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  • Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can be maintained.Section 92 of the present Civil Procedure Code eorresponds to section 539 of the old Code
  • (a) Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (b) section 92 of the same Code and (c) sections 14 and 18 of Act XX of 1863.
  • section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act
  • SECTION 14 RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT
  • RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT 1863
  • provisions of section 92(1). An amendment of Act XX
  • Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.A
  • sections 26 to 35 of the Trustee Act of 1893
  • SECTION 18 RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT
  • section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • sub-clauses of clause (1) of section 92.
  • section 539 nor the new section 92
  • section 539 of the Code of 1882.
  • provisions of sub-section (1).The
  • section 92 of the Code of Civil
  • provisions of Order I, rule 8,
  • sub-section (2) of section 92,
  • Act of 1908 by section 92
  • section 9 of the Code
  • Order I, rule 8,
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citation codes
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  • Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can be maintained.Section 92 of the present Civil Procedure Code eorresponds to section 539 of the old Code
  • (a) Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (b) section 92 of the same Code and (c) sections 14 and 18 of Act XX of 1863.
  • section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act
  • SECTION 14 RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT
  • RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT 1863
  • provisions of section 92(1). An amendment of Act XX
  • Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.A
  • sections 26 to 35 of the Trustee Act of 1893
  • SECTION 18 RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT
  • section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code,
  • section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • sub-clauses of clause (1) of section 92.
  • section 539 nor the new section 92
  • section 539 of the Code of 1882.
  • provisions of sub-section (1).The
  • section 92 of the Code of Civil
  • provisions of Order I, rule 8,
  • sub-section (2) of section 92,
  • Act of 1908 by section 92
  • section 9 of the Code
  • Order I, rule 8,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Reference to Full Bench)

Factual and Procedural Background

This litigation arises from a suit instituted by two worshippers of the Venkataramana Swami temple at Tandoni Hill near Karur, said to be brought on behalf of themselves and the other worshippers. The defendants include members of the Devasthanam Committee (defendants Nos. 1–9) and certain archakas and stanikas (defendants Nos. 10–15). The principal relief sought is to set aside a document dated 9 September 1893 described as a "perpetual lease" which purported to alienate to the archakas the money offerings (cash and gold/silver jewels) made by devotees while reserving Rs. 300 per year to the temple.

Historically, one of the archakas appears to have acted as trustee before the Devasthanam Committee came into existence around 1882. Records from the 1820s show administrative directions that the practice of archakas receiving such offerings be continued. By the late 19th century the Committee asserted rights on behalf of the Deity; a settlement in 1893 resulted in the Deity receiving Rs. 300 annually while the archakas received the remainder.

Procedural history: the District Munsif dismissed the plaintiffs' suit; the Subordinate Judge reversed the decree. Two appeals were filed (one by some archakas and another by the first plaintiff). Because of an important procedural question about the plaintiffs' capacity to sue, the matter was referred to a Full Bench by order of reference framed by Coutts Trotter, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit can be maintained by the plaintiffs suing on behalf of themselves and the other worshippers without (a) suing on the relation of the Advocate-General or (b) obtaining the sanction prescribed by section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1863 (i.e., whether the plaintiffs have locus standi under Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure without the statutory sanction).
  2. Whether the 9 September 1893 document (described as a perpetual lease) effecting an alienation of the offerings is valid — specifically, whether the offerings belong to the Deity (idol) as a matter of law and, if so, whether the trustees/Devasthanam Committee could permanently alienate that income (i.e., whether a permanent alienation is ultra vires).
  3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation, given that the 1893 document related to existing and future income (i.e., whether each wrongful appropriation gives rise to a fresh cause of action).
  4. Whether the Devasthanam Committee had authority to enter into the 1893 transaction and whether the trustee's (when not impleaded) actions affect the validity of the arrangement.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' / Defendants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • It was contended (by Mr. Rangachariar for the archakas/defendants) that the 1893 instrument was the result of a bona fide settlement of disputed claims and therefore binding on the trust.
  • The archakas relied on the long-standing usage (going back many decades) under which the archakas received the offerings, arguing a proprietary right in the offerings based on that practice.
  • It was also pleaded that the arrangement — securing Rs. 300 to the temple and the balance to the archakas — was beneficial to the temple and that the suit was barred by limitation.
  • Finally, it was contended that the plaintiffs lacked competence (locus standi) to maintain the suit without the statutory sanction or relation of the Advocate-General.

