By this chamber summons petitioner/plaintiff seeks amendment of the petition, as per schedule appended to the chamber summons and seeks permission to convert the petition for probate into petition for letters of administration with the Will annexed dated 24th January, 2002.

2. Petitioner is widow of late Boman Dinyar Faramarzi who died on 29th August, 2007. According to the petitioner, the said deceased had executed his last Will and testament dated 22nd January, 2002. The said deceased had appointed Mr. Diniar Darab Mehta and Mr. Himanshu Kode, Advocate as executors of the said Will. It is the case of the petitioner that since executors appointed by the said deceased did not take any steps to file any probate petition and in view of the fact that the earlier advocate on record appearing for the petitioner inadvertently filed petition for probate of the last Will and testament of the said deceased in this Court, in spite of filing petition for letters of administration with the Will annexed, petitioner by her advocates' letter dated 4th August, 2011 addressed to the Executors of the said Will placed on record that since petitioner through her son on several occasions both orally and in writing had requested the executors to carry out their duties as executors of the Will but as they failed to do so, petitioner was constrained to file petition for probate of the Will herself. By the said letter petitioner called upon the executors to perform their duties as executors of the said Will, agree to act as petitioners/applicants in the petition/suit and to take steps to obtain probate of the last Will and testament of the said deceased. Petitioner through her advocate sent reminder to the executors by letter dated 5th September, 2011. There was no reply from Himanshu Kode, Advocate one of the executors of the said Will. Mr. Diniar Mehta, the other executor, however, by his letter dated 9th September, 2011 informed petitioner's advocate that he was not in a position to confirm execution of the Will of the said deceased on the basis of the photocopy of the said Will which was annexed to the petition and only upon inspection of the original Will, he would be able to confirm the execution of the said Will of the said deceased. He requested the petitioner's advocate to provide inspection of the original Will executed by the said deceased and to furnish him a coloured photo copy thereof to enable him to convey his decision with regard to the execution of the Will. In the said letter, it was however, contended that since the petitioner had already initiated proceedings for obtaining probate of the Will, the question of the said executor renouncing the executorship of the said Will did not arise. In response to the said letter, petitioner through her advocate's letter dated 28th September, 2011, clarified that the petitioner did not ask the executor to renounce the executorship of the Will but had sought to know whether the said executor wish to act as executor. It was also clarified that if the said executor seeks to take inspection of the original Will of the said deceased, he was free to do so in the office of the Prothonotary and Senior Maser of this Court.

3. It is the case of the petitioner that since there was no further response from either of the executors, petitioner filed an application on 23rd April, 2012 before the Prothonotory and Senior Master for permission to allow the petitioner to convert the petition for probate into petition for letters of administration with Will dated 22nd January, 2002 annexed thereto by making necessary changes in the petition. It was also stated in the said application that caveat and affidavit dated 25th June, 2010 filed by the respondent through caveator be treated as caveat in the proceedings in petition for letters of administration. By letter dated 29th June, 2012 the learned Additional Prothonotary allowed the said application dated 23rd April, 2012 filed by the petitioner.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that petitioner had carried out necessary amendments in the papers and proceedings of the petition/suit pursuant to the said order and the same was kept ready for being redeclared by the petitioner. At the time of redeclaration however, office of this Court found that since the caveat had been filed by the caveator herein, petition had been already converted into suit and therefore, the order for amendment by way of praecipe was not possible. Petitioner was advised to take out chamber order in the matter for the purpose of carrying out amendments, to convert the probate petition into petition for letters of administration. In the month of August, 2012, petitioner filed chamber order and filed affidavit in support thereof. It was stated in the chamber order that as the executors of the Will had not filed petition for probate even after repeated requests, petitioner who is the widow of the said deceased and the sole beneficiary named in the said Will decided to file petition in this Court seeking representation of his estate. The erstwhile advocate inadvertently filed petition for probate of the last Will of the said deceased in this Court instead of filing petition for letters of administration with Will annexed thereto. A copy of the said chamber order was served upon the advocates of the caveators who opposed the said chamber order before the Additional Prothonotary and Senior Master. By an order dated 5th September, 2012, the learned Additional Prothonotary and Senior Master, did not allow the said chamber order on the ground that since the petition was converted into a suit and the Will was disputed in the affidavit in support filed by the caveator, no order for conversion could be passed by him. Petitioner accordingly filed this chamber summons inter alia praying for amendment and for seeking permission of this Court to convert the probate petition into petition for letters of administration of the Will annexed.

