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  • II, section 10, placitum 7
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  • II, section 10, placitum 7
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench) — Congenital Blindness and Hindu Inheritance

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to recover property conveyed by his deceased father by a sale-deed to the plaintiff's brother-in-law (1st defendant), alleging the sale was nominal and not intended to pass title. The plaintiff had separated from his father long before the sale. The plaintiff's entitlement to the property depended on whether any undivided sons of the father were alive and entitled to succeed. The only undivided son then alive was the 9th defendant, who was alleged by the plaintiff to have been congenitally blind. The plaintiff pleaded that a congenitally blind person could not inherit under Hindu law; this plea was not traversed by the defendants and no issue had been framed on it at trial.

On appeal, the point about congenital blindness and inheritance was raised. One respondent contended the point should not be allowed for the first time in the Second Appeal and urged reconsideration of the ruling relied upon by the plaintiff (viz., Surayya v. Subbamma). A question was referred to a Full Bench: “Is a Hindu who is congenitally blind thereby excluded from the inheritance or has the rule become obsolete?”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Hindu who is congenitally blind is excluded from inheritance under Hindu law, or whether the rule excluding congenitally blind persons has become obsolete.
  2. Whether the point regarding exclusion of congenitally blind persons may be entertained for the first time in a Second Appeal as a pure question of law.
  3. Whether the Subordinate Judge's finding that the sale to the 1st defendant was a nominal transaction should be disturbed on Second Appeal (i.e., whether the sale was real or nominal, given the evidence).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by S. Ramaswami Ayyar)

  • The disqualifying provisions cited in ancient texts (e.g., Mitakshara, Chap. II, sec. 10) are moral or religious precepts rather than mandatory rules of law; they should be treated as evidence of custom rather than binding law.
  • The texts do not wholly deprive a disqualified person of succession rights; the disqualified person may retain an interest (for example, transmissibility to issue or maintenance) and the disqualification applies only to "share-taking" at partition and not to survivorship or ownership by birth.
  • The rules of exclusion may not apply uniformly across castes/societies and examples were cited (e.g., Nadars, and other authorities) to show variability and change in practice.
  • Cases and authorities can be interpreted to show that exclusion applies to supervening blindness (not congenital); the appellant relied on arguments that the rule should be considered obsolete in modern practice or at least limited in scope.
  • Authorities and commentaries (e.g., Colebrooke, Visvarupa, Sarasvati Vilasa) were invoked to support a narrower or obsolete view of the exclusionary rule.

First Respondent's Arguments (as presented by T. R. Venkatrama Sastri)

  • The Mitakshara (Chap. II, sec. 10) should be treated as an authoritative and binding statement of Hindu law in the Presidency; it excludes a congenitally blind person from a share in ancestral property by birth.
  • The Mitakshara contemplates removal of disqualification (e.g., by cure of blindness), the timing of which affects co-parcenary rights—the rule is specific and mandatory and has been consistently treated as law in many texts and decisions.
  • The distinction between 'share-taking' at partition and other notions of family membership was emphasised: a congenitally blind person may be a family member entitled to maintenance but not a co-parcener entitled to share at partition unless the disqualification is removed.
  • Textual authorities, judicial precedents and the established commentary tradition support the view that Mitakshara's disqualifications continue as law in this jurisdiction (subject to legislative change).

Reply and Additional Submissions

  • Appellant in reply referred to precedents and the argument for a liberal interpretation of antiquated rules (citing Soundarajan v. Arunachalam Chetty) — contemporary sentiment and changing usage ought to inform interpretation; antiquated precepts should not be imposed without regard to present conditions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surayya v. Subbamma Held by its Judges that the rule excluding congenitally blind persons had become obsolete (per the Full Bench's description of that decision). The Full Bench treated the present matter as, in effect, an appeal from Surayya and considered the correctness of Surayya; ultimately the Full Bench disagreed with Surayya and concluded the rule was not obsolete.
Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai Discussed the distinction between congenital blindness and blindness acquired after birth; held the rule did not apply to persons who became blind after birth (per Westropp, C.J.). Cited as authority showing prior judicial treatment distinguishing supervening blindness from congenital blindness; used by the Bench to show existing lines of authority.
Gunjeshwar Kunwar v. Durga Prashad Singh Privy Council: supervening (after-birth) blindness is not a ground of disqualification; affirms the rule and its limitation to congenital cases. Regarded as authoritative on the point that only congenital blindness is within the exclusion; used to weaken the claim that the entire rule had become obsolete.
Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal Discusses scope of the principle; noted that the Court declined to extend the reasoning in Surayya to cases of insanity and considered that rule in that area still a "living principle." Cited to show judicial reluctance to treat all text-based disqualifications as obsolete and to highlight distinctions among different disqualifications.
Sambasivam Pillai v. Secretary of State for India The learned Judges threw doubt on the correctness of the ruling in Surayya v. Subbamma (more particularly Odgers, J.). Referred to as part of the body of authority questioning Surayya; used to demonstrate existing judicial doubt about the obsolescence finding.
Ranga Ayyar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar Addressed when a sale to close relatives may be considered nominal and evidentiary value of possession, non-transfer of patta, absence of consideration. Cited by Krishnan, J. to show that Second Appeals can consider whether a sale was nominal on the basis of evidence; distinguished by the Bench on its facts.
Radhamohun v. Hardai Bibi Cited in argument concerning how Mitakshara should be treated and the authority of text-writers versus practice. Referenced by appellant's counsel to support interpretive points; the Court summarized the invocation but did not treat it as dispositive.
Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori Privy Council: holdings about sons' control over father's self-acquisitions; commentary on mixing moral/religious precepts with positive law. Quoted to support the proposition that ancient texts mix moral precepts and positive law and to caution against conflating the two without scrutiny.
Krishna v. Sami Deals with questions of share-taking, transmissibility, and reopening partitions where disqualification is removed; used to explain share-taking vs. survivorship and transmissibility. Used by parties and discussed by the Court as authority for the proposition that a son of a disqualified man born after partition may reopen partition; the Court analyzed its reasoning in discussing transmissibility and latent rights.
Kayarohana Pathan v. Subbaraya Thevan This information was not available in the provided opinion. This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Venkata Subba Rao v. Purushottam This information was not available in the provided opinion. This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Alagappa Chettiar v. Subramania Pandia Thevar This information was not available in the provided opinion. This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal This information was not available in the provided opinion. This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Tirumamagal Ammal v. Ramaswami Ayyangar Cited (in earlier jurisprudence) as a case of idiocy where Mitakshara's provisions were treated as the law current in Madras. Relied upon to show historical judicial treatment that supported the existence and continued recognition of the text-based disqualifications.
Kelka Pershad v. Budree Sah This information was not available in the provided opinion. This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das Calcutta Bench (1864): treated as a case where a man born blind was in 1832 in fact excluded from inheritance; discussion proceeded on the basis congenital blindness excluded. Referred to as historical judicial practice showing no contemporary impression that the rule was obsolete.
Rao Kishore Singh v. Mussamat Gahenabai Privy Council: held that the maxim cessat ratio cessat lex does not apply where the custom outlives the condition which gave it birth. Quoted by the Court to reject the appellant's argument that a law necessarily falls when its original reason disappears; used to set the legal test for obsolescence of a rule.
Soundarajan v. Arunachalam Chetty Referenced by appellant's reply: Seshagiri Ayyar, J., lays down a rule of interpretation urging that antiquated rules ought not to be thrust upon people. Noted by the Court as an interpretive stance urged by appellant; the Full Bench considered, but ultimately found no evidence of abandonment of the rule in practice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench undertook a multi-step analysis grounded in sources of Hindu law, textual interpretation, judicial precedent, and the evidentiary test for obsolescence:

  1. Sources and textual basis: The Court began with the established hierarchy for this Presidency — Mitakshara (Vignaneswara's commentary on Yajnavalkya) is the primary authority. Mitakshara Chap. II, sec. 10 was read as excluding a congenitally blind person from a share in inheritance (the Court interpreted the chapter as addressing exclusion from inheritance).
  2. Nature of the rule — moral precept or positive law: The Court rejected the appellant's submission that the Mitakshara's statement of exclusion was merely a moral or religious precept not intended as enforceable law. The Bench concluded that the exclusion of a congenitally blind person, as stated by Mitakshara, is a rule of law (a principle intended to govern inheritance rights), not merely advice.
  3. Proper interpretation of other texts (Visvarupa, Sarasvati Vilasa): The Bench examined Visvarupa (a recently surfaced manuscript) and Sarasvati Vilasa, and considered competing translations and interpretations. The Court questioned the authenticity and probative value of Visvarupa (refusing to act on it without critical scholarly scrutiny) and construed the Sarasvati Vilasa passages as consistent with the Mitakshara's position when read to mean a latent interest or transmissibility rather than an immediate entitlement to share-enjoyment.
  4. Obsolescence test (fact question requiring evidence): The Court emphasized that a rule of Hindu law does not become obsolete simply because it appears antiquated or because its original reason is no longer persuasive (rejecting a simplistic application of cessat ratio cessat lex). Instead, to establish obsolescence the party must produce positive evidence that the custom or practice has been abandoned in the community governed by the rule — i.e., evidence that the rule has been disregarded in practice over a sufficient period and across the relevant community.
  5. Weight of textual and judicial authorities and historic practice: The Bench surveyed a substantial list of medieval and modern text-writers and judicial decisions across Indian jurisdictions which, in their view, supported the continued recognition of the exclusion of congenitally blind persons. The Court found a "mass of authority" and no persuasive evidence of a general custom abandoning the rule within the Presidency.
  6. Distinction between supervening and congenital blindness: The Court accepted the established limitation (endorsed by the Privy Council in Gunjeshwar Kunwar) that blindness acquired after birth does not operate as a ground for disqualification; the exclusion applies to congenital cases.
  7. Application to facts and prior procedural points: The Full Bench treated the matter as an appeal engaging the correctness of Surayya. It also considered whether the point could be raised in Second Appeal (concluding that a pure point of law based on a fact admitted in the plaint could be entertained). Regarding the question of a nominal sale, the Bench accepted the Subordinate Judge's finding that there was a considerable body of evidence supporting his conclusion of nominal transaction and declined to disturb it.

The Court therefore concluded there was ample textual and judicial evidence that the exclusion of congenitally blind persons had not been abandoned in practice in the relevant jurisdiction and that mere anachronism does not by itself suffice to render a rule obsolete.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the negative as to obsolescence: a Hindu who is congenitally blind is excluded from the inheritance and the rule has not become obsolete.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the legal question referred: The rule excluding congenitally blind persons from inheriting remains binding law in the jurisdiction; courts must continue to apply it unless and until it is abrogated by competent legislative action.
  • On the present proceedings: The Court accepted the Subordinate Judge's finding that the sale to the 1st defendant was a nominal transaction based on a body of evidence and did not disturb that factual conclusion on second appeal.
  • On obsolescence and legal change: The Bench clarified the standard for declaring a textual rule obsolete — positive evidence of community abandonment is required rather than reliance on changed sentiments or modern notions of fairness alone. The Court noted that legislative repeal would be an appropriate route to displace the rule; it observed there was a legislative proposal before the Assembly but stressed that, until such enactment, courts are bound to enforce the rule.
  • Precedential effect: The Full Bench's conclusion is an authoritative judicial pronouncement in this jurisdiction affirming the continued force of the Mitakshara rule with respect to congenital blindness. The Bench also reinforced that existing precedents and texts supporting the rule carry weight absent clear evidence of abandonment.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the information contained in the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond those expressly stated in the opinion have been added.

    Pudiava Nadar v. Pavanasa Nadar

    Krishnan, J.:— This Second Appeal raises an important question of Hindu Law, namely, whether a person born blind loses thereby his right to share in the inheritance which he would otherwise have.

    Plaintiff is suing to recover a property for which his father, Kannakku Nadan now deceased, had executed a sale-deed in favour of his son-in-law, the 1st defendant, on the ground that the sale was not a real transaction but only a nominal one not intended to pass the title. Plaintiff had become divided from his father long prior to the sale and he would have no claim to his father's properties if any of the latter's undivided sons were alive and entitled to succeed to the father. The only undivided son now alive is the 9th defendant, but the plaintiff's case is that as he was admittedly born blind he could not take the inheritance under the Hindu Law and he was thus out of the way. Plaintiff had alleged this plea in his plaint and it had not been traversed by the defendants in their written statements and no issue had been framed on it. The point is, however, taken before us that the rule of Hindu Law relied on has become obsolete and is no longer in force on the strength of the ruling in Surayya v. Subbamma(1), which no doubt fully supports the contention.