Plaintiffs' / Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Counsel for the plaintiffs (Mr. Venkatsrama Sastriyar and others) argued that, prima facie, offerings made by devotees are intended for the Deity and therefore belong to the temple (the idol) rather than to the archakas.
  • From that premise it was argued that no usage, however long, can sanction a permanent appropriation of such offerings by archakas or servants of the temple; at most allocations to servants may be temporary and subject to periodical revision to protect the trust.
  • On limitation, the plaintiffs relied on the principle that when a trustee or wrongdoer appropriates trust income day by day a fresh cause of action arises with each appropriation (invoking Holroyd v. Marshall and related authority).
  • On the jurisdictional point, plaintiffs relied on Order I, rule 8 (permitting a few persons to sue on behalf of many with the court's permission) to commence the action.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Parjaram Hirji Offers without designated recipient are to the Deity (idol). Cited as authority for treating undirected offerings as belonging to the Deity.
Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Devi Offers belong to the idol (Deity). Applied along with other cases to support the proposition that offerings are temple property.
Girijanund Datta Jha v. Sailajanund Datta Jha Offers made by devotees belong to the idol. Relied on for the same proposition that the offerings are trust property of the temple.
Narasimha Chari v. Gopala Ayyangar Trustees cannot make permanent alienation of trust property; principle that permanent alienation is ultra vires. Used to support the conclusion that a permanent alienation of temple income is ultra vires of trustees/managers.
Holroyd v. Marshall A permanent arrangement affecting future receipts creates a fresh cause of action upon each wrongful appropriation. Applied to reject limitation defence — each wrongful receipt gave rise to a fresh actionable wrong.
Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin Restrictive view: body of worshippers too vague to maintain suits (contrary authority). Noted as taking the opposite view to the Madras authorities; used to illustrate conflict of decisions.
Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram Holdings relevant to ownership of offerings (cited among cases about offerings belonging to idol). Included among decisions applied to conclude offerings belong to the Deity.
Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo Permanent alienation of trust property is ultra vires of trustees. Relied on as settled law that trustees cannot permanently alienate trust assets.
Mayandi Chettiyar v. Chokkalingam Pillay Permanent alienation of trust property is ultra vires. Grouped with other cases to establish the rule against permanent alienation by trustees.
Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koortweree Principles on trustees' powers applied to temple endowments. Referenced as foundational to limiting trustee powers and applied to temple management.
Hossein Ali Khan v. Mahanta Bhagaban Das Application of trustee principles to temple endowments (Judicial Committee application). Used to show the Judicial Committee applied family-trust principles to temple trusts.
Pramada Nath Ray v. Poorna Chandra Ray Application of general trustee principles to religious endowments. Referenced to support limitations on trustee powers over temple property.
Venkatachella Reddiar v. The Collector of Trichinopoly Invoked on limitation point (as relied upon by Mr. Rangachariar). Court treated the case as inapplicable to facts here and did not adopt its reasoning for barring the suit.
Jalandhar Thahur v. Jharula Das Each wrongful appropriation of income by a person entitled to receive it gives rise to a fresh actionable wrong. Applied to support that suits are not barred by limitation where appropriation recurs.
Kaliyanaramayyar v. Mustak Shah Saheb Discusses adoption/ratification of acts done by committees versus trustees. Cited and distinguished; court held it did not conflict with view that committee acts outside trustee powers are not binding unless adopted.
Dasondhay v. Muhammad Abu Nasar Decision in point on whether worshippers without full compliance with Order I, rule 8 or sanction may maintain suit. Noted as supporting the proposition that such suits can be maintained despite non-compliance with procedural formalities in some circumstances.
Kamaraju v. Asanali Sheriff (footnote case) Authority suggesting that, with exceptions, suits by two worshippers may be maintainable. Referenced to illustrate certain decisions holding that two worshippers could institute suits other than for possession.
Subramania Iyer v. Nagarathna Naicker Example of a suit by worshippers against trustees. Relied upon as authority showing worshippers’ suits have been entertained in this Presidency.
Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma Listed among authorities construing the special statutory procedure (section 539/92). Used in support of the view that suits against strangers are outside the special statutory provision.
Rangasamy Naidu v. Chinnasamy Iyer Listed among cases on the scope of statutory provision for suits relating to trusts. Included in the series of decisions limiting section 539/92 to certain classes of relief.
Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry Included in the list of authorities on the statutory scope. Part of the authorities relied upon to show consistent judicial approach.
Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Khalifa Included in the long list on statutory interpretation of section 539/92. Adduced as part of a pattern that suits for possession against strangers lie outside the special statutory route.
Ali Haffiz v. Abdur Rahaman Considered for the suggestion that alienees might be treated as trustees in some circumstances. Cited to note alternative judicial suggestions; no conclusive ruling taken on that point in this opinion.
Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy Principles on the scope of the statutory provision for trust suits. Included in the list showing judicial trend on the limited scope of the special provision.
Collector of Poona v. Bai Chanchalbai Discusses suits in relation to trusts and the scope of the statutory scheme. Quoted as part of the authority that a suit to recover property from strangers is outside the statutory section.
Ghelabhai Gavrishanker v. Uderam Icharam Included among precedents on scope of section 539/92. Used to demonstrate uniformity of judicial approach across various High Courts.
Ghazaffar Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain Included among authorities on the limited ambit of the statutory provision. Part of the series of cases indicating suits against strangers fall outside section 539/92.
Tika Ram v. Ratan Lal Included in the list of cases on the statutory provision's scope. Relied upon as part of the common judicial trend noted by the court.
Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav Noted as an exception to the general consensus. Mentioned as the single case taking a different view about the statutory coverage of suits.
Jawahra v. Akbar Husain Support for the proposition that habitual worshippers have direct interest in a mosque; comparison invoked for Hindu worshippers. Applied by analogy to support that worshippers have a substantial interest enabling them to sue.
Muhammad Amir v. Sumitra Kuar Cited in relation to res judicata and the role/limits of worshippers' suits. Discussed to illustrate procedural consequences and limitations in previous decisions.
Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Balkrishna Quoted for observations supportive of worshippers' rights to bring suits. Used to support the view that worshippers may have direct interest to sue for the preservation of the institution.
Adamson v. Arumugam Considered in contrast; held not to affect the present question. Court observed it does not alter the analysis of worshippers' rights to sue in this context.
Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar Discussed as not precluding collective rights where individuals lack certain rights. Referred to reject an argument that collective worshippers cannot possess rights distinct from individuals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains complementary reasoning from three judges who participated in the reference (Coutts Trotter, J.; Seshagiri Ayyar, J.; and Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J.), with Phillips, J. concurring in the final answer. Their reasoning can be summarized as follows, strictly reflecting the recorded text.

Coutts Trotter, J. (Order of Reference)

  • Factual premise: historical practice showed archakas received offerings; Devasthanam Committee arose c.1882 and in 1893 agreed an arrangement giving Rs. 300 to temple and remainder to archakas.
  • Legal analysis: in the absence of a designated recipient, offerings are to be taken to be made to the Deity — a proposition supported by earlier decisions cited.
  • Because offerings belong to the Deity, permanent alienation by trustees of that income is ultra vires; the bona fides of the transaction does not validate an ultra vires permanent alienation.
  • Limitation defence rejected because the 1893 document affected future income and each appropriation gave rise to a fresh cause of action (Holroyd v. Marshall).
  • Key procedural question: whether the plaintiffs (two worshippers suing on behalf of worshippers generally) can maintain the action without the Advocate-General's relation or the sanction under section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act. He viewed Madras authorities as being against allowing unrestricted suits by worshippers from everywhere and proposed reference to Full Bench for authoritative settlement.

