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citation codes
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  • Indian Stamp Act. Section 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act
  • Articles 33 and 58 of the Indian Stamp Act
  • section 46 of the Indian Stamp Acts, 1879.
  • section 2(24)(b) in the Indian Stamp Act
  • s. 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act
  • s. 3 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT 1879
  • Indian Stamp Act, s. 46
  • Indian Succession Act
  • SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Indian Stamp Act. Section 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act
  • Articles 33 and 58 of the Indian Stamp Act
  • section 46 of the Indian Stamp Acts, 1879.
  • section 2(24)(b) in the Indian Stamp Act
  • s. 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act
  • s. 3 of the Specific Relief Act,
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT 1879
  • Indian Stamp Act, s. 46
  • Indian Succession Act
  • SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • INDIAN STAMP ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by Abinash Chandra Lodh and Hari Mohan Lodh, two of the shebâits of Sri Sri Lakshminarayan Jiu (and other named deities), seeking an order for the withdrawal of attachments levied on estate property and for other reliefs. By consent a decree for Rs. 4,547-3-3 was passed on May 6, 1949 against the defendant, with instalments agreed and an undertaking by the defendant not to dispose of premises No. 14/3, Nimtala Ghat Street. After default in instalments, the plaintiff levied an attachment on March 3, 1950 over the defendant’s one-third share in the premises and certain movables; the notice of motion was taken out on March 17, 1950. The applicants' primary factual contention is that the attached properties are debattar (dedicated) properties, and that premises No. 14/3 had been dedicated to the Deities by a deed dated April 24, 1937 which appointed certain persons as shebâits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application was maintainable where only two of several shebâits initially applied (i.e., the procedural question of joinder and representation of all co-shebâits).
  2. Whether the deed dated April 24, 1937 constituted a valid dedication (debattar) of the property to the Deities (i.e., whether the deed created debattar property).
  3. Whether the deed of dedication, if a direct gift to a Deity, should be treated as a deed of gift (requiring stamping as a gift) or as a deed of settlement under the Indian Stamp Act (thus stamped as such) and whether the stamping objection rendered the deed inadmissible.
  4. In the summary proceeding under Order XXI (rr. 58–62) whether the attached property was in the possession of the judgment-debtor on his own account or in trust for the Deities (i.e., the limited title/possession question permissible in summary investigation).
  5. Whether the movable properties attached were similarly in the personal possession of the judgment-debtor or held on trust for the Deities.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments (as recorded)

  • The attached properties are debattar properties, dedicated to the Deities by the deed dated April 24, 1937.
  • The applicants asserted possession and title as shebâits on behalf of the Deities and sought withdrawal of the attachments.
  • When challenged on joinder, the applicants requested an adjournment to serve the other shebâits and thereafter served them (including legal representatives of a deceased shebâit).

