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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Succession Certificate Act and sec. 25 of the Contract Act
  • provisions of secs. 6 and 5 of the Indian Trust Act. Sec. 6
  • Fund.18. Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sec. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • life.29. Sec. 5 of the Trusts Act
  • sec. 6 of the Trusts Act
  • sec. 5 of the Trusts Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Succession Certificate Act and sec. 25 of the Contract Act
  • provisions of secs. 6 and 5 of the Indian Trust Act. Sec. 6
  • Fund.18. Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • sec. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • life.29. Sec. 5 of the Trusts Act
  • sec. 6 of the Trusts Act
  • sec. 5 of the Trusts Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit arises out of a deed of settlement dated 11 June 1928 executed by the late Thomas Sansoni (the "settlor"). The settlor had two marriages and children from each marriage; he also lived for many years with Miss Daisy Mackintosh (known as Mrs. Thomas) and had three children by her. The settlor had been a long-standing member of the India General Navigation and Railway Co., Ltd. Provident Fund (the "Fund") and on retirement (in 1935) received Rs. 72,468 credited to his account in the Fund. He purchased securities and retained a bank balance from those monies and died on 12 June 1935.

The deed of 11 June 1928 purported to settle the settlor's interest in the Provident Fund and certain household furniture upon trusts. The named trustees were the settlor and Nelson Mayhew Vaughan. The deed provided inter alia that the trustees should collect the Provident Fund money, pay the interest/income to the settlor during his life, and after his death pay Rs. 18,000 absolutely to Miss Mackintosh and the remainder of capital and income to Miss Phyllis Anne Sansoni (and make over the furniture to her). The deed also contained a clause allowing the settlor to alter or revoke the trusts by a subsequent deed.

Letters of administration to the settlor's estate were granted to one of his daughters (the Defendant) on 30 May 1940; the co-trustee Vaughan instituted the proceedings as Plaintiff but died in December 1941 and was substituted by the Official Trustee of Bengal (the Plaintiff). The Plaintiff sought possession of securities and bank monies, or alternatively monetary relief, and accounts and interest; the Defendant, sued in her representative capacity, raised multiple defences attacking the validity and operation of the deed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed of 11 June 1928 created a valid and enforceable trust under the Indian Trusts Act (notably sec. 6 and sec. 5 concerning declaration and transfer of trust property).
  2. Whether the credit standing to the settlor's name in the Provident Fund amounted to a "debt" or an "actionable claim" (as relevant under sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act) and thus was capable of being the subject-matter of a trust or assignment.
  3. Whether the trust property (the settlor's interest/credit in the Fund) was indicated with "reasonable certainty" so as to comply with sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, despite uncertainty as to the precise quantum payable on retirement.
  4. Whether Rule 20 of the Fund (prohibiting assignment/transfer of moneys standing to a member's credit) invalidated the assignment/settlement contained in the deed.
  5. Whether the trust was perfected and acted upon (including whether the settlor's receipt and subsequent investment of the Fund monies defeated or prevented enforcement of the trust).
  6. Whether registration of the instrument was required under sec. 5 of the Indian Trusts Act for a non-testamentary declaration of trust of movable property, and if non-registration rendered the deed unenforceable (the court noted this but declined to decide it finally because it found a transfer to trustees had in fact taken place).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Claims (as pleaded)

  • Possession of the cash at the settlor's bank at his death and the securities purchased by him during his lifetime out of the monies he received from the Provident Fund.
  • A decree for Rs. 72,468-4-8; alternatively a decree for Rs. 18,941-11-6.
  • Accounts, if necessary, and interest.