Seshagiri Ayyar, J.

  • Examined documentary and historical material and concluded that the intention of donors was to benefit the Deity and that collectors' orders in the 1820s–1880s reflected temporary arrangements to supplement archakas' remuneration rather than a proprietary transfer.
  • Held that even if the Committee honestly acted, it was not competent to make an unalterable, perpetual assignment that deprives the temple permanently of its resources; such permanent alienation is ultra vires and incompatible with religious purposes.
  • On limitation, applied the principle from Holroyd v. Marshall and Jalandhar Thahur v. Jharula Das that each wrongful appropriation is a fresh cause of action, so limitation did not bar the suit.
  • On committee powers, he adhered to prior views that the committee had only visitatorial jurisdiction and could not bind the trust by such permanent leases; a trustee could adopt unauthorized acts but was not bound by them.
  • On plaintiffs' right to sue, he articulated that Order I, rule 8, section 92 of the Code and sections 14 and 18 of Act XX of 1863 are to be read together but are not mutually destructive; he took the view that an individual or collective worshippers may have an independent right to sue where a civil right in relation to the trust is interfered with, and that section 92's sanction requirement is confined to the specific reliefs enumerated in that section. Given the existing authorities in the Presidency, he would not bar such a suit for want of locus standi; he noted the trustee should have been joined but that this could be rectified.
  • He nevertheless agreed that the conflict of authorities justified Full Bench consideration of the precise procedural question.

Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J.

  • Focused on statutory interpretation of section 92 of the Code (corresponding to old section 539), particularly sub‑section (2), and on whether the reliefs sought fall within the enumerated reliefs requiring sanction.
  • Concluded the particular reliefs in the plaint (declaration of invalidity of the lease and a direction that the trustee or duly appointed manager retain the right to collect the hundi) were not of the kind that required the sanction under section 92 because, as the court found, trustees had never been divested of the property and an order vesting property in trustees was not necessary.
  • Surveyed a long line of authorities and observed a near‑consensus among High Courts that suits to establish that property in the hands of strangers belongs to the trust, or to obtain possession from strangers, lie outside the special statutory scheme — with only one reported exception; therefore he was not prepared to construe section 92 as ousting ordinary civil jurisdiction in such cases.
  • Answering the referred question, he concluded in the affirmative: the suit can be maintained by the plaintiffs without the Advocate‑General's relation or the sanction under section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act.

Phillips, J.

  • Concurring: observed that numerous decisions have answered the question referred in the affirmative and agreed with Seshagiri Ayyar, J.'s and Coutts Trotter, J.'s exposition while expressing a preference that section 92 be amended to include suits of this nature.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench was asked the framed question and the Court's answer, as stated in the opinion, is:

Answer to the referred question: IN THE AFFIRMATIVE.

Consequences and immediate effects (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The Court held that the plaintiffs — two worshippers suing on behalf of themselves and other worshippers with leave of Court under Order I, rule 8 — may maintain the present suit without suing on the relation of the Advocate‑General and without obtaining the sanction specified by section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, insofar as the reliefs they seek fall outside the specific reliefs for which section 92 requires sanction.
  • The judges (particularly Coutts Trotter and Seshagiri Ayyar) concluded on the merits that the offerings belong to the Deity (idol) and that a permanent alienation of such income by trustees or a committee (as in the 1893 instrument) is ultra vires and not binding on the temple. The committee/trustees were never divested of the property, so an order to vest property in trustees was unnecessary in the circumstances.
  • The limitation defence was rejected on the ground that the 1893 arrangement involved future income and each wrongful appropriation gives rise to a fresh cause of action; hence the suit was not time‑barred.
  • The opinion records a practical requirement that the trustee should have been impleaded; the court indicated that this defect could be rectified.
  • While the court answered the procedural question affirmatively, several judges expressed the view that the statutory scheme could use clarification — notably suggestions that section 92 should be amended to include suits of the present kind to remove uncertainty and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The Court did not, however, purport to create a new statutory rule; it applied existing authorities and concluded according to the consensus of the High Courts on the point.

Note: The Court emphasized that its conclusions are grounded on the authorities and statutory construction summarized in the opinion; it did not purport to fashion legislative change but suggested that legislative amendment would better clarify the scope of section 92.

    Kalyana Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar

    The Second Appeals came on for hearing in the first instance before Coutts Trotter and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ., who delivered the following Order of Reference to a Full Bench:—

    Coutts Trotter, J.:— This is a suit by two worshippers of the temple of Venkataramana Swami situated in Tandoni Hill near Karur, expressed to be brought on behalf of themselves and the other worshippers of the temple. The first nine defendants are the members of the Devasthanam Committee of Karur, and defendants Nos. 10 to 14 are the archakas and stanikas. The object of the suit is to set aside a document, dated the 9th September 1893, which purported to effect an alienation of the money offerings made by the worshippers to the archakas with a reservation of Rs. 300 a year to the temple. The document is spoken of as a perpetual lease, but its actual designation is not very material, its effect being that which I have described.

    The Devasthanam Committee as a superintending body appears to have come into existence about 1882. Before that the practice appears to have been that one of the archakas should be the trustee of the temple properties. When we first hear of the temple in 1825 its revenues were small and the then Collector on a report from the Tahsildar that it was customary for the money offerings of the worshippers to go to the archakas by way of remuneration for their services endorsed the practice with his approval and directed it to continue. It did continue apparently without serious challenge till the appointment of the Devasthanam Committee in 1882. The revenues by this time had largely increased and the Committee began to raise claims to these money offerings on behalf of the Deity. The archakas cited the settled practice of something like a century in support of their contention that the money offerings were their own property. It was in this state of things that the arrangement which is impeached in this suit was come to in 1893 (Exhibit I) between the Devasthanam Committee on one side and the archakas on the other, whereby the Deity received Rs. 300 a year and surrendered the balance to the archakas, I see no reason to suppose that this document was not executed in good faith, though in the view that I take of the case that is not the determining consideration.

