ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A FULL BENCH
A preliminary objection is taken to the hearing of this appeal on the ground that the appeal should have been preferred to the District Court and not to this Court. The suit was for dissolution of partnership and for accounts, and the plaintiff valued the subject-matter of the suit at Rs. 2,000, as he was entitled to do, and instituted it in the Court of the District Munsif, Chodavaram, who after taking accounts found that the plaintiff was entitled to Rs. 5,577-7-1 and gave him a decree for that sum and interest. The appeal is from that decree and the appellants contend that as the decree was over Rs. 5,030, they are entitled to appeal to this Court. They evidently do not object to the District Munsif passing a decree for more than Rs. 2,500, at any rate that is not a ground of appeal.
The question depends on the proper construction of Sect. 13 of the Madras Civil Courts Act. The appeal lies to this Court if the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit, not of the appeal, exceeds Rs. 5,000. Sect. 12 of the same Act which prescribes the original jurisdiction of Civil Courts confers on District Munsifs jurisdiction overall original civil suits of which, the amount or value of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 2,500, and presumably the expressions are used in the same sense in both the sections.
The Act itself contains no rules and prescribes no method of arriving at the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit except where the subject-matter is land, house or garden in which case the value is to be fixed in the manner prescribed by the Court Fees Act (Sect. 14). The Suits Valuation Act of 1887 extended the principle of Sect. 14 of Civil Courts Act and Sect. 8 enacted that except in certain classes of suits, with which we are not now concerned, in all others where Court-fees are payable ad valorem the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees and the value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same. In the present case ad valorem Court-fees are payable and to fix the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction we have to turn to the Court Fees Act. Under the Act, the Court-fee is assessed in suits for accounts—this is a suit for accounts—on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. Under O. 7, R. 2, where the plaintiff sues for an amount which will be found due to him on taking unsettled accounts he must state approximately the amount sued for. These provisions make it clear that the plaintiff has a right to value the relief he claims in suits for accounts which value can only be approximate as very often he may not be in a position to fix with any precision the amount which finally he may be entitled to. There is another class of suits, viz., those for recovery of mesne profits where also the plaintiff may be in a position to know precisely what amount he is entitled to. In this case also the plaintiff is entitled to claim a certain amount approximately and is bound to pay Court-fees on that amount in the first instance. See Sect. 7, cl. 1, of the Court-Fees Act. Whether a suit for mesne profits is a suit for accounts or damages is immaterial for the present purpose. In these two classes of suits the plaintiff can obtain a decree for more money than what he has approximately claimed in the plaint, and as the basis of assessment for Court fees is the amount which he claims, and in cases where he gets more than what he approximately claims, what he in fact gets he is obliged to pay for the extra amount which he has obtained; and this obligation is enforced by certain penalties: Sect. 11 of the Court-Fees Act. It is to be observed that the levy of the extra fee does not necessitate any amendment in the valuation of the suit and does not affect the validity of the adjudication. In certain cases, which after the changes introduced in the new Code of Civil Procedure cannot now happen, the suit itself may be dismissed for non-payment of the extra Court-fee.
In these classes of cases, it is obviously inconvenient, if not impossible, to change the value according to the actual amount found to be due, for the amount may be varied in appeal which again may be varied on further appeal till you reach a final adjudication in a Court of last resort which may not be res judicata on a re-trial of the same matter in a Court competent to take cognisance of the suit according to that adjudication.
The Court which has jurisdiction to try the original suit must then depend on the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit as fixed by the plaintiff and amidst the conflict of opinion on other matters there is none on this. The further question is, can the amount or value of the subject-matter change, or be changed by the plaintiff, so as to affect (a) the jurisdiction of the trial Court (b) the power of the Court to give reliefs in accordance with its adjudication even though the value of such reliefs exceed the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction (c) the forum of appeal.
