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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
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Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Messrs S. Varadachariar and K. Satyanarayanamurti for the Appellant.
  • Mr. B. Jagannadha Doss for the Respondent.
Judges
  • Sadasiva Aiyar
  • Napier, JJ.
Acts
  • provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887. Sect. 15 of that Act
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT 1887
  • provisions of Act IX of 1887. Under Sect. 6 of Act XI of 1865,
  • Sect. 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
  • Act XI of 1865 was the Small Cause Court Act
  • provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act
  • Sect. 189 (Madras Estates Land Act),
  • Cause Courts Act, Cl. 8 and Cl. 44
  • provisions of Act XI of 1865.
  • Madras Estates Land Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Messrs S. Varadachariar and K. Satyanarayanamurti for the Appellant.
  • Mr. B. Jagannadha Doss for the Respondent.
Judges
  • Sadasiva Aiyar
  • Napier, JJ.
Acts
  • provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887. Sect. 15 of that Act
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT 1887
  • provisions of Act IX of 1887. Under Sect. 6 of Act XI of 1865,
  • Sect. 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
  • Act XI of 1865 was the Small Cause Court Act
  • provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act
  • Sect. 189 (Madras Estates Land Act),
  • Cause Courts Act, Cl. 8 and Cl. 44
  • provisions of Act XI of 1865.
  • Madras Estates Land Act.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (per provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant) is the proprietor of Tarla Estate and a land-holder under the Madras Estates Land Act. The defendant is the holder of about 2 acres of wet land described as “Kheta Jeroyati Kotwal land” in parts of the relevant muchilikas (Exs. A and B). Although in some records the land was referred to as once being held on service tenure (“Kheta Kotwal”), since about 1906 both the Zamindar and the defendant's father (then tenant) treated the land as ordinary jeroyati (ryoti) land for assessment and charging purposes.

The plaintiff instituted a suit to recover arrears of rent for four faslies preceding institution of the suit (a suit under Section 77 of the Madras Estates Land Act). The defendant pleaded that the land continued to be service inam and that no rent was payable.

A preliminary objection was raised (by respondents) that no second appeal lies under Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the suit was, in the words of Section 102, “a suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Causes” and, the amount being below Rs. 500, a second appeal would be precluded. The suit had been instituted in the Revenue Court; additionally, Section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act was argued to exclude suits for rent by landholders against tenants from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts (including Small Cause Courts).

On merit the learned District Judge had reversed the Deputy Collector's decision; the High Court (Sadasiva Aiyar, J.) considered both the preliminary jurisdictional objection and the substantive question whether the land remained service inam or had become ordinary jeroyati land.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this suit for rent is "a suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Causes" so as to preclude a second appeal where the subject-matter value is below Rs. 500.
  2. Whether suits for rent brought by landholders under the Madras Estates Land Act are excluded from the cognizance of Small Cause Courts (and thus excluded from the expression in Section 102), in light of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887 (particularly Section 15 and its Second Schedule, Articles 8 and 44) and Section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act.
  3. On the merits, whether the land in question continued to be service inam (making rent not payable) or whether it had been effectively converted / treated as ordinary jeroyati land (making rent payable), and whether any "formal" steps were required to effect such conversion.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff / Appellant

  • Brought suit under the Madras Estates Land Act (Section 77) to recover arrears of rent for four faslies.
  • Asserted that the land had been treated as ordinary jeroyati land since about 1906 by both Zamindar and the tenant's predecessor, implying rent was payable.

Defendant / Respondent (and preliminary objection)

