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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This was a suit for sale upon a mortgage originally instituted by Kalyan Mal and Lekhraj. On 18 March 1898 the Court of first instance passed a decree for sale in the form prescribed by section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. After the decree was passed the decree-holders sold the decree to the appellant, Chunni Lal. No order absolute for sale under section 89 was ever passed before the sale of the decree. At the time the decree was sold no appeal had been presented on behalf of the defendants. Shortly after the transfer an appeal against the decree was presented, and that appeal named only the original plaintiffs, Kalyan Mal and Lekhraj, as respondents. On 29 July 1898 Chunni Lal applied to the lower appellate Court to be made a respondent in substitution for the original respondents, stating that by reason of the transfer he was interested in the suit and had no additional evidence to adduce; the application purported to be made under section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 10 October 1898 the lower appellate Court ordered, purportedly under section 372 read with section 582, that Chunni Lal be added as a respondent; the original plaintiffs nonetheless remained on record as respondents. The lower appellate Court took additional evidence, held that the mortgage debt had been satisfied, set aside the decree of the first Court, and dismissed the suit as against all respondents. Chunni Lal then appealed to the court that produced this opinion, advancing mainly that, as regards him, the appeal should be treated as not having been preferred until 10 October 1898 (the date he was added as respondent), and hence should have been dismissed as time-barred.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Chunni Lal's purchase of the decree (after a decree nisi under section 88 but before order absolute under section 89) was a purchase pendente lite, so as to make section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable.
  2. If section 372 applied, whether adding Chunni Lal as a respondent on 10 October 1898 defeated any limitation plea that he could raise which his assignors could not have raised.
  3. Whether the lower appellate Court's reception of additional evidence after Chunni Lal was added (including re-examination and production of account books) was irregular in a manner warranting interference.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Main ground: As regards him, the appeal must be treated as not having been preferred until 10 October 1898 (the date on which he was ordered to be made a respondent), so the appeal was time-barred as to him.
  • Implicit in the appellant's contention is that the addition of a transferee after the period of limitation cannot relate back so as to bind him where the appeal would have been barred if originally brought against him alone.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Chunni Lal's purchase of the decree was a purchase pendente lite because it was subject to an appeal; presentation of the appeal revived the suit and related back to the passing of the original decree.
  • Therefore, the transfer made between the decree and the presentation of the appeal was a transfer pendente lite and section 372 applied to bring Chunni Lal on the record as respondent.
  • It was also argued (rejected by the court) that the transferred thing was only the decree and not immovable property under section 52; respondents contended the decree represented the mortgagee's interest in the immovable property and thus the doctrine of lis pendens was applicable.
  • The respondents relied upon the view that an order under section 88 is not final but conditional (a decree nisi), and the lis continues until order absolute under section 89 or actual sale.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatesh Govind v. Maruti Authority for the proposition that a suit continues for the purposes of lis pendens until the passing of a final decree in the Court of first instance; a decree that is not final does not terminate the suit. The court relied on this reasoning to support the conclusion that a decree under section 88 (a decree nisi for sale) is not final and that lis pendens continues until the order absolute or actual sale, so a transfer in the interim may be pendente lite.
Unreported decision of the Calcutta High Court (as cited by Dr. Rash Behari Ghose) Authority (as cited in commentary) for the proposition that in the case of a sale by a mortgage under a decree the proceedings for lis pendens must be taken to continue until the property is actually sold. The court referenced this cited authority (via Dr. Ghose) as supportive of the view that lis pendens continues until actual sale in mortgage-decree sale cases; it buttressed the court's reasoning that the transfer to Chunni Lal was pendente lite.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis focusing on (a) the character of a decree under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, (b) the doctrine of lis pendens and transfers pendente lite, and (c) the effect of making a transferee a party under section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

  1. Character of the decree under section 88:

    The court observed that a decree under section 88 is, on its face, a preliminary or conditional decree (a decree nisi) because it must be supplemented by an order absolute under section 89 and sometimes by a supplementary decree under section 90. Therefore it is not a final decree for purposes of terminating the suit.

  2. Application of lis pendens and whether the transfer was pendente lite:

    Because the suit is not terminated until a final decree or actual sale, the court held that a transfer made between the passing of the decree under section 88 and the order absolute (or actual sale) is a transfer made pendente lite and is subject to the doctrine of lis pendens. The court explained that the decree represented the mortgagee's interest in the immovable property and that transfer of the decree carried that interest to the assignee.

