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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was filed by the employer challenging an award dated 16 November 1990 (rendered under section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) which directed reinstatement of the workman (respondent no. 1) with specific conditions: payment only of subsistence allowance during suspension and payment of arrears of back wages only upon filing an affidavit that the workman was not gainfully employed while out of service.

Key chronological facts presented in the opinion:

  • The workman was suspended with effect from 12 June 1970.
  • A charge sheet dated 28 December 1971 contained five charges; enquiry was held in respect of charge Nos. 4 and 5 on 27–28 February 1974, and the enquiry officer found both charges proved.
  • After the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority issued a show-cause notice proposing dismissal; the workman was dismissed by letter dated 29 June 1974.
  • A belated departmental appeal by the workman was dismissed on a technical point and a subsequent civil suit was also dismissed.
  • The workman raised an industrial dispute with the conciliation officer on 25 April 1987; the Central Government referred the matter under section 10 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal. The reference questioned whether the dismissal effective 29 June 1974 was justified and what relief the workman was entitled to.
  • The Industrial Tribunal framed two issues on 6 September 1990 (whether the departmental enquiry was unfair and whether the findings confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority were perverse). Ultimately the Tribunal treated the punishment as disproportionate under section 11-A and substituted dismissal with reinstatement plus censure entry and withholding one increment, with restrictions on back wages.
  • The employer petitioned the High Court under Article 226, challenging that award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether inaction or delay by the workman in raising an industrial dispute can be condoned (i.e., whether a belated reference by the Central Government under section 10 could be valid despite the lapse of time).
  2. Whether the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal was entitled to substitute the punishment of dismissal imposed by the Disciplinary Authority with a lesser punishment (reinstatement with withholding of one increment and a censure entry) under section 11-A of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (learned senior counsel Sri S.N. Verma)

  • Inordinate delay in raising the industrial dispute by the workman cannot be condoned; the Central Government was not justified in making a reference after several years from the date of dismissal.
  • The punishment of dismissal was justified and proportionate to the misconduct.
  • The Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting dismissal with withholding one increment and a censure entry while reinstating the workman, and by awarding only subsistence allowance during suspension.
  • Relied upon: Chief General Manager State Bank of India v. Kedar Nath Pandey (UP LB EC 1986 p.733).

Respondent's Arguments (learned counsel for the workman)

  • Under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act the Central Government has administrative power to make a reference if an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended; there is no time limitation.
  • Reliance placed on authorities supporting the discretionary and administrative nature of the reference power, including: Scooter India Limited, Lucknow v. Labour Court Lucknow (1989 Supp (1) SCC 31 : AIR 1989 SC 149) and Avon Service Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana ((1979) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1979 SC 170).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chief General Manager State Bank of India v. Kedar Nath (Pandey / Yadav) (as cited) Case relied upon by petitioner to support his contention (citation presented by petitioner). The Court held this case was on different facts; the authority had held State Bank of India to be an 'industry' for the purposes of the Act and thus the case, instead of aiding the petitioner, in the Court's view helped the workman.
Scooter India Limited, Lucknow v. Labour Court Lucknow, (1989 Supp (1) SCC 31 : AIR 1989 SC 149) Illustrates that even where a departmental enquiry is fair and lawful, a labour court (or tribunal) may substitute a lesser punishment if it considers the punishment disproportionate (analogy to section 11-A of the Act). The Court applied this principle to hold that substitution of lesser punishment by the Tribunal was permissible and appropriate where dismissal was disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
Avon Services Production Agencies Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1979 SC 170 Section 10(1) confers discretionary power on the appropriate Government to make a reference when satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended; there must be material on which the Government forms its opinion and the adequacy of that material is generally not for judicial scrutiny; a second reference can be made. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the Central Government's power to refer matters under section 10 is administrative and discretionary, and that the expression "at any time" indicates the power is unfettered subject only to the existence or apprehension of a dispute.
Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise Baroda, (1990) 3 SCC 447 : AIR 1991 SC 754 Cited in connection with the use of Latin maxims and principles of statutory interpretation (the Court notes maxims are of assistance in summing up the principle involved). The Court invoked the case as authority for using maxims as guidance in statutory interpretation, emphasizing the need to read a provision in its entirety rather than in isolation.
Aphali Pharmaceutical Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 : AIR 1989 SC 2227 Cited with reference to the maxim that the words of law should not be departed from (use in statutory interpretation). The Court cited it to reinforce the approach that statutory words must be respected and that section 10(1) and 10(5) must be read together.
Sadhu Ram Bansal v. P.B. Sarkar, (1984) 3 SCC 410 Authority discussing the constitutional objective of social justice and the role of courts in dispensing social justice; used to support purposive interpretation of social legislation. The Court relied on its observations to justify a purposive, social-justice oriented approach to interpreting the Industrial Disputes Act and the expression "at any time".
Summers v. Seaford Corporation, 1943 AC 283; Okerake v. Brent London Borough Council, (1967) 1 QB 42 Cited as authorities supporting a purposive approach to statutes of predominant social nature. The Court invoked them to justify taking a broad purposive view of the Industrial Disputes Act as social beneficent legislation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