The value of the suit in cases where such value is or is, assumed to be, capable of precise determination, though fixed by the plaintiff in the first instance—the plaint must contain a statement of the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of Court-fees so far as the case admits—if disputed, is determined by the Court, and that determination which is preliminary to the adjudication of the suit determines the Court which has jurisdiction to try the suit. The value for the purposes of Court-fees and jurisdiction may or may not be the same. [Compare the several sections of the Suits Valution Act.] In cases where it is difficult or impossible to estimate in money value the benefit which a plaintiff may get if he succeeds, the Court-fee is a fixed fee, but for purposes of jurisdiction, the value of the property or right involved in the suit would be the test; if there are rules framed under Sect. 9 of the Suits Valution Act, the value of the subject matter must be determined in accordance with those rules. In the third class of cases, as in the present, though the amount of value is capable of precise determination, it can be arrived at only after an adjudication of the merits of the claim, and it is impossible to have a preliminary investigation into the value of the suit for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. For example, take the case of the plaintiff who sues in ejectment and claims future mesne profits in addition; the amount which he may be entitled to, may go on increasing with the increase in the duration of the pendency of the suit; and how is one to fix the value first for the purpose of jurisdiction before the trial of the suit is begun while the value may go on increasing during the trial. Again take a suit for accounts, and suppose the suit is begun in a District Munsif's Court, the plaintiff giving an approximate value, say, of Rs. 1,000. The District Munsif after trial finds that what the plaintiff is entitled to is Rs. 3,000. If he returns the plaint to be presented to the Court of a Subordinate Judge, that Court may find that the plaintiff is entitled to only Rs. 1,000 and may in its turn return the plaint to be presented to the District Munsif. In this class of cases, therefore, of necessity, the plaintiff is allowed to fix his own valuation; but in all the three classes alike when once the valuation is fixed, there is no provision of law which allows the plaintiff to change or to alter that valuation at his pleasure. Further the value of the subject-matter of the suit must be its value at the institution of the suit (O. 2, R. 3, cl. 2); for instance in a suit for recovery of ryotwari land, the fact that Government increased the assessment during the pendency of the suit cannot change the value so as to affect the jurisdiction of the Court. This of course does not affect the power of the Court to allow an amendment of the plaint at the request of the plaintiff. On principle then the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction must be its value when the plaint is filed whether such value is determined by rules made for that purpose which in case of dispute may be settled by the court as in the first two classes, or is fixed by the plaintiff without any one having a right to dispute that valuation as in the last class; and that value cannot change or be changed except by amendment as aforesaid so as to affect the jurisdiction of the trial Court.
In Bhupendra Kumar Chakravarty v. Purna Chandra Bose, a contrary view appears to have been taken. There the plaintiff valued the land at Rs. 185-8-0, past mesne profits at Rs. 200 and the future mesne profits were not valued at all as in fact they could not be. The Munsif passed a decree for possession, which was confirmed in appeal and second appeal and directed the assessment of mesne profits in execution as he was entitled to do under the old Code. The plaintiff put forward a claim for future mesne profits far exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif in whose Court he had instituted the suit for recovery of possession of land with past and future mesne profits. Mookerjee and Tewnon, JJ. held that the plaint in so far as it embodied a claim for future profits must be returned to the plaintiff to be presented to the proper Court. We venture to doubt whether the procedure under the Code allows a return of portions of the plaint or one of several claims contained in it. Though as pointed out in that judgment, no cause of action for future mesne profits arose on the date of the institution of the suit, and has not therefore to be valued in the plaint, the Court which is seized of jurisdiction of the suit to recover possession of the land is under statutory authority empowered to grant future mesne profits also. There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which in any way limits the power of the Court to award the amount found due by it, and as we construe Sect. 12 of the Civil Courts Act that section does not limit the relief to be given by a Court to an amount which is within the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction but only determines the Court which has jurisdiction over particular causes. However that may be, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplate the return of plaints to be presented to the proper Court and the way it is done is by physically handing over the plaint to the plaintiff—and do not contemplate an adjudication of portions of the claim or one of the claims set up in the same plaint and a return of the other portion or other claims contained in the same plaint for adjudication in another Court. Though a plaint may contain several causes of action, there is only one suit and the jurisdiction of the Court as regards the suit depends on the amount or value of the aggregate subject-matters at the date of instituting the suit. No doubt for certain purposes several causes of action joined in one plaint may be treated as separate suits (see for example Sect. 4 of the Limitation Act); but for the purposes of O. 7, R. 