5. The caveator filed affidavit in this chamber summons. In the affidavit in reply filed by the caveator, one of the objections raised by the caveator is that the executors of the Will were necessary and proper parties for adjudication of the issues involved in this Chamber Summons but were not impleaded as parties to the chamber summons. In view of this objection raised by the caveator in the affidavit in reply and also across the bar in the hearing held on 6th August, 2013, this Court passed an order granting leave to the petitioner to implead executors in the chamber summons and directed the petitioner to serve papers and proceedings on the executors. Impleadment of the executors was warranted also to ascertain their views whether any of them would act as executors or want to renounce their executorship. Pursuant to the said orders, executors were impeladed as respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to the chamber summons. In spite of service of papers and proceedings including chamber summons, Mr. Himanshu Kode, Advocate, one of the executors did not file any affidavit in reply and did not appear before this Court to disclose whether he would act as executor and take steps to continue the proceedings or would renounce his executorship. Mr. Diniar Mehta the other executor who was impleaded as respondent No. 2 in the Chamber summons, filed affidavit in reply dated 12th September, 2013.

6. Ms. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that since the named executors did not come forward and take any steps to file probate petition and in view of the erstwhile advocate of the petitioner advised petitioner to file petition for probate instead of filing petition for letters of administration being the sole beneficiary, petitioner had applied before the Prothonotary and Senior Master for permission to convert the said probate petition into petition for letters of administration with Will annexed and for consequential amendments. At the stage of redeclaration of the petition, it was brought to the notice of the petitioner that since the petition was converted into the suit already, no order on the application for amendment could be made. Petitioner therefore, filed chamber order for identical relief. In view of the objections raised by the caveator that the petition was already converted into suit, on the caveator filing caveat and affidavit in support, no order could be passed by the Prothonotary and Senior Master in the said chamber order filed by the petitioner. The learned Additional Prothonotary rejected the said chamber order.

7. Learned senior counsel submits that the petitioner is 69 years old and the only beneficiary in the said Will and was otherwise entitled to file petition for letters of administration if there was no executor of the said Will. It is submitted that though the named executors were called upon to act as executors, none of them came forward to file petition. My attention is invited to the correspondence exchanged between the petitioner through her advocate and executors. As far as Mr. Himanshu Kode, Advocate who was one of the executors is concerned, did not give any response to any of the letters. Mr. Mehta however, did not give any positive reply in response to the said letters and sought inspection of the original Will of the deceased. It is submitted that pursuant to the order passed by this Court, both the executors were impleaded as parties to the chamber summons. Mr. Himanshu Kode did not file any affidavit in reply disclosing his stand whether he would act as executor and would continue with the pending proceedings or even did not come forward for renouncing his executorship before this Court. Ms. Iyer, invited my attention to the affidavit in reply filed by the caveator as well as by the executor Mr. Diniar Mehta. It is submitted that Mr. Mehta has filed this affidavit after inspection of the original Will which was furnished to the said executor by the Prothontoary and Senior Master pursuant to the order passed by this Court. It is submitted that various incorrect statements are made by the said executor in his affidavit dated 12th September, 2013. Learned senior counsel would submit that since the said executor has not shown his readiness and willingness to act as executor on the basis of the Will annexed to the petition which was propounded by the petitioner, it would amount to renouncement of the executorship. It is submitted that in any event, the dispute about the genuineness of the Will raised by the said executor in the said affidavit can be decided at the stage of trial of the petition/suit.