First issue — delay/inaction and the time for reference under section 10:

  1. The Court examined the text of section 10(1) together with section 10(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act and emphasized that both sub-sections allow the Government to make a reference "at any time". The use of "at any time" was interpreted as indicating that the legislature did not intend to impose any time limitation for making a reference.
  2. The Court applied basic rules of statutory interpretation: provisions must be read together and in context rather than in isolation. The Court expressly invoked Latin maxims and precedent to support reading the statute as a whole and sticking to the words of the law.
  3. The social purpose of the Act was highlighted. Because the Act is social beneficent legislation intended to further social justice, it deserves a purposive construction favoring the object of the Act (i.e., protections for workmen), rather than a strict temporal bar to references.
  4. The Court concluded that the Appropriate Government is the sole judge in making a reference under section 10(1) and 10(5) provided an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended; there is no time limit, and therefore there is no occasion to speak of "delay" requiring condonation in this context.
  5. The Court found the authorities relied upon by the respondent (Avon Services) supported the proposition that the Central Government's discretion under section 10 is broad and that judicial interference on the adequacy of material is limited.

Second issue — substitution of punishment by the Tribunal under section 11-A:

  1. The Court observed that only two relatively minor charges were proved against the workman: (a) habitually incurring excessive debt; and (b) a cheque for Rs. 65 drawn by the workman was returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds.
  2. Applying the analogous Supreme Court authority (Scooter India Limited), the Court accepted that even where the departmental enquiry and its findings are not vitiated, a Tribunal can substitute a lesser punishment if the original punishment appears disproportionate to the misconduct.
  3. On analysis of the misconduct proved and the proportionality of the penalty, the Court held dismissal to be too harsh. The Tribunal's substitution — reinstatement with withholding one increment and a censure entry, payment of only subsistence allowance during suspension, and conditional payment of back wages on an affidavit that the workman was not gainfully employed — was held to be within the Tribunal's power under section 11-A and was appropriate in the circumstances.
  4. The Court additionally noted its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 is not an appellate jurisdiction to reappraise merits of an award rendered by a tribunal; where the tribunal has rendered an award advancing social justice and reasonably interpreting the Act, interference is not warranted absent an error appearing on the face of the record.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the petition— PETITION DISMISSED. The interim stay dated 24 April 1991 was vacated. The petitioner was directed to give effect to the award by 30 October 1993. There was no order as to costs.