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, corresponding to Sect. 57 of the old Code the aggregate of the claims put forward in the plaint must be treated as one suit; nor can we say that the amount of future mesne profits reserved for ascertainment is the subject of a fresh suit instituted after the decree for possess on, for that decree besides ordering delivery of possession declares that the plaintiff is entitled to future mesne profits in the suit already instituted and reserves only the ascertainment of the amount to further proceedings in the same suit. Again if the claim for future mesne profits is to be considered as a fresh suit when is it supposed to be instituted; is it after obtaining possession in execution of the decree for possession, when the plaintiff is in a position to know the exact period for which he is entitled to profits, or at the time when he asks the Court to ascertain the future mesne profits which he apparently can do after the preliminary decree; is the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court to depend on the amount of the claim for future profits taken by itself as if a fresh suit had been instituted for the amount, or has the value of the land and the amount of past profits, if any already adjudicated upon, also to be taken as part of the value of the suit; what if the plaintiff does not state what amount he claims for future mesne profits but simply requires the Court to continue the suit and ascertain mesne profits and award him the amount due. There may also be a difficulty as to limitation, A different view was taken in Rameswar Mahton v. Dilu Mahton. Though the actual decision in that case, was justified in the latter case, the learned Judges practically dissented from the ratio of the decision. In a still later case in the same Court, Panchuram Tekadar v. Kinoo Haldar*(2), the decision in I.L.R, 21 Cal., 550 was followed though the ground on which that decision was supported in I.L.R, 43 Cal., 650 was not available In Panchuram Tekadar v. Kinoo Haldar*, the decision in I.L.R, 43 Cal., 650 was distinguished on grounds which, with all respect, are not clear to us. We are, therefore, of opinion that in every case when the Court is seized of jurisdiction it cannot and does not lose it by any change in the value of the subject-matter of the suit after the institution of the suit or by the precise ascertainment of its Value in cases which do not admit of such ascertainment at the time of institution, except when the plaint is allowed to be amended; and that is not really an exception.
On the same principle we think the Court can award such sum as it finds due to the plaintiff although such sum is above the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction. This can happen only in suits for accounts or mesne profits, as in all other cases the plaintiff without amending his plaint cannot get more than what he claims; even in suits for accounts or mesne profits, the plaintiff does not really get more than what he asks, for the relief prayed for in those suits is not for a particular sum, but to whatever sum the plaintiff is found ultimately entitled to, and the amount fixed approximately is for the purpose of determining the Court which has jurisdiction to try the suit The decision of this Court in Arogya Udayan v. Appachi Rowthan, is we think conclusive on this question. In Golap Singh v. Indra Coomar Hazra, Mookerjee and Carnduff, JJ., held that in a suit for accounts the court can only award a sum up to limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction; and if the Court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to more, it cannot even return the plaint to be presented to the proper court. The plaintiff it seems must be deemed in law to have given up any excess sum when he chose to bring his suit in a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction; and I.L.R, 25 Mad., 543, was distinguished on the ground that there though the learned Judges held that the Munsif had jurisdiction to proceed with the further trial of the suit, they did not say the Munsif can pass a decree for the amount he finds due. The opening sentences of the judgment in Arogya Udayan v. Appachi Rowthan however show that that distinction is untenable and the judgment read as a whole is clear that the learned Judges who decided that case never imagined any such distinction. The matter was put quite clearly by Sir John Edge and Banrji, JJ. in Madho Das v. Ranji Patak(3) which has been followed in a very recent case in that Court (Sudarshan Das Shastri v. Ram Prasad(4)) where Stanley, C. J. and Banerji, J dissented from the decision of the Calcutta Court in 13 Calcutta Weekly Notes 493, and followed their previous decision in I.L.R, 16 All., 286. The principle was succinctly stated in Ratnasawmy Chetty v. Ratnammal(5), to which on of us was a party.