  • Defence pleaded that the land continued to be service inam, and therefore no rent was payable.
  • A preliminary objection was raised that no second appeal lies under Section 102 CPC because the suit was of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes and the subject-matter value was below Rs. 500; accordingly the High Court should not entertain the second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Soundaram Ayyar v. Sennia Naicken (Full Bench decision) Interpretation of the phrase (in old code Sect. 586 corresponding to Sect. 102 CPC): that the section removes the right of second appeal where the value is ≤ Rs. 500 in cases which, as regards subject-matter, would be within the jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes but are outside that jurisdiction by reason of the amount claimed being beyond the pecuniary limit. The court treated the Full Bench's observations as supportive of the interpretation that if a subject-matter is excluded from Small Cause jurisdiction by a schedule or by another enactment, then it is not a suit “of the nature cognizable by the Small Cause Court” for Section 102 CPC. The Full Bench ruling was relied upon to dispose of the preliminary jurisdictional point against the respondents' objection.
Musa Miya Sahib v. Sayad Gulam Hussain Muhammad (1882) Authority for the proposition (under the earlier Act XI of 1865) that suits for rent were regarded as falling within the category of suits cognizable by Courts of Small Causes. The court distinguished this decision as being based on the earlier Small Cause Court Act (Act XI of 1865). It held that the scheme of the later Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887, is different and that Sch. II to the 1887 Act excludes rent suits under the Estates Land Act from Small Cause jurisdiction; therefore Musa Miya Sahib was not followed for the present statutory framework.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two phases: first on the preliminary jurisdictional objection under Section 102 CPC; second on the merits of the rent claim.

Jurisdictional analysis (Section 102 CPC and Small Cause Courts)

  • The court examined Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887 (sub-sections (1), (2) and (3)) and the Second Schedule to that Act. Section 15(2) provides that, subject to exceptions in the Schedule and to other enactments, all suits of civil nature whose value does not exceed Rs. 500 are cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. Section 15(3) permits the Local Government to raise the pecuniary limit to Rs. 1,000 by order.
  • The judge explained that Clause 2 of Section 15 means that where a suit's subject-matter is excluded from Small Cause Court cognizance by the schedule or by some other enactment, it cannot properly be said to be “a suit of the nature cognizable by the Small Cause Court” for the purposes of Section 102 CPC.
  • Turning to Schedule II of the 1887 Act, the court identified Articles (Clauses) 8 and 44 as expressly excluding suits for rent due to a landlord under the Estates Land Act from the class of suits cognizable by Small Cause Courts. Article 8 excepts recovery of rent (other than house rent) unless the Small Cause Court judge has been expressly invested by the local authority; Article 44 bars suits whose cognizance is barred by any enactment for the time being in force.
  • The court relied on the Full Bench decision in Soundaram Ayyar v. Sennia Naicken to support the proposition that the expression in Section 102 must be read as excluding suits which the Schedule or another enactment places outside Small Cause jurisdiction.
  • The court distinguished Musa Miya Sahib (1882) because that was decided under Act XI of 1865 (which expressly conferred jurisdiction on Small Cause Courts for certain claims including rent), whereas the 1887 Act adopts the converse scheme: jurisdiction is the general rule subject to explicit exceptions in the Schedule and other enactments.
  • Finally, the court examined the Madras Estates Land Act (particularly Section 189) which expressly excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in respect of suits and applications specified in the Act's schedule; Part A, serial No. 8 (referring to Section 77) includes suits by a landholder to recover arrears of rent. Thus, Section 189 operates as an enactment that bars Small Cause jurisdiction under Article 44 of the Small Cause Courts schedule.
  • On this basis the court concluded that a Small Cause Court could have no jurisdiction over a suit for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act and therefore the present suit is not “a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes” within the meaning of Section 102 CPC; the preliminary objection to the second appeal was overruled.