    The learned vakil for the 1st respondent contends firstly that the point should not be allowed to be taken for the first time in Second Appeal and secondly that, the ruling itself is one that should be reconsidered. The first objection, I am inclined to think, should not be upheld as the question raised is a pure question of law and requires no other fact than the one stated by the plaintiff himself in his plaint, viz., that the 9th defendant is an undivided son of his father though congenitally blind. We must therefore, I think, allow the point to be raised but on terms as to costs, etc., to avoid any prejudice to the plaintiff.

    The second objection is a more difficult one; but I am inclined to think that the question should be settled by a Full Bench. The learned Judges who decided the case in Surayya v. Subbamma admit that a rule of Hindu Law existed as enunciated by Manu and by subsequent text writers excluding Jatyandhas or congenitally blind persons from the inheritance. A number of cases have proceeded on the footing that the rule was still in force. In fact Westropp, C.J, in Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai(2), in his very learned judgment took considerable pains to show that the rule did not apply to persons who had become blind after birth, which his Lordship need hardly have done if this rule itself had become obsolete. In the recent judgment of the Privy Council in Gunjeshwar Kunwar v. Durga Prashad Singh(3), after quoting the following passage from Sarvadhikari's Hindu Law of Inheritance.

    “Blindness, to cause exclusion from inheritance, must be congenital. Mere loss of sight which has supervened after birth is not a ground of disqualification. Incurable blindness, if not congenital, is not such an affliction as, under the Hindu Law, excludes a Hindu from the inheritance.”

    Their Lordships say that the above is the true rule. They thus affirm the rule as well its limitation as in force. This ruling is not referred to in Surayya v. Subbamma and that weakens the latter's authority considerably. To hold any part of a rule obsolete it is not sufficient to show that any other part of it has become obsolete but it must be shown that the particular part of it in question has been abandoned in practice by the communities governed by it sufficiently long ago as to justify an inference that it has been abrogated. On the other hand, in the present case it was frankly admitted by the learned vakil for the 2nd defendant that the general consciousness of the Hindus was that the rule continued in force and that was the very reason he gave why his client did not raise any contention about it when the plaintiff asserted it in the plaint. In fact nobody seems to have thought, that the rule was obsolete till the judgment in the Madras case was published.

    Much of the learned Judges’ arguments in the case, if correct, would apply with equal force to make all the other grounds of disqualification stated in the rule also obsolete, but when the ruling was quoted to the learned Judges in Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal, they declined to apply its principle to a case of insanity with regard to which they considered the rule to be still a “living principle.” Again in the judgment of this Court reported in Sambasivam Pillai v. Secretary of State for India, the learned Judges have thrown doubt on the correctness of the ruling in Surayya v. Subbamma, more particularly my learned brother Odgers, J.

    With, all respect to the learned Judges in the 43 Madras case, I think their decision requires further consideration; and as I am proposing a reference to the Full Bench I will not deal with the point in further detail or express a definite opinion on it.

    It may be mentioned in conclusion that the appellant also took exception to the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the sale to the 1st defendant was a nominal transaction and our attention was drawn to the ruling in Ranga Ayyar v. Srinivasa Ayyangar, to show that the question can be considered in Second Appeal. That, however, was a case where the sale was to the vendor's own wife and daughter, and their Lordships held that in those circumstances his possession of the property and of the sale-deed and the non-transfer of the patta and absence of consideration were matters of no evidentiary value, and as no motive was proved for executing a nominal sale-deed they considered that the sale was a real one. That case proceeded on its own special circumstances, and the finding was set aside really on the ground that there was no evidence to support it. In the present case there is a considerable body of evidence referred to by the Subordinate Judge in support of his finding and I think we must accept his conclusion.

    Before disposing of the case I would refer to the Full Bench the following question:

    “Is a Hindu who is congenitally blind thereby excluded from the inheritance or has the rule become obsolete?”

    Ayling, J.:— I should be willing to follow the decision in Surayya v. Subbomma but, in view of the doubts expressed by my learned brother, I assent to the reference proposed by him.

    I agree with him as regards the finding as to the nominal nature of the transaction.

    On This Reference

    S. Ramaswami Ayyar with E. Sankara Ayyar for appellant.—The real point is whether your Lordships are prepared to treat all the disqualifying circumstances enumerated in the Mitakshara as binding on the Courts today. I base my arguments on three considerations: (1) the disqualifying circumstances are more advisory than mandatory. They are mere moral or religious prohibitions not legal mandates (2) The texts do not take away the right of succession from the person. It resides in them but they cannot claim their particular share. (3) These rules are not meant to apply to such castes as that of the Nadars Radhamohun v. Hardai Bibi.

    (1) The rule of exclusion is taken from Manu: Mitakshara, Chap. 2, sec. 10, see Colebrooke's translation. A blind man is there named as one of the persons who are disqualified from inheriting. It does not say that blindness to disqualify must be congenital. The grounds of exclusion in Mitakshara are merely precepts of moral obligation and are not binding on Courts like statutory enactments. They can at most be regarded as evidence regarding the custom of the country. Usages have been changing, and that is specially mentioned by Vignaneswara as his justification for writing a new commentary. The provision relating to disqualification of the blind in the Yajnavalkya is quoted as it is by Visvarupa: Ghose, Vol. II, page 16. But at the same time he appends a further statement regarding the usage as it existed during his time and never mentions the blind as disqualified. He makes no attempt at reconciling the text with, the usage. It follows, therefore, that exclusion from inheritance, if ever it was a custom, had already fallen into disuse by the time of Visvarupa. Colebrooke's Digest, Vol. II, page 422, gives Gautama's text relating to the rules of exclusion from inheritance but does not mention the blind as disqualified, and there are several Smriti writers and commentators who do not exclude the blind from inheritance. It is one of the practices of Hindu Law writers to enunciate obsolete rules of law as if they still continued to be law. Even Mitakshara enumerates 8 kinds of marriages and 12 kinds of sons. This in spite of the fact that several of these had ceased to exist by that time. Again, an only son or an eldest son it is enjoined by both Vasishta and Yajnavalkya should not be given or taken in adoption. How far these precepts embody a rule of law was considered in Radhamohun v. Hardai Bibi. Chap. 1, section 1, paragraph 27, Mitakshara, gives sons control over ancestral property as well as over the self-acquisitions of the father. The Privy Council in Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori have laid down that he has no control over the latter. The precise question never was decided in High Court or Privy Council except in Surayya v. Subbamma. Reference made to the judgment of Westropp, C.J, in Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai(4), Colebrooke's translation, and the Mitakshara and to Saraswati Vilasa.

