K.C Agrawal, J.:— This petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Geep Industrial Syndicate Limited, Allahabad, challenging the orders of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 23rd Nov. 1981, and 11th Feb. 1982.

2. The dispute in the present case is relating to a part of the accommodation at 3, Minto Road, Allahabad, of which Indrajit Frank Agrawal, Retired District Judge, is the owner. This is, admittedly, a residential building. The portion in dispute, according to the petitioner, was allotted to it on Oct. 28, 1975, by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as U.P Act XIII of 1972). D.P Singh, Respondent 3, moved an application for allotment of the aforesaid portion. In pursuance of the application for allotment, the Inspector made a spot enquiry and submitted a report on 21st Nov. 1981, that Nizam Shervani, who was the occupant of the aforesaid accommodation, had vacated the same on 18th Nov. 1982, and that the same was lying vacant. The premises in dispute consists of two rooms, one Hall, one verandah, kitchen, bath room and one latrine. On being satisfied from the report, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the vacancy on Nov. 23, 1981, and fixed 26th Nov. 1981, for consideration of the allotment applications.

3. Before 26th Nov. 1981, the petitioner filed an objection to the declaration of vacancy claiming that the petitioner was the tenant of the aforesaid premises since long and was continuing in possession of the same. The petitioner also pleaded that the report submitted by the Inspector was incorrect, hence the order dated 23rd Nov. 1981, declaring vacancy was liable to be recalled. To this objection of the petitioner, a reply was filed by Respondent 3 asserting that the allegation that the premises was in possession of the petitioner, was wrong. According to Respondent 3, Nizam Shervani had been in illegal possession of the disputed premises since 1979 and as he had vacated the same on 18th Nov. 1981, the premises was vacant and was open for allotment. Nizam Shervani was in occupation in his own right and had a telephone connection in the name and style of Sigma Chemicals in which name Nizam Shervani was running the business at Kanpur Road near Subedar Ganj, Allahabad. Nizam Shervani was not an employee of Geep Industrial Syndicate Limited, the petitioner.

4. To the affidavit of D.P Singh, Respondent 3, the petitioner got an affidavit of K.M Khare, who was its Administrative Officer, filed. For the first time in this affidavit the petitioner disclosed and admitted that Nizam Shervani had vacated the premises. It was, however, maintained by the petitioner that the Company was the tenant and it had neither actually vacated the same nor was there any likelihood of its being vacated. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no power in law to declare the premises to be vacant. The petitioner asserted that the rent of the portion in dispute had been regularly paid by the petitioner to the landlord. Another affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner was that of Lal Bahadur Sharma, who claimed that R.K Gupta, who was an officer of the petitioner, was residing in the premises in dispute after the same had been vacated by Nizam Shervani.

5. D.B Singh, Respondent 3, filed a reply to these two affidavits and refuted the claim of the petitioner that there was no vacancy, and that the application for allotment made by him was not maintainable. The assertion that the report of the Inspector was against Rule 8(1) was also denied. In the affidavit, thereafter sworn by K.M Khare on 15-1-1982, the status in which Nizam Shervani was living in the premises in dispute was disclosed for the first time. It was stated that Sigma Chemicals was an ancillary unit of the petitioner Company, and that the said industry manufactured chemicals exclusively for the use of the tenant Company. The further assertion made in this connection was:—

“In fact, the tenant Company has assisted the establishment of Sigma Chemicals at Allahabad, and the wife of Mr. Nizam Shervani, Mrs. Shabana Nizam is the Managing Partner of the said firm and there being a close association and she being in difficulty due to non-availability of suitable accommodation, she was accommodated temporarily as a guest and caretaker by the tenant Company in the premises in question.”

6. Before deciding the application of the petitioner for recalling the order dated 23rd Nov. 1981, declaring vacancy, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer got another inspection made by the Inspector who submitted his report on 22nd Jan. 1982. By an order dated 11th Feb. 1982, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application of the petitioner Company for recalling the order dated 23rd Nov. 1981, holding that Nizam Shervani was neither an employee nor an officer of Geep Industrial Syndicate Limited, hence his possession was invalid, and unauthorised. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer also disbelieved the case of the petitioner that Nizam Shervani was the guest or a caretaker or that he had been residing in the premises in dispute in that capacity.

7. The petitioner's learned counsel challenged the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on a number of grounds which would be dealt with by us one by one. The first was about the non-compliance of Rule 8 of the Rules framed under U.P Act No. 13 of 1972. Rule 8 provides for ascertainment of vacancy upon an application made by a person for allotment either under S. 12 or S. 16 of the Act. The procedure prescribed is that the Inspector would visit the premises and make an enquiry at the spot and try to ascertain the factual position from two witnesses. He is also required in so far as possible to inspect the building in the presence of the landlord or the tenant or any other occupant. The submission was that the Rent Control Inspector did not give any notice of his visit to the petitioner, who was the occupant and, as such, the report dated 21st Nov. 1981, submitted by the Inspector that the premises was vacant, was invalid. It was urged that as the order declaring vacancy was founded on the said report, the report as well as the order were liable to be quashed.