Merits — conversion of service inam to jeroyati land

  • The court observed that the learned District Judge had reversed the Deputy Collector on "very unsatisfactory grounds."
  • The District Judge's apparent basis for holding that the land continued to be service inam was that no formal steps had been taken to convert the service into jeroyati land. The High Court rejected the necessity of any such “formal” ceremonies where both grantor and grantee agreed that the service should cease from a given date and thereafter both parties treated the land as ordinary jeroyati land.
  • The court emphasized the evidentiary fact (undisputed in the record) that the land had been treated as ordinary jeroyati land from about 1906 by both the Zamindar and the tenant's predecessor. Given that treatment and the statutory presumption under the Estates Land Act that all land is jeroyati land, the court held that upon cessation of the service the land resumes its character as ordinary jeroyati land without the requirement of any formal ceremonies.
  • Applying these principles to the facts, the court found for the plaintiff on the merits and would restore the decree of the first Court awarding rent (as explained in its final disposition).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court allowed the appeal, restored the decree of the first Court, and awarded costs to the plaintiff both in the High Court and in the lower Appellate Court.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's decree for recovery of arrears of rent is reinstated and costs are awarded to the plaintiff in both fora as stated by the court.
  • On the jurisdictional point, the court ruled that suits for rent brought by landholders under the Madras Estates Land Act are excluded from the cognizance of Small Cause Courts by the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887 (Schedule II, Articles 8 and 44) read together with Section 189 of the Madras Estates Land Act. Consequently, such suits are not “suits of the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes” for the purposes of Section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure; a second appeal is therefore maintainable in this case.
  • The opinion distinguishes earlier authority decided under the previous statutory regime (Act XI of 1865) and applies the different scheme embodied in the 1887 Act; the ruling clarifies the interplay between the 1887 Small Cause Courts Act schedule and the Madras Estates Land Act as regards jurisdiction and the applicability of Section 102 CPC.
  • The court did not purport to lay down an open-ended new doctrine beyond the statutory construction and factual holding in this case; the effect described above is the immediate legal consequence arising from the application of the statutes and authorities discussed in the opinion.

Note: This summary is confined to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add information external to that text.

Show full summary ...

    Varadaraja Sooru Harischendra Deo Bahadur v. Kanda Barikivadu

    Sadasiva Aiyar, J. — A preliminary objection has been aised in this case, namely, that no second appeal lies having regard to Sect. 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To understand this objection, I shall state the material facts. The plaintiff who is the appellant before us is the proprietor of Tarla Estate and a land-holder under the Madras Estates Land Act. The defendant is the holder of about 2 acres of wet land called “Kheta Jeroyati Kotwal land” in some places in some of the muchilikas Exs. A and B series but it is treated as jeroyati or ordinary ryoti land in fixing and charging assessment thereon. That it has been treated as ordinary jeroyati land from about 1906 by both the Zamindar and by the defendant's father who was then a tenant cannot be denied. The proprietor seems to have made a reference to the land as “Kheta Kotwal,” that is, as once having been held on service tenure with some object which it is not necessary to find out definitely for the purpose of this case. As I said, the fact that the land had been converted into ryoti land with the consent and knowledge of both the landlord and tenant cannot in my opinion be disputed on the evidence. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of arrears of rent for four faslies preceding the institution of the suit. The defence was that the land continued to be service inam and that no rent was payable. The preliminary objection is to the effect that as this suit for rent is, in the words of Sect. 102, Civil Procedure Code, ‘a suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Causes’ and as, the amount or value of the subject matter is less than Rs. 500, no second appeal lies, though the suit was instituted in the Revenue Court and though by Sect. 189 (Madras Estates Land Act), suits for rent brought by landholders under the Act against their tenants are expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, (which expression includes Small Cause Courts and Civil Courts exercising Small cause jurisdictions). To find out whether a suit for sent between a landlord and a ryot falling under the Madras Estates Land Act is or is not of a nature cognizable by Small Cause Courts, we have to consider the provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, IX of 1887. Sect. 15 of that Act is as follows:—

    “(1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the second Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes.

    “(2) Subject to the exceptions specified in that schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed Rs. 500 shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.

    “(3) Subject as aforesaid, the Local Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed Rs. 1000 shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the order.”

    Cl. 2 of Sect. 15 is the important clause in that section and in my opinion it shows that where any of the exceptions specified in the schedule to the Act or any provision of any other enactment for the time being in force excludes the subject-matter of a suit from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes, then a suit relating to that subject-matter is not one of a nature cognizable by the Small Cause Court within the meaning of Sect. 102, of the Civil Procedure Code. Now, if we turn to Sch. II of the Small Cause Courts Act, Cl. 8 and Cl. 44 of that schedule clearly exclude a suit of which the subject-matter is rent due to a landlord under the Estates Land Act by his tenant from the category of “suits of the nature cognizable by the Small Cause Courts.” The observations of the learned Chief Justice and of the majority of the other Judges of the Full Bench in Soundaram Ayyar v. Sennia Naicken(1) in my opinion support the above interpretation of Sect. 102, Civil Procedure Code. I might add that this preliminary objection, which might have been similarly taken in the very numerous cases which have come before this Court on second appeal under the Estates Land Act passed 12 years ago, seems either not to have been so taken at all or not seriously pressed even if taken in any of those numerous cases. I would therefore overrule the preliminary objection.