    Gunjeshwar Kunwar v. Durga Prashad Singh(5). This case holds that supervening blindness is not a ground of disqualification. It is no authority for the converse that congenital blindness is such a disqualification. Further this decision does not bind the Madras Court. Strangely enough this case is not referred to in Surayya v. Subbamma. The grounds of exclusion in the Mitakshara are very wide and it is doubtful how far these rules are followed: Kayarohana Pathan v. Subbaraya Thevan, Venkata Subba Rao v. Purushottam, Alagappa Chettiar v. Subramania Pandia Thevar, Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal, Tirumamagal Ammal v. Ramaswami Ayyangar(6), Kelka Pershad v. Budree Sah(7), Vedammal v. Vedanayaga Mudaliar(8) and Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal(9).

    That the rules of exclusion mentioned by the text writers are mere moral precepts is seen also from an examination of the theory of succession adopted in Mitakshara by Vignaneswara. Blood relationship and not a capacity to render spiritual benefits is accepted by Mitakshara as the foundation of the right to succeed. The theory of exclusion from inheritence in the Mitakshara being based on ceremonial incompetence is inconsistent with the scheme of inheritance which is based admittedly on consanguinity or blood relationship. Nor are these disqualifications permanent disabilities as is clear from the fact that many of them can be cured by expiation and penance: Mayne, page 830.

    (2) This principle of exclusion does not apply to survivorship but only to cases of partition. The word used in Yajnavalkya, “without share,” ought not to be extended beyond what the text writers say. In his chapter on exclusion there is nothing about ownership by birth. Under the Mitakshara a man gets ownership by birth. Chapter I, Mitakshara (Colebrooke) deals with partition as the mode of taking property by sons. The rule does not prevent disqualified persons from taking any part of the ancestral property by birth. The meaning of the chapter on exclusion is that prohibition is only to “share-taking” but not to share-enjoying. The issue of the disqualified person is said to take “from their father's share,” “in the pretentions of the father.” This impliedly recognizes a right to share existing in the disqualified parent. Again the theory that the disqualified person gets his share when the disqualification is removed is inexplicable if he had no share at all. In some cases it has been stated that the sons who are not disqualified are in a sense trustees of those who are disqualified and who are really share-enjoyers. Here the blind man, the 9th defendant, was the sole surviving co-parcener Smriti Chandrika, Chapter V, rules 32 and 33 recognizes the title of the disqualified persons to share though they are not entitled to claim it by a partition.

    T.R Venkatrama Sastri with K.S Ramabhadra Ayyar for first respondent.—It is too late in the day to dispute the validity of Mitakshara, Chap. II, section 10 as rules of law. It excludes right by birth if there is congenital blindness. In placitum 6 the author says that once the property has become absolute, he does not intend to deprive him of it: see also Chap. I, section 10, placitum 1.

    [Chief Justice.—If a man is born sane and then becomes insane what are his rights.

    If the other co-parceners die he will take by survivorship. If by partition he will get no property.]

    Appellant's argument that a congenitally blind man is a member of the co-parcenary all the time is not correct. All that can be said is that he is a member of the family and a potential member of the co-parcenary. By virtue of the former he becomes entitled to maintenance, and not being a member of the co-parcenary is not entitled to a share. The case of the congenitally blind being cured of blindness is specially provided for in Mitakshara, Chap. II, section 10, placiium 7. They become co-parceners by virtue of a special provision of law and as from the date of the cure. Krishna v. Sami decides that the son of a disqualified man born after partition may reopen the partition and that an estate that has become vested may be divested. The removal of the disqualification I submit must be treated in the same manner as a new birth. In Bengal and Bombay a different view prevails: see Mayne, pages 657 and 658. Reference was also made to Krishna v. Sami, Muthnsami Gurukkal v. Meenammal, Abilakh Bhagot Bhekhi Mahto and Rama Rao v. Rajah of Pittapur. Visvarupa, pages 14 and 15, paragraph 27, mentions the disqualified persons and discusses the theory underlying the disqualification. The author concludes that it is futile to try to assign a reason to the rules but says they should be observed as they are rules. Mitakshara is of paramount power in India except in Bengal and Guzarat.

    The share-taking referred to in Sarasvati Vilasa (Foulkes translation), placitum 148 is the possibility of their transmitting their share to sons born to them and not to their taking a share: Krishna v. Sami. The argument in Sarasvati Vilasa comes to this: at a partition the disqualified person gets no share. But his son takes a share. The father though he does not take a share physically he takes a share in the sense that just as he is capable of transmitting family blood (if he is marriageable) he can serve a means of the share passing to his issue. If the disqualified person cannot for any reason marry and thus is incapable of transmitting heritable blood, he cannot take a share at all. Hence the disqualified person takes a share only in a fictitious sense. He is “a taker of a share” in the sense that he is “a transmitter of a share.” It is only to explain how he transmits that the author says the disqualified person “takes “—not in the ordinary sense that he has a right to take and enjoy as well as other members of a co-parcenary. Explaining Sarasvati Vilasa in this way all authors are agreed that disqualified persons don't take at all—this agreeing with the Mitakshara. All text writers have treated this text of the Mitakshara as living. Sir Thomas Strange, C.J, writing about 1830, says that these disqualifications are recognized in Hindu Law though to him they appear harsh. Ellis, Colebrooke and Strange (junior) agree with this view. Because some of the grounds with regard to certain disqualifications (e.g, lameness, dumbness, etc.), have become unworkable is no reason why the other disqualifications not so affected should also be classed in that class. Sarvadhikari says that the Mitakshara states the true Hindu Law. Trevelyan (1912) is of the same view. Mayne includes blindness as a disqualification. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Surayya v. Subbamma, after dealing with the grounds spiritual and temporal for the exclusion of certain persons examines cases of blindness and says that incapacity is the reason of the disqualification and the reason failing the law disappears with it.