Plaintiff's / Execution Creditor's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Mr. A.K. Sen contended the application was not maintainable because only two shebâits had applied and the notice of motion should have been taken out on behalf of all shebâits (procedural demurrer).
  • He further contended that, even if the deed were admissible, it did not dedicate the properties to the Deities: the deed used words of transfer to and for the shebâ (custodian) but lacked words of transfer or dedication in favour of the Deity.
  • He argued that the deed was, at best, a deed of gift and not a settlement; it had been stamped as a settlement but not stamped as a deed of gift as required, so the document was not properly stamped and therefore inadmissible in evidence unless the proper stamp and penalty were levied and paid. He relied on Bhoopati Nath Chakrabarti v. Basanta Kumaree Debee and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, C.P. & Berar v. Mt. Sarjubai.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Nirmal Chandra Banerjee v. Jyotiprosad Bandopadhyay; Sree Sree Sreedhar Jew v. Kanta Mohan Mullick Ordinarily all shebâits should join in any suit or application relating to a debattar estate. The court acknowledged the general rule but treated it as not inflexible; used as background for the joinder issue and then considered the matter once all co-shebâits were before the court.
Monghibai v. Cooverji Umersey Principle that one or more of several persons jointly interested can bring action and, if necessary, amend by joining co-parties; once all parties are before the court appropriate relief can be given. The court relied on the observation to hold that since all interested shebâits were before it, it should entertain the claim and give relief if entitled.
Luke v. South Kensington Hotel Co.; Cullen v. Knowles; Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co., Ltd. Examples illustrating that one or more joint-interest persons can sue and that courts can adjust parties by amendment or joining. These authorities were cited as supporting examples for the principle drawn from Monghibai; they were not separately analyzed but used to justify treating joinder rules as not rigid.
Prosad Das Pal v. Jagannath Pal Example where dedication was to the shebâ and the judgment proceeded on the assumption of a valid dedication. Used to support the proposition that dedication may be to the shebâ and that such dedications have been treated as valid in prior decisions.
Sir Dinshaw Mulla (Hindu Law, Art. 407; Art. 407A) Express words are not necessary to create dedication; validity of endowment depends on whether the executant divested himself of the property as seen from subsequent acts and conduct. The court applied these principles to conclude the deed on its face purported to dedicate property to the Deities and to remind that validity requires divestment assessed by conduct; this informed the limitation of inquiry in summary proceeding.
Bhoopati Nath Chakrabarti v. Basanta Kumaree Debee; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, C.P. & Berar v. Mt. Sarjubai Held that a deed of dedication/transfer directly in favour of a Hindu Deity is a deed of gift (not a settlement) and must be stamped as a deed of gift under the Stamp Act. These cases were relied upon by the plaintiff for the stamping objection. The court reviewed and expressly disagreed with these decisions, concluding they were wrongly decided and declining to follow them in this matter.
Indian Stamp Act, s.2(24) (statutory provision) Authoritative statutory definition of "settlement" for the purposes of the Stamp Act. The court relied on the statutory definition to conclude that a direct gift/dedication to a Deity falls within the Act's definition of "settlement" (as a non-testamentary disposition for a religious purpose) and therefore can be stamped as a settlement.
Specific Relief Act, s.3 (referenced) Definition of "settlement" in that Act (disposition of successive interests) — cited to show differing statutory meanings. The court held the Specific Relief Act's definition was irrelevant to construing "settlement" under the Stamp Act and that the Stamp Act definition controls for stamping purposes.
Queen v. Commissioners under the Boiler Explosions Act, 1882 Illustration that statutory definitions may differ from ordinary meaning. Used as an example to justify adherence to the Stamp Act's definition rather than popular or other statutory meanings.
Mohammed Rashid Ahmad v. Emperor; various Stamp Reference decisions Authorities where gifts (including single-person gifts) were held to be settlements under the Stamp Act. Used to support the proposition that instruments of pure gift can nevertheless qualify as settlements for the Stamp Act.
Articles 33 and 58 of the Indian Stamp Act Article 33: instruments of gift (not being a settlement); Article 58: instruments of settlement. If instrument meets settlement description it may be stamped under Art. 58. The court interpreted these provisions to conclude that an instrument of gift which answers the description of settlement may properly be stamped as a settlement (Art. 58) rather than necessarily under Art. 33.
Emperor v. Ahmad Zaman Khan Holding that a deed of wâkf alâulâd can be an instrument of settlement though ordinarily no trust exists. Used as an analogy to show dedications without trusts have been treated as settlements under the Stamp Act.
Monohar Ganesh Támbekar v. Lohshirám Govindrám; Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ramlal Maitra Support for the notion that Hindu law recognises juridical persons/foundations and that custodians act in fiduciary/quasi-trustee capacities. Relied on to explain that dedication to a Deity constitutes a disposition for religious purpose and that custodians/shebâits occupy fiduciary positions for carrying out the institution's purposes.
Mohunt Bhagawan Ramaunj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi Authority for the limited scope of title inquiry in summary proceedings — title may be gone into only as necessary to determine trustee/agent status. Applied to restrict the court's inquiry to whether the judgment-debtor held the property on his own account or in trust for another in the summary procedure under Order XXI.
Reliance Development & Engineering, Ltd. v. Bhabani Chandra Banerjee; Protiva Sundari Chaudhury v. Reliance Bank, Ltd. Principle that complicated questions of title (e.g., benâmi) cannot be investigated in summary proceedings. Cited to reinforce that the court should not resolve complex title disputes in the present summary investigation.
Hriday Krishna Kundu v. Benode Behari Bandhopadhaya If dedication is not established, property remains with the settlors. Used to explain the likely outcome if the court did not find dedication established on the summary record.
Beaumont v. Oliveira Illustration that a legacy to a corporation with religious/charitable purposes is a charitable bequest. Used by analogy to support the court's view that a gift to a Deity is necessarily a disposition for religious purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the issues in a sequence reflecting procedural and substantive considerations:

  1. Joinder/Maintainability: The plaintiff's demurrer based on the fact that only two shebâits had initially applied was met by the applicants' subsequent service of the other shebâits (including legal representatives of a deceased shebâit) after an adjournment. The court accepted the principle (from Monghibai and related authorities) that while ordinarily all co-shebâits should join, the rule is not inflexible; once all interested parties were before the court it was appropriate to proceed to consider entitlement to relief.
  2. Construction of the deed (dedication): The court held that express words of gift to the Deity are not necessary to create a dedication. The deed in question, on its face, purported to transfer and dedicate the property "to and for the daily worship of the Deities absolutely and for ever"; the court construed "transfer and dedication to and for the shebâ of the Deities" as meaning transfer and dedication to the Deities so that their shebâ may be performed. Where two constructions were possible, the court adopted the construction upholding the deed.
  3. Stamp objection/character of instrument (gift vs. settlement): The court examined whether a direct gift to a Deity is a deed of gift (requiring stamping under the article for gifts) or an instrument of settlement under the Stamp Act. Reliance by the plaintiff on earlier decisions (Bhoopati Nath Chakrabarti; Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Sarjubai) which treated such dedications as gifts was examined and rejected. The court analysed s.2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act (definition of "settlement"), emphasising that the Stamp Act's statutory definition controls and need not correspond to the meaning in other statutes or popular usage. The court concluded that a disposition to a Deity for religious purposes falls squarely within the Stamp Act's definition of a settlement and that an instrument of gift which answers the description of a settlement may be stamped under the settlement article; therefore the deed was admissible.
  4. Scope of inquiry in summary proceedings and the standard of proof: The court reiterated that under Order XXI rr. 58–62 the permissible inquiry is essentially a summary investigation into possession; questions of title can be examined only insofar as necessary to determine whether the possessor holds the property as trustee/agent for another. The claimants bore the onus of proving that they possessed the property in trust for the Deities and under the title they set up.
  5. Application of evidence to possession/entitlement: On the evidence before it (for the limited, summary inquiry), the court found:
    • The judgment-debtor was in apparent possession of the attached immovable and movable properties.
    • Municipal records (mutation) continued to show the settlors as owners.
    • Rent receipts produced were inconclusive (no mention of the full set of Deities or proof entire income used for shebâ); the alleged Deities were said to be in Eastern Pakistan and the court was not satisfied of their actual existence or that any money was spent on their shebâ.
    • There was no satisfaction on the summary record that the settlors had divested themselves of the property or that the properties were debattar or held by the claimants as shebâits.
    Given the limitations of a summary proceeding and the onus on claimants, the court concluded it was satisfied for the purposes of the summary investigation that the one-third share in the premises and the movables were in the possession of the judgment-debtor on his own account.
  6. Resulting interlocutory and remedial reasoning: On these findings the court dismissed the application with costs but provided a procedural opportunity: if the claimants instituted an appropriate suit under Order XXI, r. 63 within one month, the costs of the present application would abide the result of that suit (i.e., the costs would be decided in light of the substantive suit's outcome). The costs of the application were to be taxed as those of a motion.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The court concluded, on the summary investigation permitted by Order XXI, that the attached one-third share of premises No. 14/3, Nimtala Ghat Street, and the attached movables were in the personal possession of the judgment-debtor and not held in trust for the Deities; accordingly, the attachments were not ordered to be withdrawn and the application for such relief was dismissed.
  • The applicants retain the procedural opportunity to file an appropriate substantive suit under Order XXI, r. 63 within one month; if they do so the costs of this application will abide the result of that suit.
  • The costs of this application are to be taxed as those of a motion and are awarded against the applicants (order for costs on dismissal subject to the foregoing proviso).
  • The court expressly stated its disagreement with the earlier decisions in Bhoopati Nath Chakrabarti v. Basanta Kumaree Debee and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, C.P. & Berar v. Mt. Sarjubai, holding that a deed of direct gift to a Deity is properly characterised as a deed of settlement for the purposes of the Stamp Act; the court refused to follow those decisions in this case (i.e., a pointed judicial dissent from those authorities appears in the opinion's analysis).
  • No further or broader declaratory relief or new binding precedent on matters beyond the scope of the present summary inquiry was pronounced beyond the court's stated view on the Stamp Act question and its disallowance of the plaintiff's stamping objection in these proceedings.