    Coming to the merits, the learned District Judge has reversed the Deputy Collector's decision on very unsatisfactory grounds. The only plausible reason for arriving at the conclusion that the land continued to be service inam, notwithstanding that both parties have treated it as having been resumed by the landholder and granted back as jeroyati land, is that although the service may have ceased, no formal steps had been taken for its conversion into jeroyati land. I think that if both the grantor and grantee agreed that the service should cease from a certain date and that the land should thereby cease to be held for the performance of such service no “formal” steps (whatever that may mean) are necessary to convert it into ordinary jeroyati land. Under the Estates Land Act, the presumption is that all land is jeroyati land and once the land ceases to be service inam land, it resumes its character of ordinary jeroyati land without any “formal” ceremonies being gone through.

    Reliance was placed upon a decision in Musa Miya Sahib v. Sayad Gulam Hussain Muhammad in support of the argument that a suit for rent is a suit of a nature cognizable by the Small Cause Court. It must be remembered however that that decision is a decision of 1882, when Act XI of 1865 was the Small Cause Court Act in force. As pointed out by Arnold White, C.J, in his opinion in the Full Bench case in the schedule of the later Act of 1887 is the converse of that of the Act XI of 1865. Under the Act of 1865, the Court of Small Causes is given Jutisdiction over certain specified claims, whereas under the Act of 1887, the Court has jurisdiction over every suit falling within certain descriptions and within a certain pecuniary limit unless that suit is expressly excluded from the cognizance of the Small Cause Court by the schedule or by any other enactment. Hence there might be one answer to the question, whether a particular suit is cognizable by a Small Cause Court, when that question is considered with reference to the provisions of Act XI of 1865. The very same question, whether that suit is cognizable by the Court of Small Causes, might permit of quite a different answer when it is considered with reference to the provisions of Act IX of 1887. Under Sect. 6 of Act XI of 1865, all claims for money due on bond or other contract or for rent, or for personal property are cognizable by Courts of Small Causes except claims which may then be brought before a Revenue Officer and so on. Thus, the subject-matter of suits for rent had been treated as a class as falling within the category of the subject-matter of suits cognizable by a Court of Small Causes and hence so long as that Act of 1865 was in force the expression “suits of the nature cognizable by a Small Cause Court” would include suits for rent; but as I Said, the scheme of the Act of 1887 is quite different and the Sch. 2 to that Act clearly excludes the subject-matter of a suit for rent due by a tenant to a landlord under the Estates Land Act from the subject matter of suits which are of a nature cognizable by Small Cause Courts.

    I would, therefore, allow the appeal and restore the decree of first Court with costs of the plaintiff here and in the lower Appellate Court.