    [Chief Justice.—Is there any authority for the position that with the reason for a rule of law ceasing to exist the rule itself ceases to exist? No. The tenure of Gavelkind has not ceased to exist.]

    S. Ramaswawi Ayyar in reply.—Seshagiri Ayyar, J. in Soundarajan v. Arunachalam Chetty lays down the correct rule of interpretation. Antiquated rules of Hindu Law ought not to be thrust upon the people. Rules ought under the circumstances to be interpreted liberally. Mitakshara ought not therefore to be construed as if it were a statute.

    OPINION

    Sir Walter Salis Schwabe, Kt., K.C, C.J:— The question referred to the Full Bench is

    “Is a Hindu who is congenitally blind thereby excluded from the inheritance, or has the rule become obsolete?”

    In Surayya v. Subbamma Sadasiva Attar and Napiee, JJ., answered this question by saying that the rule had become obsolete. This case having been tried before that decision was known, the point was not taken at the trial or on first appeal; but the appellant was allowed to raise the point by the Referring Bench. This Court was told in the course of the arguments that it is alleged that the man in question is not, in fact, congenitally blind and it will be for the Referring Bench to consider hereafter whether that matter is one which is now proper to be enquired into. For the purpose of this reference we must assume that he was congenitally blind and treat this case as, in effect, an appeal from Surayya v. Subbamma.

    It is argued that under the Hindu Law, a congenitally blind man never was excluded from inheritance and secondly that, if there was a rule or custom to that effect, it has now become obsolete and is no longer law. It has long been established that in this Presidency the most authoritative statement of, what I may call, the Hindu Common Law is to be found in the Mitakshara, a commentary by Vignaneswara on the institutes of Yajnavalkya published about A.D 1080. In Chap. II, section 10 the author quotes the text of Yajnavalkya as follows:—

    “An impotent person or outcaste and his sons, one lame, a mad man, an idiot, a blind man, and person afflicted with an incurable disease, and others (similarly disqualified) must be maintained, excluding them however, from participation.”

    It is made clear by reference to the whole chapter that the author is here dealing with exclusion from the inheritance. I think the law as stated by him amounts to this:—A man born blind does not become on birth entitled to a share in the family property, and, therefore, he gets no share at a subsequent partition; nor, if he is the sole surviving member of that family, does he acquire the property by right of survivorship; he is not, however, excluded altogether from an interest in the property because he is himself entitled to be maintained, and can transmit to his sons his full share in the property. But it is argued first that these directions are merely precepts or advice and not statements of law. It is true that there are precepts given in the Mitakshara which either by reason of the words in which they are couched or by reason of the nature of the matter dealt with, have been held to be mere moral precepts, but I can find no such reason for holding that the statement of the exclusion of a blind man from the inheritance is anything but a statement of a rule of law. It is further argued that this statement of the law in the Mitakshara is a statement of the law as it had been in the past and not as it then was; and for this, reliance is placed on the writings of Visvarupa which were discovered in Malabar some few years ago. He is stated to have lived shortly before the author of the Mitakshara. He gives the same text from Yajnavalkya and in commenting on the text, without any suggestion that it is other than law, a passage occurs which has been translated as follows:—

    “The blind and the rest, who are not outcastes, however, have a right to the grandfather's estate. Such is the custom.” We have been referred to the Sanskrit and I have no doubt that the words which have been translated as “have a right to the grandfather's estate,” would be more properly translated as “have an interest in the ancestral property” and refer to what follows immediately, namely, the right to maintenance and the right to transmit referred to above. In my judgment, when properly understood, there is no difference at all between the rules in question as stated in the Mitakshara and as published by Visvarupa, assuming that the published version is genuine.

    The next question is whether, assuming a blind man's exclusion to have been the law at the date of the Mitakshara, it has since become obsolete. This, in my judgment, is a question of fact. A law does not cease to be operative because it is out of keeping with the times. A law does not become obsolete because it is an anachronism or because it is antiquated or because the reason why it originally became the law, would be no reason for the introduction of such a law at the present time. To hold the contrary, in my judgment, would be an entire misunderstanding of the meaning of the legal maxim cessat ratio cessat lex which is relied upon in support of the contrary contention. If authority were required for this proposition, it is to be found clearly stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rao Kishore Singh v. Mussamat Gahenabai in the following words:—

    “Their Lordships therefore are of opinion that the principle: embodied in the expression cessat ratio cessat lex does not apply where the custom outlives the condition of things which gave it birth.”

    In Surayya v. Subbamma Sadasiva Ayyar, J., dealing with the matter now under consideration says, “I need not say that a rule becomes obsolete when the reason of the rule disappears through change of circumstances and environments in the society which was governed by that rule,” and Napier, J., at page 31, agreeing with that judgment says that owing to improved methods of education there is no reason why such a disqualification should still continue and that it was open to the. Court to enunciate this rule by declaring the law to be obsolete. In my view, this involves a fundamental error in considering the question and vitiates the whole of the judgments in that case. In considering whether the custom has become obsolete in the sense of its having ceased to exist, the fact that it is an anachronism may be a proper matter to be taken into consideration, if there were evidence both ways, in weighing that evidence but otherwise it is of no importance. In this case, in my judgment, the evidence is all in favour of the custom having continued. There is no oral evidence before the Court and no statement of any text writer or any judgment to which our attention has been called that this custom has become obsolete in the sense of its having been discontinued. The only semblance of evidence that the rule has become obsolete is to be found in Steele's “Law and Customs of Hindoo Castes,” published in 1826, at page 224 where he states that as a result of inquiry among about 100 castes about Poona, it was the practice in 72 of them that “blind persons” may take their share if married and if they have a family. Assuming this to be evidence, it is probably only an attempt fib state the law as to the transmissibility of a share through the blind man. But even if it be as stated that in 72 castes in that district, the law had been modified by custom, it is of no value as establishing a custom to admit the blind man to a share in this Presidency.

