The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
Mukherjea, J.:— This is one consolidated appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff and arises out of ten suits which were between the same parties and were heard together and disposed of by one and the same judgment in both the Courts below.
The material facts are not in controversy and may be shortly stated as follows:
The Plaintiff Bank purports to be a purchaser of ten raiyati holdings, which constitute the subject-matter of these suits, from one Beni Mohan Das, who in his turn purchased them from one Saroda Kripa Lala. The Plaintiff's case is, that these holdings are mokarari tenancies, held at fixed rate of rent and they were described as such in the Plaintiff's kobala. The Defendants landlords started proceedings against the Plaintiff soon after their purchase, under Sec. 26J of the Bengal Tenancy Act, for recovery of the balance of landlords' fees, on the allegation that these were ordinary occupancy holdings and were wrongly described as holdings at fixed rates in the conveyance. The Munsif made an order in favour of the Defendants and directed the Plaintiff to pay the balance of landlords' fees. The Plaintiff thereupon instituted these suits and prayed for declaration that the lands in dispute were mokarari holdings held at fixed rate of rent and in respect of them the provisions of sec. 26J of the Bengal Tenancy Act were not applicable. There were prayers also in all these suits for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from realising the money allowed to them in the Sec. 26J proceeding.
The defence in substance was that the holdings were those of occupancy raiyats and not of raiyats at fixed rents and the suits were barred by res judicata and limitation.
The trial Court overruled these defences and decreed the suits in their entirety. On appeal, the decision of the Munsif in one of the suits, viz., Suit No. 373 of 1936 was reversed and the Plaintiff's claim was altogether dismissed. As regards the other nine suits, the Appellate Court agreed with the Munsif in holding that the Plaintiff had established that the subject-matter of these suits were holdings at fixed rates of rent, but it held at the same time that the Plaintiff was not entitled to any injunction restraining the Defendants from realising the balance of landlords' fees, which were allowed to them by the order in the Sec. 26J proceeding. So far as this point was concerned, the order in Sec. 26J proceeding was held to be conclusive which could not be challenged in any subsequent suit.
It is against this decision that the present Second Appeal has been preferred.
Mr. Gunada Charan Sen who appears in support of the appeal has raised only one point for our consideration. His argument is that the Court of Appeal below was in error in holding that the order in Sec. 26J proceeding, so far as it directed the payment of the balance of landlords' fee?, was conclusive and was incapable of being questioned in a subsequent suit, even though it was held expressly in such suit that the holdings were those of raiyats at fixed rates.
Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen who appears for the Respondent, on whose behalf certain cross-objections have been filed, contends on the other hand that the Court of Appeal below ought to have gone further and held that the question of status upon which the order for payment of the landlords' fees under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, was based, was also res judicata and the same question could not be agitated in any subsequent suit. He has put forward three other grounds in support of his cross-objections. The first contention is that the Court of Appeal below put a wrong construction upon the kabuliyats and on proper interpretation of the same, it should have held that the tenancies were ordinary raiyati holdings. The second argument is that the Plaintiff's purchase of these holdings has not been proved according to law. The last ground is that there were previous decisions in proceeding under Sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act with regard to some of the holdings under which the rents of those holding were enhanced. These decisions it is said would operate as res judicata.
The main point for our determination in this appeal is as to how far an order for payment of landlords' fees passed in a proceeding under Sec. 26J Bengal Tenancy Act, would bar subsequent suit instituted by the tenant for establishment of his status as a raiyat at fixed rates and for refund of the money which he was directed to pay.
The Appellant's contention is that the proceeding under Sec. 26J, Ben gal Tenancy Act, is a summary proceeding and a decision made therein, which is not a decree and cannot be challenged by way of appeal, cannot bar a sub-sequent suit either under Sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code, or under the general principles of res judicata, which forbid the re-agitation of matters which have been already decided.
The question is not free from doubt and unfortunately there is marked divergence of judicial opinion expressed on the point.
In Srinath Base v. Debendra Nath Barai , Mr. Justice Jack expressed his opinion that for purposes of Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, the landlord was only to show in a summary proceeding that the holding was a raiyati holding in order to enable him to recover the balance of landlords' fees. This, it was said, would not debar any subsequent suit by the tenant to establish that the tenure was permanent and if he established that fact he would be entitled to recover the balance of fees he had paid under Sec. 26J of the Act.
In this case it may be pointed out, the contention raised was that the landlord could not recover the balance of landlords' fees under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act unless it was first established in a regular suit that the holding was that of an occupancy raiyat. This contention was negatived and Mr. Justice Jack observed that the proceeding under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, was a summary one.