Defendant's Arguments / Defences (summarised)

  • The deed did not create a valid trust.
  • The deed did not operate to transfer any property and no property was transferred to the trustees.
  • The settlor did not divest himself of any property by the deed.
  • The deed was never acted upon and the trust was never perfected.
  • The deed is not registered and therefore cannot be enforced.
  • Specifically contesting that the credit in the Fund was a "debt" (arguing the amount varied, depended on voluntary contributions, company profits, sickness/furlough assessments, misconduct provisions, etc., and was not a liquidated sum payable immediately).
  • Arguing that Rule 25 vested the funds in trustees and therefore there was no beneficial interest of the member that could be assigned (and separately that Rule 20 prohibited any assignment of moneys standing to a member's credit).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib Consideration of the meaning of "debt" (in context of the Succession Certificate Act) — that amounts which subsequently become due may not be a liquidated "debt". The case was cited by Defendant's counsel to support the proposition that sums not presently ascertainable are not "debts." The Court considered this authority but distinguished the Fund credit, concluding the credit was an actionable claim under sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Doraisami Padayachi v. Vaithilinga Padayachi Consideration of the meaning of "debt" (in relation to sec. 25 of the Contract Act) — amounts subsequently becoming due held not to be a liquidated debt in that context. The Court noted this authority, which had been relied on to argue the Fund credit was not a "debt," but proceeded to hold that the credit was an actionable claim under sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore capable of being transferred or settled by the deed.
Woods v. Woods Authority on the sufficiency of description of trust property and on trusts created of funds not yet in existence or where quantum is not precisely stated. Quoted and applied by the Court to support the proposition that a trust of a fund may be valid even where the exact amount is not presently ascertainable—used to uphold that the trust property was indicated with reasonable certainty.
In re Turcan Illustration that a covenant to settle property which the settlor may subsequently become entitled to can be enforced as to property subsequently acquired (and discussion of assignability/recognition despite conditions against assignment). Relied upon by the Court to show that a trust may be declared of property contingently coming into existence and that conditions against assignment do not necessarily prevent equitable enforcement; used to support the conclusion that the deed's description was sufficiently certain and not void.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner, addressing the principal legal obstacles raised by the Defendant and applying relevant statutory provisions and authorities cited in argument.

1. Character of the Provident Fund credit — actionable claim / "debt"

  • The Court analysed the Fund rules and noted Rule 12 provided for payment of the total credit only upon termination of the member's services (retirement being the relevant event here).
  • The Court referred to sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (definition of "actionable claim") and sec. 130 (transfer by instrument in writing) and concluded the credit in the Fund was an actionable claim: a benefit payable upon occurrence of prescribed events, analogous to a bank fixed deposit where a debt exists though enforceable only on the agreed event.
  • The Court held that each member, including the settlor, had a beneficial interest in his credit which was an actionable claim.

2. Effect of vesting of Fund monies in trustees (Rule 25) and Rule 20 prohibition on assignment

  • The Court observed that vesting of fund monies in trustees (Rule 25) does not negate the member's actionable claim or beneficial interest; it is analogous to money deposited in a bank which vests in the bank but gives the depositor a right to payment.
  • Regarding Rule 20 (prohibiting assignment by members and providing trustees/managers will not recognise attempted assignments), the Court held the deed did not purport to assign the sums standing to the settlor's credit at the date of the deed (the prohibition's specific target) but rather assigned the sum to which he might become entitled upon retirement. Accordingly the deed was not the type of assignment that Rule 20 was intended to invalidate. The Court therefore did not need to decide whether Rule 20 would invalidate an assignment as against an assignee.

3. Requirement of reasonable certainty under sec. 6 of the Trusts Act (trust property)

  • Defence argument: the quantum of the settlor's credit at the time it would become payable could not be ascertained in 1928 because it depended on future voluntary subscriptions, company contributions, profits, absences affecting subscriptions, or dismissal for misconduct.
  • The Court considered authorities (Halsbury, Woods v. Woods, In re Turcan) to the effect that the property need be designated or so defined that it is capable of being ascertained and that trusts of future or contingent funds can be valid.
  • Applying sec. 6 literally and the cited authorities, the Court held that sec. 6 requires reasonable certainty but not precision in quantum; the deed sufficiently indicated the trust property (the settlor's interest in the Fund and household furniture). The Court therefore held the trust property was indicated with reasonable certainty and the trust did not fail for uncertainty.