8. We do not consider it necessary to go into this question in the instant case for the simple reason that before any damage could be done to the petitioner, the petitioner filed an application for recall of the order dated 23rd Nov. 1981. The petitioner in support of its case that there was no vacancy, filed evidence. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered the evidence and then concluded that the premises was vacant. As the petitioner had full opportunity to prove its case that there was no vacancy, there is no question of holding the order dated 23rd Nov. 1981, to be invalid on that ground. True it is that the order dated 23-11-1981 was passed behind the back of the petitioner, but since another order has now been passed on 11th Feb. 1982, taking the same view, there is no question of the order dated 23rd Nov. 1981, being set aside. The rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Megarry V.C has recently urged caution by saying:

“The concepts of natural justice and the duty to be fair must not be allowed to discredit themselves by making unreasonable requirements and imposing undue burdens.” (Mulnnes v. Onslow Fane, 1978 (3) All ER 211).

9. In Trilok Singh and Co. v. District Magistrate, Lucknow ((1976) 3 SCC 726 : AIR 1976 SC 1988), the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the validity of an order of its Rent Control and Eviction Officer delcaring vacancy. The Supreme Court held that a notification of vacancy is a step-in-aid of an order of allotment or release and it is only when such an order of allotment or release is passed that the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, can have a grievance. The Supreme Court held that as the Act contemplates successive opportunities being afforded to persons whose interests are likely to be affected by any order passed by the District Magistrate the High Court was right in expressing the view that the writ was premature. In the instant case, counsel for the petitioner attempted to distinguish this ruling of the Supreme Court, with which we need not go in detail. Assuming that the distinction has been made out, we find that the ground for challenging the notification of vacancy by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was non-existent and does not justify our interference in the same.

10. The second argument of the petitioner's learned counsel was that there being no provision similar to S. 12 of the Land Acquisition Act (sic) relating to deemed vacancy in respect of a tenement held by a Company, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not hold the premises to be vacant on that ground. He urged that but for S. 12, there was no provision in the Act with the assistance of which the vacancy could be declared.

11. For appreciating this submission, it may be useful to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. U.P Act XIII of 1972 had been passed by the U.P Legislature for covering a wider field than what was done by U.P Act III of 1947. The preamble of U.P Act XIII of 1972 would indicate that the attempt made by this Act was not only to regulate and control letting and rent, but also the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings. S. 2 exempts the applicability of the Act to various types of buildings detailed therein. S. 2(f), with which we are concerned in the present case, provides for exemption of a building built and held by a registered society, a co-operative society, company or firm and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers and servants. S. 11 of the Act imposes a prohibition or restriction against letting without an allotment order. S. 12 contemplates of certain contingencies in which a landlord or tenant of a building would be deemed to have ceased to occupy it. S. 13 provides for restriction on occupation of building without allotment order. A conjoined reading of Section 11 imposes a prohibition on letting without an allotment order, S. 13 places restriction on occupation without allotment or release. These two sections are required to be read together. Reading these two sections, it would appear that neither can a landlord let out a premises without an allotment order nor can any one occupy it. These two provisions were enacted with a view to undo the effect of a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash (1963 All LJ 406) : (AIR 1964 All 1). It was held in this case that if a landlord lets out a premises without an allotment order, by entering into a contract with a person, the contract was binding between them and the allotment order made of that premises subsequently by the District Magistrate was invalid. Subsequently, this ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, before the Supreme Court came to decide that case reported in Murlidhar Agrawal v. State (1975 All LJ 270) : ((1974) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 1974 SC 1924), Act XIIL of 1972 was passed. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court found that the view of the Full Bench in Udhoo Das's case that a lease made in violation of the provisions of S. 7(2) would be valid between the parties and would create the relationship of landlord and tenant between them, was correct. With regard to the authorities appointed under the Act, the view taken by the Supreme Court was:

“Now the landlord and the tenant cannot, by their agreement, bind the District Magistrate. In spite of the lease, the District Magistrate may treat the accommodation as vacant and evict therefrom the tenant who is in occupation of the accommodation without an allotment order. This is his statutory obligation.”