Attorney for applicants: N.L. Roy. Attorney for plaintiff: S.C. Roy Chowdhury.

Application dismissed.

    Upendra Nath Poddar v. Anath Chandra Lodh

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Bachawat, J.:— This is an application on behalf of Abinash Chandra Lodh and Hari Mohan Lodh, two of the shebâits of Sri Sri Lakshminarayan Jiu, goddess Durga, Basanti, Kali and Lakshmi, for an order that certain attachments levied on the estate be at once withdrawn and for other reliefs.

    On May 6, 1949, a decree was passed in this suit by consent against the defendant. The decree was for a sum of Rs. 4,547-3-3. Certain instalments were agreed to and there was an undertaking on behalf of the defendant not to dispose of his house, being premises No. 14/3, Nimtala Ghat Street. He was in default in payment of instalments and on March 3, 1950, the plaintiff levied an attachment in execution of the decree on the one-third share of the defendant in premises No. 14/3, Nimtala Ghat Street and also several trunks, two chairs and one fancying in that premises. On March 17, 1950, this notice of motion was taken out. The ground taken in the petition is that the properties attached are debattar properties and that the premises No. 14/3, Nimtala Ghat Street, was dedicated to the Deities by a deed, dated April 24, 1937.

    By that deed, the settlors, Anath Chandra Lodh, Hari Mohan Lodh, Abinash Chandra Lodh, appointed themselves and one Hriday Chandra Lodh and Sanatan Lodh as shebâits.

    Mr. A.K Sen, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, contended that this application is not maintainable, inasmuch as the application is made by only two shebâits. He contended that the notice of motion ought to have been taken out on behalf of all the shebâits and that, in the circumstances, this application ought to be dismissed on a point of demurrer. It is to be noticed that one of the shebâits, Hriday, is dead. The other shebâit, Sanatan, was at Tripura. Obviously Anath in view of his undertaking was not prepared to join in this application.

    When the notice of motion was heard before me on a previous occasion and after this point was taken, Mr. Sanyal, appearing on behalf of the applicant, asked for an adjournment in order to enable him to serve the other shebâits. After such adjournment, the other shebâits including the legal representatives of Hriday have been served.

    It is true that ordinarily all shebâits should join in any suit or application relating to a debattar estate. See Nirmal Chandra Banerjee v. Jyotiprosad Bandopadhyay(1) and Sree Sree Sreedhar Jew v. Kanta Mohan Mullick(2). But this rule is not an inflexible one. If the exigencies of the case require, the other shebâits may be made co-defendants or co-respondents. In this connection, reference may be made to an observation in the decision of Monghibai v. Cooverji Umersey(3). In that case, there was a mortgage in favour of the firm. Certain partners in the firm retired and by a registered deed assigned their interest in the mortgage deed in favour of the continuing partners. The continuing partners instituted a suit to enforce the mortgage. They did not join the retired partners as parties to the suit. On objection being taken, the retired partners were subsequently added as parties to the suit. The question rose as to whether the suit as framed was maintainable. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed as follows:—

    It has long been recognised that one or more of several persons jointly interested can bring an action in respect of joint property, and if their right to sue is challenged can amend by joining their co-contractors as plaintiffs, if they will consent, or as co-defendants if they will not. Such cases as Luke v. South Kensington Hotel Co.(4) and Cullen v. Knowles(5) are examples of this principle. Nor indeed would it matter that a wrong person had originally sued though he had no cause of action. See Hughes v. Pump House Hotel Co., Ltd.,(6). Once all the parties are before the Court, the Court can make the appropriate order and should give judgment is favour of all the persons interested whether they be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. Prima facie, therefore, the trial Court in the present case should have given judgment in favour of the eight of the original partners who survived, though some of them had been made defendants.