4. Perfection and operation of the trust

  • The Defendant argued the trust was never acted upon or perfected because on retirement the settlor received the Fund monies personally and invested or spent them and the co-trustee did not participate in management.
  • The Court rejected this as a basis to deny enforcement: a settlor who creates a trust enforceable against him can be compelled to carry it out even where he fails to comply; the fact the settlor received the monies and invested them in his own name and enjoyed the income is consistent with the trust terms (which permitted him the undisturbed use of income during life).
  • The Court relied on indicia of continuing intention to maintain the trust: absence of any executed revocation, retention of a typed copy of the deed among the settlor's papers, and the settlor's statement to Miss Mackintosh that he intended to make provision for her. These factors indicated the settlor intended the trusts to continue.

5. Registration under sec. 5 of the Trusts Act

  • Sec. 5 requires that non-testamentary trusts of movable property be declared by a written instrument signed and registered, unless ownership is transferred to the trustee.
  • The Court found it unnecessary to decide finally whether registration was obligatory in the present circumstances because it concluded that the deed effected a transfer of the actionable claim (the credit) to the settlor and Mr. Vaughan as trustees (i.e., the ownership in the property was transferred to the trustees), thereby removing any need to decide registration questions.

Conclusion of analysis

Taking the statutory provisions and authorities together, the Court concluded that (a) the Fund credit was an actionable claim and a beneficial interest of the settlor, (b) the trust property was indicated with reasonable certainty, (c) the deed effected a transfer to trustees sufficient to create an operative trust, and (d) the deed therefore created a valid and enforceable trust.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The deed of settlement dated 11 June 1928 created a valid, operative and enforceable trust.

Direct consequences and orders made by the Court (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court ordered that the Defendant (in her capacity as administratrix) deliver to the Plaintiff within two weeks the securities set out in annexure (b) to the plaint and also any moneys in her hands belonging to the estate of which she is administratrix.
  • The costs of both Plaintiff and Defendant were ordered payable out of the trust fund; the Defendant's costs included costs incurred in obtaining Letters of Administration and furnishing security. Both sets of costs were to be taxed as between attorney and client.
  • Government fees and charges were to be a first charge upon the subject-matter of the suit.

Broader implications:

The Court's reasoning affirms that (on the facts and law considered) a member's credit in a provident fund may constitute an actionable claim / beneficial interest capable of being the subject of a trust or transfer even though the precise quantum payable in the future may be contingent on events specified in the rules of the Fund. The opinion does not purport to set out a novel rule of law beyond its application to these facts, and the Court expressly declined to decide the separate question whether registration was required where ownership in the trust property is not transferred to the trustees.

Solicitors appearing (as recorded in the opinion): B. Chatterjee for the Plaintiff; Sandersons & Morgans for the Defendant.

This summary is limited to matters expressly set out in the Court's opinion and does not infer facts or legal conclusions beyond those stated therein.

    The Official Trustee Of Bengal v. Chippendale .

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

    Gentle, J.:— This suit arises out of a deed of settlement dated the 11th June, 1928, purporting to create a trust, which deed was executed by the late Thomas Sansoni to whom reference hereafter can conveniently be made as “the Settlor.”

    2. The settlor was twice married. By his first marriage he had two daughters, the Defendant and Miss Phyllis Anne Sansoni, and one son named Paul. The issue by his second marriage was one daughter, Hope Enid, now Mrs. Douglas. The settlor separated from his second wife about 30 years ago. It has been stated that the second wife died in July, 1939, a few weeks after the death of the settlor. After he had separated from his wife, he lived with a Miss Daisy Mackintosh, who was known as Mrs. Thomas, and by whom he had three children. Miss Mackintosh lived in Calcutta, and the relationship between her and the settlor continued for about 30 years. For the major portion of this time the settlor stayed each weekend with Miss Mackintosh, but from the year 1935, about the period he retired from his occupation, until his death in 1939, he lived entirely with Miss Mackintosh. He died intestate on June 12th, 1935, at the age of 74. His death took place at Miss Mackintosh's house, and all the children of his two marriages survived him.

    3. The settlor made no provision for the maintenance of Miss Mackintosh and her children although he had maintained them entirely during the period of his association with this lady. Some time before his death he told Miss Mackintosh that he intended to make, or he had made, a deed, by which he would leave her with provision for the future. He kept his documents in a despatch box, and upon his death and when the box was opened, a typed copy of the deed was found amongst other papers, upon which he had written in pencil “on my death body to be cremated.”

