Stanley, C.J and Griffin, J.:— The sole question in this appeal depends upon the true construction of the will of one Mohan, Lal, dated the 28th of February, 1881. Mohan Lal had two daughters, namely, Lila and Maya. Both these daughters were married, Bhaskaran being the husband of Lila. Lila left a daughter, namely, the plaintiff Jaldhara. According to the will of Mohan Lal, which is a short document, after setting out that life was transient and therefore it was necessary for every person to make arrangements during his lifetime so that after his death his name may be perpetuated and commemorated, he directs that after his death his daughters, Musammats Lila and Maya, shall be the owners in possession of the whole of the property in his possession like himself. Nothing is to be found in the will to qualify the terms of this gift. The sole question before us is whether or not this gift to his two daughters was a gift to them as tenants in common or as joint tenants. Bhaskaran, the husband of Lila, and Maya executed a mortgage on the 31st of May, 1900, of a house which belonged to the testator, in favour of the defendant appellant Gopi, and it 13 his contention that the gift was a gift to the two daughters in joint tenancy, and therefore the survivor Maya was able to give a valid mortgage of the entire house. On the other hand it is contended that according to the rule of construction to be applied in the case of a Hindu will the gift in question was a gift to the two daughters as tenants in common. The court below held that it was such a gift and decreed the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of one-half of the property in dispute by right of inheritance from her mother Lila.
The question appears to us to be concluded by the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Mam Chandra Dutt. The testator in that case made a gift in the following terms:—“The remaining 4 anna share I give to you Srimati Rani Doorga Kumari, and the son born to your womb, Jogeswar Narain Deo, for your maintenance.” This was followed by a direction in the following terms:—“Upon my death you and your son and grandsons, et cetera, in due order of succession, shall hold possession of the zamindari, et cetera, according to the above distribution of shares. And I give to you the power of making alienation be sale or gift.” It was there contended, upon the authority of Vydinada v. Nagammal, that by the terms of the will the Rani and her son, Jogeswar Narain Deo, became joint tenants of the 4 anna share and not tenants in common. In Vydinada v. Nagammal a Hindu by his will granted jointly to his brother's ton and Nagammal, the wife of the latter, certain lands with power of alienation, and it was held in accordance with the rule of English conveyancing governing a gift of the kind that the grantees were joint tenants and not tenants in common. Their Lordships of the Privy Council overruled this decision, stating that there were two substantial reasons why it Ought not to be followed as an authority, the first of these being “that the learned Judges of the High Court of Madras were not justified in importing into the construction of a Hindu will an extremely technical rule of English conveyancing.” “The principle of joint tenancy,” they observed, “appears to be unknown to Hindu law, except in the case of coparcenary between the members of an undivided family.” By this decision of their Lordships we are bound in the present case, the facts of which appear to be on all fours with those in the case of Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt. We may point out that the gift was not made to members of a Joint Hindu family but to the two daughters of the testator, both of whom were married women. It is most unlikely that the testator would, under such circumstances, have given his property to his own daughters in joint tenancy. We think, therefore, that the decision of the court below was correct and dismiss this appeal with cots.
Appeal dismissed.