8. Ms. Iyer placed reliance on section 222 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 in support of her submission that the probate can be granted only to the executor appointed by the Will. It is submitted that since the executors were appointed by the said deceased in his Will, this Court cannot grant probate to the beneficiary in this probate petition even if beneficiary is able to prove the execution of the Will. It is submitted that since the executors have failed to act and did not come forward to file the probate petition or to pursue the petition in spite of the petitioner repeatedly calling upon them to act as executor or to disclose their intention as to whether they want to renounce their executorship, no steps are taken by the executors. It is submitted that no prejudice would be caused to the caveator if the probate petition which is filed by the beneficiary who is otherwise entitled to file petition for letters of administration with Will annexed, if such probate petition is allowed to be converted into petition for letters of administration with Will annexed and if the caveat and affidavit in support thereof already filed by the caveator is treated as caveat and affidavit in support in petition for letters of administration with Will annexed upon its conversion. Ms. Iyer, placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Prasad Agarwal v. Bhola Ram Agarwal, (2000) 9 SCC 714 and in particular paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 6 which read thus:

“2. One Maina Devi, wife of late Baidyanath Agarwal executed a Will on 14-6-1976 nominating her nephew Matadin Agarwal to be the owner of her house, landed properties and other immovable properties. On 23-9-1981, Maina Devi died. In the year 1982, Matadin Agarwal filed a probate petition (Probate Case No. 1 of 1982) which was converted into Title Suit No. 1 of 1985. In the probate petition, Matadin Agarwal claimed a grant of probate in his favour. On 13-7-1987, Matadin Agarwal died. On the death of Matadin Agarwal, his heirs who are appellants before us, filed an application in Title Suit No. 1 of 1985 for their substitution in place of Matadin Agarwal. They also filed another application for amendment of the petition. In the amendment application, it was prayed that instead of grant of probate the legal heirs may be granted letters of administration. These applications filed by the appellants herein were rejected by the Court. The revision filed by them was also dismissed by the High Court. It is against these orders, the appellants are before us.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants urged that the view taken by both the Courts below is erroneous inasmuch as the appellants being the heirs of the legatee were entitled to be substituted and to pray for issue of letters of administration. However, this is contested by the learned counsel for the respondent.

5. We find that it is not disputed that Matadin Agarwal was a legatee under the Will. It is true that Matadin Agarwal ought to have applied for issue of letters of administration and not for probate. However, this did not debar his heirs to get the probate petition amended. The trial Court rejected both the applications of the appellants on the ground that since the probate petition filed by the legatee related to his personal right, therefore, no right accrued to the appellants for their substitution in his. place. This view, according to us, is not correct. Matadin Agarwal, as stated above, was a legatee and not an executor under the Will. It is true that where an executor dies, his heirs cannot be substituted because the executor possessed personal right, but this is not applicable whether the heirs of a legatee apply for issue of letters of administration. It is not disputed that today the appellant can file a petition for issue of letter of administration. Since considerable time has elapsed, we feel that the interest of justice demands that the proceedings should came to an end as early as possible and we should not dismissed this appeal merely on highly technical ground.

6. For the aforesaid reason, we set aside the orders under challenge and send the case back to the trial Court. We permit the appellants to be substituted in the proceedings and also permit them to amend the petition. It goes without saying that after the remand, it will be open to the parties to take such plea as may be available to them under the law. Since the matter is pending for a considerable time, we direct the lower Court to decide the matter expeditiously. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.”

9. Ms. Iyer, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case FGP Limited v. Saleh Hooseini Doctor, (2009) 10 SCC 223 and in particular paragraph 33 which reads thus:

“33. The aforesaid recitals in the Will are in consonance with sections 222 and 234 of the Indian Succession Act. For better appreciation of this point, both the sections are set out below:

222. Probate only to appointed executor.— (1) Probate shall be granted only to an executor appointed by the Will.

2) The appointment may be expressed or by necessary implication.

234. Grant of administration where no executor, nor residuary legatee, nor representative of such legatee.— When there is no executor and no residuary legatee or representative of a residuary legatee, or he declines or is incapable to act, or cannot be found, the person or persons who would be entitled to the administration of the estate of the deceased if he had died intestate, or any other legatee having a beneficial interest, or a creditor, may be admitted to prove the Will, and letters of administration may be granted to him or them accordingly.”

