissolution Act (21 of 1866) was specially designed to meet the case of converts to Christianity from Hinduism and other cognate systems which do not recognize the dissolution of a marriage once contracted * * * * Christianity and Islam are the only two proselytizing religions, an India, and conversions to Islam, are frequently as sincere as conversions to Christianity. But no “native husband” or “native wife” adopting Islam is entitled to come to the Court to obtain the relief provided in the Act. Their status is not allowed to be governed by the laws of the new faith, but continues to be subject to the law or custom to which they were subject before”: see p. 425. * * *.
“If the conversion to Islam takes place in an Islamic country the Kazi must be moved to summon the other party to adopt the Moslem Faith. In case of compliance, the marriage remains intact and valid ab initio; and there is no need for renewing the contract, though, in practice it is sometimes done. Until the Judge has made his decree separating the parties, the connexion remains invalid and has all the consequences flowing from an invalid connexion: see pp. 426 and 427. * * * *
“The Calcutta High Court has held that India is not a non-Islamic country, and that consequently when a married non-Moslem woman adopts the Mahomedan Faith, and thereafter, contracts a fresh marriage without applying to a Judge or a Magistrate to call upon the husband to adopt Islam, she is guilty of bigamy: see p. 427.”
9. In the result, I agree with my learned brother that this second appeal should be dismissed with costs of respondents 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12.
S.N/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.