The remaining point is as to the forum of appeal. We think that the same simple rule should be applied viz., that the amount or value of the subject matter as fixed in the plaint should determine the Court to which the appeal lies. It is to be observed that the words “amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit” occur both in Sects. 12 and 13 of the Civil Courts Act and the words should be given the same meaning in both the sections in the absence of any indication either from the context or otherwise that they were used in different senses; in this case, apart from the general rule of construction, it will be clear that the words are used in the same sense when it is remembered that the value determined both the Trial Court, and the Court of Appeal, the intention of the legislature obviously being that the value when once ascertained and settled should remain the same for both purposes. The rule is not only simple and capable of easy application to all cases but is also right on principle. As pointed out by the eminent Judge Sir V. Bashyam Aiyangar in Krishnamachariar v. Mangammal, the theory of an appeal is that the suit is continued in the Court of Appeal and re-heard there. In the Court Fees Act a special provision is made for the levying of additional fees on the plaint when the suit comes before the Court of Appeal—observe the language —if that Court finds that the suit has been undervalued. If the value of the suit does not change while it is in the First Court, there is in reason to hold that that value changes when the same suit is taken to the Court of Appeal The fact that the valuation in certain cases is approximate—that is the word used in the Code of Civil Procedure, not nominal as said in certain decisions—is no reason for holding that when it is precisely ascertained, that must be the value of the suit, for whatever may have been the position before the Suits Valuation Act was enacted, by virtue of Sect. 8 of that Act whenever ad valorem Court-fees are payable the value of the suit as computed for that purpose is to be the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction; and no distinction is made between Original and Appellate jurisdiction. In certain cases and—the present is one of such—for the purposes of Court-fees the plaintiff has a right to fix his own valuation of the suit in the plaint, and he is also bound to state it in his plaint. Though additional Court-fees are payable under Sect. 11 that does not as already stated change the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. The mistake lies in supposing that the ‘amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit’ is its real or market value. It is the value fixed according to the mode prescribed by the statute though in the absence of any statutory provision as in Sect. 14 of the Civil Courts Act, or the Suits Valuation Act, the real of the market value of the subject-matter will have to be ascertained as in the case, for instance, of appeals to His Majesty in Council. This was the view taken in Madho Das v. Kanji Patak (where Sir John Edge and Banerji, JJ. pointed out the anomalies and difficulties in holding otherwise) and in Nagendra Nath v. Rusik Chandra.
But we must admit that there is a considerable body of judicial opinion against our view which we now propose to examine. It has been held that in suits for accounts, or mesne profits, where the Court is at liberty to award a larger sum than what is fixed in the plaint as the approximate amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, the amount determined by the First Court as the amount due to the plaintiff should be taken as the value of the subject-matter of the suit, that is one view, or the amount so determined and accepted by the plaintiff should be the value, that is another. The former appears to have been the view generally entertained in the Calcutta High Court though Mookerji, J. formulated the latter in his judgment in the Full Bench decision in Ijjatulla Bhuyan v. Chandra Mohan Banerjee See Mohini Mohan Das v. Satis Chandra Roy Gulab Khan v. Abdul Wahab Khan and Ijjatulla Bhuyan v. Chandra Mohan Banerjee This view of Mookerji, J., has been accepted by the Allahabad High Court in Goswami Sri Raman Lalji Maharaj…(Objector); v. Bohra Desraj…(Opposite Party).*. The former view has been adversely criticised in the judgment of Mookerji, J., and not much more need be said of it. Why the finding of the First Court should determine the value is not apparent—the legislature has not said so. In I.L.R 17 Cal., 704 which is the first of the cases in which this doctrine was propounded the learned Judges say the precise value of the suit is ascertained when the First Court has ascertained it. That with all respect does not appear to be correct, either as a matter of law or as a question of fact, so long as there is an appeal against the decree ascertaining the amount. In J.L.R, 31 Cal., 365, the reason stated is where the plaintiff fixes definitively a sum, that is the valuation, but if he fixes tentatively, then the First Court's adjudication; and this decision was followed by the majority of the Judges in I.L.R, 34 Cal., 958. As we have already pointed out there is no distiction made in the valuation of the suit between definite or tentative valuation in any of the relevant Acts. In Ibrahimji Issaji v. Bejanji Jamsedji, and Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy(6) the view later on adopted by Mookerji, J. appears to have been taken and in Goswami Sri Raman Lalji v. Bohra Desraj the learned Judges distinguished the earlier case of Madho Das…(Defendant); v. Ramji Patak…(Plaintiff).*(7) in their own Court, on the ground that in that case there was no acceptance by the plaintiff of the amount ascertained by the trial Court.