    All the interested parties, namely, all the co-shebâits are now before me and it is my duty to give relief to them if they are entitled to any relief.

    It is next contended by Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, that, assuming that deed, dated April 24, 1937, is admissible in evidence, the properties have not been dedicated to the Deities by that deed. He contends that there are words of transfer to and for the shebâ of the Deity but there are no words of transfer or dedication in favour of the Deity. This contention, in my judgment, is also unsound. It is not necessary for the purpose of creating dedication that there must be express words of gift to the Deity. See Sir Dinshaw Mulla's Hindu Law, 10th Ed., Art. 407, p. 492. The deed on the face of it purports to transfer and dedicate the property to and for the daily worship of the Deities absolutely and for ever. Transfer and dedication to and for the shebâ of the Deities, in my judgment, quite clearly means transfer and dedication to the Deities in order that their shebâ may be performed. If there are two constructions open to me, one of which will uphold the deed and the other will defeat it, I must give that construction which upholds it. I must, therefore, construe the deed as a deed purporting, on the face of it, to dedicate the property to the Deities. It seems that in the case of Prosad Das Pal v. Jagannath Pal, the dedication was to the shebâ of the Deity and the judgment in that case proceeds on the assumption that there was a valid dedication in favour of the Deity.

    It is next contended by Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, that the deed, dated April 24, 1937 is at best a deed of dedication and, therefore, a deed of gift to the Deities. The deed has been stamped on the footing that it is a deed of settlement. It is not affixed with stamp which is requisite if the deed is a deed of gift. Mr. Sen contends that the deed, not being properly stamped, is not admissible in evidence, unless the proper stamp as also the penalty is levied and paid. The court ordinarily looks with disfavour on a stamp objection, taken by counsel, when such objection does not invalidate the document, entirely. It is, however, the duty of the court to notice and decide stamp objections where such objection is brought to the notice of the Court.

    Mr. Sen relied on the case of Bhoopati Nath Chakrabarti v. Basanta Kumaree Debee. This case was followed in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, C.P and Berar v. Mt. Sarjubai. In both these cases, it was held that the deed of dedication or transfer directly in favour of a Hindu Deity is not a trust deed nor a deed of settlement but a deed of gift and that the deed ought to be stamped as a deed of gift under Art. 33 of the Stamp Act.

    The reasons given in this judgment may be shortly summarised as follows:—

    (a) The word “settlement” refers to a disposition of successive interests in property. In support of this, reference is also made, to s. 3 of the Specific Relief Act, where settlement for the purpose of Specific Relief Act is defined as meaning an instrument other than a Will or a Codicil as defined in Indian Succession Act whereby the destination or devolution of successive interest in movable or immovable property is disposed of or agreed to be disposed of. An analogous definition will appear in Halsbury's Hailsham Ed., Vol. 29, p. 528.

    (b) The conception of trust underlies a settlement. There is no trust in the case of a direct gift to the Deity.

    (c) There can be a gift in favour of the image, although it is not a sentient being.

    For the purpose of deciding whether the deed in question in this proceeding is a deed of settlement, reference must be made to the definition of settlement in the Indian Stamp Act. Section 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act reads as follows:—

    “Settlement” means any non-testamentary disposition, in writing, of movable or immovable property made—

    (a) in consideration of marriage;

    (b) for the purpose of distributing property of the settlor among his family or those for whom he desires to provide, or for the purpose of providing for some person dependent on him; or

    (c) for any religious or charitable purpose;

    and includes an agreement in writing to make such a disposition and, where any such disposition has not been made in writing, any instrument recording, whether by way of declaration of trust or otherwise, of any such disposition.