    4. The settlor was over 50 years in the employment of the India General Navigation and Railway Co., Ld., hereinafter called “the Company.” This Company has a Provident Fund Institution (which I will conveniently call “the Fund”), of which the members are the servants of the Company. The settlor was a member, and had been a member, for more than 19 years prior to the year 1928. Upon his retirement from service with the Company in 1935 he was paid a sum of Rs. 72,468, being the amount due to him and as credited in his account in the books of the Fund. Of this sum, Rs. 10,865 was the amount of his own contributions, the balance being represented by contributions made by the Company, profits and interest. It is perhaps convenient to record that on June 11th, 1928, the date of the deed, to which reference will be made later, the amount credited in his favour was a sum of Rs. 35,165, of which Rs. 9,828 represented his own contribution, Rs. 7,752 the amount of the Company's contribution, and the balance of about Rs. 17,500, the profits and interest upon the two contributions.

    5. Between the dates when he received the Provident Fund monies and his death the settlor purchased securities of the total value of about Rs. 53,000. When he died he also had a credit bank balance of Rs. 708. It is common ground that these investments and the bank balance represented part of the monies which were paid to him by the Fund, and it would seem he had spent the balance.

    6. It is now convenient to refer to the deed of June 11th, 1928. This is made between the settlor, (who therein is so described), of the one part, and the settlor again and one Nelson Mayhew Vaughan, (therein described as the trustees). The deed recites that the settlor was desirous of settling the amount to which he would be entitled as a member of the Provident Fund of the Company, which amount he estimated at Rs. 33,000 or thereabouts, and the household furniture belonging to him at his death, which he valued at Rs. 1,000, and all additions accruing to the Fund or which might otherwise become payable to him by the Company upon the trusts thereinafter declared. It was witnessed that in consideration of natural love and affection and other good causes and consideration the settlor did thereby assign and transfer unto the trustees all that sum of Rs. 33,000 or thereabouts and any other monies to which on his retirement from the service of the company he might become entitled as a subscriber or member of the Fund and also household furniture then or thereafter belonging to him and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever of the settlor into and upon the said monies and furniture to have and to hold the same unto the trustees upon the trusts thereinafter declared,’ namely,—

    1. The trustee should collect and receive the said Provident Fund money and any additions or accretions thereto;

    2. The trustee should pay the interest or income thereof to the settlor and should allow him the undisturbed free use of the furniture during his life;

    3. After his death and after payment of his funeral expenses and debts, pay out of the capital and income of the trust monies Rs. 18,000 to Miss Mackintosh absolutely, and the balance of the capital and income to the settlor's daughter, Miss Phyllis Anne Sansoni and make over the furniture to her absolutely.

    7. The deed also provided that it should be lawful for the settlor at all times by any deed to alter or revoke all or any of the trusts declared by those presents and to declare any new or other trusts.

    8. In the written statement the factum of execution of the deed was either not admitted or denied. The two executants are the settlor and Mr. Vaughan, the two attesting witnesses being Mr. McNair, a solicitor, and Mr. P.B Das, his clerk. The two executants and one attesting witness, Mr. McNair, are dead, and the whereabouts of the other attesting witness are unknown. I am satisfied from the evidence of Miss Mackintosh and of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the deed bears the signatures of the two executants ‘and the two attesting witnesses, and that the deed was properly executed. Learned Counsel in his address to me on behalf of the Defendant did not direct any argument to the contrary.

    9. Some letters written by the Defendant and Miss Sansoni and a record of the attendance of these two ladies and others at a solicitor's office shortly after the death of the settlor have been exhibited, from which it would seem that these ladies, at that time, were not intending to dispute or attack the validity of the deed of settlement. Another letter which was written by the son of the settlor by his first marriage has also been filed in which he requests that the validity of the deed should be disputed. These documents, in my view, do not affect in any way the matters which come before me for consideration.

