Fazl Ali, J.:— The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether a certain award is valid and it arises on the following facts.
One Baijnath Singh who had married two wives had a son Debi Singh by his first wife and two other sons Deo Kumar and Ram Bilas by his second wife. Ram Bilas and his son are the plaintiffs in the present litigation and the descendants of Debi Singh are the defendants. It is common ground that at one time all the three sons of Baijnath were living jointly with their father. The plaintiffs' case, however, is that Debi Singh separated from his father during his lifetime, while the rest of the family continued to be joint and that the plaintiffs being joint with Deokumar at the time of his death, are entitled to all his properties by survivorship. The case of the defendants was that after the death of Debi Singh the defendants, the plaintiffs and Deokumar separated from one another but Deokumar re-united with the defendants before his death. They also alleged that soon after Deokumar's death there was an arbitration and Deokumar's properties were divided between the plaintiffs and defendants as the result of an award made by the arbitrators which was at the moment accepted by both the parties.
The learned Munsif who tried the suit found that Deokumar died in a state of jointness with the plaintiffs but he was living with the defendants at the time of his death. He also held that there was an arbitration and the award given by the arbitrators was valid and binding on the parties. The lower appellate Court which addressed itself mainly to the question of the validity of the award has agreed with the Munsif in finding that the award was binding on the parties and, therefore, dismissed the appeal.
The only question which was argued in this Court was that the award was not valid (1) because one of the plaintiffs being a minor, there was no proper reference to arbitration and (2) because the award was not signed by any of the arbitrators.
It appears to me that there is very little substance in the first point because there is no doubt that the plaintiff no. 1 who is the father of plaintiff no. 2 and who was the karta of the family at the time was a party to the reference. As regards the other point, the learned Advocate for the appellant wishes us to hold that even though this was a reference without the intervention of the Court, it must be governed by paragraph 10 of Schedule II of the Civil Procedure Code which requires that where an award has been made the persons who made it shall sign it. This contention, however, does not appear to me to be sound. There can he no doubt that paragraph 10 applies to those awards only which are made when the suit is referred to arbitration through the intervention of the Court and this is clear not only from the place which paragraph 10 occupies in Schedule II, but also from its language which is as follows—
“Where an award in a suit has been made, the persons who made it shall sign it and cause it to be filed in court, etc.”
This provision clearly lays down that the award to which it refers must have been made in a suit and it further enjoins that the persons who make the award shall cause it to be filed in Court. The paragraphs which relate to awards made when there is reference to arbitration without the intervention of the Court are paragraphs 20 and 21. Paragraph 20 is not very material because it simply empowers any person interested in the award to apply to any Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award that the award be filed in Court. Paragraph 21 runs thus—
“Where the court is satisfied that the matter has been referred to arbitration and that an award has been made thereon and where no ground such as is mentioned or referred to in paragraph 14 or paragraph 15, is proved, the court shall order the award to be filed and shall proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award.”
This paragraph neither lays down that the award should be in writing nor does it say that if in writing it should be signed by the arbitrators. All that is required is (1) that the Court should be satisfied that the matter has been referred to arbitration on which an award has been made and (2) that the award is not liable to be attacked on grounds set out in paragraph 14 or 15, Schedule II, of the Civil Procedure Code. Now, there is ample authority for the proposition that where a reference to arbitration is made without the intervention of the Court and where writing is not required by the terms of the submission, a parol or oral award is good and will bind the parties. In Sabloppa v. Deb Chand Jenkins, C.J observed that the oral award though undesirable was perfectly valid. If, therefore, an oral award is valid, I do not see why a written award which is not signed by the arbitrators should be held to be invalid even though a Court is satisfied that the award is a genuine one and was actually made by the arbitrators to whom the matter was referred for arbitration. It may be conceded that in a private reference without the intervention of the Court if there is evidence that certain material formalities were required by the submission or that the parties had made it a condition of reference that the award should be in writing and be signed by the panches, then the award must be made, signed and executed with all the material formalities required by the submission. Where, however, nothing is said at the time of the reference as to the form of the award, it is clear that the arbitrators may adopt such formalities as they choose. Thus the only point urged in this appeal fails and as both the Courts are satisfied that there was an award made in this case and that it was acted upon for some time, the appeal is concluded by findings of fact and must be dismissed with costs.
Macpherson, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed.