The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mukherjea, J.:— This appeal is directed against an order of Gentle, J., dated June 17, 1946, made in an application presented by the Governor-General in Council, who is the Respondent before us, under sec. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.
2. The facts material for our present purposes lie within a short compass and may be stated as follows:—
There was a contract between the Respondent Company and the Industries and Supplies Department of the Government of India for the supply, by the former to the latter, of 50,000 felling axes complete with handles, at a price of Rs. 4-8 for the first 10,000 and cost plus 10 per cent, profit, with a ceiling price of Rs. 4-8 for the remaining 40,000. The tender of the Company was accepted by the Government on December 9, 1942, and it was agreed by and between the parties that the terms and conditions of the contract would be the same as are contained in Directorate Form No. “Con. 19.” Paragraph 13 of this contract provides for inspection and rejection of the stores supplied by the contractor. Sub-paragraph (iii), cl. (b) of this paragraph empowers the Inspector to reject any stores submitted as not being in accordance with the particulars. Under sub-paragraph (iv), cl. (d) the Inspector's decision as regards rejection is to be treated as final and binding on the parties. Paragraph 20 of the agreement contains the arbitration clause which runs as follows:—
“In the event of any question or dispute arising under these conditions or any special conditions of contract or in connection with this contract (except as to any matters the decision of which is specially provided for by these conditions) the same shall be referred to the, award of an Arbitrator to be nominated by the Director and an arbitrator to be nominated by the contractor.,.”
3. The Company, it is admitted, supplied to the Department a total of 16441 axes by March 31, 1945. A further consignment of 20,542 axes was tendered for delivery in October, 1945. It was, however, not accepted by the Department as the Inspector rejected these axes on the ground that they had not been properly heat-treated. On December 8, 1945, the Company wrote a letter to the Chief Controller of Purchase claiming Rs. 1,67,505 as compensation for the 20,000 and odd axes which were rejected by the Supplies Department and demanded that their claim be referred to arbitration, nominating Rai Bahadur Suraj-narain as their arbitrator. On January 11, 1946, the Chief Controller of Purchase wrote to the Company stating inter alia that the stores were not of a merchantable quality and were not properly heated in accordance with the requirements of the Inspectorate, and as the Inspector's decision in these matters was final the question could not be referred to arbitration at all. It is stated by the Government that the Company ignored this letter altogether and purported to proceed with the arbitration before Rai Bahadur Surajnarain acting as the sole arbitrator and raised their demand to Rs. 1,84,817. On March 14, 1946, the Supplies Department sent a cable message to Rai Bahadur Surajnarain requesting him not to proceed with the arbitration and on March 30, 1946, the present application was filed under sec. 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act. The prayers in the petition inter alia are that the true scope and effect of the arbitration clause contained in the contract between the parties might be determined and that on a proper construction of the said agreement it might be declared that the rejection of the supplies by the Inspectorate being final, the arbitrator or arbitrators have no jurisdiction to decide the scope and validity of such rejection or to adjudicate upon any claim or demand in respect thereof.
4. Gentle, J., by his order dated June 17, 1946, has substantially accepted the contention of the Petitioner and has decided that in the events which happened, the arbitration clause does not come into operation at all and that the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed thereunder have no jurisdiction to decide the propriety or otherwise of the decision of the Inspector, or to adjudicate upon any claim or demand in reference thereto. It is against this order that the present appeal has teen taken.
5. Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the Respondent has raised a preliminary objection challenging the competency of this appeal. His contentions are of a twofold character. It has been argued in the first place that the appeal is barred under sec. 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, and even if the order appealed against is a judgment within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, the Letters Patent must be taken subject to the Arbitration Act which is a piece of legislation passed by the Central Government.
6. In the second place it has been argued that even if sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act does not prevent the appeal, there is no appeal even under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent inasmuch as the order which has been challenged was not made pursuant to sec. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. Now so far as the first point is concerned the language of sec. 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act seems to us to be perfectly clear. It allows appeals from certain orders which are specified in the section and expressly provides that no other order made in the Act would be appealable.
7. It is conceded by Mr. Sinha, who appeared for the Appellants, that the order in the present case, being one under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act, is not appealable under sec. 39 of the Act. Mr. Sinha contends, however, that the right of appeal against the judgment of a single Judge in this Court exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction as is given by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, has not been taken away by sec. 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act. It is true, he says, that the provisions of the Letters Patent are subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Assembly, but it is argued that to take away the right of appeal given by the Letters Patent some more express words than those actually used in sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act are necessary. The right created by the Letters Patent cannot be taken away by mere implication. As an authority for the proposition Mr. Sinha placed considerable reliance upon the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia(1), where it was held that the provision of sec. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, which was worded almost in the same manner as sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, did not prevent an appeal to the High Court from an order of a Judge of that Court sitting singly under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.
8. Now in the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, sec. 588 was worded as follows:—
“An appeal shall lie from the following orders under this Code and from no other such orders”
9. The clauses that follow set out the different orders against which an appeal would lie. In Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia the dispute arose out of a proceeding to enforce an order of the Privy Council under sec. 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. What happened in that case are, that two ladies named Kali Sundari and Chundermoni filed a suit against one Hurrish Chunder in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Mymensingh for recovery of possession of a certain taluk on declaration of their title under a Will executed by one Kassiswari. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal to this Court the judgment was reversed and the suit was dismissed. There was an appeal then taken to the Judicial Committee and the Judicial Committee set aside the judgment of this Court and restored that of the Subordinate Judge. After the decision of the Judicial Committee, it appears, that Hurrish Chunder, the Defendant, purchased the interest of one of the Plaintiffs, namely, Chundermoni, from her heirs, and Kali Sundari alone made an application to a single Judge of this Court in charge of the Privy Council Department for an order under sec. 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The prayer was that the order in Council might be transmitted to the Mymensingh Court for execution. Pontifex, J., who heard the application rejected the prayer on the ground that the decree could not be executed by one of the decree-holders where the other decree-holder did not join in the application. An appeal was taken against this order to the Appellate Bench of this Court and the appeal was heard by Garth, C.J, along with White and Mitter, JJ. Garth, C.J, was of opinion that the duties of a Judge in charge of the Privy Council department were really of a ministerial character and there was no appeal against the order of Pontifex, J. The other two learned Judges held otherwise and it was held that the order was a judicial order which could be challenged by way of appeal and that on the merits the decision of Pontifex, J., was wrong. Against this decision an appeal was taken to the Judicial Committee and the Judicial Committee affirmed the majority judgment of this Court. One of the questions raised before the Judicial Committee was the competency of the appeal against the order of the single Judge, in view of the provision of sec. 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This point was disposed of by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in favour of the decree-holder in the following words:
“It only remains to observe that their Lordships do not think that sec. 588 of Act X of 1877, which has the effect of restricting certain appeals, applies to such a case as this, where the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to the full Court.”
10. On the strength of this decision it has been held by the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay that sec. 588 of the old Code of Civil Procedure did not take away the right of appeal given by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. (Vide Toolsee Money Dassee v. Sudevi Dassee(2), Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti(3) The Secretary of State of India in Council v. Jehangir Maneckji Cursetji(4). The Allahabad High Court held on the other hand, that no such general proposition could be spelt out of the judgment of the Judicial Committee and the pronouncement could be taken as an authority only for what it actually decided [Muhammad Naim-Ul-Lah Khan…(Defendant); v. Ihsan-Ul-Lah Khan…(Plaintiff).*(6)]. The Legislature has removed this conflict by enacting in sec. 104 of the present Code of Civil Procedure (which corresponds to sec. 588 of the old Code) that the right of appeal provided by any other law for the time being in force would not in any way be affected by this section. We are bound to hold that the Privy Council decision referred to above is an authority for the proposition that cl. 15 of the Letters Patent was not in any way controlled by sec. 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood in 1882. This decision, however, is not a direct authority on the present question, and we must be satisfied that the reasons for which it was held by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that see. 588 was not restricted in any way by cl. 15 of the Letters Patent would apply to sec. 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act also. The difficulty is created by the fact that the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee on this particular point is of a summary character and no reasons in the proper sense of the word have at all been given. We are certainly not permitted to say, as was said by some of the Judges of the Allahabad and Madras High Courts, that in Hurrish Chunder's case the order of Pontifex, J., being one which could come under sec. 244 of the then Code of Civil Procedure, could be challenged by way of appeal as if it were a decree [Vide per Edge, C.J, in Banno Bibi v. Mehdi Husain, per Benson, J., in Vasudeva Upadyaya v. Visvaraja Thirthasami(7)]. This is not what was said by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee or by the learned Judges who decided the appeal in this Court. It is not permissible for us to say also that sec. 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 did not contemplate an order at all, but a mere direction which would not come within the purview of sec. 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure. From the language used by the Judicial Committee, it seems clear to us that the reason why sec. 588 of the Code of Civil Procedure was hell by their Lordships not to be applicable to an appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent is that under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent the appeal is from one of the Judges of the Court to a Full Court. This obviously means, if it means anything, that there is a vital difference between an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and one under the Letters Patent. A Judge exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court is not subordinate to the High Court. He is the High Court himself, whereas the Code of Civil Procedure deals with appeals from an inferior Court to a Superior Court and not with appeals from one Judge of the Court to other Judges of the same Court. If that be the ratio decidendi upon which the decision in Hurrish Chunder's case rested, the same principle can not in our opinion be made applicable in the present case. The Arbitration Act is a consolidating and amending Act which is self-contained in its character and save what is reserved in sec. 47 of the Act, the entire law and procedure relating to arbitration in British India are contained in it. Sec. 47 of the Arbitration Act, it is pointed out to us, could only refer to the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act of 1937 which is more or less an international statute and has no connection whatsoever with arbitration proceedings between private citizens. The Act applies equally to Mufassal districts and Presidency towns and the appeals contemplated by sec. 39 can not be limited to appeals under the Civil Procedure Code where the appeal is from one inferior Court to another, but must extend to all appeals under whatever law they might have been entertained provided the order appealed against is one made under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. The language, in our opinion is perfectly explicit and it forbids appeals from all orders except those enumerated in the section.
11. The whole question it seems hinges upon the construction of the language used by the legislature and if, as we think, the language of sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act is wide enough to include a Letters Patent Appeal, we are bound to hold that clause 44 of the Letters Patent is attracted to the present case and the right of appeal given under cl. 15 has been taken away.
12. Another ground seems to have been put forward in some of the later decisions of some of the High Courts in India wherein the principle enunciated in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia was attempted to be supported (Vide Sabhapathi Chetti v. Narayanasami Chetti. The reason is that special provisions will control general provisions “Generalia Specialibus non derogant”. It is certainly a well accepted cannon of interpretation that “when the legislature has given its attention to a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly” (Vide Craies on Statute Law, 3rd Ed. p. 317). It is perfectly true that the Code of Civil Procedure is a general law vis-a-vis the Letters Patent and the special provisions contained in the Letters Patent could not be deemed to have been overridden by the Code of Civil Procedure, unless there were clear words to that effect in the Code. But vis-a-vis the Letters Patent, the Arbitration Act is certainly a special Act. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent gives a general right of appeal against all judgments of a single Judge on the Original Side exercising Civil Jurisdiction.
13. The Arbitration Act deals with one particular subject, namely, arbitration and the general right of appeal given in cl. 15 is curtailed by the special provisions of sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, which restricts the right of appeal only to the cases specified in the section itself. We do not think, therefore, that this principle upon which reliance has been placed would he of any assistance to the Appellants in this case.
14. Mr. Sinha has placed considerable reliance upon a decision of this Court which is to be found reported in Mathura Sundari Dasi v. Hiran Chandra Saha(8). There the question arose as to whether an appeal would lie to the High Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction from an order made by a Judge sitting singly on the Original Side, dismissing an application for rehearing of a suit which had been dismissed for default under Or. 9, r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question was answered in the affirmative by a Bench of three Judges who heard the appeal. Sanderson, C.J, was doubtful as to whether the order appealed against was a judgment at all but in his opinion an appeal would lie under Or. 43, r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure even though the order was one made by a single Judge sitting on the Original Side. Woodroffe, J., was of opinion that the order appealed against was a judgment and in his opinion the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure has provided for an appeal in a case like this would prima facie be an indication that the order would rank as a judgment under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. Mukherjee, J., held that the order was a judgment and an appeal would lie both under the Letters Patent as well as under Or. 43, r. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion upon this decision. The utmost that can be said about this case is that it decided that an appeal would lie from a single Judge of the High Court exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction not only under the provisions of the Letters Patent, but under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as well. The question may have to be considered by some larger Bench at a future time as to how far the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to appeals from judgments of Judges sitting singly on the Original Side. For our present purposes it is not necessary to express any opinion upon that point at all.
15. Our conclusion, therefore, is that sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act is sufficiently explicit to include an appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent as well and as the provisions of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent have to be taken subject to the Legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council we must hold that to this extent the right of appeal has been curtailed and modified.
16. It may be mentioned here that the view we are taking receives entire support from the pronouncements of the Madras and Bombay High Courts [Vide Penu-gouda Radhakrishna Murthy v. V.A.Y Ethirajulu Chetty(9) and Ranchhoddas Purushottam & Co. v. Ratanji Virpal & Co.(10)]. The concluding portion of the judgment of Leach, C.J, in the Madras High Court case runs as follows:—
“It is true that cl. 15, Letters Patent, if it stood alone, would allow the appeal; but cl. 44, Letters Patent, says that the provisions are subject inter alia to the Legislative powers of the Governor-General in Legislative Council. The Indian Arbitration Act is an Act of the Central Legislature and the provisions of sec. 39 must prevail.”
17. It is needless to say that we are in entire agreement with the view taken by the learned Chief Justice.
18. Having regard to the view we have taken it is not necessary to consider the second point raised by Mr. Chatterji in support of his, preliminary objection.
19. The result is that the preliminary point succeeds and the appeal is dismissed with costs.
20. Certified for two Counsel.
Harries, C.J:— I agree.
Solicitors: P.D Himatsinka & Co. for the Appellants, S.K Mondal for the Respondent.
S.C.S