The difficulty of accepting this position as correct is equally great. What happens if plaintiff does not accept the amount ascertained to be due; how is he to signify his acceptance; till his acceptance what is to be the position of the defendant if he wants to appeal? As far as we have been able to examine the cases, no satisfactory answer is obtainable to any of these questions. Let us take a concrete case. Suppose a suit for accounts is instituted in a Subordinate Court with unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction and the plaintiff values his claim at Rs. 3,000. The Court gives him Its, 4,000. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is satisfied; the plaintiff wants Rs. 6,000 and the defendant says nothing is due. To what Court should defendant appeal and to what Court the plaintiff? Suppose defendant wants to appeal; how is he to ascertain if the plaintiff accepts the valuation or not? Suppose defendant appeals first, his appeal must obviously be to the District Judge. After that plaintiff appeals claiming Rs. 3,000 more; should his appeal be to the High Court? If it is to the High Court, does the District Court lose jurisdiction over the defendant's appeal; and if before the plaintiff appeals the District Court decides the defendant's appeal in his favour is that adjudication void as being without jurisdiction? Suppose the plaintiff after appealing to the High Court and after the defendant's appeal is taken up to the High Court withdraws his appeal; has the defendant's appeal to be sent back? Can the plaintiff file a Memorandum of Objection in the defendant's appeal in the District Court claiming the extra three thousand? Is it the principle that till there is an ascertainment of the amount due by the First Court accepted by the plaintiff, his original valuation is the test as was apparently held in Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy? If it is, the difficulty does not cease, for if the Court dismisses the plaintiffs suit after taking accounts the plantiff if he appeals to the District Court cannot, on the principle laid down in Bhupendra Kumar Chakravarty v. Purna Chandra Bose, get more than Rs. 5,000 the limit of that Court's appellate jurisdiction. The result of accepting any of these positions would be that the value of the subject-matter of a suit is a shifting quantity and varies from the trial Court to the Court of Appeal and varies even for purposes of appeal according as the appellant is the plaintiff or the defendant. If again this interpretation is correct, the forum of appeal may change in appeals from decrees or orders of the same court in the same suit, for example, in a suit for accounts the appeal from the preliminary decree dismissing the suit or ordering accounts may lie to one Court, while an appeal from the final decree may lie to a different Court—that is just what happened in Gulab Khan v. Abdul Wahab Khan—a result certainly not contemplated by Sect. 13 of the Civil Courts Act,
In most of the cases in which the question had arisen, the original suit was instituted in a Subordinate Court of unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction, and it was easy, after the amount was ascertained by the First Court and after the plaintiff had paid the additiona1 Court-fee under Sect. 11 of the Court-Fees Act, to treat the case as one of amendment of the plaint, in which case the amendment takes effect as from the date of the institution of the suit, and the amended value the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction both of the trial Court and the Court of Appeal. Some such assumption appears to have been made in Ibrahimji Issaji v. Bejanji Jamsedji, and Chathanath Madhavi v. Chathanath Kunhunni Menon. But there is no warrant for this assumption, and as observed in Arogya Udayan v. Appachi Rowthan, the plaintiff has not, and should not be allowed, to amend the valuation, as the result of allowing the plaintiff to amend the valuation may be to shift the jurisdiction from one Court to another at the option of the plaintiff.
Hitherto we have assumed that the suit was instituted in a Court of unlimited jurisdiction, when it is possible to change the valuation for purposes of appeal without in any way affecting the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The application of this principle of valuation whether the principle be that adopted by Mookerji, J., or that adopted by the other learned Judges who took part in the decision in the Full Bench case, becomes still more difficult if not impossible in cases where the suit was instituted in a Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction. Under the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act,—and similar provisions are to be found in the Civil Courts Act of the other provinces—an appeal from a decree of the District Munsif lies only to the District Court, and the District Court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals only from decrees in suits where the value of the suit does not exceed Rs. 5,000. If in a suit for accounts or mesne profits instituted in a District Munsif's Court, the plaintiff valuing the claim at an amount within the pecuniary limits of that Court, that Court gives a decree for more than Rs. 5,000, where would the appeal lie? In Golap Singh v. Indra Coomar a Bench of the Calcutta High Court solved the problem, as already stated, by holding that the Munsif cannot pass a decree for more than the amount of his pecuniary jurisdiction. This has not been accepted by the Allahabad High Court, and that Court holds that the Munsif can pass a decree for any amount, Sudarshan Das Shastri v. Ram Prasad but yet they accept the decision in I.L.R, 34 Cal. 954 (see Goswami Sri Raman Lalji Maharaj…(Objector); v. Bohra Desraj…(Opposite Party).* as to the valuation for determining the forum of appeal. How in the case supposed would the Allahabad High Court, which has to apply the same Civil Courts Act, decide the question? The precise question is raised in this case, for the suit was instituted in a Munsif's Court and a decree of that Court awards to the plaintiff a sum over Rs. 5,000 which, if the decision of this Court in Arogya Udayan v. Appachi Rowthan, is correct, the District Munsif was entitled to do. Mr. Govindaraghava Aiyar argued that our legislature was wiser and anticipated the difficulty and provided an appeal or at least contemplated an appeal to the High Court from the decree of the District Munsif, and drew our attention to the Language of Sect. 13 which in the second clause enacts,——omitting the words not now material,——that “appeals from the decrees of Subordinate Judges and District Munsifs shall lie to the District Court except when the amount or subject matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 5,000 in which case the appeal shall lie to the High Court.’ There is, we think, no warrant for this construction It is to be observed that the assumption, if there is one, is that the District Munsif may have original jurisdiction to pass a decree in a suit the amount or value of the subject-matter of which is above Rs. 5,000 but as Sect. 12 -of the same Act is quite clear and confines the original jurisdiction of the District Munsif to suits of which the value does not exceed Rs. 2,500, the assumption is unwarranted. Reading both sections 12 and 13 together there can be no doubt that appeals from decrees of District Munsifs lie only to the District Court. We think this affords almost conclusive proof that our interpretation of the words “The amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit” is the correct one.