10. Ms. Iyer, learned senior counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Vatsala Srinivasan… v. Narisimha Raghunathan Since Deceased Smt. Shyamala Raghunathan…, 2011 (2) Mh. L.J 953 : AIR 2011 Bombay 76 and in particular paragraphs 8 and 18 of the said judgment which read thus:

“8. Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 provides that no right as executor or legatee can be established in any Court of Justice unless a Court of competent jurisdiction in India has granted probate of the Will under which the right is claimed or has granted letters of administration with the Will or an authenticated copy annexed. Section 220 provides that letters of administration entitle the Administrator to all rights belonging to the intestate as effectually as if the administration had been granted at the moment after his death. The effect of a probate under section 227 is that probate when granted establishes a Will from the death of the testator and renders valid all intermediate acts of the executor as such. Under section 222 a probate can be granted only to an executor appointed by the Will. When probate has been granted to several executors and one of them dies, section 226 stipulates that the entire representation of the testator accrues to the surviving executor or executors. Section 232 then provides as follows:—

“232. Grant of administration to universal or residuary legatees.— When (a) the deceased has made a Will, but has not appointed an executor, or

(b) the deceased has appointed an executor who is legally incapable or refuses to act, or who has died before the testator or before he has proved the Will, or

(c) the executor dies after having proved the Will, but before he has administered all the estate of the deceased, an universal or a residuary legatee may be admitted to prove the Will, and letters of administration with the Will annexed may be granted to him of the whole estate, or of so much thereof as may be unadministered.”

(emphasis supplied)

Section 232 deals with three identified situations. The first is where no executor has been named in the Will executed by the deceased. The second is where though an executor has been appointed by the deceased in the Will the executor (i) is legally incapable; or (ii) refuses to act; or (iii) has died before the testator; or (iv) had died before he has proved the Will. The third situation deals with a case where the executor after having proved the Will has died but before the estate of the deceased has been administered. In either of these situations section 232 provides that (i) a universal or a residuary legatee may be admitted to prove the Will; and (ii) letters of administration with the Will annexed may be granted to him of the whole estate or of such part of the estate as remains to be administered. The law does not postulate a vacuum in the administration of the estate of a deceased testator. Hence in the several situations to which a reference has been made in section 232, the Act contemplates that the universal or a residuary legatee may be admitted to prove the Will with a consequential issuance of letters of administration with the Will annexed. The second set of eventualities to which a reference has been made earlier contemplates a situation where the executor under a Will of the deceased has died before the Will was proved. The death of the testator before the Will is proved may occur either before the presentation of a Petition for probate or, for that matter, even after the presentation of a Petition but before probate has actually been granted upon the Will being proved. Whether as a matter of fact the death of the executor takes place before or after the institution of a Petition for probate, the death in such a case is prior to the Will being proved. Hence in both the situations, a residuary legatee is entitled in law to be admitted to prove the Will and to the issuance of letters of administration.

18. Both a proceeding for the grant of probate as well as a proceeding for the grant of letters of administration with the Will annexed is initiated for protecting the interest of the legatees under the Will. The essence of the enquiry in both the proceedings is the same and relates to the genuineness and authenticity of the Will. Having regard to these fundamental similarities in both the proceedings there is no conceivable reason as to why the law must be regarded as prohibiting a beneficiary from seeking to continue the proceedings upon the death of the sole executor and as incidental thereto for seeking formal conversion of the proceeding from one for the grant of a probate to one for the issuance of letters of administration. If there were to be a specific prohibition in law enacted by the legislature the position may have well been different. In the absence of a legal prohibition to the contrary the Court would not readily accept a submission, the effect of which would be to result in delaying the proceedings for the administration of the estate and a resultant multiplicity of proceedings. This is amplified in the present case where the recording of evidence is complete. Nearly eight years have elapsed since the institution of the suit. Evidence of seven witnesses has been recorded and the suit is ripe for final hearing. There is no dispute about the position that in any event the beneficiary would have been entitled to institute separate proceedings independently for the grant of letters of administration. That right can well be espoused by the beneficiary by seeking a continuation of the existing proceedings. It must be noted, that this right which is available is recognized with reference to a beneficiary under the Will. A fundamental difference has to be made between a situation where the legal heirs of a sole executor seek impleadment in the proceedings on the death of the executor. The legal heirs of the sole executor cannot be brought on record since the right to seek probate of the Will subsists in the executor alone. But that is not to say that a beneficiary under the Will is prohibited from continuing the existing proceedings. The proceedings enure to the benefit of the legatee. The appointment of the administrator is but a step in aid of the proper administration of the estate of the deceased. Section 273 provides that probate or letters of administration shall have effect over all the properties and estate of the deceased through the State in which the same is or are granted and shall be conclusive as to the representative title against all debtors of the deceased and all persons holding property which belongs to him. Parties, documents and facts are similar in both sets of proceedings. In this view of the matter and particularly having regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court to which we have made a reference earlier we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge was not in error in allowing the Chamber Summons.”