    In the absence of a designated recipient by the donor it is to my mind only possible to hold that the offerings must be taken to be made to the Deity. See Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Parjaram Hirji(1) and Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Devi(2), Girijanund Datta Jha v. Sailajanund Datta Jha(3), though the proposition is so obvious to my mind as hardly to need authority to establish it. It appears to me to be equally obvious that if the offerings primarily belonged to the Deity it is ultra vires of the temple trustees to make any permanent alienation of them; [see Narasimha Chari…(Plaintiff) v. Gopala Ayyangar…(Dependant) .*(6)] and I do not think it is any answer to say that the alienation was made bonâ fide in the honest expectation and belief that as matters stood it was for the benefit of the trust. In this view of the matter it appears to me unnecessary to discuss the question as to whether the Devasthanam Committee or the trustees were the proper body to enter into valid transactions on behalf of the trust, I am also of opinion that there is no substance in the plea of limitation relied upon by Mr. Rangachariar The alienation in the dooument of September 1893 related not only to existing but to future income, and a fresh cause of action was created in respect of each successive act of appropriation. This question appears to me to have been settled for ever by the well-known decision in Holroyd v. Marshall(7).

    There remains then only one question for disposal; but it is one which to my mind is of the Utmost importance, namely, whether the present plaintiffs are entitled to bring this action. By Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is provided that where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court, sue in such suit on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. By section 92 power is given to the Advocate-General or to two or more private individuals having an interest in a public trust to sue for certain reliefs. Sub-section (2) of section 92 enacts that no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted except in conformity with the manner indicated by sub-section (1) with a clause saving the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act of 1863. I may say at once that it cannot be contended that the present suit claims any of the reliefs enumerated in section 92(1). Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act of 1863 provides that any person or persons interested in any mosque, temple or religious establishment or the trusts relating thereto may without joining any other persons as plaintiffs sue the trustee, etc., of such mosque or temple for any misfeasance or breach of trust committed by him. Section 18 of the same Act enacts that no suit shall be brought under the Act without the previous sanction of the Court. No sanction has in fact been sought or obtained in the present case. The case law on the subject in India is admittedly conflicting, and I do not propose to examine it in detail. I think it cannot be disputed that the Madras decisions are in favour of the position contended for by the respondent. That position, as I understand it, is this: that any Hindu hailing from any place all over India may at his pleasure institute a suit in the Courts of this Presidency challenging the acts of the trustees of a temple here for years back and call on them to account for sums of money which may amount to lakhs of rupees. This he is said to be entitled to do since as a Hindu he may be an actual and always is a potential worshipper at the particular temple and thus has an interest in the management of its funds. I should be loath to accede to such a startling proposition unless the authorities throughout India were clear and unanimous. The contrary view was emphatically taken at least in Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin. The Allahabad decisions do not appear to me to be helpful authorities one way or the other, for they are expressly based not on any consideration of the general law of Indian Procedure, but on what they take to be a settled principle of Muhammadan Law. In my opinion the object of section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code was to protect the temple trustees from being sued by irresponsible persons and to confine suits against them to the cases enumerated in that section and section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act, No limitation of course is put upon the right of any person to sue who has suffered or is likely to suffer some particular and individual injury over and above the general public. But I think the object, of the Act was to compel persons who wished to sue as representing the general public to satisfy the Court that their suit was not vexatious or to obtain the relation of the Advocate-General as representing the community at large in relation to the trust. The plaintiffs in the present suit have no doubt succeeded in framing a plaint which while seeking the same ends as the remedies enumerated in section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act avoids asking in terms for identically the same relief. The answer to that, in my opinion, is that those sections have designedly enacted the reliefs and the only reliefs open to members of the general public suing as such and hedged them round with the restrictions contained in the sections. In the present state of the authorities, especially of the Madras authorities, I do not feel at liberty to give expression in the form of a dissenting judgment to the strong view which I hold on this subject, and I think that can only be done, if it is to be done at all, by a Full Bench. I think the matter is of such importance that it ought to be authoritatively settled and I therefore propose the following question to be referred to a Full Bench:—

    “Can the present suit he maintained at the instance of the plaintiffs acting neither on the relation of the Advocate-General nor with the sanction prescribed by section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, but merely suing on behalf of themselves and of the other worshippers of the temple?”

    Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— This is a suit by two worshippers of the temple for a declaration that a perpetual lease of temple-income in favour of the defendants is void and not binding on the Devasthanam. The defendants Nos. 1 to 9 represent the members of the Devasthanam Committee who granted the lease on the 9th September 1893. Defendants Nos. 10 to 15 are the representatives of the archakas of the temple who obtained the lease. The trustee of the temple has not been made a party to this litigation. It is undisputed that the temple in question came under the management of the Committee only in 1882. At the time of the lease, Srinivasa Ayyangar, one of the archakas of the temple, was the trustee.

    A number of defences was raised to the action. It was pleaded that the collections leased out really belonged to the archakas and that the arrangement by which a sum of Rs. 300 a year was secured in perpetuity to the temple was beneficial to the temple. The further contentions were that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiffs were not competent to maintain the suit.

    The District Munsif dismissed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed the decree. Two appeals, one by some of the archakas and the other by the first plaintiff, have been filed.

    It may be stated at the outset that the questions argued before us have not been considered at any length by the Courts below, although the pleadings raised the points. Mr. Rangachariar's main contention was that the lease of 1893 was the result of a bonâ fide settlement of disputed claims, and that consequently it is binding on the trust. There can be no question that until 1893 the archakas were permitted to receive the whole of the income derived from the presents made to the Deity by devotees. The learned vakil argues from this that the usage of the temple is to vest the proprietary right in the offerings in the archakas. Mr. Venkatsrama Sastriyar contends in reply that primâ facie the presents belong to the Deity and that no usage, however long and ancient, can sanction a permanent appropriation of them by the servants of the temple. Before dealing with the questions of law which these contentions involve, it is necessary to examine the facts placed in evidence in this case.