    Reliance was placed on a passage in Sarasvati Vilasa, a digest published by a king about A.D 1510, which has been recognized by this Court as of authority. The passage relied on occurs in section 149 and has been translated as “those who are born blind, and those who are born deaf, the pair thus mentioned, though a “share certainly belongs to them, are to be nourished and cherished, notwithstanding their being endowed with a share, because they are marriageable.” The translation to this effect was adopted by the Full Bench of this Court in 1886 in Krishna v. Sami. With great submission I venture to doubt if that translation is correct and whether the word translated as “share” would not be more correctly translated as “interest.” But whether that is so or not, a careful examination of sections 149 to 167 shows that the author is quoting as law the passage from Yajnavalkya and passages from some other writers to the like effect excluding the born blind from the inheritance without suggesting that the law is otherwise or that it is obsolete. If the proper translation of the passage is to the effect that the born blind take a share, I think it is to be explained, as it was in the case referred to above in the judgment of Sir Charles Turner, C.J, as meaning” that there are classes who, though they may be unable to be relieved of their disqualification, are capable of transmitting heritable blood. Their right to share in the family wealth is latent or may come into existence at a future date as it does in the ‘case of the after born son. When it comes into existence either in the person of the formerly disqualified heir or of his son, it is to be recognized. If capable of transmitting heritable blood, they are share-takers though not at the time share-enjoyers.’ In fact in this passage the Sarasvati Vilasa is using the expression “take a share” to explain that though disqualified, such persons have a latent right which will become effective on the disqualification being removed, and can be transmitted. In my judgment, there is nothing in this to show that this law was then regarded as obsolete.

    The evidence on the other side is overwhelming. Taking it in the order of date, one finds this law or custom stated as existing in Madana Parijata about the end of twelfth century, in Vivada Ratnakara about A.D 1350, Dayabhaga about A.D 1400, Vivada Chinta-mani about A.D 1450, Daya Tattva about A.D 1500, Mayukha about A.D 1600, Dattaka Chandrika about A.D 1600, Viramitrodaya about A.D 1625 and Dayakrama Sangraha about A.D 1700. These are all texts of recognized authority and they all give the rule without any suggestion that it is no longer law.

    Coming to the more modern writers, Sir W. Mac-naghten writing in 1829, and Sir Thomas Strange, Chief Justice of Madras, writing in 1830, state that the blind are excluded. The latter's son, a Judge of the Sudder Court writing in 1856 says the same. Mr. Mayne in his well-known book of Hindu Law states it to be the law.

    In 1862 in Tirumamagal Ammal v. Ramasami Ayyan-gar, a case of idiocy, Strange and Holloway, JJ., quote this part of the Mitakshara as being the law current in Madras. In 1864, Kalidas Das v. Krishan Chandra Das, came before a Bench of fire Judges of Calcutta presided over by Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J In that case a man who was born blind was in 1832 in fact excluded from the inheritance to his father. He married and had a son in 1858. The passages in the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga which are to the same effect were fully discussed and the whole argument and judgment proceeded on the basis that a person born blind was himself excluded. No one then present had apparently any idea that the rule was obsolete. In 1876 in Murarji Gokuldas v. Parvatibai, Westropp, C.J, with Sarjent, J., agreeing, fully discussed the text of Yajnavalkya and the Mitakshara commentaries on it and the texts of the other Rishis on the subject and held that the rule is confined to the congenitally blind and does not extend to those who become blind. It was not suggested that the rule had become obsolete. In 1885, in Krishna v. Sami, quoted above, there was no suggestion that the rule had become obsolete. Finally in 1917, the Privy Council in Gunjesh-war Kunwar v. Durga Frashad Singh, states the rule of the exclusion of the blind as an existing rule of law but confines the application to the congenitally blind.

    It is impossible to believe that a custom to disregard the established rule, which it would be necessary to prove in order to show that it had become obsolete, existed without any of these Judges, or practitioners in these cases being aware of the fact. There is in my judgment ample evidence of the rule, and no evidence of such a custom to disregard it, as would be necessary to make the rule obsolete as a rule of law. It follows that the answer to the question must be that a Hindu who is congenitally blind is excluded from the inheritance and that the rule has not become obsolete.

    Oldfield, J.:— I agree and, having had the advantage of reading the judgment which Coutts Trotter, J., is about to deliver, desire further to associate myself with his observations on the commentary of Visvarupa and the principle underlying them.

    Coutts Trotter, J.:— The short point raised by this case is whether or not it is a rule of Hindu Law that a congenitally blind member of an undivided Hindu family is to be excluded from inheritance or whether if such a rule existed, it has become obsolete. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., admits that such a rule once existed, but has held it to be obsolete. Krishnan, J., holds it to be an existing and positive rule of law.

    It must not be forgotten that the Hindu Law is the result of many ingredients. In the first place, we have the Smritis or records of the pronouncements of Rishis, (Saints) among whom stands paramount Manu. We do not possess the original text of Manu and the version we have is placed by modern scholars as dating from about 200 B.C but there is no doubt that a treatise known as the Laws of Manu in different recensions existed from many centuries before the date of our version. Next in authority to Manu of the Smritis is Yajnavalkya and the commentary on his work known as the Mitakshara written by Vignaneswara stands as the governing authority for this part of India: and it is an accepted principle that the Mitakshara is final where it is unambiguous, and that recourse is to be had to the Smritis only where the Mitakshara is silent or obscure. The third element is that of custom, the importance of which was emphasised by Mr. Mayne when he entitled his book “Hindu Law and Usage.” Since the British occupation of India another element has been added, that of judicial decisions of the Indian Courts and of the Privy Council on appeal from them. The rulings of the Privy Council are final and it is only in cases not covered by such rulings that recourse need be had to other sources.

    The position with regard to the present question is that there is no express ruling of a Court of Law which says, in terms, that a congenitally blind man is excluded from inheritance. There are cases which definitely decide that blindness which is not congenital but is traumatic or supervenes on disease does not exclude. There are many cases which assume, without expressly deciding, that congenital blindness does exclude. That position is now challenged and it devolves upon us to say how the law on the subject stands in India at this day.