11. Mr. Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the caveator on the other hand submits that this Chamber Summons for seeking permission to convert probate petition into the petition for Letters of Administration itself is not maintainable. It is submitted that probate petition has been filed by the beneficiary and has not been correctly and properly instituted. Learned counsel submits that since executor appointed under the alleged Will in question has not renounced the executorship, the Chamber Summons for conversion of petition for probate into petition for Letters of Administration is not maintainable. It is submitted by the learned counsel that since executor had admittedly not renounced their alleged executorship before filing probate petition by the petitioner, conditions of section 232 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are not satisfied. It is submitted that when probate petition was filed, there was no evidence placed on record to show that any of the executors had refused to act as executor. Except bare averments in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons, no correspondence was produced in the petition. It is submitted that letters addressed to the executors which are now placed on record along with affidavit in support of this Chamber Summons are addressed after filing of the petition.

12. Mr. Shetty, learned counsel further submits that in view of the affidavit filed by one of the executors Mr. Diniar Mehta, who has disputed the fact that he had not attended the office of the Sub Registrar as alleged in the petition, execution of the Will in question is suspicious and thus in any event at this stage this Chamber Summons seeking conversion of probate petition into the petition for Letters of Administration cannot be considered. It is submitted that Mr. Diniar Mehta, one of the alleged executors has disputed the existence of the Will in the form annexed to the petition. It is submitted by the learned counsel that in any event, the cause of action for making an application for conversion of the petition for probate into petition for Letters of Administration arose in the year 2008 whereas this Chamber Summons has been filed by the petitioner on 11th December, 2012 i.e after three years after approval of cause of action and in view of Article 137 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act, 1963, Chamber Summons itself is barred by limitation and thus deserves to be dismissed on that ground alone. Learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in case of Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. Vijay Agarwal, reported in 2012 (2) Mh. L.J 106 : 2012 (4) ALLMR 628 and in particular paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment which read thus:

8. In Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, MANU/SC/0323/1976 : (1976) 4 SCC 634, the Supreme Court was considering whether a petition filed before the District Judge under section 16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 claiming an enhancement of compensation was barred by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Relying upon a decision of a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, MANU/SC/0331/1969 : (1969) 1 SCC 873, it was contended before the Court that Article 137 does not apply to the applications which were presented of any tribunal bodies or authorities other than a Civil Court. Following the decision in Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed before a Civil Court under any Act. In paragraph No. 22 of the decision, the Supreme Court observed:

The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a Civil Court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure.

The decision in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board (supra) was followed by the Supreme Court in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur, MANU/SC/7451/2008 : (2008) 8 SCC 463. After extracting the above quoted passage from the decision of Kerala State Electricity Board (supra), the Court held:

In terms of the aforesaid judgment (Kerala State Electricity Board) any application to Civil Court under the Act is covered by Article 137.

(Underlining supplied)

In view of the clear enunciation of law by the Supreme Court that every application made to a Civil Court is covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, it must be held that Article 137 applies even to an application made for amendment of the pleadings.

9. Mr. Kamdar, learned counsel appearing for the defendants referred to and relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons, MANU/SC/1724/2009 : (2009) 10 SCC 84 and invited my attention to the observations in paragraph No. 39 which reads thus:

39. The rule, however, is not a universal one and under certain circumstances, such an amendment may be allowed by the Court notwithstanding the law of limitation. The fact that the claim is barred by the law of limitation is but one of the factors to be taken into account by the Court in exercising the discretion as to whether the amendment should be allowed or refused, but it does not affect the power of the Court if the amendment is required in the interests of justice (see Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and Arundhati Mishra v. Ram Charitra Pandey).