    The temple in question is one of great repute among the worshippers. Under Regulation VII of 1816, it was under the management of the Collector of Coimbatore. In September 1825, Mr. Sullivan, the then Collector, directed the Tahsildar to report as to why “the kanikas (offerings) made to God which were receivable by the Sirkar from a long time were not received during the year in question.” He stated that it is “the custom that the money relating to kanikas in all Devastbanams are received by the Sirkar” and wanted to know “how the right of receiving the money in respect of the kanikas by the archakas came into existence in the said Devastbanam only”—Exhibit II. The Tahsildar reported in November of the same year that from the beginning the kanikas were received by the archakas. Thereupon the Collector directed the Tahsildar to continue the practice. Apparently the Government officials began to interfere with the collections even after this. Exhibit V, in April 1829, shows that one of the archakas complained to the Collector that if the collections were not paid back to him he would find it impossible to perform the puja, as the income from the land assigned to him was meagre. The Collector ordered the collections to be returned to the archaka. This state of affairs was not disturbed for a long time. The last order on the subject is Exhibit IV in April 1889. What led to this is not ascertainable. The order says that the income from the lands was not sufficient and that the cash collections may be made by the archakas. At this time, the Committee was in charge of the Devasthanam. There must have been a trustee also. What the Revenue Department had to do with the temple at this period, is not apparent. However that may be, there were deputes regarding the right to these offerings in 1893. Exhibits I and I(a) (the lease and its counterpart) both refer to the respective claims put forward. The Committee—I am prepared to concede that they acted at this time honestly—in consideration of being paid an annual subsidy of Rs. 300, assigned in perpetuity the right to the cash offerings.

    The first question is whether, granting that the Committee had power to act in the matter—I propose to say a few words on this question later on—they were justified in making an arrangement to enure for all time to come. I do not think that the Subordinate Judge construed the documents rightly when he said that the Collector did not assign the entire offerings to the arckakas. If the income appertained to the archakas, there can be no question that the Committee acted wisely in securing a fraction of it to the Deity. If it belonged to the Deity, is the alienation valid and binding on the trust? On the documents on which Mr. Rangachariar relied strongly, there is no doubt that the offerings were recorded as primâ facie belonging to the Deity. It cannot be otherwise. The intention of the donors is to propitiate God. They seek to obtain temporal and spiritual advantages by making these presents to the Deity. They have not the slightest idea of benefiting the archakas by these presents. The Hindu sastras which encourage pious gifts contemplate the upkeep of the places of worship and the performance of pujas and festivals to the Deity. Of course, it is competent to those who are in management to allocate either wholly or in fixed proportions the offerings as remuneration for the necessary services rendered by the servants of the temple. In my opinion, Exhibits II to V evidence only such an arrangement. The income from the offerings was not very large in those days, and the Collector thought it right that the archakas should be in receipt of it to supplement their remuneration. But this would not justify an unalterable arrangement by which the temple is deprived of the best part of its resources for ever. The arrangement should be subject to periodical revision, regard being had to the paramount interests of the institution.

    It is not necessary to labour further the point that the archakas can have no proprietary right in the offerings made to the Deity. In all the important temples in Southern India, devotees are called upon to pay a fixed sum for the archana that has to be performed. This includes the wages of the person who performs the archana, the cost of the flowers, the remuneration of the person who recites the archana, etc., and the swarnapushpam offered to the Deity. A practice which distributes a portion of the levy to the persons who bring the flowers, who recite the holy names, and who actually do the puja, will not be illegal. But any arrangement which recognizes the swarnapushpam as the property of the archaka will be obnoxious to religious precepts and purposes. If the swarnapushpam is regarded as the property of the Deity and if a portion of it is utilized to supplement the pay of the servants, there can be no objection to it. But such an arrangement can only be of a temporary character, subject to periodical re-adjustment with reference to the exigencies of the time.

    Mr. Rangachariar strenuously contended that a permanent allotment of the income of the Deity is not invalid. He instanced the various inams which have been granted to archakas and others, and argued that those endowments were really permanent alienations of temple property. I am unable to see the analogy. Inams have been granted either by the ancient Rajas or by pious donors to particular families to enable them to conduct temple worship. This was done because the property they gave away was their own. They made grants to the temple as well as to those who were entrusted with the duty of conducting the daily aredanas in the temple. They were entitled to make any distribution of their property. The ingenious suggestion that we must consider that the donor dedicated to the Deity the total extant of the inam, that he constituted himself the trustee of the entire endowment and that from this endowment a permanent alienation in favour of those who conducted the worship was made, has no foundation either historically or in practice.

    It is now settled law that ordinarily a permanent alienation of trust property is ultra vires of the powers of a trustee: Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo, Mayandi Chettiyar v. Chokkalingam Pillay and Narasimha Chari v. Gopala Ayyangar. The foundation for this rule is that the trustee's primary duty should be to see that the temple income is not parted with to the prejudice of the trust. A permanent conveyance would render it impossible for the institution to gain advantages which increase in the income may bring. Another position is also equally well settled, namely, that the trustee has no larger powers over the trust property than managers of Hindu families have. The principles of the well-known case of Hunoomanpersaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koortweree have been applied by the Judicial Committee to temple endowments: Hossein Ali Khan v. Mahanta Bhagaban Das and Pramada Nath Ray v. Poorna Chandra Ray. It follows from these two positions that a trustee has no right to part with temple-income permanently. Benefit to the institution and justifiable necessity are the criteria to be applied in dealing with alienation of temple property.