    That which we call the Hindu Law, is composed of many incongruous elements—I am speaking, now, of its substance, and not of the sources in which it is to be sought. It primarily lays down rules of law, which must be treated as of practical applicability to the India of to-day. Such rules there are in abundance, but they are interspersed with mandatory precepts which have been treated by commentators and Judges as being merely of religious or moral force but which cannot govern the rights and duties of a member of a Hindu family with the force of a positive rule of law. I may refer in this connexion to the words of the Judicial Committee in Balwant Singh v. Rani Kishori.

    “All these old text books and commentaries are apt to mingle religious and moral considerations, not being positive laws, with rules intended for positive laws. In his preface to his valuable work on Hindu Law, Sir W. Macnaghten says: It by no means follows that because an act has been prohibited it should therefore be considered as illegal. The distinction between the Yinculam juris and the Vinculum pudoris is not always discernible. (Hindu Law, Principles and Precedents, page 6 of the preliminary remarks.) He illustrates this position by the example of the very subject of the present discussion. It is, as their Lordships think, the most remarkable inference that the passage in section 1 belongs to the former class of precepts, and those of sections 4 and 5 to the latter.”

    It was argued in this case that the rule which excludes a blind man from inheritance was something other than a rule of positive law. It seems to me that that position is wholly untenable and that such a principle of exclusion can only belong to the domain of positive law, and not to that of either religion or morality. If it is not a rule of law, it must be meaningless. The only colour to the argument is derived from the fact that both Manu and Mitakshara, to which for the moment I shall confine myself, include within the ambit of their prohibition, persons with disqualifications which are obviously based on moral grounds and on grounds which it would be impossible for a Court of Law to pronounce upon. The text of Manu is as follows:—

    “Eunuchs and outcastes, persons born blind or deaf, mad men, idiots, the dumb and such as have lost the use of a limb are excluded from a share of the heritage,” Chap. IX, section 201.

    The relevant section of the Mitakshara is section 10 of Chap. II. There the writer is commenting not directly on the text of Manu as we have it but on the text of Yajnavalkya in section 160 which runs as follows:—

    “An impotent person or outcaste and his issue, one lame, a mad man, an idiot, a blind man and a person afflicted with an incurable disease as well as others (similarly disqualified) must be maintained, excluding them from participation.”

    Placitum 3 of section 10 explains this as follows:—

    “Under the term ‘others’ are comprehended one who has entered into another order (i.e, has become an ascetic) an enemy to his father, a sinner in an inferior degree and a person deaf, dumb or wanting an organ.” Thus Vasishta says: “They who have entered into another order are debarred from share,”

    Narada also declares,

    “An enemy to his father, an outcaste, an impotent person, and one who is addicted to vice, take no share of the inheritance even though they be legitimate; much less, if they be sons of the wife by an appointed kinsman. Manu likewise ordains, ‘Impotent persons and outcastes are excluded from a share of the heritage and so are persons born blind and deaf, as well as mad men, idiots, the dumb and those who have lost a sense or a limb.’”

    This section incorporates quotations from Narada and Vasishta and produces categories of persons, who, in a Court of Law nowadays would not be held disqualified from inheritance. They are brought under the text of Yajnavalkya who adds the Sanskrit word “Adya” translated by Colebrooke as “as well as others;” its literal meaning being “and the like” or practically, “etc., etc.” Under cover of the latitude afforded by this expression placitum 3 brings in such intangible persons as “an enemy to his father” and “one who is addicted to vice “—disqualifications so vague, it is clear, that no Court of Law could now assert their validity. I do not think it right to say that these grounds of exclusion are obsolete or that they were originally intended to be moral rather than legal obligations: but rather that they are of so nebulous a character that they could never have been enforcible at any time when the enunciation of the rights of inheritance passed from the hands of family mediators or village panchayatdars to anything which can be dignified by the name of “Court of Law.”

    I do not think that any useful purpose would be served by inquiring into the meaning of such terms as “Nirindriya” or “Pangu.” They do not seem to me to assist the present discussion and I think it is probable that legislation will abolish the exclusion from inheritance based on these terms before the Courts are called upon to determine their exact meaning. Similarly I think it unnecessary to discus whether Yajnavalkya meant anything more by using the word “Andha” than what Manu meant by “Jathyandha “. “Jati” comes from the same root as the Greek Gignomai, Genos, etc., and Latin “Genus.” It is, I think, clear that both Manu and the Mitakshara explicitly lay down the rule of law that at least a “Jathyandha” is excluded from inheritance and that the only way to escape from this is to do what Sadasiva Ayyar, J., has done and say boldly

    “It is not a subsisting rule of law. It has become obsolete and abrogated.”

    In any system of law other than the Hindu Law, it would be almost a contradiction in terms to predicate of any proposition of law that it is obsolete. In the Hindu Law it is a possible state of things and it has been admitted to exist with regard to many maxims which cannot be treated as of merely moral or religious obligation. I need only instance the kinds of marriages and the classes of sons enumerated in the ancient writings and also the various rules for marriages between persons of different castes. There is a consensus of opinion that there are only two forms of marriages and only two classes of sons now existing and intermarriages between persons of different castes have in practice long ceased to exist. It is not now possible to trace the steps by which this state of things came about, but it may be said generally, that, in the days when the Sudder Court had recourse to the opinions of the Pandits, the latter felt themselves quite free to say with regard to any rule of law that, in practice, it was regarded as obsolete and the Courts felt themselves equally free to act on such opinions. There is good evidence to show that, in the early days, the Pandits responded to some extent to the advance of popular sentiment and consciousness and stigmatized as obsolete, rules and practices which, though enshrined in the early writings, did not accord with the sentiments of the people. The time has now gone by when this process was possible and if there is anything dignified by the name “Rule of Law” enshrined in the Mitakshara, it can only be abrogated by positive evidence of custom to disregard it. It is not pretended that there is any such evidence of custom with regard to the exclusion of the congenitally blind and no such evidence was attempted to be produced in this case. No doubt, Mitakshara, Chap. II, section 10, placitum 7 provides for the removal of the disqualification on the removal by medicaments or other means of the physical disability, and it is doubtless true that modern surgery can restore eyesight to many, who in the days of the Mitakshara would have been blind for life. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., does not so much have regard to this consideration, as to the view that the texts are based on a primitive idea that blindness was either a visitation of God for some sin in a past existence or was an indication of mental incapacity to deal with practical affairs. Justly regarding these ideas as out of consonance with modern knowledge and feeling, he deduces the conclusion that the rule is therefore to be considered as ipso facto abrogated. To my mind, before allowing a mandate such as I conceive this to be, to be disregarded, it must either be proved by evidence to be actually disregarded in practice at the present time, and as I have already said there is no such evidence in this case—or it must be shown by an examination of the smritis and commentaries to have been obsolete at the time they were written, and that the authors thereof merely repeated parrot-like the words of Manu and the Mitakshara as a maxim dignified by antiquity but not corresponding to the practice obtaining at the time either of the Mitakshara or of their own compilations. If it could be shown that commentators earlier than the Mitakshara had used language meaning or implying that the rule in this respect was obsolete, that might be a legitimate ground for the conclusion that the Mitakshara was merely repeating the words of Manu without inquiring whether the rule survived in force when the Mitakshara was written. If a commentator later than the Mitakshara used similar language, that might lead to a legitimate inference that, though in force at the date of the Mitakshara, the rule had subsequently become obsolete. It is argued that there is one of each suggested class of authorities, Visvarupa of the first and Sarasvati Vilasa of the second. For practical purposes we may take Yajnavalkya as dating approximately A.D 350, the Mitakshara as about A.D 1000, Visvarupa as about A.D: 800 and the Sarasvati Vilasa as about A.D 1500. There are some authorities who think that the Sarasvati Vilasa was of an earlier date, but in any event it is substantially later than the Mitakshara.

