R.S Pathak, J.:— This petition raises an important question as to the interpretation of Section 154 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Does the family of transferee contemplated by Section 154 include his parents?
2. On June 23, 1960, the village Bheoli in the district of Fatehpur was brought under consolidation operations in accordance with the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act. Khata No. 7, which related to bhumidhari land, was entered in the names of Srimati Janki. Ram Ratan and Chandrika Prasad, and Khata No. 72, which related to, sirdari land, was recorded in the names of Srimati Janki and Ram Ratan in the basic year. On March 18, 1960 Srimati Janki executed a sale deed in respect of a half share in Khata No. 7 in favour of Bharosey and certain others and on February 8, 1961 she similarly executed a sale deed in respect of Khata No. 72 in favour of the same persons. An application was made by the transferees for mutation of their names, but an objection was filed by Srimati Janki's co-tenants. An application was also made by Chandrika Prasad for expunging the name of Srimati Janki on the ground that it was iarzi. The applications were rejected by Consolidation Officer who did not accept either the validity of the transfers or the plea that Srimati Janki's name was entered farzi He directed that the entries should continue as recorded. The order was challenged in appeal by the transferees and by Chandrika Prasad before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The Settlement Officer held that Srimati Janki had lost her rights as a tenant in the Khata before acquiring bhumidhari rights by depositing a sum of equal to ten-times the rent and had, therefore, no interest to transfer by sale. He directed that her name be expunged from the records and refused mutation of the names of the transferees. Accordingly, he allowed the appeal filed by Chandrika Prasad and dismissed that filed by the transferees. The transferees proceeded in second appeal. A second appeal was also filed by Srimati Janki. Assistant Director of Consolidation disposing of the two second appeals held that the sale deeds were valid and ordered mutation in favour of the transferees. Chandrika Prasad applied in revision. The joint Director of Consolidation dismissed the revision application. Hence this petition for certiorari. Before the joint Director the petitioners Challenged the validity of the sale deeds on the ground that the permission of the Settlement Officer had not been taken before the execution of the sale deeds and on the ground that the transfers contravened the provision of Section 154 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and land Reforms Act inasmuch as the land falling to the share of one of the transferees, Ishtiaq Ahmad, who was a minor, resulted in the limit of 12-112 acres being exceeded when considered with the land already held by his parents. The Joint Director has held that in the case of the earlier sale deed the permission of the Settlement Officer was not necessary as the transfer took place prior to the Commencement of the consolidation operations. As regards the later sale deed, he found that permission had been obtained from the Settlement Officer. The second ground upon which the transfers were challenged was negatived by the Joint Director who held that having regard to the terms of Section 154 there was no contravention of that provision.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Joint Director has erred in interpreting Section 154. It is said that in applying Section 154, the family of the minor must be considered to include his parents. The submission is that the Explanation to Section 154 is not exhaustive but only inclusive, and that apart from the Explanation, the natural meaning of the word ‘family’ includes not only the person concerned but extends to his parents. It is urged that as a minor is included in the family of the parents, so the parents must be included in the family of the minor. The contention cannot be accepted.
4. To appreciate the true scope of Section 154, as it stands at present, it is desirable to set out the provision as it has evolved through the years when the statute was originally enacted, Section 154 reads:—
“No bhumidhar shall have the right to trannsfer, by sale or gift, any land to any person (other than an institution established for a charitable purpose) where such person shall, as a result of the sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by himself or together with his family will, in the aggregate, exceed 30 acres in Uttar Pradesh.
Explanation:— For the purposes of this section a person's family shall, if the members are living jointly, consist of the person himself, his minor children, his wife or her husband, as the case may be, and if the person himself is a “minor his father and mother”.
5. The provision continued to read thus, except for a minor variation occasioned by the U.P Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1954, up to 1956 when the U.P Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1956 substituted two Explanations. Explanation I declared:—
“For the purposes of this section, family shall include, in case it is a joint family, the transferee himself, his father and his mother, his male lineal descendants and his wife or her husband, as the case may be.”
6. And Explanation II read:—
“For the purpose of this section the transferee shall, unless proved to the contrary, be presumed to be joint with the members of his family mentioned in explanation I.”
7. Then the U.P Land Reforms (Amendment), Act, 1958 substituted the following provision as Section 154:—
“No bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer, by sale or gift, any land other than tea gardens to any person (other than an institution established for a charitable purpose) where such person shall, as a result of the sale or gift, become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by himself or together with his family, will, in the aggregate, exceed 12-112 acres in Uttar Pradesh.
Explanation:— For the purposes of this section a family shall include the transferee himself, his wife, or Husband, as the case may be, and his minor children.”
8. It has continued in those terms since.
9. The history of the legislation demonstrates that the original intention of the Legislature was to prescribe the maximum limit of 30 acres and to enlarge the scope of the word ‘family’ for the purpose of Section 154, so that it included, in the case of a joint family (and the transferee was presumed to be joint with the members of his family unless proved to the contrary), the ransferee, the transferee's father and mother, his wife or her husband, as the case may be, and the male lineal descendants. In 1958 the Maximum permissible aggregate of the holdings was educed to 12-112 acres and the content of the word family was also reduced. The ‘family’ now would, for the purpose of Section 154, be considered to include the transferee, his or her spouse and the minor children. The limits of the ‘family’ were deliberately contracted and reference to the father and mother of the transferee was expressly omitted. The Legislature intended, in order to avoid confusion, to give a specific definition to the word ‘family’ and that definition was set out as an Explanation. It is true that the Explanation uses “shall include” (but that, to my mind, is not conclusive. Although the phrase “shall include” is generally employed as a phrase of extension and not of restrictive definition, it may, according to the context, be susceptible of another construction which make it equivalent to “mean and include” and in that case it is to be considered as affon ng an exhaustive explanation of the meaning of the word or term explained. See Dilwonth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1). Having regard to the consideration that ‘family’ is a word which takes its meaning according to its context, it was necessary that it should be clearly defined so that the mathematical limit of 12-112 acres could be exactly determined. It seems to me that the Explanation defines a family, for the purpose of Section 154, to include the transferee, the transferees' spouse and the minor children, and no other. I cannot accept the submission that for the purpose of Section 154 a family must be considered to extend to the parents of the transferee. It may be that the transferee is a minor and that the minor is not married and has no children. In that event, the minor has no family. Merely because the transferee is a minor does not mean that the family of the minor includes his parents. A minor can be said to belong to the family of his parents but it is not correct to say that the parents belong to the family of the minor. When we speak of the family of a person, we envisage a group with that person at its head. The words used in section 154 are ‘his family’ and not merely ‘a family’. It is the family of the transferee which is contemplated by Section 154 and not a group of individuals living as a family. Accordingly, I hold that upon a true interpretation of Section 154, the family of the minor cannot include his parents. The first contention of the petitioners is rejected.
10. The petitioners then urge that the Joint Director should have entertained their submission that the finding of the Assistant Director that Srimati Janki had a half share in the two Khatas was in excess of the jurisdiction of the Assistant Director. I have perused the order of the Assistant Director and it appears to me that the petitioners are right. The Assistant Director, while concluding his order dismissing the second appeals, did observe:—
“it must be held that Smt. Janki had a right to the extent of ½ share in the Khata and that she was fully entitled to dispose it of in the manner she deemed fit.”
11. This observation appears to have been overlooked by the Joint Director. It was necessary for him to consider the submission ot the petitioners as to whether the Assistant Director had jurisdiction to give a finding on the question. On this ground the petitioners are entitled to relief. An objection was raised by the respondents to the effect that a single writ petition was not maintainable by the petitioners inasmuch as two Khatas were involved. It appears, however, that the applications and objections in respect of the two Khatas were treated by the Consolidation Officer as one case and the appeals, which followed, arose out of the order passed in that case. The preliminary objection is, therefore, rejected.
12. The petition is allowed in part. The order of the Joint Director is quashed to the extent that he declined to entertain the submission of the petitioners as to the validity of the finding of the Assistant Director that Shrimati Janki had a half share in the two Khatas. The Joint Director will reconsider afresh the revision application to that extent and dispose it of in accordance with law. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.