Implications (direct effects on the parties):

  • The Industrial Tribunal's award reinstating the workman with the specified conditions (withholding one increment, censure entry, subsistence allowance during suspension, and conditional payment of back wages upon affidavit) stands and must be implemented by the petitioner by the stated date.
  • The High Court refused to interfere with the Tribunal's substitution of a lesser punishment under section 11-A, concluding dismissal was disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
  • The Court held there is no temporal bar to the Central Government making a reference under section 10(1) and 10(5) — the Government may make a reference "at any time" if satisfied an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended.
  • No broader or novel legal precedent was asserted to be laid down by this decision beyond applying established principles: (a) purposive construction of social legislation, (b) deference to the discretionary administrative power under section 10, and (c) tribunal power to substitute lesser punishment under section 11-A where dismissal is disproportionate. The decision primarily resolves the parties' dispute and upholds the Tribunal's award.

    Chief General Manager, State Bank Of India v. B.C Verma And Another

    B.L Yadav, J.:— Whether inaction or delay in arising industrial dispute by the workman can be condoned and whether Presiding officer of the Central Industrial Tribunal is entitled to substitute his own discretion, converting the punishment of dismissal from service, to that of withholding one increment of the workman and censure entry in the character Roll, are short questions that fall for determination in the present petition filed by the employer challenging the award dated 16th of November, 1990 (Annexure No. 10 to the writ petition), seeking relief for issuance of a writ of Certiorari quashing the said award rendered under section 11 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (Gompendiously the Act), whereby the petitioner has been directed to reinstate the workman, respondent no. 1, and the work-man has been direted not to be paid any amount except subsistence allowance during period of suspension and the arrears of the back wages would be paid only after an affidavit was filed that workman was not gainfully employed any where during the period he was out of the service.

    2. The facts lie in narrow compass and they are these:

    The respondent no. 1 was suspended with effect from 12th of June, 1970 and was served with a charge sheet dated 28th of December, 1971, which contains five charges of misconduct against him. An enquiry was conducted in respect of these charges, to with charge Nos. 4 and 5. The enquiry was conducted on 27th and 28th of February, 1974, and the enquiry officer submitted bis report holding both the charges to be proved. The Disciplinary Authority after obtaining the report, issued show cause notiee proposing punishment of dismissal, and the workman gave reply to the proposed order of dismissal and was actually dismissed by the Disciplinary Authority vide letter dated 29th of June, 1974 (Annexure No. 4). A belated appeal was filed by the workman which was dismissed on Tachnical point. Thereafter, the workman filed a civil suit. It was also dismissed. Thereafter, the workman approached the conciliation officer on 25th of April, 1987, raising an industrial dispute, which was referred by the Central Government, under section 10 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal. The terms of the Reference was whether the management was justified in dismissing, the workman Sri R.C Verma with effect from 29th of June, 1974, and to what relief the workman was entitled.

    3. Both the parties filed written statement and led the evidence and two issues were framed by the Tribunal on 6th of September, 1990, to the effect, whether the departmental enquiry was not conducted fairly and properly and whether the findings, confirmed by the Disciplinary Authority are perverse. Ultimately, only the second issue appears to have been decided. It was held that the resort of the enquiry officer cannot be assailed, but in view of the provisions of section 11-A of the Act, punishment of dismissal from service was deemed to be disproportionate to the misconduct proved on the basis of the charges nos. 4 and 5. The charge no. 4 was to the effect that the workman was in the habit of incurring excessive debt and charge no. 5 was to the effect that cheque dated 10th of August, 1970, for Rs. 65/- drawn by the workman was returned, unpaid on 11th of August, 1970, due to shortage of funds in the workman's saving bank account. Consequently, the impugned award was passed substituting the punishment of dismissal to the reinstatement with back wages and with addition to award censure entry in the Character Roll and withholding one increment of the workman. Against this award, the present petition has been filed.

    4. Sri S.N Verma, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that inordinate delay in raising the industrial dispute by the workman can not be condoned and the Central Government was not justified in making reference after a lapse of several years from the date of dismissal from service and that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the workman was justified and proportionate to the misconduct, whereas the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting just withholding one increment with censure entry and reinstatement with back wages and awarding only subsistence allowance to be paid during the period the workman remain suspended. He leaned heavily on The Chief General Manager State Bank of India v. Kedar Nath Pandey, UP LB EC 1986 at p. 733.