    I shall deal first with Visvarupa. The existing text is inscribed on a cadjan found at Calicut in the late seventies and was translated by Mr. S. Sitaram Sastri. I am totally unable to ascertain that any competent scholar has scrutinized its claims to be regarded as what it purports to be either from the point of view of paleographical, linguistic or historical standards. This is not a critical country and the moment it was produced, it was held at once to be what it purported to be and has apparently passed as such without question since. That such discoveries very often fail to stand the slightest critical test will be seen by any one who has the curiosity to peruse page 12 of Mr. Burnell's preface to the Vyavahara Nirnaya where he exposes the imposture of a treatise which had been readily accepted as a genuine record of the customs of South Kanara passing under the name of Aliyasantana Kattu Kattale. I do not profess to have any beyond general grounds for questioning the authenticity of this single text of Visvarupa. I content myself with saying that I decline to act upon it until its pretensions have been scrutinized by some competent critic of Sanskrit texts.

    It runs as follows (page 15):

    “The blind and the rest, who are not outcaste, however, have a right to the grandfather's estate. Such is the custom.”

    It is apparent that the author treats the mandate which he quotes as a mere moral maxim, opposed to the rule of law which he considers to be established by his text and if the expression “grandfather's estate” means no more than “ancestral estate,” the text of Visvarupa need mean no more than that of the Mitakshara, and the right may be a mere right to maintenance or at most a capacity to transmit heritable blood.

    With regard to the Sarasvati Vilasa, the first observation to be made is that made by the learned Chief Justice in the course of the argument that, if the author wished to say that the text of the Mitakshara on this point was obsolete, he could perfectly well have said so in terms. Further in any event the true explanation of the passage in the Sarasvati Vilasa is to my mind undoubtedly that given by Turner, C.J, in Krishna v. Sami, where he points out that the distinction which is being drawn is not that between those who are capable and those who are incapable of inheriting, but between those who are share-takers in the sense that they are persons capable of transmitting heritable blood though they may not themselves be able to enjoy the heritage owing to their disqualifications, and share-enjoyers who are not merely capable of transmitting heritable blood but also of enjoying their shares themselves in their life-time.

    As against these two very doubtful texts there is a mass of authority which is all the other way, which recognizes to the full the exclusion of the blind in the sense of the congenitally blind and accepts the statement of the law contained in the Mitakshara. I will enumerate these texts (most of which are to be found in Setlur's collection) with their approximate dates:

    Madana Parijata … … … 1100 A.D Smriti Cbandrika … … … 13th century. Vivada Ratnakara … … … 1300 A.D Dayavibhaga of Madhava … … 1400 ” Dayabhaga of Jimutavabana … … 1400 ” Vivada Chintamani … … … 1450 ” Daya Tattva … … … 1500 ” Viramicrodaya … … … 1620 ” Dayakrama Sangraba … … … 1750 ”

    and Jagannadha's Digest, for what it is worth. Writers of modern text-books on Hindu Law also treat the rule as subsisting,—Sir Thomas Strange in 1830, T.L Strange in 1856, Mayne in 1878, Sarvadhikari in 1880 and Trevel-yan in 1890. It is quite true that no express decision exists to the effect that a man blind from birth cannot inherit but there are several decisions that assume it, culminating in the pronouncement of the Privy Council in Gunjeshwar Kunwar v. Durga Prashad Singh.

    The only other matter which I need deal with is the argument that the rule of exclusion in the Mitakshara applies only to those who take by succession and not to those who take by survivorship. The answer to this is that Chap. II, section 10, placitum 1, begins with the statement that the rule of exclusion propounds an exception to dayagrahana (taking of daya) by the sons, widows and other heirs and the reunited members and this by necessary implication refers one back to the definition of daya in the beginning of Chap. I. Daya apparently means property considered in the light of something which in the natural course of events will pass from one person to another and includes both Apratibandha daya and Sapratibandha daya (unobstructed heritage and obstructed heritage) the former passing by survivorship to the sons, etc., and the latter passing by succession to widows and other heirs. This is the reference to Vibhaga or partition in placita 6 and 7, and placitum 8 also shows that the word dayagrahana includes within its scope both property which passes by survivorship and that which passes by succession.

    For these reasons I am of opinion that it must be regarded as an unabrogated rule of Hindu Law that a congenitally blind person is excluded from succession and that it cannot be described as obsolete in any other sense than that of being repugnant to more modern and more enlightened ideas than those which prevailed at the time of the smritis and the commentators. It can of course be repealed by the Legislature and we are informed that a Bill to that effect is now before the Legislative Assembly, the author of which was once a Judge of this Court. But until that step is taken and the proposal passes into law, I feel constrained to say that the Courts of this country have no option but to enforce the rule with whatever reluctance and with whatever consciousness of its repugnance to the present sentiments of the Hindu people.

    M.H.H

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