    The word “settlement” is authoritatively defined in the Stamp Act. Where a statute gives a definition for an instrument, that definition cannot be controlled by the meaning commonly attributed to such instrument or by the meaning attributed to it by another statute. No extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that the word has a meaning other than what is defined in the Act under consideration. See Burrows' “Interpretation of Documents”, p. 61. The definition given in a section very commonly extends and alters the ordinary meaning attributed to the word. Reference may be made to the case of the Queen v. Commissioners under the Boiler Explosions Act, 1882, where the statute under consideration gave a meaning to the word “boiler” widely different from its ordinary meaning.

    It is pointed out in Halsbury 2nd Ed., Vol. 29, p. 528, that the legislature has from time to time given definition of the word “settlement” for the purpose of particular statutes, but there is no generally accepted legal definition of the word.

    There is some high authority that in the popular sense the word “settlement” contemplates and connotes the retention of the property by the donee and not its immediate alienation or consumption. Even conceding for the sake of argument that such popular meaning ought to control the statutory meaning, a deed of dedication is made with a view to make property inalienable and such deed may fairly be called a deed of settlement even in the popular sense.

    In my judgment, the express meaning given to the word by the Indian Stamp Act cannot be controlled by reference to any so-called popular meaning. The ordinary meaning or the meaning given by the Specific Relief Act is entirely irrelevant in construing the word “settlement” with reference to the Stamp Act. The Stamp Act itself authoritatively declares the meaning of the word “settlement”. The word “settlement” has been apparently used in the Act merely for the purpose of convenience of drafting to convey the idea of several kinds of instruments mentioned in s. 2(24) of the Act. If a document answers the description of settlement as defined in the Act, it must be held to be a deed of settlement for the purpose of the Act. It must be remembered that the Stamp Act is a fiscal enactment and if there is a doubt or ambiguity, such doubt and ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the citizen.

    Neither the intervention of trust nor disposition of successive interest in property is an essential requisite of settlement as defined in the Indian Stamp Act. There are numerous cases in which it has been held that a gift of property for the purpose of, distributing it amongst the members of the settlor's family or for those whom he desires to provide is a settlement as defined in the Indian Stamp Act. Mohammed Rashid Ahmad v. Emperor, a gift by mother to sons in equal shares and in Stamp Reference by the Board of Revenue, a gift to a brother was held to be a deed of Settlement. In Reference under Indian Stamp Act, s. 46 a gift to sister for life was held to be a settlement. The definition of “settlement” in the Indian Stamp Act of 1879 suggested the creation of separate interest in favour of several persons and accordingly a joint gift to a sister and her son was held not to be a settlement. Reference from the Board of Revenue under section 46 of the Indian Stamp Acts, 1879. The object of the present Stamp Act was to widen the definition of the word “settlement” so as to include within the definition of the word “settlement” a disposition of property even if separate interests in favour of several persons have not been created. The object of the extended definition of section 2(24)(b) in the Indian Stamp Act will appear from the speech of Sir James Westland in introducing the bill:—

    In the Madras Presidency, it has been ruled that the use of the word “distribution” in the definition of “settlement” indicates that a settlement must necessarily be in favour of more than one person. It has consequently been ruled in that Presidency that if a settlement is made in favour of one person it is not a settlement within the meaning of the Stamp Act. We propose to alter the definition of the word “settlement” so as to prevent the exclusion from it of what is not an infrequent document—a settlement in favour of single person. A person, of course, includes persons, and the consequence is that a settlement is made to include not only a document which has for its object the distribution of property of the settlor, but of providing, whether by disbribution or otherwise, for some person dependent on him.

    In all the foregoing cases which I have cited, there was a gift pure and simple. There was neither a trust nor any disposition of successive interests in property. In my judgment, a deed of disposition of property for the purposes mentioned in s. 2(24) of the Indian Stamp Act is a deed of settlement notwithstanding that there is no trust and notwithstanding that there is no disposition of successive interest in immovable property.

    An instrument may be an instrument of settlement notwithstanding that it is an instrument of gift. Articles 33 and 58 of the Indian Stamp Act deal with instruments of gift and settlement respectively. Article 33 is the more specific and Art. 58 is the more general article. An instrument of gift which answers the description of settlement need not be stamped under Art. 33. Article 33 expressly relates to instruments of gift not being a settlement. If an instrument may be described both as an instrument of gift and settlement, it may be stamped under Art. 58.