    10. Letters of administration of the settlor's estate were granted to the Defendant on May 30th, 1940, and in this suit she is sued as the administratrix of the estate of her deceased father, and in that representative capacity. At the time the suit was instituted Mr. Vaughan, the co-trustee with the settlor, was still alive and he instituted the present proceedings as trustee. He died in December, 1941, and by orders of this Court the Official Trustee of Bengal has been substituted as the trustee of the trust, if there is a trust, created by the deed of settlement and also as the Plaintiff in the suit in the place of Mr. Vaughan. No question now arises regarding the substitution, and the contention on behalf of the Defendant was abandoned by learned Counsel, Mr. Chowdhury, that the suit had abated before the substitution of the Official Trustee of Bengal as Plaintiff in the suit.

    11. The Plaintiff claims (1) possession of the cash at the settlor's bank at the date of his death, and the securities purchased by him during his life-time out of the monies he received from the Provident Fund; (2) a decree for the sum of Rs. 72,468-4-8; alternatively a decree for the sum of Rs. 18,941-11-6; (3) accounts, if necessary, (4) interest.

    12. The defences which are now raised can be summarised as follows:—

    (1) The deed did not operate to create a valid trust; (2) it was not operative to transfer any property, and none was transferred to the trustees; (3) the settlor did not divest himself of any property by the deed; (4) the deed was never acted upon, and the trust was never perfected; (5) the deed is not registered, and therefore cannot be enforced.

    13. Reference to the relevant rules of the Provident Fund can now conveniently be made:—

    5 (1) Every Member shall subscribe a sum of 5 per centum per mensem on the amount of his salary.

    5 (2) Any Member may subscribe a further sum not exceeding 7½ per centum per mensem on the amount of his salary, which voluntary contribution can be reduced or can cease upon notice given to the Managers;

    7. The subscriptions of any Member absent on sick leave or furlough shall be assessed on the salary allowed during such absence if desired by the Member.

    8. In respect of each year in which the profits of the Company exceed the sum required to pay interest at the rate of 5 per centum upon the issued Share Capital, there shall be contributed by the Company to the Provident Fund; out of the excess net profits, but not otherwise a sum equal to the aggregate amount of compulsory and voluntary subscriptions of Members for such year, such contribution shall not exceed an amount equivalent to 5 per centum of the net profits for the year, and the Company shall be at liberty, without any obligation to do so, to make up the deficiency of any of its yearly contribution out of the profits in any subsequent year.

    9. All sums contributed by the Company under Rule 8 shall be appropriated among the Members (1) in the event of the contribution not exceeding the aggregate amount of the compulsory subscriptions, the amount should be divided among the Members in proportion to the amount of their compulsory subscription; (ii) in the event of the contribution exceeding the aggregate amount of the compulsory subscriptions there shall first be a division amongst the Members to the amount of their respective compulsory subscriptions and out of the surplus a second division, amongst the Members who elected to increase their subscriptions for that particular year beyond the compulsory amount in proportion to the amount of the voluntary subscriptions, and the Managers shall credit the account of each Member with his share of the contribution; (iii) for purposes of such appropriations the contributions shall be deemed to have been paid by the Company on the 31st December in each year, and for purposes of the Rules the account of each Member shall be deemed to have been credited with his respective share of the contributions as on the 31st December.

    11. Except as provided by the Rules no Member nor any person or persons on his behalf or in respect of his interest shall be entitled to claim any payment of money to him or them.

    12. (So far as is material in the present case) Upon the termination of the services of the settlor the Managers shall pay to him the total amount of the credit standing in his favour in the books of the Fund.

    14. If the Member's services with the Company were terminated by reason of misconduct the Managers shall pay to him the amount of the subscriptions which he should actually then have paid.

    20. No Member shall be entitled in any way to assign, transfer or deal with by way of security or otherwise any money standing to his credit in the books of the institution and any attempted assignment, transfer or transaction shall toe invalid, and the trustees and Managers shall not recognise or be bound by any notice to them of any such attempted assignment, transfer or transaction.