12. From the above, it would appear that in case of an illegal letting or subletting, the view taken was that the contract may be binding on the parties to it, but not on the authorities, which would mean that the possession of a person who has been illegally let in would be unauthorised. Ss. 11 and 13 of the present Act make that position very clear. No one now can either let out any premises without an allotment order nor can anyone occupy the same. If any one occupies the premises without an allotment order, he would not only be an unauthorised occupant but also liable to prosecution under S. 31 of the said Act. His possession being unauthorised cannot be recognised in the eye of law and if it cannot be recognised in the eye of law, there would be a vacancy. That would entitle the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under S. 16 to pass an allotment order.

13. It is interesting to note that Udhoo Das v. Prem Prakash (1963 All LJ 406) (supra) was overruled by a Full Bench of five Judges of this Court in Abdul Hamid v. Mohammad Ishaq (1974 All LJ 676) : (AIR 1975 All 166). The case, however, was not brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The view taken in the later Full Bench was that a person to whom an accommodation has been let out by a landlord in contravention of the general order passed by the District Magistrate under S. 7(2) of the Act is liable to be proceeded against under S. 7A at the instance of the person in whose favour an allotment order has been passed by the District Magistrate, even though that order was made subsequent to the accommodation being unauthorisedly let out, and occupied by the former person. As it is not necessary to explain the provisions of the Act, we need not consider the necessity of doing it. We simply have noted the above case of Abdul Hamid v. Mohammad Ishaq (supra) for a limited purpose that although it was not a good law in view of the Supreme Court decision in Murlidhar Agrawal v. State (1975 All LJ 270) (supra), but now Ss. 11 and 13 are in line with the view taken in this case.

14. Counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the use of the expression “where a landlord or a tenant ceases to occupy a building or part thereof” is indicative of the fact that this section will apply only to cases contemplated by S. 12 inasmuch as the words “ceases to occupy” have been used in sub-sec. (4) of S. 12. To us, it appears that S. 13 serves the dual purpose. It may apply to a case covered by S. 12 but it has to be read along with S. 11 as well. S. 13 is common to both the provisions. That being so, the applicability of S. 13 cannot be restricted to cases covered by S. 12.

15. That apart, we are also unable to agree with the petitioner's learned counsel that S. 12 is applicable only to the case of a natural person. Counsel took us through whole of the section and emphasised that the use of the word “he” in Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12, the use of the words “allowed to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family” in S. 12(1)(b), the phraseology of S. 12(1)(c) that “he as well as members of his family have taken up residence” have necessarily to be interpreted as meaning applicability to natural persons. He urged that a Company since does not have a family, S. 12 is not meant to apply to it.

16. We have given our thoughtful consideration to this submission. To us, it appears that for the purpose of the present case, it is only necessary to point out that S. 12(1) uses the expression “landlord or tenant”. These words apply to a natural person as well as to a company equally. In case, therefore, a company is a tenant and if it substantially removes its effects from a building, there can be a vacancy. The mere use of the word ‘he’ in Cl. (a) of S. 12(1) will not be of any consequence. It is undeniable that a company since is a juristic person, can be a tenant as well as a landlord. The word “Company” means ordinarily an association of a number of individuals formed for some common purpose. It is a person within the meaning of that word defined in the General Clauses Act. Being a person, it has a separate entity in law.

17. Counsel for the petitioner urged that a company since is entitled to occupy a house for itself and can also use the premises as a guest house, the giving of the premises to Nizam Shervani as a guest could not amount to letting out the premises to him. Sri S.S Bhatnagar urged that under the Act either a person could be a tenant or a licensee. In either event, the possession of Nizam Shervani was unauthorised in 1981, and, as such, the vacancy was rightly declared treating his possession as no possession in the eye of law. The petitioner's case about the nature of possession of Nizam Shervani was vacillating. In the first affidavit, the petitioner did not come forward with the capacity of possession of Nizam Shervani in which he held the premises. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed on its behalf which was not clear on the controversy. Nizam Shervani either was a caretaker or that he was living in the premises as a guest. Both the pleas were taken in the affidavit. One was capable of defeating the other. In casting doubt on the plea taken by the petitioner about the nature of possession of Nizam Shervani and in disbelieving that he was a guest, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer could not be said to have committed an error which was apparent and required our interference. It is true that companies keep guest houses, but for that purpose there was no material before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. In one breath the petitioner took one plea while in the other contrary to it. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not wrong in disbelieving the petitioner and in holding that the possession of Nizam Shervani was unauthorised. From the record it does not appear that the petitioner even filed the allotment order before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Before us, an attempt to file a photostat copy was made. We found ourselves unable to take that document on record as that was not considered necessary to decide the writ petition.

18. Assuming that S. 13 of the Act applies only to cases contemplated by S. 12, alternatively we find that, as possession of Nizam Shervani was unauthorised and illegal, there was a vacancy even at the time when the house was in his occupation and after it was vacated by him. S. 11 prohibits a tenant from letting any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under S. 16. Since there is a prohibition imposed on the right of any person, which will include a landlord and tenant both, the person occupying the premises would be in an unauthorised possession. Such a person could not be treated to be a tenant. The authorised possession of a person gives a right or authority to occupy it, whereas unauthorised would mean that the person occupying is not possessed of rightful or legal power and, as such, no legal competency which can have any recognition in the eye of law, as a result of which the premises would be deemed to be unoccupied or unfilled, or empty. If that is so, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer under S. 16 would be entitled to pass an order of allotment. The vacancy talked of in S. 16 takes within its purview also possession of a person which is not recognised in law. If a person without any authority occupies a premises, his possession would be of no value and the premises would be available to the District Magistrate for passing an allotment order under S. 16.

19. In Murli Dhar Agrawal v. State of U.P (1975 All LJ 270) (supra), the Supreme Court found that since there was no prohibition in U.P Act No. III of 1947 for letting or occupying, the contract arrived at between the two would be binding. The lacuna has now been removed. In Act XIII of 1972, there is a prohibition on the right of any person to let out which will impose a corresponding obligation not to occupy the same. In the absence of a provision like S. 11 of the present Act, the Supreme Court held that the contract of letting in that case was finding between the landlord and the tenant. However, what is material to consider is that even in that case the Supreme Court found that such a contract was not binding on the District Magistrate and he could treat the building as vacant and evict therefrom the tenant. S. 11 has made the position crystal clear. The District Magistrate can ignore the contract arrived at between a landlord and the tenant and pass an appropriate order for allotment under S. 16. What he may be required to do is to afford an opportunity of hearing before evicting the tenant.

20. In that case, the Supreme Court found that the public policy behind S. 3 was to protect the weaker section of the community with a view to ultimately protecting the interest of the community in general by creating equality of bargaining power. On this public policy, the view taken was that the landlord, after having let out the premises to a tenant without allotment order, was not permitted in law to bring a suit for eviction against him.

21. The Preamble of the present Act discloses the intention of the legislature for enacting the Act, which was “Regulation of Letting and Eviction of tenants”. The regulation of letting was felt necessary to provide for accommodation to needy persons. It was also intended that in the garb of his personal need a tenant may not profiteer or otherwise gain unlawful advantage, hence prohibition was imposed on the right of any person to let out without an allotment order. The public policy behind S. 11 imposing bar to let out is meant for the public good. In Egerton v. Brownlow ((1853) 4 HLC 1), public policy has been defined as meaning:

“That principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good.”

22. The policy behind S. 11 is to safeguard the interest of the general public for the good of whom the Act has been made. To permit any person to let for profiteering or for his personal ends would injure the interest of the public. Any contract, therefore, arrived at between two persons, which contravenes S. 11 of U.P Act XIII of 1972, would be void inasmuch as such a contract is forbidden and would, therefore, be illegal. It has been said that “a Judge is not free to speculate upon, what, in his intention, is for the good of the community. He must be content to apply, either directly or by way of analogy, the principles laid down in the previous decisions. He must expound, and not expand, this particular branch of law. The heads of public policy thus comprise, and are limited to nine types of contracts already enumerated at page 321.” (Cheshire's Law of Contract, Eighth Edition, page 322).

23. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Murli Dhar Agrawal v. State of U.P (1975 All LJ 270) (supra) where the Supreme Court has held (at p. 277):

“Though there is considerable support in judicial dicta for the view that the Court cannot create any new heads of public policy, there is also no lack of judicial authority for the view that the categories of heads of public policy are not closed, and that there remains a bright field within which Courts can apply a variable notion of policy as a principle of judicial legislation or interpretation found on the current needs of the community.”

24. In the instant case, applying the doctrine laid down by Lord Atkin, we find it incontestable that to permit letting against S. 11 would be harmful to the public. We have already held above that the Company has to be kept at par with a natural person for the purpose of S. 11. S. 11 uses the expression “any person”, which would include a company. S. 2(f) of the Act lays down that only in case where a building is built and held by a company, the same can be used for various purposes enumerated therein. But, where the company is a tenant, all the prohibitions imposed by the Act would be applicable to it as well. To hold that the prohibitions imposed by the Act would not apply to a company whereas that would apply to a natural person, would be interpreting the Act in the manner not permitted by law.

25. Sri S.P Gupta had initially challenged the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on the basis of S. 2(f) of the Act and had urged that no proceedings could be taken for allotment in respect of the building in dispute, but subsequently since he gave up this argument, we need not consider the same. For the reasons given above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. The stay order is discharged. No order as to costs.

26. Petition dismissed.