(Delivered by Horwill J.)
The question that arises in this appeal is whether the lower Court was right in valuing the parambas which were the subject of the suit under, S. 7, Cl. v(b) of the Court Fees Act and calculating the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction on the half share of the suit properties comprising parambas, building, garden, etc., claimed by the plaintiffs.
The main question is whether jurisdiction should be determined by valuing the whole of the plaint schedule properties or only the half share which the plaintiffs claim as theirs.
Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act says:—
“Where a suit……relates to land or an interest in land……the amount at which for purposes of jurisdiction the relief sought in the suit is valued shall not exceed the value of the land or interest as determined by rules under Sec. 3.”
It is clear from this section that for purposes of jurisdiction it is the plaintiffs' interest in the property that must be valued. The plaintiffs' suit was for partition of their half share in the suit properties. In other words, they asked that their undivided half share in the properties should be converted into a divided half share. The relief could not be valued; and Court fee had to be calculated according to the provisions of Art. 17 of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. The matter in dispute in the suit was however whether the plaintiffs had a half share in the plaint schedule properties or not. According to their claim, they had an undivided half share in the suit properties, which they sought to have divided; and so it seems clear to us that the suit related only to a half share of the plaint-schedule properties.
The value of a partition suit has been considered on many occasions by this Court, but it is unnecessary to refer to those decisions, for the matter came up for consideration by the Privy Council recently in Bai Shevanti Bai v. Janarthan Raghunath Warick (1). Their Lordships were concerned with the valuation of an appeal sought to be preferred under S. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and they held that the value of the matter in dispute was the value of the share of the joint family property claimed by the appellant.
They said:—
“It is enough for the purposes of the present case to say that their Lordships feel no doubt that a question as to the title of the plaintiff to the share which she claims in the joint property does not become a question respecting the whole of the joint family estate merely because if her title is established it would result in the joint family estate being partitioned.”
It is true that their Lordships were considering the value of the subject matter of an appeal under S. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not the subject matter of the suit; but the values were there the same, as the scope of the appeal related to the whole subject matter of the suit.
The learned Subordinate Judge also discussed the question whether the value of the parambas would have to be calculated under S. 7, Cl. v of the Court Fees Act or not. It is conceded here that if the appeal fails on the first point, then S. 7, Cl. v will apply: but it is argued that the sub-clause applicable is not S. 7 Cl. v(b), according to which the value would be ten times the land assessment, but S. 7, Cl. v(c) or (e). In the first case, the value would be calculated at fifteen times the net profits or according to the market value of similar land in the neighbourhood. It is contended that the suit should be valued under S. 7, Cl. v(e) because the paramba has a house standing upon it. We however find that the question as to the sub-clause of S. 7, Cl. v applicable was not discussed in the lower Court, the arguments there proceeding on the basis that if S. 7, Cl. v applied, then the value of the parambas would be calculated at ten times the rent. Even in the grounds of appeal we find no reference to the point now sought to be raised. It cannot therefore be allowed to be argued in this Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
N.R.R