In Joy Chandra Bhowmik v. Kali Kinkar Nath , Mr. Justice M.C Ghose observed that a decision in favour of a landlord in a proceeding under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, was res judicata on the question of the amount payable as landlords' fees, on that particular transfer; but the decision on the question of status was not final and a suit would lie for a declaration that the tenancy was a permanent tenure or a raiyati at fixed rent and that no transfer fees were payable in case of transfer. In this case, it was held actually on the materials on the record, that the holding was an occupancy holding but under a covenant contained in the kabuliyat the tenant obtained a right of transfer from the landlord and consequently the latter was not entitled to transfer fees. The same question was adverted to and considered in Civil Rule No. 965 of 1933. In that case the Court below had decided in favour of the landlord and had directed payment of landlords' fees on the footing that the holding was an occupancy holding. Against that order a Rule was obtained from this Court and the Rule was heard by Guha and Bartley, JJ. The learned Judges discharged the Rule, holding that the decision arrived at in the summary proceeding was not revisable under Sec. 115, Civil Procedure Code, as there was no error of jurisdiction involved in it. At the end of the judgment there occurred the following passage:
“But in discharging the Rule we desire to make the position clear that the petitioner in this Court is entitled to bring a suit to establish that what was transferred to him were permanent tenures and recover the balance of landlord's fees paid by him in pursuance of the orders of the Munsiff dated the 4th and the 7th July, 1933, against which this Rule is directed”
In pursuance of this direction there was a suit commenced by the tenant who prayed for a declaration that he had permanent rights at a fixed rent in the lands in suit. This suit was decreed by the Courts below. The decision was affirmed by Mr. Justice Remfry on second appeal to this Court. There was then a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Mr. Justice Remfry, which was heard by Costello and Panckridge, JJ. [vide Krishna Chandra Mukherjee v. Manik Lal Mukherjee ]. The learned Judges set aside the decision of Mr. Justice Remfry and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit on the ground that it was barred by res judicata. It was said that the question of the character of tenancy was not merely incidental or ancillary but was a matter directly in question between the parties in a proceeding under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act and consequently the decision of the Munsif was final and barred a subsequent suit on the general principles of res judicata.
Such being the state of judicial opinion, it is necessary for arriving at a proper decision on this point, to examine carefully the different provisions of law which have any bearing on the subject.
Now Sec. 26J(2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act provides that if payment is not made in accordance with the provision of sub-sec.(1), the landlord shall be entitled to recover the balance of landlords' fees together with such compensation as the Court thinks fit. This section simply defines the rights of the landlord in cases where an occupancy-holding is sold with a false description, that it is a permanent tenure or a holding at fixed rates; and if the matter stood there, the conclusion would have been irresistible, that the balance of landlords' fees would be recoverable by an ordinary suit instituted under the previsions of the Civil Procedure Code. No difficulty would have arisen in that case, as the suit would end in a decree which could be challenged by way of appeal in such manner as is laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. The legislature however, while enumerating the acts which the law authorises co-sharers landlords to do either acting together or by an agent, definitely spoke of an application under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act and from that it has been held and in my opinion rightly, that the recovery of the balance of transfer fees by the landlord under Sec. 26J should be by application and not by suit. Vide Aghore Chandra v. Raj Nandini Debi and Mahamed Ismail v. Lal Mia, . It may be that the legislature intended to provide for a quicker and more summary remedy and did not consider proper that the elaborate procedure provided for, in suits, with provisions for appeals and second appeals, should be followed in such cases. I do not think that it would be right to say., as has been said by Mr. Justice Costello in Krishna Chandra v. Manik Lal , that the landlord can recover the fees payable under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act either by an application or by a suit. In my opinion, if the passage in Sec. 188 has got any meaning, it is to limit the landlord to that form of procedure which is initiated by an application and there is no remedy by way of suit. There is a good deal of difference between the two kinds of procedure as we shall see presently and if the view taken in Krishna Chandra v. Manik Lal is accepted, the result will be, that it would lie with the landlord to choose as to whether he would institute a suit or file an application and by adopting the latter procedure he might deprive the tenant of the rights of an appeal and a second appeal. I hold therefore that the legislature intended that the recovery of landlords' fees under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, must be by an application and if this view is correct it will give us an indication as to the scope of the proceeding and the finality of the order that is made therein.