The observations cannot be read out of context. It is settled principle of law that judgments of Court are not to be read as statute but the observations made in a judgment must be read in the context in which they are made. The above quoted observations were made while dealing with an argument that the amendment should not be allowed as it sought to add a claim which was barred by limitation on the date on which the application for amendment was made. It was in this context that the Supreme Court held that the Court has a discretion whether the amendment should be allowed or refused. In a given case, the question whether the claim which is sought to be introduced by an amendment in the plaint is barred by limitation or not would be a mixed question of law and facts and in that case it would be inappropriate to shut out an amendment without the trial and without knowing whether the claim made is really barred by limitation. The decision on the question of limitation as to a claim often requires appreciation of evidence. The distinction between a claim sought to be introduced by an amendment being barred by limitation and the application for amendment being barred by limitation must be borne in mind. The starting point for computing period of limitation for making an application for amendment of the plaint is the date when the right to apply for amendment accrues. In a given case, the right to apply for amendment may accrue on a day which is different than the date on which the cause of action for the claim sought to be made by amendment accrues. Article 137 of the Limitation Act provides that the period of limitation for making of an application is to be computed from “when the right to apply accrues”. The Court would therefore, have to see when the right to apply for the amendment of pleadings accrued to the plaintiff and compute the period of limitation from the date when the right accrued.

13. Mr. Shetty also made an attempt to distinguish the judgment relied upon by Ms. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner on the ground that in this matter, executors have not renounced their executorship before filing probate petition.

14. In rejoinder, Ms. Iyer, learned senior counsel submits that in the correspondence addressed by Mr. Diniar Mehta, in response to the letters addressed by the petitioner on 4th August 2011, it was not denied that any oral request was made by the petitioner to him to come forward and to act as an executor. My attention is invited to the letters addressed by Mr. Diniar Mehta in support of this submission. Learned senior counsel submits that the judgment relied upon by Mr. Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the caveators in case of Harinarayan G. Bajaj (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of this case since neither of the executors have rejected the request to act as an executor in the correspondence entered into. As far as Mr. Diniar Mehta is concerned, it is submitted that even in the letter addressed by him to the petitioner, it was made clear by him that till the inspection of the original Will was taken by him, he could not make any statement whether he would act as an executor or not. Learned senior counsel would submits that allegations made by Mr. Mehta for the first time in affidavit in reply filed by this Court are totally incorrect. It is submitted that since the said executor did not want to act as an executor as can be demonstrated from the said affidavit and in view of the fact that Mr. Himanshu Kode, the other executor of the Will has not come forward before this Court though papers and proceedings were served upon him to disclose his intention whether to act as an executor or not, application for seeking permission to convert the petition for probate into the petition for Letters of Administration be granted. Learned senior counsel submits that judgment thus relied upon by Mr. Shetty would be of no assistance to the caveator. It is submitted that in any event since the application filed by the petitioner is for conversion of the probate petition into the petition for Letters of Administration is with a view to bring this proceedings in conformity with the provisions of law, Article 137 of the Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act would not apply. It is submitted that in any event, the amendment can be allowed by this Court in the interest of justice. It is submitted that even if Article 137 is applicable, chamber summons is within time.

Reasons and Conclusion:—

15. It is not in dispute that the petition is filed by the beneficiary under the alleged Will in question. It is also not in dispute that by the alleged Will in question, there were two executors appointed by the said deceased. In the application made before the Prothonotary and Senior Master on 23rd April, 2012, it was stated by the petitioner that as executors appointed under the Will in question had not filed the petition for probate, the petitioner decided to file petition in this Court. The earlier advocate for the petitioner had inadvertently filed petition for probate instead of filing the petition for Letters of Administration with Will annexed. In view of the objection raised by the caveator in the chamber order filed by the petitioner, learned Prothonotary and Senior Master did not allow the said chamber order. On perusal of the letters addressed by the petitioner to the executors on 4th August, 2011, it is clear that it was case of the petitioner that since none of the executors took any steps as an executor and did not apply for probate of the Will, the petitioner was constrained to file the petition for probate of the Will herself. It was also the case of the petitioner that as the executors failed to act as an executors of the last Will of the said deceased and had not renounced executorship, the petitioner called upon the executor to perform their duties and to agree to act as the petitioners in this petition/suit and to take steps to obtain probate of the last Will and testament of the said deceased. The petitioner had also called upon Mr. Diniar Mehta, one of the executors to inform whether he was willing to sign and affirm the usual affidavit as an attesting witness with regard to the execution of the Will in question as he was alleged to be one of the attesting witnesses to the Will in question. On perusal of the letter addressed by Mr. Diniar Mehta, it is clear that there is no denial in the said letter to the statement made by the petitioner in her advocate's letter dated 4th August, 2011 that the said Mr. Diniar Mehta did not take any steps as an executor nor applied for probate of Will and had failed to act as an executor. As far as Mr. Himanshu Kode, advocate who was the other executor of the said Will is concerned, he did not give any response to the letters addressed by the petitioner through her advocate nor filed any affidavit in reply nor remained present in these proceedings though served.