    The exact point which we are called upon to decide has not been judicially considered in any Madras case. But in Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Govindram, Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Parjaram Hirji(8), Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev(9) and Girijanund Datta Jha v. Sailajanund Datta Jha(10), it was hold that offerings made by devotees belong to the idol and not to the archaka. Apart from the particular facts of these cases, the principles laid down in them are applicable to the present case. Mr. Rangachariar's appeal to hoary antiquity does not disturb me. If my conclusion is correct that the income belongs to the temple, it would be a breach of trust on the part of those responsible for the management to consent to its permanent alienation. Time cannot convert such violations of law into recognizable customs. The principle of Hindu Law that custom outweighs the written text of law does not apply to illegal customs. Manu in Chapter VIII, section 41, says: “A king who knows the revealed law must inquire into the particular laws of classes, the laws or usages of districts, the customs of traders or the rules of certain families, and establish their peculiar laws, if they be not repugnant to the law of Gad.” The English law is equally explicit on the point; Tudor on Charitable Trusts, page 163, My conclusion on this part of the case is that the income from the offerings belongs to the Deity, that it is not competent to the manager of the temple to permanently assign it away to the appellants and that consequently the arrangement of 1893 is not binding on the temple.

    The next contention of Mr. Rangachariar may be briefly dealt with. He relied on Venkatachella Reddiar v. The Collector of Trichinopoly for the position that the suit for declaration is barred by limitation. It is not necessary to state whether I agree with the view taken is that case. It is enough to say that case has no application to the present case. The Committee purported to assign away not any existing property, but what was expected to come into existence de die in diem. The cause of action to question such an alienation accrues every time that the offering is wrongfully received: see Holroyd v. Marshall. The Judicial Committee in Jalandhar Thahur v. Jharula Das said: “on each occasion upon which Jharula Das received and wrongfully appropriated to his own use a share of the income to which the shebait was entitled, Jharula Das committed a fresh actionable wrong in respect of which a suit could be brought against him by the shebait.” Applying this principle the suit is clearly not barred by limitation.

    I shall now say a word on the right of the Devasthanam Committee to enter into this transaction. I adhere to everything that I said in the Srirangam case regarding the respective rights and duties of trustees and of temple committees. Mr. Rangachariyar has not convinced me that the course of decisions in this Presidency which I followed in that case needs reconsideration. The decision in Kaliyanaramayyar v. Mustak Shah Saheb is not in conflict with my views. What Subrahmanya Ayyar, J., held in that case was, that where a committee does an act which is properly within the province of the trustee, the latter might adopt it. This is no more than saying that a person is not debarred from recognizing as valid an act done on his behalf without authority. He is not bound by it. He can repudiate it if he chooses. But he can take the benefit of it also. It was sought to justify the interference of the Committee on the ground that one of the archakas whose rights were in dispute was a trustee. That is a reason to my mind, to have asked the archakas to establish their claim in a Court of law. The trustee who was bound to protect the trust was making a claim against it in his capacity as arehaka; and the claim was conceded by the Committee which had no power to grant or renew leases but only a visitatorial jurisdiction. To my mind, the transaction seems entirely unsustainable. However, as I have held that even if the Committee had power to actively manage trust property and to represent the temple, the permanent lease is ultra vires its powers; it is not necessary to say anything more on the subject.

    I now come to the question of the plaintiffs' right of suit. I am aware that the decisions on the subject are not uniform, and may probably require reconsideration. I shall state my views on the subject, as at present advised. The provisions which bear on the question are: (a) Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (b) section 92 of the same Code and (c) sections 14 and 18 of Act XX of 1863. In my opinion, these provisions are mutually exclusive. An individual may have a right of suit irrespective of any of these provisions, when his civil right in relation to a trust is interfered with. If a man is denied access to a temple or mosque for purposes of worship, he can resort to a Court to establish his right. If the property of the institution is wasted or alienated, primâ facie the collective body of worshippers can sue on behalf of the trust. Order I, rule 8, is designed to consolidate this right of action and to confer the position of dominus litis on a few who obtain the sanction of the Court to represent others equally interested. Section 92 restricts by its second clause the right to obtain relief in respect of the conditions enumerated in clause (1) to the persons who obtain the Collector's or the Advocate-General's sanction; if the claim preferred is outside the purview of clause (1), it cannot be argued that the institution is without a remedy. I think the right to seek the aid of the Court existed independently of the statute and that the restriction imposed by section 92 should not be interpreted as taking away this right, except in so far as a special, mode of enforcing it after obtaining a particular sanction was imposed on the litigant. Under the earlier Acts now superseded, only some tribunals were invested with the power to grant the reliefs. The Act of 1908 has done away with that distinction. What I have said with reference to the Code of Civil Procedure applies mutatis mutandis to Act XX of 1863.

    In the present case, the right to obtain a declaration that the lease is not binding on the temple is not a relief covered by any of the sub-clauses of clause (1) of section 92. Nor does the Religious Endowments Act apply. No doubt by impleading the trustee and by slightly changing the nature of the relief claimed, the suit can be made to fall either under the Code or the Temple Act. But is a suitor bound to adopt this expedient on penalty of being denied redress, if he does not do so? If I understand Mr. Rangachariar aright, a suit of this kind ought certainly to claim a schema: that is the only proper procedure; and if a litigant does not adopt that course, be has no remedy. As at present advised, I do not see my way to adopting this drastic suggestion. I think that before the plaintiffs like the present, are told that they have no locus standi, it should be shown that the relief they claim has been specially reserved for persons who ought to have armed themselves with a sanction under the Code. Until that is done, the Courts which are charged under section 9 of the Code with jurisdiction to try all civil suits are not powerless to act.