A Court dealing with an application or what is called ordinarily a miscellaneous petition, exercises a jurisdiction which is much more attentuated than what it exercises in case of a suit. A suit culminates in a decree, which conclusively determines all or any of the matters in controversy between the parties and is open to appeal. A petition on the other hand unless there are exceptions made by statute, is dealt with summarily and ends in an order which is not a decree and does not conclusively determine any thing else than what is contained in the order itself. In a proceeding under Sec. 26J of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the only order which the Court is competent to make is one directing the purchaser to pay certain money to the landlord as his fees. This order for payment of money, as it is passed by a Court competent to make it, must be regarded as valid and binding on the parties and it must be deemed to be final also, unless the legislature has expressly provided for an appeal.
I cannot accept the contention of Mr. Gunada Charan Sen, that the order could be set aside by a subsequent suit if there is no bar of res judicata. There would be no meaning in laying down that the landlord should follow a particular procedure, if that could be set at naught by a subsequent suit, which would bring in all the delay and complications which it was the intention of the legislature to avoid. It is true that it is nowhere said that the order for payment of transfer fees passed on an application under Sec. 26J would be final; but that must be the necessary implication if we are to hold that the remedy of the landlord lies only in an application. I do not agree with Mr. Sen that Sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code really assists him so far as this point is concerned.
A judicial order passed by a Court having jurisdiction to pass it is always binding on the parties and no suit would lie to set aside that order except on grounds of fraud. The finding on the issue upon which the order rests may not be res judicata, in a subsequent suit, but no suit would lie merely to annul that order. As an illustration, we may conceive of a decree for money being passed in favour of a particular person by a Court which has pecuniary jurisdiction to try a suit valued up to 500 rupees. In a subsequent suit, which is valued at more than 500 rupees and has been filed in a higher Court and in which the same question has been raised, the decision in the earlier Court will not be res judicata; but nevertheless, it would not be open to the Defendant in the previous suit to get a refund of the money which he was compelled to pay under the decree in that suit. He could have taken an appeal against the previous decision if there was any appeal provided for in law and if there was no such provision the decree or order must be held to be final.
In my opinion, therefore, the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the order for payment of transfer lees passed in the proceeding, under sec. 26J was final and conclusive and could not be challenged in a subsequent suit. The appeal thus fails.
It is now necessary to deal with the other aspect of the question that has been raised by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen in support of his cross-objections; viz., as to whether the order in the Sec. 26J proceeding, was final on the question of the status of the tenant and the matter could not be re-opened in any subsequent suit. Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen argues that this question must be answered in the affirmative and in support of his contention relies most strongly upon the decision in Krishna Chandra v. Manik Lal . With all respect to the learned Judges who decided that case, I find it extremely difficult to accept this decision as correct. I think that the learned Judges entirely overlooked the fact that there is a vital difference between a suit and an application both as regards the scope and the nature of the orders passed therein and that the powers of the Court while dealing with the one are not the same as are exercised with regard to the other. As I have said above, the order for payment of money passed by a Court on an application under Sec. 26J is final. It may obviously be necessary for the Court to pass that order to decide some question of title or status, but such decision or finding on the question of title, if it is arrived at a miscellaneous proceeding which is not a suit and the decision in which does not amount to a decree, cannot in my opinion, bar a subsequent suit in which the same question is raised. The Court in dealing with an application under Sec. 26J cannot make any declaration as to the status of the tenant. It can only make an effective order relating to payment of landlords' fees. It is true that the basis of the payment order is the finding relating to the nature of the tenancy, but the fact that the legislature intended that the order of payment should be passed on an application and not a suit clearly shows that the question of status was not intended to be finally decided in this summary proceeding.
This view would be fortified if we refer to the provisions of Sec. 158, Bengal Tenancy Act. That is the only section under the Bengal Tenancy Act under which there can be a determination of the status of the tenant by the Court on a mere application without the necessity of instituting a suit. Sub-sec. (3) of the section lays down that the order on such application shall have the effect of and would be subject to like appeal as a decree. It could never be contended that though the legislature has expressly provided for appeal and second appeal, when the status of the tenant is declared in an application under Sec. 158, Bengal Tenancy Act, yet it would be an unappealable and final order if the same declaration is made in connection with an application under Sec. 26J of the same Act. As I have said above, the Court in the Sec. 26J proceeding is not competent to make any declaration at all.