    5. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that under section 10 of the Act, Central Government has unfettered administrative powers to make Reference provided an industrial dispute existed or was apprehended or the dispute involved any question of National importance Reliance was placed on Scooter India Limited, Lucknow v. Labour Court Lucknow, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 31 : AIR 1989 SC 149 and Avon Service Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana, (1979) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1979 SC 170.

    6. Having scrutinized the submission of the learned counsel for the parties, short questions for determination are whether inaction in raising industrial dispute by the workman can be condoned and whether the Industrial Tribunal was not justified and substituting the lesser punishment of holding one increment with censure entry in the character Roll to the punishment of dismissal.

    7. As regards the first point, suffice it to say, that no time limit has been provided rather under section 10(5) of the Act, it has been specifically provided that in case the appropriate Government is of the opinion either on an application is made or otherwise and the Government is of the opinion that there exists an industrial dispute or the same is apprehended, the Reference can be made ‘at any time’. The use of expression “at any time” indicates the intention of the legislature.

    8. It is the cardinal rule of interpretation that any provision need not to be read in isolation rather it must be read with other provisions. In the present case, every part of section 10 and its sub-section have to be read together, particularly, section 10(1) has to be read alongwith sub-section 5, and every provisions must be looked at generally in the context in which it is used.

    9. I am conscious that Latin Maxims are not to be mechanically applied, and they are of assistance only insofar as they furnish guidance by compenditiously summing up principle involved. See Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise Baroda, (1990) 3 SCC 447 : AIR 1991 SC 754, but in the present case the maxim would be of assistance and it furnishes guidance in respect of the principle. “The Maxim INJUSTUM EST NISI TOTE LEGA INSPECTA DE UNS ALIQUA EJUS PA RTICULA PROPRITE JUDICERE NEL RESPNDE” cannotes that it is unjust to refer to only one part of a section without examining the whole law. In other words, the statute must be read as a whole. The next maxim is “A VERBIS LEGISNON EXT RECEDEN DLIM” which connotes that from the words of law, there must be no departure. See Aphali Pharmeceutical Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 : AIR 1989 SC 2227.

    10. In the present case, section 10(1) may be read alongwith section 10(5). Both the sub-sections read together lead to the conclusion that at any time the Reference can be made in the exercise of the administrative power by the Central Government provided there exists an industrial dispute or the same is apprehended. The use of expression “at any time” in both the sub-sections clearly indicates that legislature never intended any limitation to be imposed for making reference.

    11. There appears to be another reason for the expression “at any time” has been used under section 10(5) of the Act. The Act is not a simple statute rather it contain the provision of social beneficent legislation with a view to render social justice to the workman. The social justice was cherished the goal of the framers of the Constitution and the same was incorporated in the Preamble of the Constitution. The aims and object intended in the. Preamble of the Constitution indicate the aspirations of the people. The observations in Sadhu Ram Bansal v. P.B Sarkar, (1984) 3 SCC 410 are set out.

    “Justice social, Economic and Political, is preamble to our Constitution: Administration of justiee can no longer be merely protector of legal rights but must whenever be possible dispenser of social justice. Benthern's greatest happiness of greater number-theory in administering justice social or legal— jurisprudence has shifted away from fines upon technicalities and abstract rules to recognition of human beings and human needs, and if these cannot be fulfilled without deprivation of existing legal rights of any party concerned, courts must lean to words that.”

    12. The approach to a statute of predominant social nature (i.e as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act) has to be made in that light. The court must take a broad view of the background and policy of the statute in question See Summers v. Seaford Corporation, 1943 AC 283, Okerake v. Brant London Borough Council, (1967) 1 QB 42.

    13. To put it differently, the Act imposes social amelioration giving more benefits to the workman. These provisions in my opinion must receive not a simple construction, rather a purposive construction with a view to advance the object of the Act sought to be achieved.