    I now proceed to the decided cases which I do not propose to examine in any detail. Dasondhay v. Muhammad Abu Nasar is a decision in point. Even the provisions of Order I, rule 8, were not complied with, although the indication of the learned Judges was for holding that a sanction should have been obtained. In the case reported as a foot-note to Kamaraju v. Asanali Sheriff, the learned Judges hold that all but suits for possession can be maintained by two worshippers. Probably this is an extreme case. In Subramania Iyer v. Nagarathna Naicker, the trustees were no doubt defendants, but the suit was by the worshippers. Mr. Bhashyam Ayyangar has collected and placed before us quite an array of cases in which Courts wars moved by worshippers to deal with malversations of temple endowments. In this Presidency, the weight of authority is in favour of permitting such a suit. Mohiuddin v. Sayiduddin takes the opposite view. According to this decision, the body of worshippers is too vague an entity to be entrusted with rights of this kind. I prefer the view of Mahmood, J., concurred in by the other members of the Full Bench in Jawahra v. Akbar Husain: “It is an undoubted principle of Muhammadan Law that the persons who have the most direct interest in a mosque are the worshippers who are entitled and accustomed to use it.” This observation applies to Hindu devotees also. The Manager and the archakas have far less at stake than the worshippers. Their interest is that of servants or agents. The worshippers have a deeper interest in the integrity and well-being of the institutions. It is no answer to this to say that they ought not to be allowed to disturb rights. Order I, rule 8, imposes a limitation on the exercise of that powers. It is in this view I take it that the decision as to res judicata in Muhammad Amir v. Sumitra Kuar proceeds. The observation of Ranade, J., in Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Balkrishna support this view. The decision in Adamson v. Arumugam does not affect the present question. The right of worshippers in a temple is not analogous to the right of persons to use a public pathway. I do not think that Shephard, J., in Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar intended to lay down that if as individuals, persons belonging to a community have not certain rights, they cannot collectively possess them. In that case, the individual right was recognised and it was pointed out that the sanctity of a sanction under section 30 would not add to the rights. I do not consider it necessary to deal with the other cases quoted at the bar. I think that the action is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of want of capacity in the plaintiffs. I am aware that the decree is wrong in clothing the absent trustee with rights. I am also of opinion that the trustee should have been made a party to the suit. But that can be done even now.

    Although I have stated my views fully, I recognise that conflicting views have been held on this question; and it is desirable in a matter relating to procedure to formulate a common rule. I have, therefore, no objection to refer to the opinion of a Full Bench the question which my learned brother has framed.

    On this Reference—

    Second Appeal No. 801 of 1914.

    C.S Venkatachariar and N.C Vijayaraghavachariar for the appellants.

    K. Bhashyam Ayyangar for the respondents.

    Second Appeal No. 688 of 1914.

    K. Bhashyam Ayyangar for the appellant.

    Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J:— The question referred to the Full Bench is in these terms: “Can the present suit be maintained at the instance of the plaintiffs acting neither on the relation of the Advocate-General nor with the sanction prescribed by section 18 of the Religious Endowments Act, but merely suing on behalf of themselves and of other worshippers of the temple?”. It appears from the plaint in this suit that the Devasthanam Committee of the temple of Venkataramana Swami in Tandoni Hill near Karur, now represented by defendants Nos. 1 to 9, granted on 3th September 1893, what is called a perpetual lease of the right to collect offerings made by the pilgrims in cash and in gold and silver jewels, to defendants Nos. 10 to 14 who are the archakas and stanikas. It is alleged that the alienation of what is a chief source of income of the temple is highly detrimental to its interests, was beyond the power of the Committee and is not binding on the temple.

    The main reliefs which the plaintiffs claim are: “(a) to declare that the Committee had do power to make the alienation in question, (b) that alienation of the right in question is invalid and not binding on the temple and (c) to direct that the trustee or the manager duly appointed should retain the right of collecting the hundis is question” (‘hundi’ is the receptacle in which the offerings are put). The trustee has not been impleaded in the suit, No sanction was obtained under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code either of the Advocate-General or of the Collector and the question for our opinion is whether, without it, the suit which is instituted by two of the worshippers on behalf of themselves and the other worshippers with the leave of the Court obtained under Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can be maintained.

    Section 92 of the present Civil Procedure Code eorresponds to section 539 of the old Code with some difference. One important change is embodied in Sub-section (2) of section 92, which says, “save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, no suits claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity to the provisions of that section.” This has made clear what was formerly the subject of conflicting decisions, viz., that if the object of a suit is to obtain any relief of the specified description it will be entertained only if the conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled.

    In considering whether any of the reliefs asked for in a suit relating to a public, religious, or charitable trust answers the description of those mentioned in section 92, we must obviously have in regard the intrinsic nature of the relief claimed and not the language in which the draftsman of the plaint has chosen to express it. In this case, prayer (c) of the plaint, i.e, “the Court may be pleased to direct that the trustee or manager duly appointed should retain the right of collecting the hundi in questions is the only one which it is suggested corresponds to a relief specifically mentioned in section 92, viz., a decree vesting any property in a trustee.” Now there cm be no doubt that, as found, the alienation of the right by the Committee and the trustee was void and did not bind the temple in any way. The trustees were therefore never divested of the property which always remained vested in them and hence no order of the Court vesting it in them was necessary. The phrase “vesting any property in trustees” seams to contemplate cases where new trastees have been appointed or other cases of a similar nature such as those mentioned in sections 26 to 35 of the Trustee Act of 1893 of England. See Godefroi on Trusts, pages 512 to 516.

    Then, are the reliefs asked for in this suit of the nature contemplated by the general clause (h) “granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require”? That clause is not new: it found a place in section 539 of the Code of 1882. And it has always been held that it must be read along with the specified reliefs, and the reliefs that can be granted under the general clause should not be of a character different from those expressly mentioned; see Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy.