    25. The funds and moneys of the institution shall be vested in the trustees.

    14. Before proceeding further it is desirable to set out the provisions of secs. 6 and 5 of the Indian Trust Act. Sec. 6 is as follows:—

    “(Subject to the provisions of see. 5 a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts: (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust; (b) the purpose of the trust; (c) the beneficiary, and (d) the trust property; and (unless the trust is declared by will) or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust property to the trustee.

    Sec 5:— “No trust in relation to immovable property is valid unless declared by a non-testamentary instrument in writing signed toy the author of the trust or the trustee and registered or by the will of the author of the trust or of the trustee. No trust in relation to movable property is valid unless declared as aforesaid or unless the ownership of the property is transferred to the trustee.”

    15. Considerable argument was addressed to me on several aspects arising in the course of this suit. It was contended on behalf of the Defendant that the money standing to the credit of the settlor in the Fund was not a debt, either presently or payable in futuro or upon a contingency. It was argued that the amount of the credit varied from time to time, and the amount which would be due would not be known until either retirement from service of the settlor or his death, and it was not a liquidated sum. The variation in the amount would depend on whether the settlor made or continued to make a voluntary contribution in addition to the compulsory contribution, whether the Company was able to pay any contribution and the amount of it, which payment is dependent upon its ability to pay a dividend of 5 per cent, upon the issued Share Capital and having surplus profits thereafter; the decrease in the contributions of the settlor by reason of his absence on account of sickness or furlough and a consequent reduction in his monthly payments; and also if he were dismissed from the Company's service on grounds of misconduct, he could claim only the amount of his own contributions to the Fund and not the amounts contributed by the Company which stood to his credit in the books.

    16. Two authorities were cited: Subju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib(1) and Doraisami Padayachi v. Vaithilinga Padayachi(2). Those cases considered the meaning of “debt” in the Succession Certificate Act and sec. 25 of the Contract Act respectively and it was held in respect of taking of partnership accounts in the first case and taking of accounts by an arbitrator in the second case, that the amount which subsequently would become due was not a debt; it was not liquidated, and it was not a sum payable in respect of a money demand recoverable by action.

    17. It was further contended that there was no beneficial interest of the settlor in the credit in the Fund which he could assign. Reference was made to r. 25 which provides that the funds and monies of the Provident Fund institution should be vested in trustees, and it was, therefore, argued that since the rules provided for such vestment, there could be no debt due to the settlor from the Fund.

    18. Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act defines an actionable claim as meaning a claim to any debt whether such debt be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent. An actionable claim is transferable with or without consideration by the execution of an instrument in writing under sec. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act. A note to this section in the 2nd Edition of Sir Dinshaw Mulla's work upon the Act, page 690, states that “both present and future debts are existing debts and are actionable claims.” The monies standing to the credit of the settlor were monies which were payable to him, not immediately or each year whilst the credit was running, but upon the happening of the events provided in the Rules. The credits were obtained by payments made to the Fund by the settlor himself as a member and by him being given the benefit of some of the contributions made by his employers, and profits and interest upon the monies. For the purpose of analogy reference can be made to a customer of a bank who places a sum upon a fixed deposit account repayable by the bank after the elapse of a specified period. Throughout the time the money is deposited there is a debt due to the customer by the bank, but it is not enforceable and the debt becomes payable only after the agreed period of the deposit. In the same way payment of the amount of a member's credit in Provident Fund could only be demanded, as Rule 12 provides, upon retirement, which is the only event with which we are concerned. Between the making of each deposit and retirement, the debt is accruing and payment is at least conditional or contingent inasmuch as it arises upon the happening of the prescribed event which gives rise to payment being able to be demanded.

    19. In my view the credit in favour of each member, including the settlor, in the books of the Provident Fund was an actionable claim as defined by sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, each member has a beneficial interest in his credit in the fund which is also an actionable claim as defined by the above section of the Transfer of Property Act.

    20. The vesting of the monies of the fund in trustees, pursuant to Rule 25, does not alter the position. The money must vest in someone while with the fund. In the same way when a customer pays money into his account in the bank, the money he pays then vests in the bank, but he is entitled, either upon demand or upon the expiration of any specified period, to demand payment from the bank. The bank uses the money deposited with it for its own purposes whilst it is in deposit. In the same way the trustees would use the money for investment and to make further profits for the Fund.