    The simple question before me is whether a deed of direct gift of property in favour of the Hindu Deity answers the description of an instrument of settlement as defined in the Stamp Act. It cannot be disputed that such a deed is a Heed of non-testamentary disposition of property. The deed, therefore, must be held to be an instrument of settlement if the disposition of property made by it is for a religious or charitable purpose. I am quite clearly of the opinion that the disposition of property made by such deed is for a religious purpose and that such a deed must be held to be an instrument of settlement.

    If the form of that deed was that the property was conveyed to certain trustees in trust for the shebâ of the Deity, there would have been no doubt that there would have been a disposition of property for a religious and charitable purpose. The fact that the dedication is made directly in favour of the Deity and not through the medium of a trust, in my judgment, makes no difference. The Hindu law recognises juridical persons or subjects called foundations. A Hindu, who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution, may express his purpose and endow it. A trust is not required for that purpose. The juridical person is the ideal embodiment of a pious idea and is the centre of the religious foundation. [See judgment of West J. in Monohar Ganesh Támbekar v. Lohshirám Govindrám] When a Hindu dedicates property to a Deity, he is manifestly making a disposition for religious purpose. The image is the symbol of the religious idea and is a compendious expression of the pious purpose. The dedication is a gift to the Deity only in an ideal and special sense. The custodian of the Deity, by whatever name he is called, stands in a fiduciary capacity and is quasi-trustee for carrying out the purposes of the institution: see the observations of Jenkins, C.J in Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ramlal Maitra.

    A gift to a corporation, whose object and purpose is only religious and charitable, has always been held to be a gift to charity. By way of illustration, gifts to the Royal Geographical Society, the Protestant Alliance and the Church Missionary Society may be mentioned. Numerous cases are quoted in Halsbury, Vol. 4, Art. 154 and Art. 156, pp. 117 and 119.

    In Beaumont v. Oliveira the question was whether a legacy to the Royal Geographical Society was a charitable bequest. Selwyn L.J observed in that case as follows:—

    In the case now before us, both the bequests are bequests to corporations, the objects and purposes of which are the diffusion and improvement of particular branches of knowledge. They subsist for these purposes and no others, therefore for public purposes—therefore, for the advancement of objects of general public utility—therefore for purposes analogous and similar to those mentioned in the Statute of Elizabeth—therefore for charitable purposes; and this being so, we agree with Sir John Stuart V.C that the legacies given to them are charitable legacies, and applicable only to the purposes for which the recipients exist as corporations.

    A gift to a Hindu Deity is ex necessitate rei a gift for a religious purpose. The Deity is the symbol of the religious purpose. It exists only for the religious purpose. In fact, it is the religious purpose itself. Dedication to the Deity is a dedication to and for the religious purpose. Treated as a foundation or corporation, the Deity exists for no other purpose except the purpose of religion and a dedication to the Deity must, in my judgment, be held to be a disposition of property for a religious purpose.

    It is noteworthy that a deed of wâkf alâulâd has been held to be an instrument of settlement for the purposes of this Act. [See the case of Emperor v. Ahmad Zaman Khan.] It is well-known that in such wâkfs, there is ordinarily no trust.

    In my judgment, the deed of dedication in this proceeding is a deed of disposition of an immovable property for a religious purpose and is therefore a deed of settlement. It is not disputed that if it is a deed of settlement, it is properly stamped.

    In my judgment, no cogent or sound reason has been advanced in any of the judgments which I have mentioned for holding that a deed of direct gift to the Deity cannot be held to be a deed of settlement. I am convinced that the judgments in the case of Bhooyati Nath Chakrabarti v. Basanta Kumaree Debee (supra) and Chief Controller, Revenue Authority, C.P & Berar v. Sarjubai (supra) are wrongly decided and that I ought not to follow these decisions. With very great respect to the learned and eminent Judges who decided the two cases, I dissent from those two decisions.