16. In view of the issue raised by the caveator that the executors were necessary and/or proper parties to this Chamber Summons, to ascertain their views whether they would act as an executors or not, by an order dated 6th August, 2013 passed by this Court, the petitioner was granted leave to amend to implead the executors and to serve papers and proceedings upon the executors. Though Mr. Diniar Mehta filed affidavit in response to the said order dated 6th August, 2013, no affidavit in reply is filed by Mr. Himanshu Kode. On perusal of the affidavit filed by Mr. Diniar Mehta on 12th September, 2013, it is noticed that the said Mr. Diniar Mehta has alleged that he was not witness to the Will in the present form as produced before this Court and had not attended the office of the Sub Registrar of Assurances of Mumbai on 22nd January, 2002 for the registration of the Will in question and had not made/affixed his signature before the Sub-Registrar of Assurances as claimed by the petitioner. Upon query raised by this Court to the learned counsel appearing for Mr. Diniar Mehta, learned counsel made a statement that his client was not ready and willing to act as executor on the basis of the original Will as propounded by the petitioner and produced in this proceedings. Submissions made by the learned counsel is accepted.

17. Question that arises for consideration of this Court is whether in this petition this Court can grant probate in favour of the beneficiary in view of section 222 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. On perusal of section 222 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 it is clear that probate can be granted only to an executor appointed by the Will. Section 230 of the Indian Succession Act provides that the executor may renunciate orally in the presence of the Judge, or by a writing signed by him renouncing his rights to act as executor. Section 231 of the Act provides that if the executor renounces or fails to accept the executorship within the time limited for the acceptance or refusal thereof, the Will may be proved and letters of administration, with a copy of the Will annexed, may be granted to the person who would be entitled to administration in case of intestacy.

18. On perusal of the record produced by parties, in my view both the executors who were alleged to have been appointed by the said deceased in the Will in question have not come forward to act as an executors. Though this Court had passed an order impleading the executors with a view to ascertain whether any of those executors who would act as executor or would renounce the executorship, as far as Mr. Himanshu Kode is concerned, he neither appeared before this Court nor filed any affidavit in reply. There was no response given by Mr. Himanshu Kode to any of the letters addressed by the petitioner. As far as Mr. Diniar Mehta is concerned, he made a statement through his counsel that he did not want to act as an executor in respect of the Will in the form as annexed or produced with the petition by the petitioner. Since Mr. Himanshu Kode has not come forward to act as an executor though served with notice and proceedings and since Mr. Diniar Mehta has refused to act as an executor in respect of the Will in the form in which it is produced by the petitioner, in my view in this situation, the beneficiary would have been entitled to file a petition for Letters of Administration with Will annexed. It is the case of the petitioner that since none of the executors had come forward to act as executors and in view of the erstwhile advocate filing a petition for probate instead of filing petition for Letters of Administration, petitioner had filed such proceedings. In my view, no prejudice would be caused to the caveator if the petition filed for probate is allowed to be converted into the petition for Letters of Administration in the circumstances referred to above.