    The court noted authorities and commentary (including Venkatesh Govind v. Maruti, American authorities cited via Van Fleet, and an unreported Calcutta decision cited by Dr. Rash Behari Ghose) as showing that there is support for treating such transfers as pendente lite, but the court emphasized it did not need to decide the broader, more difficult question of whether pendente lite applies in all such cases because an alternative ground sufficed here.

  3. Effect of section 372 on limitation and procedural status:

    The court analyzed section 372 and distinguished it from provisions like section 559 of the Code, section 22 of the Limitation Act, and section 32 of the Code. It held that when a party is brought on the record under section 372 (assignment, creation, or devolution of interest pending the suit) the suit is continued by or against him as the same suit from the beginning — there is no new suit or appeal as regards that transferee. Consequently the addition of Chunni Lal under section 372 did not initiate a new appeal or suit for limitation purposes.

    The court concluded that if Chunni Lal would have been bound by the appellate Court's decree without being made a party at all (because he was a transferee pendente lite), he cannot be in a better position by being added later; section 372 does not permit him to raise limitation pleas that his assignors could not have raised.

  4. Additional evidence and procedural irregularity:

    The court acknowledged imperfections in the manner the lower appellate Court took additional evidence (including apparent misunderstanding that Chunni Lal would not be bound by earlier evidence and re-taking evidence). However, because the relevant account books were produced by Lekhraj, the pleaders on both sides agreed to examination, and no objection was made in the lower Court to admission or consideration of the account books or the commissioner's report, any irregularity did not warrant interference. The lower appellate Court properly treated the onus of proof as on the defendants to prove payment, and it found that on the balance of evidence the debt had been paid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Appeal dismissed.

Implications:

  • The court held that Chunni Lal's purchase of the decree made pendente lite was properly treated under section 372 of the Code so that adding him as a respondent did not create a new appeal or revive limitation in his favour; accordingly, he could not successfully contend that the appeal was time-barred as to him when the appeal had been originally instituted against his assignors.
  • The court declined to set aside the lower appellate Court's finding that the mortgage debt had been satisfied; it found no reversible procedural error in the admission and consideration of evidence given the absence of objection below.
  • Direct effect: the lower appellate Court's decree setting aside the decree of the first Court and dismissing the suit is upheld; costs were awarded against the appellant. The opinion does not announce any broader new principle beyond the application of section 372 to a transferee brought into an existing appeal and the conclusion that such addition does not create a new appeal for limitation purposes.

Concurring opinion: Banerji, J. agreed with the Chief Justice's reasoning and conclusion, reiterating that section 372 applied to continue the originally instituted appeal against the transferee and that no question of limitation arose.