    14. In case the legislature wanted to place time limit for making Reference as was suggested by Mr. Verma, the learned counsel for the petitioner, in that event the expression “at any time” would not have been used under section 10(1) and 10(5) of the Act. In the eventuality that the Reference has once been refused, the same can be made again provided there is some fresh material in respect of existence of industrial dispute.

    15. In my opinion Appropriate Government is the sole judge in making the Reference under section 10(1) and 10(5) for adjudication, provided there exists and industrial dispute or the same is apprehended and there is no time limit for making the Reference, fortiorari, there is no question of any delay of condonation of the same.

    16. The Chief General Manager State Bank of India v. Kedar Nath Yadav, (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was a case on different facts. In that case, it was held that State Bank of India was an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. Consequently, such disputes between the employer and the workman would be industrial dispute. In such matters, jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred. The case instead of helping the petitioner, helps the workman, respodent no. I…

    17. Avon Services Production Agencies Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Haryana (Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, appear to be relevant authority where it was held that Section 10(1) of the Act confers discretionary power which can be exercised on being satisfied that industrial disputes exists or is apprehended, and there must be some material on which the Government must form opinion and the adequacy and ufficiency of the material on which the opinion was formed was beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny and even the second reference can be made. But the expression “at any time” indicates that the discretionary power exercised by the Central Government was unfettered and the only condition was that it must be satisfied that industrial dispute existed or the same was apprehended.

    18. Reverting to the second question whether substituting lesser punishment for the punishment proposed by the disciplinary authority was consistent under Section 11-A of the Act. In the present case only two charges were proved against the workman. The first charge was that the workman was in the habit of incurring excessive debt and the next charge was that the cheque issued by the workman for a sum of Rs. 65/- was returned uppaid on 11th of August, 1970, for such filmsy charges, in my opinion, the punishment of dismissal from service was not warranted.

    19. Scooter India Limited, Lucknow v. Labour Court Lucknow (supra) was the next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. In this case, their lordships of the Supreme Court observed while considering the scope of section 6 (2-A) of the U.P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (which was analogous to section 11-A of the Act) that even though disciplinary enquiry was found to be fair and law-ful and its findings were not vitiated in any manner, that by itself would not be ground for non-interference with the order of retrenchment or termination of service by Labour Court and the Labour Court could substitute the lesser punishment to that awarded by the disciplinary authority, which appears to the court to be proportionate with the misconduct committed by the workman.

    20. In the present case, charges even though were proved, but the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and the Presiding Officer of the Central Tribunal was perfectly justified in passing the award by substituting the punishment of dismissal with reinstatement and withholding of one increment of the workman and censure entry in the character Roll regarding the matter proved against him, and directing that during the period of suspension, he would not be paid any thing except subsistence allowance but he would be entitled for payment of back wages provided the workman furnishes an affidavit that he was not gainfully employed during the period he remain out of service.

    21. Under the circumstances of the case, there was no error much less the error on the face of the record. The matter can be viewed from another angle about the jurisdiction of this court under Articte 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of Certiorari. The power of this court is not an appellate court. Particularly, against the award of the labour court. It was not a judgment and decree of the Civil Court rather it was the disposal of the controversy between the employer and the workman pertaining to the industrial dispute. In many cases, the awards are rendered keeping in view the demands of social justice which was the cherised goal of our sacred Constitution and also keeping in mind that the Act is a social beneficent legislation, Even if two interpretation is possible of any provision and one is consistent with the interest of the workman, who are vulnerable section of the society, the latter interpretation has to be preferred.

    22. Under the facts and circumstances of the case substantial justice has been done by the Labour Court and the award rendered by it is perfectly correct. There weuld be no justification for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    23. In view of the premises aforesaid, petition fails and it is dimissed. Interim stay dated 24-4-1991 is vacated. The petitioner is directed to give effect to the award in any case by 30th of October, 1993. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

    24. Petition dismissed.

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    Chief General Manager, State Bank Of India v. B.C Verma And Another
    (Sep 22, 1993)