    21. It was argued that the trust property is not indicated with reasonable certainty in the trust deed, and consequently compliance with sec. 6 of the Act has not been made. This section, the provisions of which are set out earlier, requires, for a trust to be created, that the author should indicate with reasonable certainty his intention to create a trust, its purpose, the beneficiary, and the trust property. It is conceded that the first three are satisfied, but it is argued that the trust property is not indicated with reasonable certainty.

    22. At the date when the deed was executed on June 11th, 1928, the settler was in credit with the Fund to the extent of Rs. 35,000; in the deed he estimates this amount as Rs. 33,000 or thereabouts. As mentioned earlier, it was argued that at the date of the deed the amount could not be ascertained which would be payable to him upon retirement, since it would depend upon several factors, for example, the ability of the Company to make contributions during the intervening years. It was, therefore, contended that since the amount which the credit would represent at the time when it became payable could not then be determined, the settlor had not indicated, with reasonable certainty, the trust property. There is certainty in every other respect regarding the trust property, its origin, its nature and so on. The only point upon which uncertainty was alleged was the quantum. It is to be noticed that sec. 6 of the Trusts Act does not use the words “exact” or “precise,” or language to that effect. It requires the property to be indicated with reasonable certainty. In Vol. 33 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, p. 100, paragraph 164, it is stated as follows:—

    “In order to raise a trust, the property to be affected by it must be either expressly designated or so defined that it is capable of being ascertained. Otherwise the trust is void for uncertainty. A trust of the residue of a fund after a gift thereout of an undefined amount for an object which, for any cause fails will he an effectual trust of the whole fund.”

    23. Then paragraph 165:

    “A trust may be declared of a fund contingently on the fund subsequently coming into existence.”

    24. Reference is made to Woods v. Woods(3). Again in In re: Turcan(4): “a marriage settlement contained a covenant by the settlor to settle his estate and interest in any property or estate of or to which he should become possessed or entitled during the marri age by device, bequest, purchase, or otherwise.” He afterwards effected some policies of insurance on his life and it was held that these policies were property to which the settlor had during the marriage become entitled by purchase within the specific words of the covenant in the marriage settlement and the trust could be enforced as to that property. In that case the description of the trust property was much wider than it is in the deed of settlement executed by the settlor and the amount or value was not indicated.

    25. In my view the property has been indicated with reasonable certainty and the trust does not fail, because at the date of the trust deed, the precise amount of the fund over which a trust was then sought to be created was not actually ascertainable. So far as sec. 6 of the Trusts Act is concerned, I am satisfied and I hold that the deed fully complies with all its provisions.

    26. It was further urged that the deed of settlement is an assignment which is prohibited by r. 20 and the attempt to assign the settlor's credit in the fund is invalid as the rule so provides. The exact provision of the rule is required to be considered. It is that no member is entitled to assign any moneys standing to his credit in the books and the trustees and managers shall not recognise or be bound by notice of any attempted assignment. In the operative portion of the deed of settlement, the settlor purports to assign the sum of Rs. 33,000 and other moneys to which he might become entitled as a subscriber or member of the fund upon his retirement. It is an assignment of such sum to which he might become entitled at the date of his retirement, there is no assignment of the sums in credit at the date of the execution of the deed which Rule 20 purports to prohibit and which it purports to enact shall be void, Further, in the rule there is also a provision that the trustees and managers shall not recognise or be bound by any notice to them of any attempted assignment. A provision of a somewhat similar nature was contained in, a policy of insurance which was considered by the English Courts in In re: Turcan. In the course of the judgment at p. 10, Cotton, L.J, observed as follows:—

    “There was another point argued about which we had some doubt, arising out of the condition, annexed to the policy for £1,000 that it should not be in any case assignable. But the policy contains another condition, showing that the insurance office recognised the right of the insured to part with his interest, for it provided that the company should not be bound by notice of liens and changes on the policy. Would a Court of Equity in the lifetime of the covenantor have enforced the covenant to settle this policy notwithstanding the condition against assigment? I think it would “.