    Chunni Lal v. Abdul Ali Khan

    Strachey, C.J:— This was a suit for sale upon a mortgage. The original plaintiffs in the suit were Kalyan Mal and Lekhraj. On the 18th March, 1898, the Court of first instance gave the plaintiffs a decree for sale in the form prescribed by section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. After the decree was passed the decree-holders sold it to the appellant before us. No order absolute for sale was ever passed under section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. At the time of the sale of the decree no appeal had been presented against the decree on behalf of the defendants. Shortly after the transfer an appeal against the decree was presented. To that appeal they made respondents only the original plaintiffs, Kalyan Mal and Lekhraj. It is clear from the fourth paragraph of their memorandum of appeal to the lower appellate Court that at the time when they instituted that appeal they were aware of the transfer of the decree to the present appellant. On the 29th July, 1898, the appellant Chunni Lal made an application to the lower appellate Court that he should be made a respondent in the appeal in substitution for the original respondents, saying that, by reason of the transfer to him, he was interested in the suit, and that he had no additional evidence to adduce. That application purported to be made under section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the 10th October, 1898, the lower appellate Court made an order purporting to be passed under section 372, read with section 582 of the Code, to the effect that it was necessary to make Chunni Lal a party, as the decision of the appeal might affect his purchase; and accordingly Chunni Lal was added as a respondent to the appeal, but the comes of the original respondents, Kalyan Mal and Lekhraj, still remained on the record a respondents. The application of the 29th July, 1898, was made some time after the period of limitation would have expired if the appeal had originally been brought against Chunni Lal alone. The lower appellate Court too certain additional evidence, held that the mortgage-debt had been satisfied, set aside the decree of the first Court, and dismissed the suit as against all the respondents before it. Against that decree Chunni Lal now appeals, and his main ground is that, as regards him, the appeal must be taken as not having been preferred until the 10th of October, 1898, when the order bringing him on the record as a respondent was passed, and consequently the lower appellate Court ought to have dismissed the appeal as time-barred, so far as he was concerned. The first question is, under what provision of the law was Chunni Lal made a respondent in the lower appellate Court? He was not, and could not have been, made a party under section 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which only authorizes the addition of persons as respondents who were parties to the suit in the Court of first instance. It was suggested that Chunni Lal was made a party under section 32 read with section 582 of the Code. The application, however, and the order by which he was made a party, expressly purported to have been made under section 372 read with section 582 of the Code. Section 372 refers to cases of assignment, creation, or devolution of any interest pending the suit otherwise than by the death, marriage, or insolvency of parties to which the preceding sections of Chapter XXI relate. The application and order certainly presuppose that Chunni Lal stood in the position of a transferee pending the suit, and the question is whether that was really his position. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that Chunni Lal's purchase of the decree was a purchase made pendente lite, because it was subject to an appeal from the decree, that the presentation of the appeal revived the suit, that such revival related back to the passing of the original decree, and that consequently a transfer made between the date of the decree of the first Court and the presentation of an appeal was a transfer made pendente lite subject to the doctrine of pendente lite. Now the question whether the doctrine of pendente lite is applicable to the transfer of property during the interval between the passing of the decree of a Court of first instance and the presentation of an appeal is one of considerable difficulty, and the authorities which have been cited show that it has been the subject of difference of opinion both in his country and in England. There is probably much to be said in support of both sides of the question, and I should be very unwilling to decide such a question unless it was absolutely necessary for the determination of this case. In the view which I take of the case, it is not necessary to decide that question. There is another ground on which I think that the appellant's purchase must be regarded as a purchase made pendente lite. There can be no doubt, at all events, that a suit continues for the purposes of the doctrine of lis pendens until the passing of a final decree in the Court of first instance. The its is not at an end until there is a final decree, and a decree which is not final—such, for instance, as a decree for an account—has always been held not to terminate the suit—see the cases referred to in Venkatesh Govind v. Maruti (1). Now a decree under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is, on the face of it, not a final decree but a decree nisi is has to be supplemented by an order absolute for sale under section 89, and even after an actual sale in some cases it may become necessary to pass a supplementary decree under section 90, and that can only be a decree in the original suit. The lis would probably not be completed before the actual sale, and certainly not before the passing of the order absolute, before which, as section 89 shows, the defendant's right to redeem and the security are not extinguished. This conclusion is, I think, in no way affected by the circumstance that for certain purposes an order absolute under section 89 has in some cases been held to be an order passed in execution of the decree under section 88. That is quite true in a sense and for certain purposes of the Limitation Act and the Code of Civil Procedure; but it does not alter the fact that the decree under section 88 is a preliminary and, conditional one, which requires to be supplemented by the order absolute, and is not final in itself. In America it appears to have been held that in the analogous case of a decree for foreclosure, the suit continues for the purposes of lis pendens until the mortgagee is actually placed in possession under his foreclosure. (See Van Fleets' Treatise on the Law of Former Adjudication, p. 1098; and Hukum Chand on Res Judicata, pp. 697-698.) In his edition of the Transfer of Property Act, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose (2nd Ed., p. 435) refers to an unreported decision of the Calcutta High Court as an authority for the proposition that in the case of a sale by a mortgage under a decree the proceedings for the purposes of lis pendens must be taken to continue till the property is actually sold. It was suggested that the doctrine would not be applicable, because the thing that was transferred here was not immovable property within the meaning of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act but the decree itself. But the decree represented all the interest which the mortgagee had in the mortgaged property, and the transfer of the decree undoubtedly carried with it a transfer of that interest in immovable property, which after the transfer, obviously did not remain in the mortgagee, and therefore passed with the decree to its assignee. It was a transfer to which, I think, the doctrine of lis pendens was applicable, because it was made before the final decree in the suit in the original Court. Now that being so, and Chunni Lal having been made a respondent under section 372 of the Code, the question is how does this affect the plea of limitation? I think it shows that no question of limitation can arise. Assuming that the purchase was made pendente lite, it was not necessary to add Chunui Lal as a respondent to the appeal at all, and the decree passed on appeal would be binding on him, though only the original mortgagees had been made parties. Now if Chunni Lal would have been bound by the appellate Court's decree without his having been made a party to the appeal at all, he would not be less bound if he were made a party to the appeal after a certain time. He was added as a respondent under section 372, not as a matter of right, but because his assignors, having no further interest in the matter, could not be expected to support a decree in which they had no longer any concern. It is clear from the terms of section 372 of the Code that when a party is brought on the record under that section, there is, as regards him, no new suit at all. He is added in the suit already instituted, and than suit is “continued by or against” him. The phraseology of section 372 in this respect is totally different from that of section 22 of the Limitation Act or section 32 of the Code, which has been so much discussed in the argument. In the same way where, by reason of section 372 read with section 582, a person is added as a respondent, there is, as regards him, no now suit or appeal dating from the time when he was so added. The original suit continues, and the original appeal continues, and no new suit or appeal begins. The essence of section 372, whether applied to proceedings in the Court of first instance or proceedings in appeal, is that the suit is one from the beginning, and that the addition of the transferee does not initiate, as regards him, a new proceeding. The new respondent introduced in that way can, I think, only take such pleas as his assignors could have raised and cannot introduce any new issue. That being so, I think that the main ground of appeal by Chunni Lal fails.