19. Supreme Court in case of Shambhu Prasad Agarwal has considered a similar situation and has held that the petitioner in that case who had filed a petition for probate instead of filing petition for letters of administration would not be debarred to get the petition for probate amended. The petitioner in that case was a legatee and not an executor under the Will. It is held that the legal heirs could file a petition for issuance of letters of Administration even on the demise of the original petitioner and in the interest of justice proceedings would not come to an end and the appeal would not be dismissed merely on technical ground. I am respectfully bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Shambhu Prasad Agarwal (supra). In my view, the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Shambhu Prasad Agarwal (supra) squarely apply to the facts of this case.

20. In the facts of this case, it is clear that the petitioner who claims to be the sole beneficiary under the Will in question is 69 years old. On filing of the caveat and affidavit in support by the caveator, petition for probate has been already converted into a suit. Whether Will propounded by the petitioner was executed or not or validly attested or not would be an issue which would be tried at the time of trial of the petition. Merely because a probate petition is allowed to be converted into a petition for Letters of Administration with Will annexed, it would not prove the existence and/or execution of the Will in question. The caveator who has disputed the Will would be entitled to treat the caveat as well as affidavit in support of the caveat filed as caveat and affidavit in support in the petition for Letters of Administration with the Will annexed.

21. Supreme Court in case of FGP Limited (supra) on consideration of sections 222 and 234 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 has held that the said Act recognise the contingency where the executor appointed by the Will is unable to act, when there is no executor and no residuary legatee or representative of a residuary legatee, or he declines or is incapable to act, or cannot be found, the person or persons who would be entitled to the administration of the estate of the deceased if he had died intestate, or any other legatee having a beneficial interest, or a creditor, may be admitted to prove the Will, and letters of administration may be granted to him or them accordingly. I am respectfully bound by the statement of law declared by the Supreme Court in the said judgment.

22. Division Bench of this Court in case of Smt. Vatsala (supra) has held that the petition for grant of probate as well as proceedings for grant of administration with the Will annexed are in the interest of the legatees and the question involved in such proceedings will be the same, namely, about the truth and genuineness, authenticity of the Will. It is held that there is no conceivable reason as to why the law must be regarded as prohibiting a beneficiary from seeking to continue the proceedings upon the death of the sole executor and as incidental thereto for seeking formal conversion of the proceeding from one for the grant of a probate to one for the issuance of letters of administration. It is held that in any event the beneficiary would have been entitled to institute separate proceedings independently for the grant of letters of administration which right can well be espoused by the beneficiary by seeking a continuation of the existing proceedings.

23. In my view, since in this case, both the executors have refused to act as executors, petitioner who is claiming to be a sole beneficiary under the Will in question is entitled to seek conversion of petition for probate into petition for letters of administration with Will annexed and to proceed with the petition for Letters of Administration. In my view, application thus made by the petitioner for seeking permission to convert the probate petition into the petition for Letters of Administration is justified and deserved to be granted.

24. As far as judgment of this Court in case of Harinarayan G. Bajaj (supra) relied upon by Mr. Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the respondent on the issue of limitation is concerned, since the executors have not renounced at any point of time to act as an executor either in the correspondence or any time prior to filing of affidavit in this Court, in my view limitation for making any application for amendment in this case would commence only when executors did not appear before this Court and/or refused to act as executor before this Court upon their impleadment. Chamber Summons thus is within time.

25. As far as submission of Mr. Shetty that in view of the serious allegations made by Mr. Diniar Mehta in his affidavit disputing the existence of the Will in the form as is produced by the petitioner and his signature before the Sub Registrar of Assurances is concerned, such issue can be decided at the stage of trial of the petition by leading oral evidence if parties so desire.

26. On perusal of the affidavit in support and for reasons recorded in affidavit in support, delay in filing this Chamber Summons is condoned. In my view, there is no merit in any of the submissions made by the caveator or by the executor who remained present before this Court. Case is made out by the petitioner for grant of reliefs as claimed in the Chamber Summons. Petition for probate which is converted as testamentary suit is restored as petition for probate and is converted to a petition for letters of administration with Will annexed. Caveat and affidavit in support of the caveat filed by the caveator shall be treated as caveat and affidavit in support in petition for letters of administration with Will annexed. Chamber Summons is accordingly made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c). Amendment to be carried out within eight weeks from today.

27. On oral application of Mr. Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the caveator, operation of this order is stayed for a period of four weeks from today. There shall be no order as to costs.

Order accordingly.