    Napier, J.—I agree and only wish to add a few words on the preliminary point taken, as we are informed that there is no reported case in which this point has been decided. That this objection has at all events rarely been taken is obvious from the ‘fact that this Court has for the last ten years been occupied in giving decision on the construction and meaning of the word rent in cases which, if this objection prevailed, could not have come to this court. It is therefore necessary, that there should be a definite ruling on the point so that the question may be set at rest. In my opinion the ruling of the Full Bench in Soundaram Ayyar v. Sennia Naicken, disposes of the matter. There the Court had to consider the meaning of Sect. 586 of the Old Code, Act XIV of 1882, corresponding to Sect. 102 of the present Code. The Chief Justice stated as follows on the meaning of these words:—“The object of this section, as it seems to me, is to take away the right of second appeal or special appeal where the value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 500 in the case of all suits which as regards their subject matter would be within the jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes but which are outside that jurisdiction by reason of the amount claimed being beyond the pocuniary limit of the Small Cause jurisdiction.” In another part of his judgment, the learned Chief Justice said: “It seems to me that Sect. 586 of the Code applies to cases which as regards subject-matter would be within, but by reason of the amount claimed are without, the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes”—The words “any suit of the nature cognizable” as used in Sect. 586 of the Code may be paraphrased thus: any suit relating to a subject-matter over which a Court of Small Causes would have jurisdiction if the claim were within the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction.” Shephard, J., said “If it is found that a suit for rent could legally be tried by a Small Cause Court, that suit is a Small Cause, and therefore, a second appeal is precluded. Subramania Ayyar, J., said: “It is, therefore, as urged by Sir V. Bhashyam Ayyangar on behalf of the appellants almost certain that the words ‘any suit of a nature cognizable in Courts of Small Causes’ in Sect. 586 were intended to comprise suits which are cognizable by any Court of Small Causes by virtue of the provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act itself, but not suits which may become cognizable by Small Cause Courts under special circumstances only.” Benson and Davies, JJ., agreed with the learned Chief Justice. Taking the language of the learned Chief Justice, the important words are “suits which as regards their subject-matter would be within the jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes” and we have to ascertain whether a suit such as this would be within the jurisdiction of the Courts of Small Causes in any circumstance whatever. The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act of 1887 contains this provision; “Sect. 15 (2). Subject to the exceptions specified in the second schedule and to the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five hundred rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.” Sub-sect. 3 says: “Subject as aforesaid the Local Government may, by order in writing, direct that all suits of civil nature of which the value does not exceed one thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.” We have therefore to see, with regard to the first of these two sub-sections, whether there is any exception specified in the sche dule and any provision of any enactment for the time being in force which prevents these suits which are otherwise of a civil nature from being cognizable by Courts of Small Causes; and with regard to the second Sub-section, whether it would be possible for the Local Government by order in writing to direct that suits such as these, the value of which does not exceed one thousand rupees should be cognizable by Courts of Small Causes.

    I will first deal with the exceptions based on the schedule of the Act. The schedule provides under Art. 8 that a suit for the recovery of rent, other than house rent, unless the judge of the Court of Small Causes has been expressly invested by the local authority to exercise jurisdiction, is excepted. Therefore, unless there has been a special investment, such a suit would not be cognizable. But with regard to Sub-sect. 3, there is this provision that the Local Government may, by order in writing direct, and we have therefore to find if the Local Government did so direct and whether there is any other provision in the second schedule which would prevent such a direction having effect. This provision is to be found in art. 44 “a suit the cognizance whereof by a Court of Small Causes is barred by any enactment for the time being in force.” So that, even with regrad to the exceptions specified in the Schedule, there is this article 44 which is a complete bar to the jurisdiction either accruing by virtue of Sect. 15 (2) or being made applicable by virtue of Sect. 15. (3).

    Then we have to turn to the language of the Madras Estates Land Act. The suit is one under Sect. 77 of the Madras Estates Land Act, to recover arrears of rent and the language is “At any time after an arrear of rent has become due, the landholder may institute a suit before the Collector for the recovery of the arrear.” Then Sect. 189 provides that “A collector or other Revenue officer specially authorised under this Act shall bear and determine as a Revenue Court, all suits and applications of the nature specified in Parts A and B of the schedule and no Civil Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which such suits or applications might be brought or made” and the Sch. Part A, serial No. 8, which has reference to sect. 77 says: “By landholder to recover arrears of rent.” Therefore, both under the specific language of the Madras Estates Land Act which is definite on the point as excluding the jurisdiction of all Civil Courts and on the true construction of Sect. 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, it is clear that a Small Cause Court can have no jurisdiction over a suit for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act, and therefore it is not within the meaning of Sect. 102 Civil Procedure Code, a suit “of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.” It follows therefore that this suit is excepted from the lauguage of the Chief Justice in the case above referred to, namely, in the case of all suits which, as regards, the subject-matter, would be within the jurisdiction of Courts of Small Causes, and the contention for the respondents is negatived by that ruling.

    R. V. S.Appeal allowed

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    Comments

    Varadaraja Sooru Harischendra Deo Bahadur v. Kanda Barikivadu
    (Jan 27, 1921)