    It has been ruled in a long series of decisions by all the Courts that neither the old section 539 nor the new section 92 includes within its purview suits in which relief is sought against persons other than trustees, whether they are alienees from the trustees or trespassers. This special provision of the Code does not apply to suits the object of which is to establish that the property in the hands of strangers belongs to the trust and to recover the same. Its scope is confined to cases in which a proper administration of the trust is sought to be secured: see Strinivasa Ayyangar v. Strinivasa Swami, Subramania Iyer v. Nagarathna Naicker, Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma, Rangasamy Naidu v. Chinnasamy Iyer, Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry, Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Khalifa, Ali Haffiz v. Abdur Rahaman, Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy, Collector of Poona v. Bai Chanchalbai, Ghelabhai Gavrishanker v. Uderam Icharam, Ghazaffar Husain Khan v. Yawar Husain(11) and Tika Ram v. Ratan Lal(12). There is only one case brought to our notice in which a different view has been taken; namely, Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav(13). With that exception the consensus of opinion in all the High Courts has hitherto been that suits in which relief is asked for against strangers to the trust whether they are alienees from the trustees or trespassers are outside the purview of section 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure and I am not prepared to hold that this view is not warranted by the language of the statute. In certain cases it might lead to a multiplicity of actions and perhaps to conflict of decisions. On the other hand, the legislature might well have thought that where the main object of a suit is to secure a proper administration of the trust it is not desirable to complicate matters by allowing questions being raised between the trust on one hand and third parties claiming adversely to the trust. Having regard to the uniform trend of decisions upon section 539 of the Code of 1882 so far as this point is concerned, if the legislature thought the suits such as this should not be instituted except with the sanction of the Advocate-General, one would have expected it to include an express provision to that effect in section 92 of the present Code as it did as regards the removal of a trustee. I may mention that it has been suggested in Collector of Poona v. Bai Chanchalbai, that the alienees from a trustee would be proper parties to a suit under section 539 though no relief could be given against them by way of a decree in ejectment: and that suggestion has been approved by my learned brother Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma. It is not necessary however to express any opinion on that point, nor on the suggestion made by Mr. Justice Greaves of the Calcutta High Court in Ali Haffis v. Abdur Rahaman that the alienees might be treated as trustees and asked to convey the property to the duly appointed trustees.

    The answer to the question referred to us should be in the affirmative.

    Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— I stated in the Order of Reference, some of the reasons which led me to think that, notwithstanding the conflict of decisions, it was desirable to allow persons, like the plaintiffs in this case to institute suits under Order I, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    A brief historical sketch of the development of processual law in conserving trust properties for the trust may be given in order to see to what extent the existing judicial differences of opinion are capable of adjustment. The old Supreme Courts had an equitable jurisdiction in respect of charities. Under 53 Geo, III, cap. 155, section 111, the Advocate-General was empowered to lay informations and to represent, the Crown regarding the administration of charitable funds. The prerogative only extended to the local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. In the mufassal Courts, be had no right to intervene. The Civil Procedure Codes of 1859 and 1861 did not give him any such power. It was in the Act of 1877 that provisions were inserted for the first time which gave the Advocate-General a voice in the administration of charitable trusts in the mufassal. Religious trusts were not even then included.

    The Act of 1882 introduced some changes. Religious trusts were brought within the purview of the section and some minor amendments were made. The main object of the legislature was not yet achieved. Under section 539 of the Act of 1882, it was held that a resort to its provisions was not mandatory, but only permissive. There was no clause in the Act authorizing the removal of the trustee. Only the District Courts in the Presidency had jurisdiction in the matter.

    The Act of 1908 by section 92 has introduced far-reaching changes: (a) any Court of civil jurisdiction empowered in that behalf can take cognizance of the suit; (b) a clause is inserted enabling the Court to remove a trustas; (c) the operative portion of the sanction says that proceedings may be either contentious or non-contentious; clause (d) provides for directing accounts and enquiries and finally, sub-section (2) prohibits the institution of suits of the kind contemplated by the section except in conformity with the provisions of sub-section (1).

    The above outline gives some indication of the expansion of the legislative mind on this question. There is first a tentative provision. Only some charities are included. Subsequently every form of public charity is brought in, and the permission develops into a mandate.

    If this is the bent of mind, can the section be so construed as to cover all cases of abuse? The difficulty lies in the wording of the sub-clauses of sub-section (1). If under the section a trustee can be removed and a new one appointed, if accounts can be asked of the old one and enquiries can be directed against his management and if a scheme can be settled for the management, at first sight, it is difficult to understand why possession should not be taken from a person unlawfully holding trust properties, and why a declaration should not be given that the properties alienated belong to the trust. The principle that the express mention of a few instances implies the exclusion of others is the first obstacle in the way can the residuary clause (b) be invoked to grant the relief as to possession or declaration? The term “further relief” is of no use. If at all, these claims should be included in the word “other.” But when the legislature enacted section 92 of the Coda of Civil Procedure, all the High Courts had held that the previous section 539 would not cover suits for possession against strangers. And yet although a clause enabling the removal of a trustee was inserted is order to put an end to a controversy in that behalf and although a clause about enquiries and accounts from trustees was added, this prayer was not specifically provided for. Under these circumstances, it would be doing violence to the language employed by the legislature to hold that possession against strangers is within the purview of section 92. The same observations hold good with reference to declarations. Excellent reasons may be advanced for the contention that there is no reason for excluding suits for possession or declaration from the operation of the section; but we have to construe the section as it is and not as it ought to be; and although I feel strongly that the view hitherto entertained leads to anomalies and multiplicity of suits, I feel constrained to adhere to the other view by the fact that very eminent Judges have construed the section differently and that contention has held the field for a long time. To the number of those that have taken this view has to be added the Officiating Chief Justice in the present case.

    I do not think I would be justified in the face of this weight of authority for the other view, in giving effect to what I feel convinced is the real intention of the legislature.

    If I may venture a suggestion, the time is come for the intervention of the legislature to insert a clear and unambiguous provision in the Code of Civil Procedure that all reliefs relating to public, religious and charitable trusts, except those which partake of the character of personal or communal rights, should be litigated only under the provisions of section 92(1). An amendment of Act XX of 1863 may be necessary to give full effect to this suggestion.

    In the present case, the trustee is not before the Court and what is asked for, is virtually a declaration that the action of the Devasthanam Committee in alienating trust property is not binding on the trust. The decided cases to which I referred on the last occasion, with practical unanimity, hold that such a suit is not within section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    Following those decisions, I agree in answering the question referred to us in the affirmative.

    Phillips, J.:— In view of the numerous decisions, extending over a long period, which have answered the question referred, in the affirmative, I agree that the same answer should now be given. At the same time I wish to express my agreement with the views of my learned brother Seshagiri Ayyar, J., and the views expressed by Coutts Trotter, J., in his Order of Reference and venture to state my opinion that it is desirable that section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be made to include suits of the nature of the one before us.

    C.M.N

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    Kalyana Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar
    (Aug 15, 1916)