It was said that our construction leads also to some anomalies; it enables the District Munsif to try and decree suits and the District Court to try appeals, whose real value may be much larger than the limits of their pecuniary jurisdiction as fixed by the Statue. If this is an anomaly it is not peculiar to suits for accounts or mesne profits or any other such class of suits where the plaintiff is given the right to fix his own valuation; for even in cases of so called determinate valuation, the valuation as fixed by the rules framed for that purpose may not be, and in a considerable class of important suits as for example suits for land is not the real value of the subject-matter of the suit. A striking instance of such a case is the case of Bhupendra Kumar v. Purna Chandra Bose already referred to. The original suit was for land and mesne profits. The land was valued at Rs. 886-60 and was decreed by the Munsif; there was an appeal to the Subordinate Judge; and a second appeal to the High Court. The plaintiff claimed profits of the very land for ten years and in execution of that decree fixed the approximate amount at Rs. 75,510 and the High Court held the Munsif was not entitled to try this claim in execution of his own decree. If the District Munsif can try a suit for the land and give a decree for it though the real value of that land must have been much larger than the amount claimed for mesne profits, if such claim was at least approximately correct, we are unable to perceive any anomaly in our holding that the approximate valuation fixed by the plaintiff, where that is one of the modes prescribed by the Legislature for the valuation of the suit, should govern jurisdiction in the trial of the suit in all its stages whether in the Court of First Instance or in an Appellate Court. One other instance is sufficient. Take the case of redemption of a mortgage. The value of the suit is the amount of the mortgage. The land sought to be recovered may be worth lakhs while the mortgage amount may be only a few hundreds. An instance of this kind is to be found in Second Appeal No. 852 of 1912.
In a recent case, Ayyalu Naidy v. Ramaswami Raja, in this Court, Oldfield and Krishnan, JJ., followed the decisions in I.L.R 34 Cal., 958 and in Chathanath Madhavi v. Chathanath Kunhunni Menon. Though the last case may be distinguished on the ground that the original suit was in the Subordinate Court, the decision in C. M. A. No. 131 of 1915 cannot be so distinguished. As we are unable to agree with the learned Judges who decided this last case and in view of the large body of Judicial opinion against our view, we think it will be more satisfactory if the question is disposed of by a Full Bench, and we accordingly refer the following question to the Full Bench:—
“Whether in suits for accounts instituted in a District Munsif's Court, an appeal from the final decree which awards more than Rs. 5,000 lies to the District Court or the High Court.”
[This Appeal came on for hearing this day pursuant to the above Order of Reference, before the Full Bench as constituted above.]
The Hon'ble Mr. B. N. Sarma the Appellant.
Mr. V. Ramesam for the Respondent.
OPINION.
Our answer to the question referred to us is that where a suit for accounts is instituted in a District Munsifs Court the plaintiff valuing the subject-matter of the suit at an amount within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif and a decree is passed for more than Rs. 5,000 the appeal from that decree lies to the District Court and not to the High Court. The question is fully discussed in the Order of Reference and it is not necessary to add anything. We overrule the decision in Ayyalu Naidu v. Ramaswami Raja, which follows Ijjatulla Bhuyan v. Chandra Mohan Banerjee, and Chathanath Madhavi v. Chathanath Kunhunni Menon.
We may mention that the case in Muttammal v. Chinnana Goundan, which has been referred to at the bar, does not affect the present question.
S.S