In my opinion the scope of the application under Sec. 26J. Bengal Tenancy Act, is merely to enable the landlord to get an order for payment of landlords' fees in an expeditious manner, without the necessity of instituting a regular suit. The order for payment would be conclusive so far as the parties to the proceeding are concerned, but the question of the character of the tenancy cannot be deemed to be finally decided in this proceeding which has been aptly described as a summary proceeding. I think that the correct view was taken by Mr. Justice Mitter in Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Benode Behary Choudhury , where he held that a proceeding under Sec. 26J of the Bengal Tenancy Act cannot be stayed under Sec. 111 of the Act
“A suit or proceeding”
so observes the learned Judge,
“can be stayed under Sec. 111 only if the suit or the application is filed for the determination of the status of any tenant. The prayer in an application under Sec. 26J is not for the determination of the status of the tenant but for recovery of a sum of money although in deciding the said claim of the landlord the question of status may hare to be gone into. It is a money claim which the landlord wants to enforce and the fact that the question of status has to be gone into because the Defendant has raised the question of status, will not authorise the Court to stay the application under Sec. 111.”
It would certainly sound absurd, if the application cannot be stayed under Sec. 111, yet when the order is passed, it is held to be res judicata on the question of status.
In my opinion, the order of the Court in the Sec. 26J proceeding cannot operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit for determination of status. Sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code has obviously no application and this has been conceded by the learned Advocates on both sides. The question is whether there would be a bar under the general principles of res judicata, quite apart from Sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code. I think the answer to this question must be in the negative. There are a number of cases decided by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee where the doctrine of res judicata as contained in Sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code has been held not to be exhaustive and the principle has been applied even though the case did not come within the language of the section. If we look to those cases, we find that they may be classified conveniently under two heads: The 1st class comprises cases, where an interlocutory judgment passed in a suit or proceeding, has been held to be binding on the same parties at subsequent stages of the same suit or proceeding. The decisions in Ram Kripal v. Rup Kumari (7) and Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal (8) come under this category. The 2nd class relates to cases where the earlier decision was given in a contentious proceeding, e.g, under the Probate and Administration Act or the Land Acquisition Act, which though not technically a suit within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, yet culminates in a final order, which had all the characteristic of a decree and was open to challenge by way of appeal. The cases of Seoparzan Singh v. Ram Nandan Singh (9), Ravi Chandra Rao v. Ram Chandra Rao (10) and Kali Pada De v. Durga Pada De (11) may be taken as illustrations of this class. The present case does not come under the purview of either of these two classes. The same question has not arisen here, at later stages of the same suit or proceeding and as I have indicated above, the miscellaneous proceeding under Sec. 26J was not a proceeding for determination of status and so far as that question was concerned, could not end in a final pronouncement of the type which would make it a conclusive adjudication on the rights of the parties to the proceedings. It is worthy of note that there is no decision reported up till now, where the Judicial Committee has extended the principle of res judicata to a case of this description. In Maung Sem Done v. Ma Pan Nyun (12), it was observed by Lord Russell of Killowen that as Sec. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code was not exhaustive, recourse might properly be had to the decisions of English Courts for the purpose of ascertaining the general principles governing the application of the doctrine of res judicata.
The leading English decision on the subject of res judicata is the Duchess of Kingstone's case (13) and the proposition laid down there by the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common, Pleas is that the
“Judgment of a Court of Concurrent Jurisdiction, directly upon the point is as a plea, a bar or as evidence conclusive, between the same parties upon the same matter directly in question in another Court;……… but neither the judgment of a Court of Concurrent or Exclusive Jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognisable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from judgment.”
It was said by Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce in Barrs v. Jackson (14) that
“the rule against reagitating matters adjudicated is subject to this general restriction that however essential the establishment of particular facts may be to the soundness of the judicial decision, however it may proceed on them as established and however binding and conclusive the decision may be as to its immediate and direct object, those facts are not all necessarily established conclusively between the parties and that either may again litigate them for any other purpose as to which they may come in question; provided the immediate subject of the decision be not attempted to be withdrawn from its operation, so as to defeat its direct object.”
I think that this principle applies with full force to the facts of this case. The immediate subject of adjudication in an application under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, is whether the landlord is entitled to transfer fees on a particular transfer. That matter cannot be withdrawn from the operation of that order, but however much it may be necessary to pass that order that the Court should determine the nature of the tenancy, such matter being outside the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with the petition, would be only “incidentally cognisable” and could not operate as res judicata.
The case of the Queen v. Hutchings (15) would in my opinion furnish an apposite illustration. In that case an application by a Local Board to the Justices under the Public Health Act for recovery of a proportion of the expenses of sewering a street from the owner of premises abutting thereon was dismissed on the ground that the street was a public highway and was consequently repairable by the inhabitants at large. Several years afterwards the Local Board made an application against the same persons for recovery of a portion of paving expenses in connection with the same street and a Magistrate made an order for the payment of such expenses. It was held by Lord Selborne, L.C that the adjudication of the Justices that the street was a highway was beyond their jurisdiction which was only to make or refuse the order for the expenses claimed. Consequently the adjudication on the first application did not estop the Local Board from making the second application.