    The deed of dedication, therefore, must be held to be admissible in these proceedings. I have held that on, the face of it, the deed purports to dedicate the property to the Deities. The next question is what is the effect of such deed. In this connection, I will refer to a passage in Sir Dinshaw Mullah's Hindu Law, 10th Ed., Art. 407A at p. 493. That passage is as follows:—

    The mere execution of a deed though it may purport on the face of it to dedicate property to an idol is not enough to constitute a valid endowment, for the real object of the executant may be to defraud creditors or defeat the provisions of the ordinary law of descent or to restrain alienations and keep the property in perpetuity in the family. It is necessary for the validity of a deed of endowment that the executant should divest himself of the property. Whether he has done so or not is to be determined by his subsequent acts and conduct.

    Order XXI, rr. 58 to 62 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for summary investigation into possession. It is however, impossible to separate the questions of possession and of title. The question of title can he gone into only in so far as it may be necessary to determine whether the person holds the property as trustee or agent of another. See Mohunt Bhagawan Ramaunj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi. The sole question before me is whether the attached property was in the possession of the judgment-debtor and, if so, whether such possession was on his own account or in trust for some other person. It appears that the property was in the possession of the judgment-debtor and, therefore, the only question is whether the property was in his possession on his own account or in trust for some other person.

    If dedication is not established, the property lies where it originally lay, namely, with the settlors. [See Hriday Krishna Kundu v. Benode Behari Bandhopadhaya.] However, complicated questions of title like questions of benâmi cannot be investigated in the summary proceeding. [See Reliance Development & Engineering, Ltd. v. Bhabani Chandra Banerjee and Protiva Sundari Chaudhury v. Reliance Bank, Ltd..]

    If there is apparent possession tacked on the apparent title, the Court must give effect to it in a summary proceeding.

    It is to be observed that the onus of proof in these proceedings is upon the claimants. They must prove to my satisfaction that they are possessed of the property in trust for and on account of the deities and under the title which they set up. The applicants are asserting jointly on behalf of themselves and the three respondent shebâits that the property is debattar property and is possessed by them as shebâits of a debattar estate. The normal procedure was to apply on behalf of the shebâits and if relief is to be given in these proceedings, the relief must be given to all the shebâits jointly and on the same basis as if the application had been by all the shebâits. The applicants cannot improve their case by making some of the shebâits co-respondents. One of the shebâits, namely, the judgment-debtor formally admitted before this Court when the decree in this suit was passed that the property was his property. He certainly then claimed to have the title to the property in his personal capacity and, therefore, the possession thereof on his own account. The deed of dedication does not provide for residence of shebâits in the attached premises, but admittedly Anath and Harimohan resided there.

    There has been no mutation in the records of the Corporation of Calcutta and the three settlors, namely, Anath, Abinash and Harimohan are still shown as owner of the property in the records of the Corporation of Calcutta. So far as such records are concerned, they are still in possession as owners.

    Certain rent receipts are produced. They purport to have been issued by certain persons on behalf of Sri Sri Lakshmi Narayan Jew debttar property. It is, however, to be observed that there is no mention of any other Deity or Deities in such rent receipts. It is alleged that the shebâ of the Deity is met out of the income but there is no allegation that the entire income is spent on account of such shebâ. The Deities are said to be in Eastern Pakistan. I am not satisfied that they in fact exist or that any money is spent on account of their shebâ. I am not satisfied that the settlors divested themselves of the property. I am also not satisfied that the properties attached are debattar or are possessed by the claimants as shebâits of Hindu Deity or Deities. For the purpose of this summary investigation I am satisfied that ⅓rd share in the premises No. 14/3, Nimtala Ghat Street, is in the possession of the judgment-debtor on his own account and not on account of any other person.

    With regard to the movable properties, Mr. Sanyal had not seriously pressed the application and I am also satisfied for the purposes of summary investigation that these properties were also in possession of the judgment-debtor on his own account and not on account of any other person.

    The result is that this application must be dismissed with costs. However, if the claimant file an appropriate suit under O. XXI, r. 63, within a month, the costs of this application will abide by the result of such suit.

    The costs of this application will be taxed as that of a motion.

    Application dismissed.

    Attorney for applicants: N.L Roy.

    Attorney for plaintiff: S.C Roy Chowdhury.

    A.K.B

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    Upendra Nath Poddar v. Anath Chandra Lodh
    (May 5, 1950)