    The other ground which has been urged on his behalf relates to the manner in which evidence was taken by the lower appellate Court. I must say that the circumstances in which that evidence was taken are not very satisfactory. The Court appears to have been under the mistaken impression that when Chunni Lal was made a respondent under section 372, he would not be bound or affected by the evidence which had been given in the Court of first instance, and that therefore it was necessary to take the evidence of certain persons over again. I infer that this was the view of the Court from the terms of the order ??? the evidence to be taken. Then the decision of the lower appellate Court is based upon the omission in certain account books produced by Lekhraj of any mention of the mortgage debt, and the fact that Lekharaj did not produce in that Court any account books for certain years in which, if that debt were outstanding, it might have been mentioned. The account books which were produced were produced by Lekhraj in the lower appellate Court. He was directed to produce them in consequence of an application of 22nd September, 1898, in which the defendants, appellants in that Court, offered to be bound by Lakhraj's statement on oath if he would make such a statement and produce his account books. Ultimately, after Chunni Lal was brought on the record, that offer was withdrawn; but in the meantime, acting apparently on the assumption that it would hold good, Lekhraj produced the books, an order was made for their examination and for a report upon them by a commissioner, and at the hearing of the appeal the report of the commissioner regarding the account books was taken into consideration. So far as the hooks are concerned, it cannot be said that the provisions of the last paragraph of section 568 of the Code requiring the Court to record the reasons for the admission of additional evidence were complied with; but any irregularity in the admission and treatment of the account books, as well as in the examination of Lekhraj, appears to be covered by the tact that no objection was raised to those proceedings in the Court below. It is expressly recorded that the pleaders on both sides agreed to the examination of Lekhraj; he himself produced the books, and no objection was ever made to their consideration or to the consideration, of the commissioner's report regarding them. There is not a trace of any objection being made, and that being so I do not think that we ought to interfere on that ground with the decision of the Court below. The Court below clearly recognised that the onus lay upon the defendants to prove their plea of payment. It found in substance that they had sustained that onus, and that consequently the mortgage debt must be considered to have been paid. We cannot in second appeal consider whether the Court's reasons for that conclusion were well founded. I think that this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    Banerji, J.:— I am of the same opinion. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appeal of the respondents to the Court below as against the present appellant was barred by limitation is, in my opinion, untenable. No question of the application of section 22 of the Limitation Act, or of section 32 read with section 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arises in this case. The present appellant applied under section 372 of the Code to be substituted for the original plaintiffs as a respondent to the appeal which had already been brought against those plaintiffs. The order directing him to be added to the record purports to have been made under the same section. If that section applied to the case, it was not open to the present appellant to raise any plea of limitation which his assignors could not have raised. He was added with the object that the appeal which had already been instituted against his assignors should be continued against him also. No fresh appeal was filed against him, but the appeal which had originally been instituted was continued as against him. That being so, no question of limitation could arise. The real point is the case is whether section 372 did apply to the case of the present appellant. He was the assignee of a decree which was a decree nisi for sale under section 88 of the Transfer of Property Act. He took that decree subject to its being made absolute by an order under section 89 of that Act. Until such order was made it cannot be said that the suit had come to an end. Therefore as he took the assignment pendente lite, the doctrine of ils pendens applies to his case. Section 372 was consequently applicable, and the appellant was not competent to raise any plea of limitation which, as I have said above, his assignors could not have put forward. Upon the other points which were discussed in this appeal I am in full accord with what has been said by the learned Chief Justice. I agree in dismissing the appeal.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Chunni Lal v. Abdul Ali Khan
    (Apr 13, 1901)