This case was distinguished in Mayor, Alderman and Citizens of the City of Wakefield v. Cooke (16), where also there was a determination by a Court of a summary jurisdiction that a street was a highway, in a proceeding under the Private Street Works Act. It was held by the House of Lords, that under the Private Street Act, unlike the Public Healths Act, the very question as to whether or not a particular road is a public highway is remitted for determination by the tribunal and consequently the adjudication would operate as res judicata in future proceedings. In the present case, as I have indicated before, the Court has been given no power in a summary proceeding under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act to determine the question of status as has been given to it under Sec. 158, Bengal Tenancy Act. To some extent it may sound anomalous, that while the, tenant could have his status as a permanent tenure-holder, or mokirari raiyat established in a subsequent suit, yet he could not claim refund of the money which he was compelled to pay on the footing that he had no such rights. But such anomalies must exist whenever one Court is invested with a summary jurisdiction to pass certain orders or decrees Which depend on determination of questions of title which such Court cannot decide finally.
My conclusion therefore is that a tenant against whom an order for payment of landlords' fees has been made under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, is not precluded from raising the question in a subsequent suit that the tenancy which he holds is a permanent tenure or raiyati at fixed rate of rent and such suit is not barred either under Sec. 11, Civil Procedure Code, or the general principles of res judicata. This view is indeed different from what has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Krishna Chandra v. Manik Lal but having regard to the facts of this particular case, I do not think that a reference to a Full Bench is necessary. In this case, the Munsif who passed the order under Sec. 26J, Bengal Tenancy Act, expressly refrained from deciding the question of status finally. He referred in his judgment to the decision of this Court in Srinath Base v. Debendra Nath and held that as it was a summary proceeding it was not necessary for him to consider the matter in detail and he could dispose of the case on the basis of the C.S records. This obviously means that the finding he arrived at was not to be considered final and it was open to the aggrieved party to hays the question of status determined in a regular suit. This decision could not operate as res judicata even on the view taken by Costello and Panokridge, JJ, in Krishna Chandra v. Manik Lal . I consider a reference to Full Bench further unnecessary by reason of the fact that Sec. 26J is no longer in the Act and the question would have no practical importance in the future.
It remains for me now to consider the other facts that have been raised by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen in support of his cross-objections.
The main point relates to the construction of the kabuliyats by which these tenancies were created. The leases were executed practically at the same time, though the language is not the same in all of them. In two of the leases, Ex. 2(e) and 2(f), which relate to suits Nos. 378 and 379 the tenancies were described as Daimi Kaimi and Mr. Sen fairly Conceded that they must be held to be mokarari tenancies. With regard to the other seven the rent has been described not as mokarari but mokra. Both these words came from the same Arabic root and neither of them by itself signifies perpetual fixity, though it must be held that the word “Mokarari” has assumed a special signification by usage [vide Nabendra Rishare Roy v. Choudhury Mian (17)]. Be that as it may, we find from a reading of the leases as a whole, that the rents reserved by them were fixed in perpetuity. In the first place, the kabuliyats expressly provide that the rents fixed therein were to be paid by the lessees from generation to generation according to the instalments mentioned in the document. In the second place it is said that if excess lands were found they would be assessed with rents at the same rate. The third material term is that the landlord would be able to avail himself of the provision of Regulation VIII of 1819 for realising the rents. The 2nd and 3rd stipulations may or may not be conclusive but the first in my opinion leads to the only conclusion that the rents were fixed for ever. There are indeed certain restrictions on the powers of user of the lessee but these are not necessarily inconsistent with the tenancy being permanent and for a fixed rent. I hold therefore that the decision on this point by the Court below is right.
The other two points raised by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen are manifestly untenable. The proceedings under Sec. 105, Bengal Tenancy Act, which were started in 1931 were against Saroda Kripa Lala, although Saroda had long before transferred his interest to Beni Mohan. The finding of the lower Appellate Court is that Beni was recognised as a tenant by the landlords, but inspite of that he was not made a party to the Sec. 105 proceedings. In these circumstances the decisions in the Sec. 105 cases could not bind the Plaintiff.
As to whether the Plaintiffs had established their title by purchase a point was taken that although they produced their own kobala and that of their immediate predecessor, the two other previous kobalas, upon which their title rested were not produced. But no such point was taken at any stage of the litigation not even in the memorandum of appeal to the lower Appellate Court. These earlier sales moreover were not disputed and consequently it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to produce the earlier documents.
The result is that both the appeal and the cross-objections fail and they are dismissed. No order as to costs.
Roxburgh, J.:— I agree.
C.C