    27. Whether the provisions of r. 20 of the fund makes an assignment of a credit invalid as against the assignee, does not require to be examined or decided. The deed is not an assignment which this rule contemplates and, therefore, is not voided by the rule.

    28. Another argument, on behalf of the Defendant, was that the trust was never acted upon and that it was never perfected. It is correct that upon his retirement the settlor himself received the moneys payable to him from the fund and it does not appear that the co-trustee, Mr. Vaughan, in any way participated or attempted to participate in the management of the trust property or of the investments or the spending of the moneys received from the fund. When a person creates a trust, which trust can be enforced against him, he can be made to carry out the trust, if he fails to abide by his obligation it cannot then be said that the trust has not been acted upon, or in other words that it has been abandoned and in consequence it has lapsed or ceased to be enforceable. In the trust deed there is a provision which enabled the settlor by deed to alter or revoke all or any of the trusts declared and to declare any new or other trusts. He never executed a deed of alteration or revocation. He died 11 years after the execution of the trust deed, and amongst the documents which he kept locked in a despatch box, there was found a typewritten copy of the trust deed. Further, he told Miss Mackintosh, and I accept her evidence, that he intended to make or he had made a deed by which he would make provision for her. These factors, particularly the failure to execute a deed of revocation and the retention of a copy of the trust deed, shew the settlor's intention to continue the trusts and that they were to remain in force. Whilst there was not the formality of the purchase, with the provident fund moneys, of trust securities in the names of the settlor and Mr. Vaughan as the trustees, the fact that the settlor received the moneys, invested them — or the major portion of them — in his own name and received the income there from, does not support the contention that the trust was never acted upon. He was entitled, under the trust deed, to enjoy the income from the trust during his life.

    29. sec. 5 of the Trusts Act requires that a trust, in relation to movable property, shall be declared by a non-testamentary instrument unless the ownership of the property is transferred to the trustee. The question whether a non-testamentary instrument in respect of a trust of movable property requires registration, need not be discussed. It is conceded that if the ownership in trust property is transferred to the trustee, registration of the instrument is not required. The operative part of trustees the moneys to which the settlor the deed of settlement assigns to the might become entitled to receive upon his retirement from the service of the Company. I have already said, and in my view, the money credited to the settlor in the fund was a debt. Further, he had the beneficial interest in that credit. Both the debt and the beneficial interest are actionable claims, as defined by sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, which actionable claims are transferable under sec. 130 of the Transfer of Property Act and which is effected by the execution of an instrument in writing signed by the transferor. The deed of the 11th June, 1928, is an instrument within the above section. There was, therefore, in my view, a transfer of trust property by this deed, from the settlor to himself and to Mr. Vaughan as trustees.

    30. In my opinion, the provisions of the Trusts Act have been fully complied with and the deed created a trust on the terms and for the benefit of the cestui que trusts mentioned in it and it is an operative and enforceable trust.

    31. Having come to the conclusion that the property in the trust was transferred, it is not necessary for me to express any opinion regarding the necessity or otherwise for the trust deed to have been registered or whether sec. 5 of the Trusts Act makes it obligatory for a non-testamentary instrument declaring a trust of movable property to be registered.

    32. The result of the above is that there will be a decree for the Plaintiff that the Defendant will deliver to the Plaintiff within two weeks the securities set out in annexure (b) to the plaint and also any moneys coming into her hands belonging to the estate of which she is the administratrix.

    33. In my view, this was a proper case for both parties to contest and that the costs of the Plaintiff and the Defendant should be paid out of the trust fund. The Defendant's costs will include the costs and expenses which have been incurred by her and to which she has been put in obtaining the grant of Letters of Administration and furnishing security as required by this Court. Both sets of costs will be taxed as between attorney and client. The fees and charges of Government will be a first charge upon the subject-matter of the suit.

    Solicitors: B. Chatterjee for the Plaintiff; Sandersons & Morgans for the Defendant.

    P.C

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    The Official Trustee Of Bengal v. Chippendale .
    (Feb 17, 1943)